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This thesis is an examination of the attitudes of the British political elite 
towards the Soviet Union and an assessment of the influence such attitudes had 
upon British foreign policy between May 1937 - August 1939. The British 
political elite in this thesis include members of the Cabinet, Foreign Policy 
Committee, and Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Office officials, ambassadors and 
diplomats, and those members of the Conservative party and opposition 
elsewhere referred to as the `anti-appeasers. ' Using a large number of private 
papers, diaries and memoirs, as well as official government and Foreign Office 
records, the thesis provides a uniquely detailed and critical analysis of 
individuals. The views of the Soviet Union and of Anglo-Soviet collaboration 
amongst Foreign Office officials and the anti-appeasers especially have not 
before been examined in such depth. Nor have the views of the different groups 
within the British political elite been comparatively examined in one work. 
In terms of the existing literary debate concerning this area of history, the thesis 
belongs to the counter-revisionist school of thought. Thus, it does not accept 
that politicians were constrained by factors outside of their control and instead 
suggests that there existed an alternative to the policy of appeasement pursued 
by Neville Chamberlain, namely an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. Not only does 
this thesis contend that there should have been an Anglo-French-Soviet 
alliance, but, more importantly, it contributes to existing literature by revealing 
how an alliance could have been, and so nearly was, concluded. Attitudes 
towards the Soviet Union were not simplistic and the thesis emphasises the 
complexities of attitudes that existed. Ultimately, however, it reveals that 
Britain's loss of a Soviet ally was due to the unwillingness of certain ministers to 
put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices during the foreign policy decision making 
process. 
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Introduction 
Mr Chamberlain on receipt of the Russian offer [of a 
triple alliance ] had replied: "Yes. Let us three bond together 
and break Hitler's neck", or words to that effect, Parliament 
would have approved, Stalin would have understood, and 
history might have taken a different course. " 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1939, British, French and Soviet 
representatives negotiated to conclude some form of agreement regarding the 
resistance to future German aggression. The result, however, was the 
announcement of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact on 23 August. When 
Britain finally declared war on 3 September, it did so without a Soviet ally. The 
British government had failed to secure the assistance of a country that would 
eventually help to decide the outcome of the war. Moreover it had failed because 
of the unwillingness of certain ministers to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices 
during the foreign policy decision making process. This contention is 
substantiated in the following thesis by an examination of the attitudes of the 
British political elite towards the Soviet Union during the period of Neville 
Chamberlain's premiership, and an assessment of the influence such attitudes 
had upon British foreign policy. 
Much has been written about appeasement policy, the Chamberlain government 
and the path to war. ' Three schools of thought have emerged from the literature 
published to date. First, the `orthodox' school of thought, which dominated 
opinion immediately after the Second World War. Authors of this school 
1 Winston S. Churchill, Second World War, Vol. I., (London, 1948), p. 285. 
2 For two concise historiographies of the literature upon this subject see, Michael Jabara Carley, 
1939 - The Alliance that never was and the coming of World War ll, (Chicago, 1999), pp. xiii - 
xix; D. Cameron Watt, `Appeasement: The Rise of the Revisionist School', Political Quarterly, 
Vol. XXXVI, (1965), pp. 193-7, pp. 208-12. 
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criticise appeasement policy and the `guilty men' of the British government for 
their obstinate support of appeasement. ' Neville Chamberlain, in particular, is 
portrayed as a man determined to appease Hitler and Mussolini. The reasons 
given for his dedication to appeasement include an ignorance of foreign affairs, 
pacifism and self confidence. Several historians argue that appeasement policy 
reflected the pro-Fascist, anti-Communist ideology of the decision makers. ' Not 
all authors agree that two such distinct groups, namely pro-Hitler, anti-Soviet 
appeasers on the one hand, and anti-Hitler, pro-Soviet anti appeasers on the 
other, existed. ' It is argued by most, however, that war could have been avoided 
if Hitler had been stopped. 
The second school of thought, the `revisionist' school of thought, has emerged 
since the 196os. Authors of this school emphasise what could be termed as the 
`structural constraints' that faced Chamberlain and his government at the time, 
and thereby largely defend the policies pursued by London. ' Such constraints 
include the disparity between Britain's will power and its military and economic 
strength, the pro-appeasement demands of the dominion governments, the 
strategical concerns raised by Polish and Rumanian opposition to Soviet access 
through their territory, as well as the simultaneous threat of three aggressor 
states, namely, Germany, Italy and Japan. Furthermore, revisionist literature 
challenges the image of Neville Chamberlain as being pro-German and ignorant 
of foreign affairs. Instead Chamberlain is depicted as a man not afraid of 
For example, 'Cato', Guilty Men, (London, 1940); Lewis B. Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, 1938- 
1939, (London, 1948). 
Examples include: Keith Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion: The British Government and 
Germany, 1937-1939, (London, 1972); A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, 
(London 1961); Neville Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers: Conservative Opposition to 
Appeasement in the 1930s, (Oxford, 1971). 
5 Robert Manne, 'The Foreign Office and the Failure of Anglo-Soviet Rapprochement', Journal 
of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, (1981), pp. 725-755. 
6 See, for example, the recent works of John Charmley: John Charmley, Chamberlain and the 
Lost Peace, (London, 1989); Ibid, Churchill: The End of Glory, (Toronto, 1993). 
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conflict, but determined to avoid war. ' 
More recently, the third school of thought, the `counter revisionists', have 
emerged. R. A. C Parker and Michael Jabara Carley are the main proponents of 
this school. ' These authors return to earlier interpretations of the path to war. 
They criticise appeasement policy and the appeasers. They reject the contention 
that policy makers were constrained by factors outside of their control. Indeed, 
they point out the alternatives that existed, most importantly, the option of an 
Anglo-French-Soviet alliance, and argue, as contemporaries did, that such 
alternatives should have been explored. It is within this school of thought that 
this thesis belongs. To some extent, it, too, returns to the arguments of 
contemporaries. The underlying contention of the thesis is that an Anglo- 
French-Soviet alliance could, and should, have been concluded. What does the 
thesis add to the existing counter revisionist literature? This shall be discussed 
below. First, it is important to discuss exactly who this thesis focuses upon. 
Who are the British political elite? In this thesis they include members of the 
Cabinet, Foreign Policy Committee and Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Office officials, 
ambassadors and diplomats, and those members of the opposition and 
Conservative party collectively known as the `anti-appeasers. ' Members of the 
Cabinet and the Foreign Policy Committee are clearly recorded in official 
papers. Where relevant, individuals outside the Cabinet, Foreign Policy 
Committee and Chiefs of Staff, will be included in the chapters focusing upon 
these bodies because of their influence upon the decision makers. Sir Nevile 
Several texts which highlight the influence of structural constraints upon British foreign policy 
are footnoted in D. Cameron Watt, 'Appeasement', pp. 208-212. More recent examples include; 
G. C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939, (Edinburgh, 1979); B. Bond, 
Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, (Oxford, 1980), pp. 279-80; Michael Graham Fry, 
'Agents and Structures: the Dominions and the Czechoslovak Crisis, September 1938', 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. X, (1999). 
8 Carley, The Alliance ; R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the 
Coming of the Second World War, (London, 1993). 
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Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, is one example. Chapters three 
and seven look at the attitudes of the British ambassador, military attaches and 
officials in the Moscow embassy, as well as the views of the heads of department 
and junior Foreign Office officials within Whitehall. The Northern Department 
is afforded greatest attention because of its focus upon the Soviet Union. The 
opinions of several diplomats in Europe, such as Sir Eric Phipps, the British 
ambassador in Paris, are also included. The `anti-appeasers' are a more difficult 
group to define. Most of those named in chapters four and eight have been 
collectively referred to elsewhere in literature as the 'anti- appeasers. " 
Throughout the 1930s, their names were associated with various political 
factions and groups. Namely, the `Old Guard', which included Churchill and 
four or five of his loyal supporters, such as Robert Boothby, and another group 
known as the `Glamour Boys', headed by Anthony Eden. This group totalled 
approximately thirty members by the time of Munich, including Harold 
Macmillan, Leopold Amery, Harold Nicolson, and General Spears. ` The 
membership of each group was fluid and, in some cases, individuals appear to 
have been considered a member of both. " Indeed, though two distinct groups 
existed, members from each maintained regular contact and on several 
occasions collaborated with regard to protesting against government foreign 
policy, especially concerning the Soviet Union. Thus, in mailing addresses for 
memoranda and in recollections of meetings, the same names from both 
groups, and all political parties, repeatedly appeared together. In this sense, 
they were a cohesive body of politicians. 
Thompson, Anti Appeasers, pp. 167-168. 
1° Max Egremont, Under Two Flags. The Life of Major General Sir Edward Spears, (London, 
1997), pp. 127-8; pp. 134-5, p. 139; Harold Macmillan, Winds of Change 1914 - 1939, (London 
1966), pp. 548-9. 
" Egremont notes that Spears' papers show Boothby to be a member of 'Group', see, 
Egremont, Spears, pp. 127-8; pp. 134-5. But in Macmillan's memoirs, Boothby is listed as one 
of Churchill's followers, See, Macmillan, Winds of Change, pp. 548-9. 
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Not all individuals from each sector of the British political elite are included in 
this thesis. Nor is the depth of analysis of each individual's attitudes equal. 
Several factors determined those focused upon and the amount of attention 
they received. For members of the Cabinet and Foreign Policy Committee 
especially, but also other sectors of the British political elite, the influence and 
prominence of individuals in political life affected the extent to which their 
views were initially researched. More importantly, however, only those that held 
and expressed an opinion about the Soviet Union are included. Amongst the 
anti-appeasers, only those that expressed support for Anglo-Soviet 
collaboration at some point during Chamberlain's premiership are looked at. 
Such politicians were deliberately chosen because it enables an examination of 
the reasons behind the support that existed for closer Anglo-Soviet relations 
amongst the British political elite. The findings can then be compared to, and 
used to explain, the attitudes of those who did not support collaboration with 
Moscow. The degree to which politicians and officials expressed their opinions 
determines the depth of analysis possible. Winston Churchill, Neville 
Chamberlain and Hugh Dalton, for example, repeatedly outlined their beliefs, 
and sometimes in great detail, in private papers, the House of Commons, 
official meetings and memoirs. In contrast, several individuals whom the reader 
might expect to be included or looked at in more detail in a thesis on this period 
are only briefly mentioned, or not mentioned at all, because of the paucity of 
material upon their attitudes. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Simon, 
the Secretary of State for Dominions, Malcolm MacDonald and the leader of 
the Labour party, Clement Attlee are some examples. Explanations for their 
relative silence can be given. Clement Attlee, for example, suffered from flu in 
1939 and this affected his attendance in parliament. " In the cases of Simon and 
MacDonald, the lack of information regarding their opinion reflects the 
12 Hugh Dalton explains Attlee's absence from parliament in terms of his illness in his diary. See 
Diary 1939 1/20. Dalton Papers. London School of Economics Archives. 
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weeding of their private papers. 
For several individuals involved in the foreign policy decision making process, 
or in close liaison with the decision makers, weeding of their papers has also 
occurred. One such example is Richard Austin Butler, the Parliamentary Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Whether such weeding has had any 
significant effect upon the portrayal of individuals in this thesis is difficult to 
say, but as the collections of Churchill, Chamberlain and Dalton show, it was in 
private letters and diaries that individuals revealed their most personal, and 
more honest, feelings about subjects such as the Soviet Union and Anglo-Soviet 
collaboration. Another obstacle regarding the sources relevant for this subject 
is gaining access to private papers. At the time of researching this thesis, for 
example, the private papers of Leopold Amery were closed to all researchers. 
However, detailed memoirs as well as comments upon his views by other 
members of the British political elite has enabled a sufficient analysis. Indeed, 
despite the problems that exist concerning certain sources, there does exist a 
wealth of information upon which one can gain an accurate insight into the 
attitudes of the British political elite and the influence of such attitudes upon 
foreign policy decisions. 
Using such information, this thesis establishes that alleged structural 
constraints and concerns about Soviet military weakness did not force the 
British government to adopt the policy it did towards the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, though this thesis is not an examination of An glo-French- Soviet 
relations, its brief examination of the attitudes and decisions of the French and 
Soviet governments shows that their responsibility for the failure to conclude an 
Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was not as great as that of the British government. 
To explain the failure to conclude an alliance, one has to look at the foreign 
policy decision making process in London and the attitudes of the British 
10 
political elite. This thesis differs from other works in the `counter revisionist' 
school of thought, however, in several ways. Thus, it provides a uniquely 
detailed, critical analysis of the opinions and decisions of a wide variety of 
individuals. Views of the Soviet Union and of Anglo-Soviet collaboration 
amongst the anti-appeasers and members of the Foreign Office, especially, have 
not before been examined in such depth. Nor have the views of the different 
groups within the British political elite been comparatively examined in one 
work 
Moreover, this thesis makes a distinction between opinions of the Soviet Union 
and of Anglo-Soviet collaboration. It compares the two beliefs and assesses the 
relationship between them. It then discusses the influence of such beliefs upon 
foreign policy during this period. What it reveals is a complexity of attitudes 
towards Anglo- Soviet collaboration, despite the almost identical opinions of the 
Soviet Union held by the various groups and political parties. 
This thesis does not return entirely to the views of the `orthodox' school of 
thought, as other `counter revisionist' historians allegedly have. ' It reveals the 
differences of opinion amongst those that supported Anglo-Soviet collaboration 
in the Foreign Office and amongst the `anti-appeasers'. Underlining the 
hesitancy amongst them and the psychological struggle several endured to voice 
their support for closer Anglo-Soviet relations. It acknowledges the support 
that existed for Chamberlain's policy towards the Soviet Union, and the reasons 
for it. Moreover, the thesis does not criticise the British government and its 
ministers equally. Nearly all members of the Cabinet and Foreign Policy 
Committee are criticised. Despite the hesitancy and contradictory remarks of 
several anti-appeasers, those looked at in this thesis argued that British 
ministers could, and should, put aside anti-Soviet prejudices. Indeed, they were 
13 Carley, The Alliance p. xvii. 
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willing and able to put aside their own prejudices against the Soviet Union. 
Cabinet ministers and members of the Foreign Policy Committee, in contrast, 
refused for too long to overlook their distrust and hostility completely. 
This unwillingness, by most, to overlook completely their anti-Soviet prejudices 
throughout Chamberlain's premiership meant that all ministers ultimately bore 
some responsibility for Britain's failure to secure a Soviet ally. However, this 
thesis does not label them `villains' or `cowards'. Nor does it refer to `moral 
depravity. "' Rather it reveals the real effort made by several ministers and 
officials to overlook what one could argue was an almost inherent ideological 
distrust and hostility towards the Soviet government. Despite the criticism of 
ministers by many within the `orthodox' and `counter revisionist' school of 
thought, the majority of ministers in fact twice succeeded in putting aside their 
suspicion. On both occasions, Neville Chamberlain undermined the opportunity 
to conclude an agreement with the Soviets. Indeed, this thesis emphasises the 
dishonest and destructive role of Chamberlain, especially, in Britain's failure to 
conclude an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. 
This thesis argues, as contemporaries did, that an alternative existed to the 
policy of appeasement, namely, an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance, and that the 
key to securing such an alliance was for British ministers to put aside their anti- 
Soviet prejudices when deciding foreign policy. What it also shows, however, is 
the struggle and success of most ministers in putting aside their ideological 
suspicion and how close they came to concluding an alliance. Indeed, it reveals, 
that had it not been for Neville Chamberlain, an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance 
would have been concluded in May 1939. 
" Ibid., p. xiii. 
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Chapter One: 
Attitudes of the British Cabinet, Foreign Policy Committee and 
Chiefs of Staff towards the Soviet Union, May 1937 - August 1938. 
On 28 May, 1937, Neville Chamberlain replaced Stanley Baldwin as Prime 
Minister of Great Britain. Anglo-Soviet relations were not foremost on his 
foreign policy agenda. Indeed, throughout 1937, the only diplomatic contact 
maintained with the Soviet government concerned its role in the Spanish civil 
war. Furthermore, during the first eight months of 1938, the British 
government deliberately excluded the Soviet Union from talks held and 
decisions taken regarding the crisis in the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland. The 
aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed examination of the attitudes held 
towards the Soviet Union by members of the Cabinet, Foreign Policy Committee 
and Chiefs of Staff. Also to discuss the various influences upon British foreign 
policy during this period and show that they did not necessarily dictate policy 
towards the Soviet Union. 
The new Prime Minister's first Cabinet consisted of Sir John Simon as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Leslie Hore-Belisha as Secretary of State for War, 
Duff Cooper as First Lord of the Admiralty, and Samuel Hoare as Secretary of 
State for Home Affairs. Anthony Eden remained Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs and was assisted by the Lord President of the Council, Lord Halifax. The 
foreign policy of the new government was two fold; `limited liability' regarding 
Europe and the Far East, and determined appeasement of Germany and Italy. '' 
Thus, in his 1937 report, the Minister for Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas 
15 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled - British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth 
Century, (London and New York, 1991), p. 119; Bond, Military Policy,, pp. 270-71; Brian Bond, 
The Continental Commitment in British Strategy in the 1930s', in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and 
Lothar Kettenacker eds., The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, (London, 
1983), p. 201. 
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Inskip, laid down Britain's new strategic priorities: First, to protect the British 
isles, Second, to protect the trading routes that led to Britain, third, to safeguard 
the British empire, and fourth, to assist allies, but only in the last resort. i6 
Consequently, the British government took no significant action regarding 
Japan's renewed war against China and maintained a policy of non-intervention 
concerning the escalating Spanish civil war. 
The Spanish civil war had begun in July 1936 following the failed attempt at a 
coup d'etat by the Nationalists, led by General Franco, against the elected 
Popular Front government. The British and French governments had declared 
a policy of non-intervention in August 1936, establishing the Non-Intervention 
Committee [NIC] a month later. Both political and strategical considerations 
determined the policy. The Chiefs of Staff, warned that Britain needed to ensure 
good relations with whichever side were eventually victorious in Spain. For 
those that perceived the Spanish Popular government to be a bastion of 
Communism, the policy appeared to protect the French government from 
Communist infiltration. Subscribing to non-interventionism was thought to 
create a veneer of neutrality that would at least quieten the left wing politicians 
in parliament, moreover it was hoped that not intervening would prevent any 
further alienation of Italy or Germany. It was this policy that Chamberlain 
inherited, " and it was primarily in the context of the Spanish Civil War and the 
policy of non-intervention that ministers discussed the Soviet Union during 
1937" 
By the time Chamberlain became Prime Minister in the summer of 1937, the 
16 Adrian Preston, General Staffs and Diplomacy before the Second World War, (London, 1978), 
p. 122; Bond, Military Policy, pp. 257-258; G. Peden, British Rearmament, pp. 138-139. 
17 Jill Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 1936 -1939, (London, 1979), 
pp. 35-36; pp. 60-61; p. 153. 
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policy of non-intervention was, in any practical sense, a failure. " The British 
government had never had any authority to enforce non-intervention. The 
Germans and Italians intervened almost immediately after the outbreak of war 
and despite their declarations of allegiance to a policy of non-intervention, 
continued to send aid and men in support of Franco's Nationalists throughout. 
The Soviets, in response, also broke their declarations of non-intervention in 
October and sent aid and men in support of the Republicans. ' Throughout the 
Spanish Civil War, the Soviet government, along with the German and Italian 
governments, was invited to participate in the Non Intervention Committee. 
Disagreements frequently occurred, however. Moreover, the Soviets complained 
that the British showed unfair leniency towards the Italians and Germans. 
Viscount Chilston, the British ambassador in Moscow, explained the views of 
the Kremlin. The complaint, he wrote, `is that we have been weak with Hitler, 
Mussolini and the Japs, and let them do what they like in Manchuria, Abyssinia, 
Spain and China. '2O Indeed, the Soviets did not think it impossible that the 
British government would conclude a four power pact with the Germans, 
Italians and French, at the exclusion of the Soviet Union. ' 
Moscow's accusations and suspicions were justified. Complaints by Soviet 
representatives about German and Italian intervention, especially at the 
beginning of the conflict, were ignored. In 1936, the Foreign Secretary could not 
promise that a settlement would not be made with the Italian and German 
governments. Furthermore, British naval policy, though not actively aiding 
Franco, undermined the position of the Republicans by failing to retaliate 
18 Ibid, p. 60. 
19 Ibid, p. 136; For more details on the Spanish civil war and the contributions made by the 
Germans, Italians and Soviets see; Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, third ed., (London, 
1966); G. Stone, 'The European Great Powers and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939', in R. 
Boyce and E. Robertson eds., Paths to War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World 
War, (New York, 1989), pp. 199-232. 
2° Telegram to Chilston. 27 Oct, 1937; Chilston to Eden. 29 Oct, 1937. FO 371/ 21347. 
21 Seventh meeting of NIC. FO 849/1. Cited in Edwards, The British Government, pp. 47-8 
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against Nationalist aggression. The Soviet government was not exempt from 
criticism. But the Germans and Italians had intervened first and War Office 
reports concluded, even by the autumn of 1937, that there remained no 
evidence to `show that there are other governments more to blame than those of 
Germany and Italy. ' An attempt to take action against the illegal tactics of the 
Italians and Germans was made at the Nyon Conference, on 14 September 1937" 
Decisions were made regarding the measures to be taken to protect threatened 
shipping in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. The Nyon conference, however, 
was to be the last attempt at curbing the illegitimate actions of the Germans and 
Italians. ' During the autumn of 1937, Eden worked hard to ensure the 
continued inclusion of the Soviet Union in a settlement of the Spanish crisis. 
He warned Moscow against playing into the hands of the Germans and 
Italians' Such effort to ensure cooperation between the Soviets and the West 
ended, however, with Eden's resignation on 19 February, 1938, as did any form 
of resistance against Germany and Italy by the British government. 
Since becoming Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain had never desired to 
improve relations with the Soviet Union. His primary aim in 1937 and 
throughout the duration of the Spanish Civil war until its end in April 1939, was 
to settle issues with the Italian government and appease Berlin. He wanted 
volunteers withdrawn from Spain, a Franco victory, and an end to the war he 
perceived to be a major obstacle to improved Anglo-Italian and Anglo-German 
relations. ' During the following sixteen months, the British government still 
22War Office note on the supply of arms to Spain, 23 Nov, 1936. FO 371/ 20586. Cited Ibid, p. 
135; pp. 47-48; pp. 130-1. 
23 Ibid, pp. 117 - 127. 
24 Eden to Chilston, 27 Oct, 1937. no. 271; Eden to Chilston, 18 Oct, 1937. no. 252. D. B. F. P., 2, 
XIX. 
25 A few political notes on foreign agreements re our duties. NC 2/25. Cited in Edwards, The 
British Government, p. 129. 
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had to deal with the issues of withdrawing "volunteers"' from Spain, and legal 
recognition of the rebels. But Nationalist control grew during this period. The 
problems of the Spanish Civil War were no longer of major concern to the 
Cabinet. Instead, by early 1938, foreign policy discussions became dominated 
by the growing crisis in the Sudetenland. 
Internal weaknesses had existed within Czechoslovakia since its creation in 
1919. The Czech population were deeply divided between those that supported 
the existing order, Slovaks demanding autonomy, and those who felt affiliation 
either with Hungary or Poland. In addition and most problematic were the 
three and a quarter million Germans living in the Sudetenland area of 
Czechoslovakia. ' Throughout the summer of 1937, the complaints of the 
Sudeten Germans against alleged wrongs had increased. z8 But at the beginning 
of 1938, nationalist feeling amongst the Sudeten Germans was provoked even 
further by the absorption of Austria by Hitler in March. ' 
The Anschluss, earlier forbidden by the treaties of Versailles and St Germain, 
took place on 13 March, 1938 when German troops marched into Austria and 
Austrian independence disappeared. The event did not cause much reaction 
within Britain. By most it was perceived to be an inevitable occurrence. The 
British Prime Minister only weakly criticised the step. 3° In contrast, the Soviet 
government was alarmed by Hitler's actions. In particular, Moscow feared 
Hitler's next target would be Czechoslovakia. Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, told Viscount Chilston that `he was sure that 
Herr Hitler having now annexed Austria was not going to stop there and would 
21 "Volunteers" was a term used to describe those fro Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union who 
went to fight in the Spanish civil war. 
27 Christopher Thorne, The Approach of War 1938-1939, (London, 1967), pp. 54 - 55. 
28 Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, (Sutton, 1984), pp. 462-3. 
21 Newton to Halifax. 22 Mar, 1938. no. 97. D. B. F. P., 3, I. 
I Thorne, Approach of War, pp. 35, p. 39, p. 49. 
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soon proceed to deal with Czechoslovakia. ' Any German ambitions regarding 
Czechoslovakia were directly relevant and of great importance to the Soviet 
government, who had previously signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the 
Czechoslovakian government in 1935. Thus, Moscow took the initiative 
regarding future resistance to any such actions. On 17 March, Litvinov proposed 
a conference of all major powers to discuss the potential crisis in the 
Sudetenland. 3` The British government rejected the proposal. The Cabinet had 
already explored the possibility of military collaboration with regards to the 
crisis. The Chiefs of Staff were instructed to advise on 
... (a) the British government giving a contingent guarantee to France to 
protect her is she were attacked as a consequence of her going to support 
Czechoslovakia, and (b) a Grand Alliance, involving Britain, France, and 
Russia, based on the League of Nations and directed against any and all 
aggression. ` 
But no support for collaboration with the Soviets existed within the Cabinet. 
At the same time as Litvinov had proposed a conference with the French and 
British regarding collaboration against future aggression, the Commissar also 
proposed conversations with the French and Czechoslovakian governments in 
order to discuss and conclude a plan regarding Soviet military assistance in the 
event of an attack upon Czechoslovakia. 35 A report informed the newly 
appointed Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, that `a Russian General and Colonel 
have arrived in Prague and are having general discussions with the General 
Staff. "' Moscow reassured both the French and Czechoslovakian governments 
31 Chilston to Halifax, 16 Mar, 1938. no. 83. D. B. F. P., 3, I. 
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that `they would immediately honour their obligations"', as agreed in the 1935 
treaty. On 28 - 29 April, however, Chamberlain, the French Prime Minister, 
Edouard Daladier, the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet, and Lord 
Halifax met in London. They decided that pressure would be placed on the 
Czechoslovakian President, Edouard Benes, to settle the Sudeten problem with 
the leader of the Sudeten Germans Konrad Heinlein. Not until a week later was 
the Soviet ambassador in Britain, Ivan Maisky, informed about the talks and its 
decisions. " Such action was indicative of the British desire not to include the 
Soviet Union in any settlement of the Sudeten problem. 
During mid-May the threat of war appeared to increase considerably when 
Czech troops were mobilised following rumours that German troops were 
preparing to threaten Czechoslovakian borders on 20-21 May. Georges Bonnet 
announced French assistance if Czechoslovakia was attacked. Halifax warned 
the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, that if Germany was to 
attack Czechoslovakia there could be no assurances that Britain would stand 
aside. ' Whether the French and British governments would have acted against 
Germany is impossible to tell because conflict was ultimately avoided. " Notably, 
the only contact with the Soviet government during the occurrence was a note 
to ask for the avoidance of any `incident which might give the German 
Government an excuse for trying to settle the Czechoslovak question by force... " 
London did pay more attention to the role of the Soviet Union in June. But 
discussions concentrated only on how to reduce the Soviet Union's potential 
37 Ibid. 
38 FO Memorandum - Record of Anglo-French conversation during the visit of French ministers 
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involvement. Thus Cabinet ministers deliberated the possibility of altering the 
Soviet, Czech, and French treaties. The suggestion was to remove 
Czechoslovakia's obligation to assist France or the Soviet Union if either were 
attacked. The French and Soviets would remain obliged to defend 
Czechoslovakia, but a non-aggression pact between Czechoslovakia and 
Germany would be concluded stating that Czech territory could not be used as a 
passage for others. ' 
Would the French government not be aggrieved at the British decision to 
weaken their east European alliance? The French government had signed a 
treaty with the Czechoslovakian government in 1925 pledging to aid 
Czechoslovakia if it was attacked and France itself appeared to be in danger. At 
the beginning of 1938, the French Prime Minister, Leon Blum, and his Foreign 
Minister, Paul Bancour, had reassured the Czechoslovakian government that 
that they would fulfil their treaty obligations. Unfortunately for the Czech 
government, Blum's government fell on lo April. The new Prime Minister, 
Edouard Daladier, distrusted Hitler. He stepped up rearmament and also urged 
the British government to warn the German dictator against aggressive action 
towards Czechoslovakia. Ultimately, however, he did not want to go to war, and 
was not willing to take a stand in defence of the Sudetenland. Hence, French 
foreign policy throughout 1938 came to reflect more the position of the new 
Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet, a fervent supporter of appeasement at 
whatever cost. 3 
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In particular, Bonnet, indeed, many in the French political elite including the 
French General Staff, opposed collaboration with the Soviets. ' Relations 
between the two supposed allies were poor. The French press and politicians 
accused Moscow of interfering in French domestic affairs. The Soviet 
government attacked Paris for what it perceived to be its abandonment of 
French commitments in eastern Europe. Reports of Stalin's purges, now being 
received in great detail both in France and Britain, evoked horror. French 
generals did not want to ally with a country that could offer, as far as they were 
concerned, little effective military assistance. In addition, they were not 
prepared to agree to an alliance at the expense of ties with Poland. A further 
reason, in fact the primary reason for this opposition to collaboration, however, 
was ideological suspicion and hostility. Paris distrusted Soviet intentions. To 
some degree, the devastating effects of the purges, especially on Soviet military 
potential, provided a means by which both the military experts and the 
politicians could disguise the real cause of their opposition to French - Soviet 
collaboration. 45 In September, Eric Phipps, a good friend of Georges Bonnet, 
told Halifax of Bonnet's belief that: 
... Russia's great wish is to provoke a general conflagration in which she 
herself will play but little part, beyond perhaps a little bombing from a 
distance, but after which she will arise like a phoenix, but out of all our 
ashes, and bring about world revolution. ' 
Not everyone in France opposed French - Soviet collaboration, especially 
concerning the Czechoslovakian problem. 47 Robert Coulondre, the French 
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ambassador in Moscow between 1936-1938, for example, worked very hard to 
improve relations and reduce the mistrust that existed in France. 48 But his 
attempts made little difference. Paris did not denounce the Franco-Soviet pact 
that had been signed in 1935 because it represented some security. It was 
thought, for example, to prevent the danger of collaboration between the 
Germans and the Soviets. ' Yet, throughout 1938, one finds numerous examples 
of French politicians and military personnel deliberately misreporting 
information in order to present a Franco-Soviet alliance as potentially 
ineffective. For example, although contact was made with Moscow in May to 
discover Soviet intentions regarding Czechoslovakia, nothing was concluded. 
Instead, Bonnet made it clear that he wanted London to press the 
Czechoslovakian president to make concessions. ' In July, the Czech proposal 
for conversations regarding the coordination of French and Soviet military 
action in support of Czechoslovakia was avoided' Once more Bonnet 
recommended informal dialogue with the Soviet government in August to 
clarify its intentions regarding the defence of Czechoslovakia. Yet, when Bonnet 
repeated the negotiations to Sir Eric Phipps, he deliberately suppressed the 
Soviet offer of staff talks. j2 Furthermore, French military experts continued to 
downplay Soviet military potential during this period' , and the more 
favourable reports, such as that stating possible Soviet air support over 
Rumania, were overlooked. Throughout 1938 and especially regarding the 
Czechoslovakian crisis, then, the French government said much, but actually 
did very little. ' 
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There is the view that French inaction during this period resulted from British 
pressure, that French foreign policy represented a mere appendage of British 
appeasement policy. ' Such an interpretation can be convincingly challenged. 
The evidence clearly reveals that French foreign policy reflected primarily the 
wishes and intentions of those in Paris. The French government made no real 
effort to defend its east European ally during 1938 and was willing to comply 
with Chamberlain's determination to conciliate the aggressors. ' Yet this does 
not mean that the British government can be entirely excused of all 
responsibility for French inaction. London did actively try to influence French 
foreign policy, particularly with regard to the Soviet Union. London repeatedly 
warned the French government that an alliance with the Soviet Union would 
evoke an unfavourable response from certain sectors of the political elite. " The 
French did intend to avoid any military collaboration with the Soviet Union, 
nevertheless, one cannot ignore the steps taken by the British government to 
inform Paris that it did not approve of any western collaboration with the 
Soviets, including French-Soviet cooperation. ' London was determined to 
ensure Soviet exclusion from both British and French foreign policy plans 
regarding the settlement of the Sudeten crisis, and therefore must bear some 
responsibility. 
Throughout the summer of 1938, negotiations between the Czechoslovakian 
government and the Sudeten German party continued. Added to the demands 
of the Sudeten Germans however were now the claims made by the Polish and 
Hungarian governments. Both wanted the return of land and minorities. 
Halifax and Chamberlain decided to send a mediator to Czechoslovakia. 
Chamberlain announced Lord Runciman's (President of Board of Trade during 
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Baldwin's premiership) visit to Czechoslovakia at the end of July. '' Meanwhile 
the Soviet government maintained its criticism of what its perceived to be 
French and British weakness in the face of German aggression. " Moscow stated, 
once again, its own willingness to defend its east European ally. ' But it received 
no response and no proposals of collaboration from either the French or British. 
Between May 1937 - August 1938, then, Anglo-Soviet relations developed little. 
During 1937 it would be accurate to contend that there did not exist any specific 
foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Chamberlain's mind, from the moment 
he became Prime Minister, was focused upon the appeasement of Germany and 
Italy. However, during 1938 and particularly regarding the Sudetenland crisis, 
the decisions and statements of ministers and officials revealed that there 
existed a very specific policy towards the Soviet Union, namely, the British 
government remained intent on deliberately excluding the Soviet government 
from the affairs of Western and Central Europe. 62 Individuals involved in the 
foreign policy decision making process during this period did, after the war, 
deny that this was the intention of the British government. R. A. Butler is one 
example. 63 Yet their recollections do not correlate with the events and decisions 
outlined in this chapter, or with the decisions taken in September, as outlined in 
chapter two. Throughout 1938, the Soviet government possessed a legitimate 
interest in the developments of the Sudetenland crisis because of its 
involvement in the French, Czech, Soviet alliance system. The British and 
French governments, for this reason alone, should have discussed proposals 
with Moscow, or at least informed the Soviet government of developments and 
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decisions' But they deliberately chose not to. Why did London not want the 
Soviet Union to participate in the settlement of the Sudetenland crisis? 
Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff explained their decisions in relation to the 
policy of conciliation (towards Germany and Italy) and its causes. ' Indeed, 
factors such as the desire for peace and the `structural constraints' facing the 
government were put forward to explain British foreign policy decisions 
towards the Soviet Union until the summer of 1939. ' Before one can discuss 
the role of suspicion and ideology in the foreign policy decision making process, 
therefore, it is necessary to assess the influence of these factors. 
Of particular importance was the pursuit of peace and Chamberlain's 
determination to conciliate Hitler. 67 So much has been written on Chamberlain 
and appeasement, it would be repetitive to discuss in detail the Prime Minister's 
attitude towards the dictators here. The view taken by this thesis is that 
throughout 1938 - 1939, Chamberlain wanted to avoid war through diplomatic 
means. `These dictators, as it seemed to him, must be reasonable men', and he 
was confident in his own ability to persuade them against aggression. ' The 
Soviet government on the other hand called for Anglo-French-Soviet 
collaboration and later a treaty of mutual assistance in order to resist German 
aggression. Such proposals were considered by British ministers and officials to 
'4Although Britain was not a part of the Soviet-French-Czech alliance system, it had involved 
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be deliberately provocative to the Germans' and therefore incompatible with 
the aims of the British government. An Anglo-French-Soviet agreement in any 
form would, many believed, lead to a formation of blocs, in particular, 
ideological blocs which would only result in dangerous instability. In 1938, the 
Foreign Policy Committee was told: 
His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that the indirect, but 
nonetheless inevitable consequence of such action as is proposed by the 
Russian Government would be to aggravate the tendency towards the 
establishment of division between nations, according to the different 
forms of their domestic government, which must in the view of His 
Majesty's Government be inimical to the prospects of European peace. '° 
An alliance would almost certainly lead to cries of encirclement by Germany, 
thus diminishing any willingness to negotiate on Berlin's part. Halifax explained 
that `the more closely we associated ourselves with ... Russia the more we 
produced on German minds the impression that we were plotting to encircle 
Germany and the more difficult it would be to make any real settlement with 
Germany. " Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, continued 
to inform London of the German government's hostility towards, and suspicion 
of, the Soviet Union in an effort to warn of the damage Soviet involvement 
would inevitably cause to Britain's appeasement policy. In May 1938, for 
example, he reported to Halifax; 
Baron Von Neurath told me he was convinced ... that the Czech war office 
was largely under influence of Moscow... Russia, anticipating failure in 
Spain, was in his opinion now endeavouring to create new focus of 
trouble in Czechoslovakia.. 72 
A choice, it was explained on several occasions, had to be made between 
Germany and the Soviet Union. The German government were simply not 
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willing to consider Soviet involvement in the settling of the Sudeten crisis and if 
Hitler was to be appeased, the Soviet government had to be excluded. 73 `We had 
to face facts' Halifax explained to Maisky after the Munich Conference, `and one 
of these facts was,..., that the heads of the German Government and of the 
Italian Government would not be willing in present circumstances to sit in 
conference with Soviet representatives. " 
Throughout 1939, the same arguments referring to Britain's wish to conciliate 
Hitler and the undermining effect such an alliance would have, were 
reiterated. " The Foreign Office believed that the Axis would perceive a `triple 
pact of mutual assistance', as signifying Britain's abandonment of `any further 
attempt to remain impartial. ' Britain would be thought by others to be 
`deliberately aligning for war between rival groups of powers', and this would in 
turn infuriate Hitler and possibly lead to aggressive action. " Most recently, 
Gabriel Gorodetsky has highlighted the incompatibility of aims as the primary 
reason for the failure of the Anglo-French - Soviet summer negotiations, stating 
that what both `Soviet and western historians have often failed to realise [is] sic 
that England and the Soviet Union were in fact seeking different agreements. ' 
Apart from wanting to avoid war, Britain was also perceived by military experts 
to be incapable of going to war during this period. In 1938, the Soviet Union 
may have been able to resist German forces in the East, but Britain was thought 
to be incapable of defeating German forces in the West. The Chiefs of Staff had, 
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for some time, supported a policy of limited liability. '8 During the year of the 
Czechoslovakian crisis, their advice remained constant; that Britain should try 
to avoid war at all costs. 79 During the winter after Munich the process of 
rearmament was accelerated", confidence grew amongst the military experts, 
and by the end of January 1939, the Chiefs of Staff were in favour of accepting 
military continental commitment. 8' There still existed, however, a number of 
conditions that militated against a continental commitment, including, for 
example, the financial and industrial arguments that Britain could not afford to 
rearm all three services. " Furthermore, the French military machine, Daladier 
was informed by his Generals, would similarly face great difficulties in a war 
against Germany. ' 
Inherent strategic difficulties also beset Anglo-French-Soviet military 
collaboration. The defence of Czechoslovakia from German aggression, 
especially, raised problems because the country was on the other side of Europe 
surrounded by hostile nations. ' Chamberlain pointed out that `you only have to 
look at a map to see that nothing that France or Russia could do could save 
Czechoslovakia from being overrun by the Germans... Russia is loo miles 
away. i ' Thus, the Prime Minister wrote of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance; 
`... there is almost everything to be said for it until you come to examine its 
practicability. "' The greatest dilemma involved in any proposal of an Anglo- 
French-Soviet alliance in 1938, and indeed in 1939, was the refusal of both 
7e Bond, Military Policy, pp. 270-271. 
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Poland and Rumania to allow access for Soviet troops across their territories. " 
Relations between the Polish and Soviet governments in particular were not 
cordial. This was reflected in Polish defence planning which was focused more 
upon defending Poland from the Soviet Union than from the Germans. " 
Indeed, the one certainty in Polish policy was an adamant refusal to allow 
Soviet forces to cross Polish territory. ' In 1938 this made Soviet assistance to 
Czechoslovakia almost impossible because the Soviet Union did not have 
borders with either Germany or Czechoslovakia. The Soviets would be unable to 
bring direct military pressure upon Germany or supply Czechoslovakia with 
materials and arms without the cooperation of the surrounding countries. The 
Rumanians were not so adamant in their refusal, but there was a possibility that 
the Rumanian government would, at the last moment, also refuse access for 
Soviet troops and transport. 9°As long as the hostility held by both governments 
towards the Soviet Union continued, so the strategical problems remained. 
During 1939, the issue was again raised by Chamberlain and Halifax and said to 
be crucially influential upon the foreign policy decisions taken. ' 
The opinions of the Poles and Rumanians were, therefore, important 
considerations for the British. So too were the attitudes of the Dominions. The 
dominion governments would, potentially, be involved in a war over the 
Sudetenland, and any war on the side of Poland during the following year. 
However, the Dominions did not support an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance 
before 24 May 1939.92 In addition to the ideological prejudices that existed 
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amongst the majority of the dominion governments, it was suspected that 
Soviet commitments to Czechoslovakia and France were forged only to ensure a 
capitalist war between the West and Germany. ' Their opposition to an alliance 
continued during the early months of 1939. ß' As late as i6 May, the Prime 
Minister warned the Cabinet `that anything in the nature of an alliance with 
Russia would give rise to serious difficulties with certain of the Dominions. 'v5 
Such issues as have been discussed were evidently important considerations for 
ministers and the Chiefs of Staff throughout 1938 and 1939. Whilst they 
confirmed and may have even influenced the policy of appeasement, however, 
they were not in fact the reasons for London's refusal to collaborate with 
Moscow during this period. Instead, it is the contention of this thesis that 
British policy towards the Soviet Union was determined by the unwillingness of 
certain ministers to put aside the ideological suspicion and political hostility 
each held towards the Soviet Union during the foreign policy decision making 
process. 96 
This contention can be substantiated, firstly, by challenging the reasons for 
Soviet exclusion put forward by ministers at the time. Thus, just as several 
historians have argued that Britain's military weakness and the opposition to 
war from the dominion powers confirmed rather than dictated Chamberlain's 
determination to conciliate Germany97 , 
it is the contention of this thesis that 
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such structural constraints confirmed rather than forced Chamberlain's 
determination to oppose collaboration with the Soviets. The opinions of the 
dominion powers as well as east European countries, for example, were 
repeatedly raised in Cabinet meetings throughout 1938 and 1939. But it is very 
difficult to believe that Chamberlain would have really bowed to their demands 
and allowed the opinions of others to dictate a foreign policy with which he did 
not agree. Rather than have any influence upon the decisions taken by London, 
their opinions simply mirrored those already held by Chamberlain and other 
ministers. Their views were identical not influential. 
Constraints such as Polish and Rumanian opposition to Soviet troops crossing 
their territory did appear to be a critical strategic consideration. Yet, two 
important points need to be made regarding their position. Firstly, despite the 
claims of several ministers during the Sudetenland crisis, the Rumanian 
government was never as decisively opposed to cooperating with the Soviet 
government as was Warsaw. 98 Thus, such wavering would have easily enabled 
London to persuade the Rumanians to join an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance if 
that is what it wanted. Secondly, at the end of September and before the Munich 
settlement was agreed, the Rumanian government did give permission for 
Moscow to send aircraft through Rumanian airspace. Admittedly, the 
Rumanians had little choice, their anti-aircraft defences were too weak to stop 
Soviet aircraft. ' With respect to Poland, it is worth noting that the British 
government made no effort to persuade Warsaw to agree to an alliance, either 
in 1938 or 1939. Poland existed between two traditionally hostile giants. Yet, 
neither Chamberlain not his cabinet took advantage of Poland's predicament. 
Furthermore, even if British efforts to persuade the Poles to allow Soviet troops 
through their territory failed, this still did not render an Anglo-French-Soviet 
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alliance entirely ineffective. Amongst other attributes, for example, the Soviets 
could have exerted direct pressure upon Germany in the Baltic by blockading 
the German trade route with Scandinavia, thereby interrupting supplies of 
important materials such as iron ore. " 
The above arguments undermine to a certain extent the suggestion that 
strategic and political difficulties dictated British foreign policy towards the 
Soviet Union. The most convincing evidence of their secondary importance 
however is the fact that on the two occasions when ministers perceived a greater 
threat facing Britain than Soviet expansionism, they agreed to Soviet 
involvement in the resistance to aggression. '°' This will be discussed in more 
detail throughout the thesis. 
One factor that contributed to ministers changing their minds about Anglo - 
Soviet collaboration was their changing perceptions of Germany. Before 
September, the Cabinet shared Chamberlain's belief that Hitler's actions in 
Europe to date, namely the remilitarisation of the Rhineland and the Anschluss, 
had been driven by no more than a desire to redress the grievances of Versailles 
and incorporate all Germans in the Reich. With the exception of Duff Cooper, 
they all, therefore, supported the policy of conciliation towards the German 
dictator. The Cabinet continued to believe in the possibility of an Anglo-German 
agreement throughout 1938 - 1939. But following Munich, particularly during 
the winter of 1938 - 1939, ministers received intelligence reports which 
challenged their images of Hitler and his ambitions. 1O' It is notable that during 
this period military intelligence reports also evoked a new optimism about the 
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military balance of power. '°3 To what extent, then, one may ask, were attitudes 
towards Anglo-Soviet collaboration dictated by perceptions of Hitler and a 
belief in the possibility of an Anglo-German agreement? One interpretation 
could be that support for the diplomatic exclusion of the Soviet Union during 
1938 reflected the ministers' convictions that Hitler's aims were limited. The 
diplomatic contacts made with Moscow yet the resistance to an Anglo-French- 
Soviet alliance during the winter of 1938 and 1939 could be said to have 
reflected the continued hope of an agreement with Berlin yet a changing 
perception of Germany's dictator (as well as Britain's own military standing). 
Certainly views of Hitler and of the prospects of an Anglo- German agreement 
were important when deciding policy towards Moscow. However, they were not 
directly influential. Rather, they were indirect influences. Thus, the desire for, 
and belief in the possibility of, an Anglo-German agreement only remained 
influential as one of several reasons for ministers not to put aside their anti- 
Soviet prejudices. As long as one believed a pact with the German dictator was 
still possible, there existed no reason to fear Soviet isolationism and no reason, 
therefore, to overlook hostility and distrust. Intelligence reports and the actions 
of Hitler during March 1939 affected the ministers' perceptions of Hitler 
enough to weaken the influence of their anti-Soviet attitudes, but not to the 
extent that such prejudices were overlooked altogether and Soviet proposals of 
an alliance accepted. "' 
Inextricably linked to the belief in, and pursuit of, an Anglo-German agreement 
by the British government is the suggestion that the aims of London and 
Moscow were simply incompatible. 105 However, it is possible to challenge 
whether the aims of the West and of the Soviet Union were really as 
1113 Wark, Ultimate Enemy, p. 232-4. 
'°° For more discussion on the influence of perceptions of Hitler see Chapter 2. 
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incompatible as some contemporaries and historians have suggested. In 1938, 
in particular, Moscow did not want to go to war. Rather, its aim was to bluff the 
German dictator into retreating. The Soviet government was willing to go to war 
if necessary, but it sincerely believed that Hitler could be deterred. io6 Alleged 
strategical constraints were irrelevant to such a policy. Some British officials 
warned that such a bluff would be called by Hitler. Nevile Henderson, for 
example, `thought that Herr Hitler attached little importance to Russia except 
as regards aeroplanes, and that he would go forward against a combination of 
France, Russia and this country. "°' In his memoirs, William Strang, an official 
in, and later head of, the Central Department within the Foreign Office, wrote; 
Hitler himself and the German General Staff seem to have thought it 
quite likely that the Soviet Government would intervene in arms if 
Germany attacked Czechoslovakia; but they seem also to have thought 
that Soviet intervention, what with the recent great military purge and 
geographical difficulties, would not reach serious proportions and could 
be discounted. io' 
Furthermore, ministers were concerned by the fact that a bluff would make 
war wholly dependent upon Hitler. It would take the decision for war away from 
the West. `I am satisfied', Chamberlain wrote to his sister, `that we should be 
wrong to allow the most vital decision that any country could take, the decision 
as to peace or war, to pass out of our own hands into those of the ruler of 
another country... "' 
Such fear of the decision for war being in the hands of another was legitimate, 
but the decision for war would always be taken by the aggressor. Reports that 
Hitler would certainly act against such a bluff, on the other hand, were based 
'°" Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War, (London, 
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purely upon supposition, and notably the supposition of one who admitted his 
own prejudice against the Soviet Union. "° In the case of Nevile Henderson, 
especially, it is worth noting that his reports were probably influenced by the 
fact that he knew both Chamberlain and Halifax opposed Soviet involvement for 
their own reasons and so that such reports would have been well received. "' 
Several historians have since substantiated the opinions of Henderson and 
Strang, arguing that evidence released after the war shows Hitler's willingness 
to go to war against Britain, France and the Soviet Union during 1-938. Donald 
Cameron Watt, for example, argues that following the May Crisis, Hitler became 
determined to smash Czechoslovakia come what may. "` Research by Keith 
Robbins found that when assessing the reactions of possible opponents to an 
attack on Czechoslovakia, Hitler believed at worst that he would be opposed by 
Britain, France and the Soviet Union, and that this still did not rule out the 
feasibility of an attack. 113 It is not coincidental that these historians belong to the 
`Revisionist' school of thought and thereby largely defend Chamberlain's foreign 
policy decisions during this period. Moreover, the evidence put forward in such 
literature still does not prove that a bluff would have failed. 
Considering the evidence available today one can argue that a bluff may have 
succeeded. Hitler had backed down twice before in the face of joint resistance. "' 
Although intelligence reports stated that Hitler did appear determined to attack 
Czechoslovakia, they also revealed that both the German army and 
industrialists acknowledged that Germany was in no condition to sustain a 
"° Henderson to Halifax. 31 May, 1939. FO 800 / 270; Henderson to Halifax. 17 June, 1939. FO 
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protracted war. "' Furthermore, the German people were said to be united 
against war. "' Consequently, several individuals involved in intelligence, 
including Robert Vansittart, the Chief Diplomatic Adviser, and Mason 
MacFarlane, Britain's military attache in Berlin, believed a resolute stand by 
Britain would force Hitler to back down. "' 
Although each country was undermined by military weaknesses, the combined 
efforts of Britain, France and the Soviet Union would have posed serious, and 
very possibly, successful resistance to Germany in 1938 and 1939. i8 `German 
armed forces in September 1938, in terms of war readiness and overall 
mobilised strength, were a much inferior foe compared to the military machine' 
of 1940.119 Germany's military strength grew throughout 1939. Still, when the 
`test of war came' in 1939, G. Peden points out; 
Britain was able to contribute to the Allied cause the world's largest navy, 
an aircraft industry which outproduced Germany in 1940, and an army 
which was just large enough to deny the German army any decisive 
advantage in men or quality of equipment. 12° 
Moreover, such achievements were made, and survival sustained, without the 
second front and valuable resources a Soviet ally would have brought. It is not 
surprising, then, that despite his statements of confidence, there is evidence to 
suggest that Hitler realised the potential of such an alliance and actually feared 
having to fight a war involving the Soviet Union. The German dictator did not 
want the Soviet Union involved in any guarantee of the remainder of 
15 Memoranda by Vansittart. 21 Mar, 1938. VNST 1,1/23; 20 Jan, 1938. VNST 11,2/16. Cited 
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Czechoslovakia, for example. He wanted to avoid all possibility of 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, and he would not have insisted upon 
Moscow's exclusion from a guarantee of Czechoslovakia unless he genuinely 
feared that the Soviet Union could seriously hinder Germany's foreign policy 
ambitions. Indeed, such concern expressed itself a year later through German 
attempts to ensure Soviet neutrality in the event of war, which finally led to the 
conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact. As a result, it is equally 
permissible to suggest that the German dictator would have been deterred from 
taking action against Czechoslovakia in 1938. It is likely that Hitler would have 
taken aggressive steps at some stage, but it would have been possible until then 
for the British, Soviets and French to organise future military cooperation. Yet, 
the British Cabinet chose not to debate the possibility of bluff. It was briefly 
mentioned on one or two occasions, but Cabinet records show no detailed 
examination of the evidence. Instead Chamberlain and some of his colleagues 
deliberately proposed war as the only alternative to a policy of conciliation 
because this enabled them to repeatedly highlight the structural constraints that 
appeared to support their underlying wish to avoid collaboration with the 
Soviets. 
The British government then, could, and should, have at least attempted to 
deter an intended resistance against German aggression over the Sudetenland. 
Aversion to military alliances , British military and economic weakness and the 
opposition to Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration from the dominion 
governments and other governments involved in the crisis should have had no 
bearing on the inclusion of Soviet representatives to settle the Sudetenland 
crisis peacefully. The aims of the British and Soviet governments were not 
impossibly incompatible . London may 
have discovered this if it had made the 
effort to discuss Soviet foreign policy intentions with Moscow itself. The 
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contention by some ministers that contact with Moscow, if only to discuss 
peaceful measures, could not be made for fear of antagonising the Germans, 
was weak. It suggested that the British government was forced into excluding 
the Soviet Union against its wishes. In fact, ministers and officials were only 
too eager to abide by Berlin's wishes regarding the exclusion of Moscow. 12' In 
1939, when fears of a German - Soviet rapprochement had begun to persuade 
ministers and officials to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices, several finally 
admitted the deterrence value of cooperation between Britain, France and the 
Soviet Union. " 
The inadequacies of the reasons put forward by ministers at the time and 
several historians since, are evident. This alone, however, does not substantiate 
the contention of this chapter and thesis. The inadequacies of the reasons put 
forward by certain ministers are accentuated if one looks at the admissions and 
explanations given by officials and ministers in meetings, but especially in their 
private correspondence. When individuals believed they were writing in 
confidence, or when, in May 1939, they were forced to explain their sudden 
change in attitude towards Anglo-French - Soviet collaboration, ministers and 
officials revealed the real motivation behind British policy towards the Soviet 
Union. Thus, the most compelling evidence in support of the contention of this 
thesis exists in the Cabinet and Foreign Policy Committee minutes, Foreign 
Office reports and private papers of the decision makers during 1937 - 1939. 
A detailed examination of such papers throughout Chamberlain's premiership 
reveals the existence of a deep seated suspicion and hostility towards the Soviet 
Union among ministers and officials that derived ultimately from ideological 
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differences. " Neville Chamberlain, as Prime Minister and so the ultimate 
decision maker, is an important example. In his private papers, Chamberlain 
repeatedly admitted his `most profound distrust of Russia. " ' His distrust 
stemmed from a perception of Communism as the enemy of civilisation. Indeed, 
throughout his premiership, Chamberlain believed that Communist expansion 
remained the main threat. It was far greater than any expansion threatened by 
German racial philosophies. i26 Consequently, Germany and Britain were 
perceived to be natural allies in the face of the enemy. Chamberlain told King 
George VI that he had `sketched out the prospect of Germany and England as 
the two pillars of European peace and buttresses against Communism. "' It is 
not surprising, then, that Chamberlain believed Soviet proposals of 
collaboration were intended only to divide Germany and Britain in order to 
defeat the resistance they represented to Moscow's intention to expand 
Communism. He was convinced that the Soviets were `stealthily and cunningly 
pulling all the strings behind the scenes to get us involved in war with 
Germany. "' In Chamberlain's mind, the ideological divide between Britain and 
the Soviet Union meant Soviet intentions could never be the same as those of 
the West, and as such, would always be suspicious. Such admissions by the 
Prime Minister greatly undermine the suggestion that he in fact perceived there 
to be little difference between Germany and the Soviet Union, and that his 
foreign policy decisions were not based on likes and dislikes. Indeed the 
contention that Chamberlain `only drew attention to the fact that the Soviet 
Union was not swaddled in pure white when his critics found something 
uniquely wicked in Hitler's Germany"' , 
is shown to be a significant 
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underestimation of the Prime Minister's personal attitudes. Chamberlain's 
hostility towards the Soviet Union was much greater than his opposition to the 
internal system of Germany. 
Chamberlain's close friends and immediate advisers shared his passionate 
suspicion of Moscow's intentions. According to Theo Kordt, Counsellor of the 
German embassy in London, Sir Horace Wilson, the Chief Industrial Adviser to 
the government and confidant of the Prime Minister, thought it would be the 
height of folly if two leading `white races' exterminated each other in war 
because only bolshevism would profit. '3° Halifax, who, as Viceroy, had worked 
hard to suppress Communist influence in India in 1927,13' was also `very 
suspicious of Soviet Russia. "" Later, he admitted he held `... considerable 
distrust of Bolshevik guarantees and undertakings, and thought that in all these 
matters the policy of the Soviet government would, in the last resort, be 
governed by what that government thought at the time best in their own 
interests. ' 113 Of the other two ministers who played a significant role in the 
decision making process as members of what has been termed `the inner 
cabinet"34 , Sir John 
Simon said very little about the Soviet Union either in 
private or in the Cabinet. 135 Samuel Hoare on the other hand, held very strong 
views of the Soviet Unioni3' and frequently aired them. During the first few 
months of Chamberlain's premiership, Hoare, as First Lord of the Admiralty, 
had voiced his opposition to any collaboration with the Soviets regarding the 
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Spanish civil war. Communist expansion, he warned, existed as a real threat to 
Britain: `On no account must we do anything to bolster up Communism in 
Spain, particularly when it is remembered that Communism in Portugal, to 
which it would probably spread and particularly Lisbon, would be a grave 
danger to the British Empire. "" Hoare was not alone in making such 
comments. At the time, Lord Chatfield, First Sea Lord, expressed his aversion to 
Communism, declaring that Franco's cause was `much nobler than the Reds. 738 
During 1938, Chatfield said little about the Soviet Union, but Hoare remained 
aware of `stock Communist propaganda' and the `mischief it could make. 139 As 
Home Secretary, he had to deal with the brawls that occurred between 
Communists and Fascists in East London" , and the complaints of British 
religious denominations about Moscow's support of anti-religious 
organisations. "' Though such events in fact posed no threat to Britain's security, 
what appeared to be the infiltration of Communist influence could only have 
added to Hoare's hostility towards Moscow and his conviction that Soviet 
intentions were to the detriment of Britain. Indeed, like Chamberlain, Hoare 
believed that Moscow's proposals of collaboration during 1938 were intended 
only to bring about war between Britain and Germany, thus allowing for 
Communist expansion. "' The Marquis of Zetland, Secretary of State for India, 
agreed, warning the Cabinet that world war `would bring about the destruction 
of the present world order and the emergence of something which might 
approximate to the ideals of those who controlled the destiny of Russia. "43 
Others who voiced their distrust of Soviet declarations in the foreign policy 
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committee included Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary in the 
Foreign Office, ' and R. A. Butler who believed `both on political and military 
grounds, the USSR could not be trusted... ' to act outside its own interests. "' To 
act in one's own interest, in itself, was, and still is, customary for governments. 
For many within Britain, however, Soviet self-interest was thought of as being 
in the interests of Communism. Even the Chiefs of Staff, generally trusted to 
provide objective accurate military information upon which the politicians 
could decide policy, were not exempt from such prejudicial views. They, too, 
distrusted the Soviet government and its declarations. In 1938 they believed 
Moscow had no intention of going to war over Czechoslovakia. A report dated 
25 April, stated that the Soviet government `will go to almost any lengths.. . to 
avoid hostilities', and that it was `unsafe to assume that Soviet Russia would 
carry out her obligations towards Czechoslovakia. "' Furthermore the report 
warned that Moscow would not be `backward in stirring up hostilities' in order 
to provoke a war in which it had no intention of officially participating in. X47 The 
Chiefs of Staff, unlike most Cabinet ministers, were prepared to admit that such 
distrust and judgment was subjective and a `matter of opinion. "" Nevertheless, 
they continued to warn that in their opinion the Soviet Union remained 
'incalculable. `9 Such distrust of and aversion towards the `Red danger"' not 
only existed within Britain. Indeed, ministers recognised the existence and 
influence of such prejudices upon the foreign policies of other governments. 
Fear of `giving a handle to German anti-Communist propaganda"" , 
for 
example, was often noted. 
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Despite admitting their own distrust of the Soviet Union and recognising the 
ideological suspicion of so many others, a number of individuals still denied the 
importance of such prejudices, albeit on few occasions, during this period. 
Alexander Cadogan, for example, argued that foreign policy decisions were 
purely practical. In response to minutes circulating within the Foreign Office 
concerning the relative threat of fascism and communism, Cadogan wrote; 
I personally,..., think it otiose to discuss whether Fascism or Communism 
is the more dangerous to us. It is quite plain that, at the moment, the 
former is the more dangerous to us, because it is the more efficient, and 
makes more and better guns and aeroplanes. "' 
Even the Prime Minister denied the influence of `ideological differences' and 
said that `the suggestion that we despise the assistance of the Soviet Union is 
without foundation. "J3 But such suggestions did have foundation. Comments 
during official meetings and the private papers of numerous politicians and 
officials, revealed the existence and influence of distrust. Later, for example, 
Halifax admitted his `cynical appreciation' of Soviet intentions had persuaded 
him `to make a narrower arrangement with Soviet Russia.. . than he would be 
prepared to make with a partner in whom he felt trust and confidence. "54 
Moreover, such prejudice was admitted after the war, when ministers were no 
longer under pressure to deny its influence. Samuel Hoare wrote in his 
memoirs, Nine Troubled Years. that the decision making process was 
`undoubtedly influenced by suspicion of the Soviet. ' Nor did he apologise. There 
were `solid reasons for distrusting the Soviet. ' Indeed, Hoare explained, `whilst 
we fully realised that the prejudices of the past should not affect our later policy, 
we should not have been human if we had not been influenced by this long 
record of Russian duplicity and hostility. ' 1 
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Thus, the widespread hostility towards, and intense suspicion of, the Soviet 
Union amongst government ministers and Chiefs of Staff stemmed from 
decades of animosity. In his memoirs, the Home Secretary explained further: 
For more than twenty years successive British Governments had suffered 
from Russian plots and intrigues. British party politics had been 
constantly poisoned by Russian propaganda. Russian secret agents were 
continuously exploiting any chance of stirring trouble, Russian money 
was finding its way into the pockets of British agitators. The Zinoviev 
letter that created so resounding a sensation in 1924 was not an isolated 
instance of Russian interference in our affairs. The attempts to incite 
mutinies in the fighting services and strikes in the ranks of Labour went 
unabated during the whole period between the two wars, and the Russian 
embassy never ceased to be a centre of espionage and agitation. "' 
Hoare's recollection of Soviet infiltration `during the whole period between the 
two wars' is an exaggeration. Like many other former ministers writing their 
memoirs during the 1950s, it is most likely that Hoare was influenced by the 
growing antagonism between the West and its former war time ally over central 
and eastern Europe. The Home Secretary's description of the animosity that 
existed throughout the 192os, however, is accurate. Russia was first perceived to 
represent an ideological threat to the West following the Bolshevik revolution in 
1917. The creation of the Communist International, otherwise known as the 
Comintern, soon after, confirmed for many the belief that there existed a real 
danger of Communist expansion. Indeed, fear of Communism at least partly 
contributed to the abatement of hostility towards the Germans after the war. 117 
During the i92os, Moscow did much to reaffirm such fears and suspicions. 
Decisions taken showed little or no intention to cooperate, but instead a 
determination to undermine democracy, including the British government. 
Lenin's government collaborated with anti-British forces in the Middle East. 
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The Comintern circulated subversive Communist propaganda within Britain 
and India. Though it was largely Conservative party members that spoke out 
against Communism, fear and distrust also existed within the Labour party. 
Members of the Labour party had, at times, been willing to speak out in support 
of the Soviet Union, especially regarding allied intervention in the Russian civil 
war during the years after the Bolshevik revolution. In 1924, the newly elected 
Labour government granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet State. Yet 
throughout, the Labour party rejected Communist affiliations for 
membership. "' The apprehension that prevailed amongst all political parties 
regarding the Communist threat during this period was typified by two 
scandals, namely the case of J. R. Campbell and the case of the Zinoviev letter, 
both of which led to Conservatives accusing the Labour leader Ramsay 
MacDonald of leniency towards the Communists. Suspicion and fear of 
Communist expansion emanating from Moscow continued and again appeared 
to many to be reaffirmed by the general strike in 1926 and uprisings in both 
China and India in 1927. In the same year, for the first time, the British 
government acted to resist what it perceived to be the threat posed by 
Communism. Hence the offices of Soviet diplomatic representatives were raided 
following information that they were engaged in subversive activities. "' With 
the issues of trade and compensation for British investors in Russia before the 
revolution still unresolved, the 193os begun, for Conservative politicians at 
least, on a basis of resentment and distrust. Despite a grudging acceptance of 
the Soviet Union as a member of the League of Nations in 1934, many within 
the British political elite continued to believe Moscow remained intent on 
Communist expansion. Indeed, such fear was to play a decisive part in the 
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foreign policy decisions taken by the Baldwin government regarding the 
Spanish civil warb' , only a year 
before Chamberlain became Prime Minister. "' 
That ideological distrust and hostility remained amongst politicians during 
Chamberlain's premiership, then, is not surprising and perhaps 
understandable. Such attitudes had become almost inherent within the political 
elite. Yet the word `prejudice', used in this chapter and thesis to describe such 
opinions, is deliberate. Despite its history, no substantial evidence existed 
during Chamberlain's premiership, not at least until July 1939, that Moscow's 
feelers to the West were in fact insincere and a means to ensure the future 
expansion of Communism. Certainly Stalin's priority was the future security of 
his own country. Jonathan Haslam is right to point out that Stalin's adherence 
to a policy of collective security was not due to his concern for peace in Europe. 
One cannot dismiss entirely the suggestion that Moscow continued to hope for 
improved German - Soviet relations until 1937.162 But this was not incompatible 
with a policy of cooperation with the West. The fact is that from 1933 onwards, 
the Soviet government did pursue a policy of collective security which the 
British and French could have embraced. Thus, the Soviet Union joined the 
League of Nations in 1934 and in May 1935 signed mutual assistance pacts with 
France and Czechoslovakia. The Comintern announced a new Popular Front 
policy, urging European Communist parties to ally with liberals, social 
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democrats and anyone who opposed fascism. i63 Moscow, as a member of the 
League participated in the imposition of sanctions on Italy after Mussolini's 
invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 164 , and called for action against Hitler's 
invasion of the Rhineland in March 1936. 
In contrast, following Hitler's election in 1933, Germany withdrew from the 
League of Nations and began to rearm. Throughout the 193os Berlin embarked 
on an aggressive foreign policy which included marching into the Rhineland, 
intervening almost immediately in the Spanish civil war, declaring the 
Anschluss in March 1938, and threatening invasion of the Czech Sudetenland by 
September. During this period, the British public also learnt of the persecution 
of the Jews and other minorities within Germany. What was known about 
Stalin's purges was equally abhorrent. Yet, much had occurred to suggest to any 
objective observer of the international situation that Nazi Germany was in fact 
Britain's greatest threat. Despite this, members of the Conservative party in 
particular continued to `believe Nazis on the whole are more conservative than 
communists and socialists. "" Even during the war, members of the British 
political elite continued to make comments such as; `no doubt that the Soviet 
government is even worse than Hitler's, and it will be a misfortune if it 
survives. "" The depth of ideological suspicion amongst certain members of the 
British political elite was such that neither the actions of the German nor Soviet 
governments during the 1930S would have made any significant difference. 
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In addition to the evident hostility and distrust that existed within the Cabinet, 
Foreign Policy Committee and Chiefs of Staff, politicians and officials also 
shared a perception of the Soviet Union as militarily ineffective, and 
emphasised this as a crucial influence upon the foreign policy decisions taken. " 
As early as April 1938, for example, Halifax was convinced that the Soviet 
Union could not `be counted upon for any substantial contribution to the 
defence of Czechoslovakia. "" Alexander Cadogan, agreed. The Soviet Union 
was capable of defending itself but had little offensive strength. ' Samuel Hoare 
similarly wrote that `after the great purge of the Russian army' Stalin was in no 
`position to join in coercive action against Hitler"' , and Sir John Simon 
damned the Soviet Union as `useless as an ally. "" Neville Chamberlain, in 
particular, repeatedly pointed to Soviet military weakness during 1939 as a 
reason to oppose an alliance with Moscow to resist German aggression. " He 
described those in the House of Commons who `believe that Russia is the key to 
our salvation' as 'pathetic. "' Unlike other opinions of the Russians, this 
perception of the Russian armed forces was not historic. Indeed, during the 
Great War, Tsarist Russia was thought of as the great steamroller, capable of 
seriously hindering the German army. 14 The belief that the Soviet Union was 
militarily weak existed only from 1937 onwards and was a result of the 
undermining of the Soviet forces as a result of Stalin's purges. The Foreign 
Office had received reports throughout 1938 stating that the `army had.. . 
been 
seriously weakened by recent events. ' Officials in Moscow estimated that `about 
187 Hoare, Troubled Years. 
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65 per cent of general officers had been liquidated... ' Even if the Soviet Union 
were militarily capable, reports stated that the transport system would not 
stand the strain of war. " The Chiefs of Staff, unsurprisingly then, also 
concluded that the Soviet armed forces were incapable of waging an effective 
war over Czechoslovakia. " 
Evidence of the destruction caused by Stalin's purges alone strengthens the 
argument that Soviet military weakness was an important consideration. 
Ministers and military experts were justified in their concerns. Like the various 
structural constraints put forward by Cabinet ministers, however, Soviet 
military weakness was not a dominant influence upon the decisions made 
regarding the Soviet Union. Firstly this can be confirmed by the fact that 
ministers later acknowledged the military potential of the Soviet Union when it 
appeared that assistance might be needed. Halifax, in February 1939, for 
example, explained that the best `way to describe Russia now is something 
between the 1914 attitude of "the unconquerable steam roller" and looking on 
her as entirely useless militarily. We cannot ignore a population of i8o, ooo, 
00o people. "" Chamberlain told the House of Commons in May 1939 that `... no 
one would be so foolish as to suppose that that huge country, with its vast 
population and enormous resources, would be a negligible factor in war. "" He 
even admitted that if Poland and Rumania were attacked `there would be good 
reasons on the merits of the case for trying to secure some measure of Soviet 
participation. "' The Minister for Coordination of Defence, Lord Chatfield, told 
the Prime Minister in May 1939 that the `active and whole hearted assistance of 
Russia as our ally would be of appreciable value particularly in containing 
15 Verekerto Halifax. 23 May, 1938. no. 222. D. B. F. P., 3, I. See Chapter3. 
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substantial enemy forces and in supplying war material to our other allies in 
Eastern Europe. "' He continued, `there was no doubt that the possibility of war 
with Russia was a great deterrent to Germany who greatly feared having to 
conduct a war both on the East and on the West. ' 181 Even R. A. Butler, a 
dedicated supporter of Chamberlain and his opposition to closer Anglo-Soviet 
collaboration, admitted in June that `history showed us that Russia was needed 
if a balance of power in Europe was to be preserved. "" 
In addition, and more importantly, ministers themselves admitted the 
secondary importance of their military perceptions of the Soviet Union 
(compared to their ideological suspicion). In a conversation with the Labour 
M. P., Hugh Dalton, for example, Chamberlain confessed that even if Soviet 
forces were capable of launching an effective offensive, he still could not trust 
Moscow. "' As Sir Alexander Cadogan so aptly commented, Chamberlain was `a 
man of prejudices which were not easily eradicated. i" The relatively few 
remarks made about Soviet military potential compared with the influx of 
information from Moscow's military attaches during 1938 exemplified its 
secondary importance in the minds of the decision makers, and this was to be 
confirmed further by events during September. i85 
Looking at the foreign policy and private papers of the British government 
regarding the Soviet Union between May 1937 - August 1938 provides an 
important context for this thesis. The reasons put forward by ministers for the 
deliberate exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Czechoslovakian settlement, 
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and for the rejection of Soviet proposals for collaboration thereafter, were false. 
What dominated the minds of those involved in the foreign policy decision 
making process towards the Soviet Union was an intense hostility and suspicion 
derived primarily from ideological differences. Though events from 1934 
onwards show that such ideological distrust was largely unfounded, the history 
of Anglo-Soviet relations illustrates amply why it was difficult for many to 
change their views of the Soviet Union. Ministers could and should, however, 
have put aside such views. The remainder of this thesis examines further the 
attitudes of the British political elite towards the Soviet Union, and puts 
forward evidence to show that it was, in fact, the unwillingness of certain 
individuals to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices during the foreign policy 
decision making process, and not the existence of such prejudice in itself, that 
determined policy towards the Soviet Union. 
Chapter Two: 
Attitudes of the British Cabinet, Foreign Policy Committee and 
51 
Chiefs of Staff towards the Soviet Union, September 1938 - March 
1939" 
Between 1- 30 September 1938, several ministers within Neville Chamberlain's 
Cabinet, if only temporarily, considered cooperation with the Soviet Union over 
the Sudetenland crisis. Between October 1938 - March 1939, Halifax made an 
effort to rebuild Anglo-Soviet relations. Despite this, British foreign policy 
towards the Soviet Union did not change during this period. Hence, the Soviet 
government was excluded from the Munich conference and there remained no 
intention on the part of London to collaborate with Moscow regarding the 
resistance to future German aggression. Nevertheless, what such consideration 
of cooperation and concern about Soviet reactions revealed is that British 
foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was not a result of impossible structural 
constraints, but rather a matter of willingness to put aside the anti-Soviet 
prejudices many continued to hold. 
As a result of the announcement that there would be additional German troop 
movements and partial mobilisation in September, on 2 September Litvinov 
proposed to the French government not only an appeal to the League, but also 
immediate joint military talks and an Anglo-French-Soviet declaration of 
resolve. 186 On 12 September, riots erupted in the Sudetenland following Hitler's 
speech at Nuremburg, in which the German dictator stated his support for the 
Sudeten German struggle for autonomy. Neville Chamberlain decided, without 
consulting either the French or Soviet governments, or indeed his own Cabinet 
'ý Francois - Poncet, The Fateful Years; Georges Bonnet, Defence, pp. 199-201; Telegram 
from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R to the Soviet Minister of 
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until the last minute, that he would visit Hitler. The two men discussed the 
Sudeten crisis on 15 September at Berchtesgaden. Chamberlain protested 
against any use of force by the German government. He did not, however, 
oppose Hitler's demand that Czechoslovakia's pacts with the French and Soviet 
governments should be invalidated. 'A' Finally, Chamberlain agreed to the 
detachment of Sudeten areas, although he informed Hitler that both the British 
Cabinet and the French government would have to be consulted. On 18 
September, Daladier and Bonnet were invited to a conference in Downing Street 
in order that they `should know exactly what had happened at Berchtesgaden, 
and what was likely to emerge at the Prime Minister's next meeting. "" The 
Soviet government, which also had a treaty of assistance with Czechoslovakia, 
was not invited to the conference, nor, indeed, informed of any developments 
by London. Daladier and Bonnet initially rejected Chamberlain's solution, 
namely that the Sudetenland be handed to Germany, but were soon brought 
round. 1$9 A concession was made. Thus, following the cessation of the 
Sudetenland to Germany, a guarantee would be given to the remaining 
Czechoslovakia. On 19 September, British and French representatives advised 
Edouard Benes, the Czechoslovakian president, that areas containing 50% or 
more Germans should be ceded to Germany. "' 
Benes, in turn, asked the French and Soviet governments whether they would 
fulfil their treaty obligations. "' Benes request for Soviet assistance in particular 
187 Felling, Chamberlain, p. 357, pp. 366-68; Memorandum on the Conversation between Fuhrer 
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revealed the anxiety felt by the Czech President because he was averse to Soviet 
troops occupying Czech territory for fear of Communist expansion. Soviet - 
Czech diplomatic relations had only been improved in 1934-5, but since then, 
the Czechoslovakian government had faced both domestic as well as 
international difficulties regarding Soviet-Czech relations. Firstly, there existed 
domestic opposition to such collaboration. Although left wing parties and the 
Communists urged closer relations with the Soviet Union, the Agrarian and 
right wing parties opposed closer relations. Secondly, Benes had to ensure that 
the German dictator could not accuse Czechoslovakia of being an outpost of 
Communism. Consequently, when the Czech government signed the mutual 
assistance treaty with the Soviet Union in 1935, it insisted that the treaty would 
only come into operation if the French acted first. By the autumn of 1938 
relations between Prague and Moscow were not entirely satisfactory. For 
domestic as well as personal reasons, the Czech president resisted pressing for 
confirmation of Soviet aid in the event of war. Indeed, no joint military planning 
had taken place between the two governments. 192 When war appeared to be 
imminent, however, Benes recognised the necessity of putting aside the 
ideological suspicion and hostility of many within his country. 
On 20 September, Moscow replied to Benes enquiry about Soviet sincerity. The 
Kremlin repeated its support and rejected the French and British proposal to 
cede the Sudetenland. "' Benes, however, conceded to the French and British 
demands. The Czech president had been warned that if he refused his country 
would be left to face the Germans alone. "' On 22 September, the Czech 
government led by Milan Hadza, resigned. On the same day at Godesberg, 
192Robbins, Munich. p. 262. 
193Telegram from the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Minister to 
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Hitler rejected Chamberlain's proposals as inadequate. The German dictator 
now wanted the Polish and Hungarian demands for Czech land met. "' The 
Polish government had already begun to assemble its forces along the 
Czechoslovakian border in anticipation of an opportunity to seize Teschen, an 
area with a large Polish population. "' On 23 September, Hitler demanded that 
the occupation of the Sudetenland be speeded up. The occupation would begin 
on 26 September and would be completed on 28 September up to a line drawn 
by the German general staff. A plebiscite would then be held in this and 
additional areas. " 
Chamberlain rejected Hitler's new demands, as did the Czech government, and 
Czechoslovakian troops were mobilised. X98 Earlier, on 23 September, R. A. 
Butler, and the Lord Privy Seal, Lord de la Warr, had sought confirmation of 
Soviet intentions regarding Czechoslovakia at Geneva. In this first meeting of 
British and Soviet representatives regarding the Sudetenland crisis, Litvinov 
reiterated Moscow's dedication to honouring its pact with Prague. Litvinov 
added that the Kremlin had informed the Polish government that any attack by 
them on the Teschen area would invalidate the Soviet - Polish non aggression 
pact and action would be taken by Soviet troops. The Soviet Commissar made 
another proposal for a meeting of the French, British and Soviet governments, 
but again Moscow received no reply. ' 
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On 26 September, Hitler gave his ultimatum. " On the same day, the News 
Department in the British Foreign Office, headed by Reginald Leeper'°' , issued 
a press communique. It stated that 
... if 
in spite of all efforts made by the British Prime Minister a German 
attack is made upon Czechoslovakia the immediate result must be that 
France will be bound to come to her assistance and Great Britain and 
Russia will certainly stand by France. Z°2 
Thus, the Soviet Union was mentioned for the first time in a British 
communique regarding Czechoslovakia. Immediately after its publication, 
however, a repudiation of the statement was issued. 2O3 On 27 September, 
Chamberlain sent a personal message to the Czech president warning him that 
the West would not provide aid if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia. " 
Afterwards, in reply to a letter from Hitler, Chamberlain urged another meeting 
to settle the issue. Chamberlain also wrote to the Italian dictator, Benito 
Mussolini, expressing his hope that a peaceful solution could be found. " Hitler 
and Mussolini decided to hold a conference at Munich. On 28 September, 
Chamberlain announced his invitation to the conference and his acceptance, to 
the House of Commons. zo' At Munich, neither the Czechoslovakian nor Soviet 
governments were represented. Questions raised by Chamberlain and Daladier 
were brushed aside. Finally, on 30 September, an agreement not dissimilar to 
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the demands made by Hitler at Godesberg, was concluded. " It stated that the 
Sudetenland was to be occupied in stages between 1- lo October up to a line 
determined by an international commission, with additional plebiscite areas as 
necessary. 208 Once claims of the Polish and Hungarian minorities were satisfied 
then Britain and France would join with Italy and Germany in guaranteeing the 
remainder of the Czech state. Benes made one more appeal for aid from the 
Soviet government, but before it could be replied to, he submitted. Later, the 
Czech president stated that Moscow had in fact promised unilateral assistance 
in the event of a German invasion of Czechoslovakia. " The reply, however, had 
been too late. Four days after the Munich agreement was concluded, Benes 
resigned. 
Throughout September 1938, Neville Chamberlain remained opposed to any 
suggestion of collaboration with the Soviet government over the Sudetenland 
crisis. Having earlier agreed to the Foreign Secretary's plans to try to change the 
terms of the Soviet - Czechoslovakian pact21° , the Prime Minister did not 
hesitate to agree to Hitler's demands to remove Czechoslovakia's obligations to 
the Soviet Union. He also reproved the Foreign Secretary for his publication of 
the communique regarding Britain's willingness to assist France and the Soviet 
Union. " Twice in September, the Prime Minister named the Soviet Union when 
discussing a possible guarantee of what remained of Czechoslovakia if the 
207 Memorandum on the first meeting between the British and French Prime Ministers, the Duce, 
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Sudetenland was ceded. "' But this in no way reflected a genuine willingness to 
collaborate with the Soviets. The Prime Minister had no intention of 
guaranteeing Czechoslovakia, and, indeed, the guarantee was never ratified. 
Instead, such statements had been made to placate domestic critics. Thus, the 
Munich agreement was not an expression of Chamberlain not wanting to choose 
between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. '3 The Prime Minister's decisions 
during the meetings with Hitler, and indeed his final agreement to the Munich 
conference, exemplified his attitude towards the Soviet Union. Chamberlain 
continued to be indifferent to the position of the Soviet government and 
remained only too eager to see the Soviet Union diplomatically excluded from 
Europe. 
Britain's agreement to the Munich settlement, indeed nearly all of the decisions 
taken regarding the settlement of the Sudetenland crisis during September were 
taken by Chamberlain alone. The Prime Minister had, for example, initiated the 
Munich meeting by contacting Hitler and Mussolini without consulting other 
members of the Cabinet or even the Foreign Secretary. On 19 September, 
Chamberlain wrote to his sister: `On Tuesday night I saw the moment had come 
and must be taken if I was not to be too late. So I sent the fateful telegram and 
told the cabinet the next morning what I had done. f214 On the evening before 
Chamberlain left for Munich he failed to assemble the Cabinet or even the 
`inner cabinet'. "' Throughout 1938, the entire Cabinet had supported 
Chamberlain's decisions regarding the rebuttals of Soviet proposals for 
collaboration over the Czech crisis. Why, then, did he feel he could not discuss 
the possibility of proposing such a meeting with his Cabinet? One suggestion is 
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that Chamberlain feared mounting opposition to his determination to reach an 
accord with Hitler. Another suggestion, however, is that the Prime Minister 
recognised that some members of his Cabinet were rethinking their position 
regarding the inclusion of the Soviet Union. To support this interpretation one 
can first point to Chamberlain deliberately misleading his Cabinet regarding the 
opinions of the opposition towards Soviet involvement in settling the Czech 
crisis. Thus, on 19 September, the Prime Minister decided to give his colleagues 
an account of the conversation he had had with the Labour deputation, 
consisting of Herbert Morrison , Hugh Dalton, and Walter Citrine, two days 
earlier. After telling the deputation that Georges Bonnet had `grave doubts as to 
whether the Soviet Union really meant to do anything"", Chamberlain told his 
Cabinet that the Labour deputation had expressed their regret at calling for 
collaboration with Moscow and their criticisms of government policy over the 
Sudetenland. ' Yet Chamberlain's account of the meeting was in stark contrast 
to the recollections of Hugh Dalton. Dalton recorded in his diary on 17 
September 1938, that he ( Dalton) did not agree with Bonnet's accusations of 
insincerity on Moscow's part and therefore continued to support Anglo-French- 
Soviet cooperation regarding the defence of the Sudetenland. u8 
Further evidence that ministers were changing their opinions about 
collaborating with the Soviets over Czechoslovakia can be revealed in an 
examination of the statements and decisions made by Cabinet ministers 
themselves during September. Throughout most of 1938, indeed for the first 
three weeks of September, Cabinet ministers had supported Chamberlain's 
diplomatic exclusion of the Soviets. Early in March, for example, Halifax, had 
suggested that the French be persuaded to support the British in its attempt to 
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`isolate Russia. "" In May, it had been Halifax that led the proposal to change the 
terms of the Soviet - Czech pact of assistance. `2° He refused to keep the Soviet 
ambassador informed of developments regarding Czechoslovakia, ' and in 
September put forward a number of inadequate excuses as to why the Soviet 
proposal of cooperation could not be accepted. "' He told Winston Churchill, for 
example, that in order to achieve an Anglo-French- Soviet alliance ` it would be 
necessary to draw up a formal instrument in Treaty form, and this would be a 
long and complicated matter. "" Of course, the amount of time it would in fact 
take to establish collaboration depended entirely on those countries involved, 
and would only be a long and complicated matter if certain governments wished 
it to be. 
Despite such opposition to collaboration, however, during the final week of 
September several ministers appeared to change their minds. 22' Halifax, in 
particular, made two significant decisions between 23 - 29 September. The 
first, was to send R. A. Butler and Lord de la Warr to Geneva to discover Soviet 
intentions regarding the defence of Czechoslovakia. Though the Foreign 
Secretary's decision revealed an arrogant presumption that, after months of 
exclusion, Moscow would still confide and cooperate with London, Halifax had, 
nevertheless, taken the step to at least enquire about Soviet intentions. His 
second revealing decision was to ratify the foreign office communique released 
on 26 September, which stated Britain's willingness to assist both France and 
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the Soviet Union if necessary. ' 
Halifax was not alone in his change of attitude towards cooperating with the 
Soviets. Samuel Hoare also considered the Soviet Union when thinking about 
possible settlements of the crisis. In his memoirs written after the war, Hoare 
depicted himself as being very much opposed to any form of Anglo-Soviet 
collaboration and this was largely true for much of his political career up to 
September 1938. Yet, in a letter to the Foreign Secretary on 15 September, 
Hoare suggested the neutralisation of Czechoslovakia `under guarantee of 
principal European powers', including Germany and the Soviet Union. The 
reason for this, he explained, was that the Czechs would never surrender their 
alliances with the French and Soviets, as Hitler demanded, because such 
alliances were their `only hope of security. '226 Not only, then, did Hoare believe 
the Soviet government could be involved in the settling of the Sudetenland 
crisis, but he even went on to explain how this would benefit Moscow; `... to the 
Russians', he wrote, `a large neutralised area between themselves and the 
Germans would be an advantage strategically, and they would be freed from any 
obligation to intervene in a war such as may now be impending. '2' 
Following this, on 25 September, the Home Secretary told the Cabinet that he 
`thought it was of utmost importance that the countries involved', namely, 
Britain, the Soviet Union and France, `should examine the military position as 
225 Hoare states in his memoirs that, in fact, the communique had never been authorised and 
this is why the Cabinet sent out an immediate repudiation. However, in addition to the general 
unreliability of Hoare's memoirs, William Strang points out in his memoirs that a statement on p. 
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impartially as possible. '" Thus, for the first time, a Cabinet minister considered 
the views and perspective of the Soviet government. In addition, Hoare 
appeared to acknowledge the influence of prejudices upon foreign policy 
decisions and suggested that such feelings be put aside. Halifax's and Hoare's 
change of attitude towards Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration was mirrored by 
others including de la Warr and the Secretary of State for Air, Kingsley Wood. 
Both had accepted the diplomatic exclusion of the Soviet Union throughout 
1938, yet, on 2 September, de la Warr had written to the Foreign Secretary to 
suggest that the Foreign Office make a demonstration of consulting with the 
Soviet and French ambassadors in London. Such a step, he explained, `would do 
good with the Russians whose help after all we may need in the last resort. I 
gather from Harold Nicolson who saw Maisky the other day that there is a 
certain amount of feeling about being left out in the cold... " Despite earlier 
commenting upon the weaknesses of the Soviet airforce23° , Kingsley Wood 
suggested to the cabinet on 25 September, `that inter-staff talks should take 
place between the Chief of Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the French 
General Staff. ' Wood added, `... if possible the Russians might be associated with 
these talks. '' Indeed, records show that during this meeting, the ' Home 
Secretary's proposal for joint conversations between Britain, France and Russia 
in order that the cabinet might be in possession of the best military information 
and advice met with support' from almost all members. 232 
For certain ministers such as Wood and de la Warr, lack of evidence makes it 
difficult to conclude with any certainty that it was their ideological prejudices 
that had influenced their attitudes towards Anglo-Soviet collaboration 
226 CAB 23 / 95 Cab. 43.25 Sept, 1938. 
229 Letter from de la Warr to Halifax. 2 Sept, 1938. FO 800 / 314. Halifax Papers. The suggestion 
was repeated on the 10 September, 1938. 




throughout 1938, and therefore that it was a decision to put aside such 
prejudices in September that caused them to change their minds regarding 
collaboration. However, it is fair to assume this interpretation applies equally to 
these ministers as to others, such as Hoare and Halifax. The assumption can be 
made for two reasons. Firstly, although certain ministers wrote little about their 
personal views of the Soviet Union during the 1930s, the similarity, in content, 
intensity and reasoning amongst those who did note their opinions, suggests 
that such attitudes were almost inherent and most probably shared by a 
majority of the political elite. Secondly, that such ministers, especially Kingsley 
Wood, changed his opinion on an issue which he had put forward throughout 
1938 as a primary reason to oppose Anglo-Soviet collaboration, namely Soviet 
military weakness, suggests that it had only ever been put forward as a 
convenient excuse to mask more personal reasons. 
Cabinet ministers were not the only ones to alter their perception of Soviet 
capabilities in the event of war. The Chiefs of Staff also changed their minds 
regarding Soviet military capability and intentions regarding the defence of 
Czechoslovakia. They did not believe that Moscow would unconditionally 
defend its ally and in doing so undoubtedly defeat the German forces. However, 
by August, the Chiefs of Staff did acknowledge that even if the Soviet 
government remained neutral in war, `there seems every possibility that she 
might give valuable' assistance to Czechoslovakia in the form of warlike stores 
and `volunteers', notably pilots flying Russian aircraft. ' The report added that 
this `tendency of exploiting the "volunteer" system of support may help 
Czechoslovakia and enable her to sustain her defence against German 
aggression. "" The Soviet government had already provided aid both to the 
233 My italics. 
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Chinese in the Sino-Japanese war and the Republicans in the Spanish civil 
war. ' Thus, in contrast to earlier reports, the Chiefs of Staff now depicted 
Soviet involvement in war over Czechoslovakia as likely and valuable. 
Why had the Chiefs of Staff changed their perceptions of Soviet capabilities and 
intentions, and why, more significantly, did several Cabinet ministers change 
their minds, albeit temporarily, with regard to Anglo-Soviet collaboration? 
Because each decided to put aside their personal prejudices towards the Soviet 
Union during the foreign policy decision making process. What had persuaded 
these individuals to put aside their distrust and hostility? One suggestion was 
that ministers finally listened to the demands of those outside the government. 
In the House of Commons, numerous politicians from both Labour and 
Conservative parties had called for cooperation with the Soviets during 1938.236 
Winston Churchill, in particular, had also written privately to Halifax in July 
suggesting a possibly peaceful solution to the crisis that would also include, and 
so placate, the Soviet government. He wrote: 
... 
it seems to me there are two things which might be done this week to 
increase the deterrents against violent action by H., [Hitler] neither of 
which would commit you to the dread guarantee. First would it not be 
possible to frame a joint note between Britain, France and Russia stating 
(a) their desire for peace and friendly relations; (b) their deep anxiety at 
the military preparations of Germany; (c) their joint interest in a peaceful 
solution of the Czechoslovak controversy, and (d) that an invasion by 
Germany of Czechoslovakia would raise capital issues for all three 
powers ... It seems to me that this process would give the 
best chance to 
the peaceful elements in German official circles to make a stand and that 
H. [Hitler] might find a way out for himself.. . The 
important thing is the 
joint note. ' 
What evidence seems primarily to indicate, however, is that ministers were 
235 Ibid. 
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influenced by their changing perceptions of Hitler. During the first year of 
Chamberlain's premiership ministers such as Halifax and Hoare especially had 
noted their suspicions of the German dictator. At the same time, however, they 
and the rest of the Cabinet had shared Chamberlain's confidence that Hitler's 
aims were limited and an agreement possible. It was only during the summer 
of 1938 that this belief began to change. Halifax especially had been receiving 
intelligence reports from Vansittart since July warning of Hitler's future 
aggressive ambitions. X3' Events during September appeared to confirm these 
reports. The Cabinet believed that negotiations with Hitler had broken down, or 
were likely to collapse, and that war was now inevitable. ' Ministers had 
opposed Hitler's Godesberg terms and all were left in London when 
Chamberlain flew to meet Hitler for the final meeting in Munich. No one knew 
what news the Prime Minister would bring back. Thus, until 30 September, a 
bigger fear loomed, something seemingly more threatening than the Soviet 
Union and Communist expansion. 
Neither the Chiefs of Staff nor members of the Cabinet were yet willing to 
advocate a full Anglo-French-Soviet military alliance. This exemplified the 
strength of the suspicion that existed towards Moscow. It took great effort on 
the part of ministers to overlook their distrust of the Soviet government, 
especially when Soviet decisions continued to fuel such suspicions. Moscow's 
warning to Poland against the seizure of Teschen, for example, had only seemed 
to confirm suspicions that the Soviet Union wanted to exploit the crisis in 
Czechoslovakia to expand eastwards. Consequently, ministers such as Hoare, 
despite his consideration of cooperation, clarified his position by adding that `in 
2" Gorden Martel, ed., The Times and Appeasement. The Journals of A. L. Kennedy, 1932- 
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any event the Russian attitude need not be a conclusive factor with Britain and 
France. '' Though distrust had been overlooked to the extent that ministers 
were willing to consider cooperation, attitudes towards the Soviet Union had 
not changed. Distrust and hostility remained. Certain members of the Cabinet, 
most notably, Simon and Chamberlain, were not even willing to consider 
collaboration with the Soviet government. "' 
Was Chamberlain, indeed the entire British Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff, right to 
distrust the Soviet government in 1938? Several historians since have argued 
that the Prime Minister and his cabinet were correct in their suspicion of Soviet 
intentions. Most recently, for example, Igor Lukes, in his article, `Stalin and 
Czechoslovakia, 1-938 - 1939; An Autopsy of a Myth', asserts that the Soviet 
Union had no intention of assisting Czechoslovakia in resisting German 
aggression in 1938.243 Moscow, Lukes insists, was never really dedicated to the 
promotion of peace, but instead urged the Czechoslovakian government to 
resist German demands only due to its desire for conflict between Franco- 
British capitalism and German - Nazism. 244 Moscow deemed future war 
desirable because `Hitler's offensive could be but a prelude to a wave of Socialist 
revolutions in Europe. "' Lukes' article reiterates many of the suspicions voiced 
by ministers at the time, yet it is no more convincing. The reason for this is that 
Lukes' argument is based primarily on Czechoslovakian archives and the 
recollections of the Czech president Benes. This is despite the fact that, as Lukes 
admits himself, Benes was extremely suspicious of, and felt great hostility 
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towards, the Soviet government. The reliability of such evidence therefore is 
highly questionable. Lukes' emphasis upon the practical difficulties inherent in 
any Soviet assistance of Czechoslovakian are valid. However, such difficulties 
are irrelevant to the question of Soviet willingness to act. `' 
In contrast to the accusations put forward by ministers in 1938 and historians 
thereafter, there is much evidence to suggest the Soviet government had every 
intention of assisting Czechoslovakia. Geoffrey Roberts in his book, The Soviet 
Union and the Origins of the Second World War, argues convincingly that, 
... from the beginning to the end of the crisis the Soviets campaigned for 
international resistance to Hitler's designs on Czechoslovakia, urged the 
Czechs to stand firm, made it crystal clear that they would fulfil their 
mutual assistance obligations and agitated for France to do the same. " 
Moscow hedged on the question of providing assistance come what may, but 
such behaviour was not, as ministers and historians have suggested, indicative 
of the Kremlin's efforts to escape its treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. 
Instead, it reflected two thoughts within Moscow; first a strong conviction that a 
collective front by Britain, France and the Soviet Union would deter Hitler from 
war, and second, a suspicion that both London and Paris were encouraging 
German expansionism eastwards. Moscow did not want to be left to fight the 
Germans alone while the British and French stood by. Thus, it is accurate to say 
that the Soviet government was reluctant to go to war and to point out that 
Moscow did not make a unilateral declaration of aid come what may. However, 
as Roberts' research has shown, this does not provide adequate evidence to 
support the contention that the Soviet Union would not have acted to defend its 
ally alongside Britain and France. " 
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Because of the Munich settlement it will remain difficult to conclude for certain 
what Stalin's genuine intentions were regarding Czechoslovakia. However, it is 
revealing that neither Chamberlain nor his ministers chose to deliberate points 
such as Soviet suspicion of the West and the equity of their proposals. Only 
twice in the first nine months of 1938 were Soviet suspicions of the West even 
mentioned. It was certainly never acknowledged that the demands being placed 
upon the Soviet government were unfair. Indeed, no other government, 
including the French, which also had a treaty of assistance with Czechoslovakia, 
was expected to make a unilateral declaration of assistance. This reflected the 
arrogance and presumption of many within the Cabinet. Even when the Soviet 
government made quite clear its intention to fulfil its obligations according to 
the treaty signed with Czechoslovakia in 1935, this did not satisfy British 
officials. R. A. Butler, wrote after his meeting with Litvinov on 23 September, 
that he `was left in no doubt that the Russians themselves did not mean 
business. ' `Litvinov', he added, `had been deliberately evasive and vague except 
when he said that if France acted the Soviet would act too. fX49 The reason 
Litvinov's wholly unambiguous answer did not satisfy Butler was because 
nothing the Soviets said or did would be enough for those who were intent on 
opposing collaboration for other reasons. Only two weeks earlier Litvinov had 
informed Bonnet, `that he would like to get the Czech question discussed by an 
ad hoc committee', involving Soviet and Czech representatives. Butler wrote to 
Halifax in response; `Let us hope no more will come of this idea. " O British 
demands for greater demonstrations of sincerity by Moscow were made in 
anticipation of a Soviet refusal. For those who opposed Anglo - French - Soviet 
collaboration, such as Butler and Chamberlain, it remained convenient to allow 
Soviet hedging to be perceived as a reflection of Soviet insincerity. 
249 In his memoirs, Butler denied the British government deliberately attempted to exclude the 
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Ultimately, all within the Cabinet, with the exception of Duff Cooper, accepted 
the agreement Chamberlain signed and brought back from Munich. The Prime 
Minister had apparently averted war. He claimed to have achieved not only 
`peace with honour' but also `peace in our time. ' Hence, there no longer existed 
any urgent reason for ministers to continue overlooking their suspicion of the 
Soviet Union. One who did not agree with the settlement reached at Munich, 
however, was the First Lord of the Admiralty, Duff Cooper. His perception of 
Hitler at the time of Munich differed from others, and he consequently opposed 
Chamberlain's appeasement policies. "' Cooper said little about the Soviet Union 
during his time in government and his memoirs, Old Men Forget. provides little 
more insight into his views of the Soviet government and Communism. " In 
1938, however, the First Lord of the Admiralty did want the Soviet Union 
involved in plans to resist future German aggression. Indeed, Cooper was the 
only member of the cabinet to favour a bluff, involving the Soviet Union, against 
Hitler. He thought that if Hitler was made to believe he would face the old 
alliance of 1914 - 1918, together with American support, the German dictator 
would back down and war would be averted. ` Evidently, then, the First Lord 
believed the Soviet Union to be militarily strong enough to deter Hitler from 
war. His greater recognition of the German threat had convinced Cooper, for 
much longer and to a greater extent than other ministers, of the need to exclude 
political and ideological considerations in the foreign policy decision making 
process. `If in the face of the real and terrible German danger all our efforts are 
to be analysed by the ... 
bolshevist bogey', he wrote, `... I feel inclined to 
despair. 'zr' His greater recognition of Hitler's aggressive foreign policy 
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ambitions, however, also led Cooper to resign at the end of September' rather 
than accept the Munich agreement. 
Cooper's resignation did not greatly concern the Prime Minister. He remained 
hopeful that an accord with Hitler was still possible. During the winter of 1938 - 
1939, London put out unofficial feelers involving a colonial settlement, private 
visits to Hitler, and even the possibility of a defensive alliance against the Soviet 
Union. " Anglo-German relations, however, were to deteriorate. On io 
November, in what has since become known as `Crystal Night', the Jews of 
Germany were attacked in response to the murder of a German diplomat by a 
Polish Jew in Paris. Hitler announced that he no longer valued British 
friendship and in December, Berlin declared that there would be an increase in 
the German submarine fleet equivalent to that of the British fleet. This 
represented a clear breach of the Anglo-German naval agreement signed in 
1935.217 As relations worsened, London looked for an improvement of relations 
with Italy. In January, Chamberlain and Halifax visited Rome to meet the 
Italian dictator. But Mussolini had already accepted Hitler's proposals for 
turning the anti-Comintern pact signed in November 1937 into a military 
alliance. "' In the same month, Hitler ordered the Czechoslovakian government 
to pull out of the League of Nations. Promises made at the end of September 
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1938 to guarantee what remained of Czechoslovakia had not materialised. ' 
Indeed, at the end of February, the German dictator made it clear that he had 
no intention of participating in any guarantee of Czechoslovakia. 2 
Despite the apparent aversion of war achieved by Munich, the agreement had 
only highlighted the exclusion of the Soviet Union from international affairs. 26' 
In Moscow, Molotov argued that the settlement typified the political prejudices 
of the West. `The real point', he declared on 6 November, 'is that ... the 
"democratic" states, although they deplore the "excesses" of the Fascist states... 
have a still greater fear of the working class movement.. . and think that Fascism 
is a good antidote. ' 262 His accusation was not wholly inaccurate. There is little 
evidence to show that, as Ivan Maisky later suggested, the British actually 
encouraged Hitler eastwards. 26' However Chamberlain was entirely indifferent 
to the possibility of a German attack on the Soviet Union. After having been told 
by British intelligence that Hitler's aim at the end of 1938 was to devote `special 
attention to the eastward drive, to securing control of the exploitable riches of 
south and possibly more of, Russia... i264 , Chamberlain informed the Cabinet 
that `if there were any truth in these rumours', the main concern of London was 
to avoid being dragged into any `quarrel between Russia and Germany. " 
By signing the Munich agreement, Moscow believed the British and French had 
failed to take the last opportunity to halt Hitler's aggressive foreign policy. 
Consequently, Soviet hope for collective security would now become 
The British government, after pressure from the House of Commons, had announced on 4 
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subordinated to a policy of collective defence. 166 Between October 1938 - March 
1939, Moscow reverted to a policy of isolationism. In November, Soviet troops 
and aid were withdrawn from Spain. 2' Dissatisfaction with the actions of the 
Western powers continued to be voiced. In February, for example, Litvinov told 
the new British ambassador in Moscow, William Seeds, that the Soviet 
government and public opinion saw no sign that Britain and France would do 
anything but continue to capitulate. `Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini', 
Litvinov explained, `are as frightened of war as you are but they now know from 
experience that you will never fight. ' The Soviet Union, therefore, would `keep 
aloof, especially since its interests were not directly threatened. z6' Stalin, 
himself, expressed his resentment at the decisions taken by the British and 
French. On io March, 1939, at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, Stalin accused the western powers of abandoning and so 
destroying the principle of collective security. The Soviet Union, he warned, 
269 would no longer be a mercenary for others. 
Almost no diplomatic activity took place between London and Moscow until 
January 1939 when William Seeds replaced the British ambassador in Moscow, 
Viscount Chilston. It seemed a new opportunity for improved relations. Though 
equally appalled by the Soviet internal system, Seeds had lived in Russia, spoke 
Russian and was an advocate of closer Anglo-French-Soviet relations. 2JO His 
instruction was to emphasise London's goodwill towards Moscow, which he 
did. ' During the same month, the Foreign Office received rumours for the first 
time of German - Soviet negotiations. The talks caused uneasiness, but they 
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were largely dismissed as mistaken, deriving from what was actually German - 
Soviet economic talks. 2'2 Further steps were taken to foster improved Anglo- 
Soviet relations in February, when Robert Hudson, Head of the Department of 
Overseas Trade, was sent to Moscow to negotiate the possibility of a new trade 
agreement with the Soviet government. X73 Negotiations in March, however, were 
soon overshadowed by the consequences of what was occurring in central 
eastern Europe, namely, the disappearance of what remained of Czechoslovakia 
between 13 - 15 March. 
After the Munich agreement, several Cabinet ministers spoke out in favour of 
improving Anglo - Soviet relations. The Foreign Secretary, in particular, made 
an effort to ease tension between the two countries. X74 Thus, he took the time to 
explain the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Munich conference. Halifax 
had never before shown any concern for the reaction of Moscow, yet on 29 
September he told Maisky that he `was particularly anxious that his government 
should not misinterpret the fact that this conference did not include a 
representative of the Soviet government. " The Foreign Secretary's willingness 
to conciliate the Soviet government was even more evident in a letter he wrote 
to the British ambassador in Moscow: 
I assured the Ambassador [Maisky] that there was no desire on our part 
to see the Soviet Government, whose interest in these great issues was as 
large as our own, in any way excluded from them, and the fact that in 
present circumstances it might be impossible, if we were to talk to the 
German and Italian Governments at all, to include the Soviet 
government directly in these talks, in no way signified any weakening of 
a desire on our part, any more, no doubt, than on that of the French 
Government, to preserve our understandings and relations with the 
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Initially, Halifax had been cautious. He acknowledged in the House of Lords 
that the exclusion of the Soviet Union to date would have caused much 
resentment; `Russia herself has never been consulted, and we do not know what 
her attitude would be. " After his conversation with Maisky, however, Halifax 
seemed hopeful that progress would be made. He told Chilston that Maisky's, 
... general attitude seemed to me, as, 
indeed, it was likely to be, one of 
some suspicion, but not one of resentment in face of facts, which he was 
perforce obliged to admit. And, as our conversation proceeded, he 
seemed to discard some of the suspicion. " 
The Foreign Secretary, in fact, could not have been more wrong about the 
resentment and suspicion harboured by the Kremlin. Nevertheless, he 
continued to try and establish a closer relationship with Moscow. Most 
significantly, he took the opportunity of improving relations through a revision 
of the 1934 trade agreement. The initial demand for a revision of the trade 
agreement had stemmed from the complaints of UK traders regarding 
Moscow's unfair trading. ' Oliver Stanley, President of the Board of the Trade, 
informed the Cabinet of the complaints at the end of 1938. Stanley, himself a 
supporter of improving Anglo-Soviet relations, did not want to antagonise the 
Soviet government and suggested negotiations be carried out at a later date . 
`8° 
Thus, in February, Halifax took up the initiative and told the Cabinet that he 
`did not wish to lose any opportunity of establishing closer relations with 
Russia. ii8' He spoke of `warming up to Russia and sending a minister there. '" 
Robert Hudson was sent to negotiate the possibility of a new economic 
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relationship between Britain and the Soviet Union. Soon after, Alexander 
Cadogan also appeared to at least ponder the prospect of further 
collaboration. 283 
Both Samuel Hoare and Sir John Simon also made statements following 
Munich declaring a willingness on the part of the British government not to 
exclude the Soviet government from international politics. On 5 October, Simon 
informed the House of Commons that it was the government's `hope that Russia 
will be willing to join in the guarantee of Czechoslovakia', and that the 
government had `no intention whatever of excluding Russia.. from any future 
settlements in Europe. ' 2$4 Hoare reiterated the point, stating the government did 
`not in anyway contemplate the exclusion of Soviet Russia. ' `85 Throughout 1938, 
Simon had said almost nothing about the Soviet Union, and what few remarks 
he made were negative. Consequently, it is most likely that his statement in the 
House of Commons was intended only to calm critics and did not reflect his 
personal attitudes towards the Soviet Union or future Anglo-Soviet relations. 
Samuel Hoare, on the other hand, had considered collaboration with Moscow at 
the height of the Czechoslovakian crisis and continued to call for closer relations 
in Cabinet meetings after Munich. The Home Secretary was genuinely in favour 
of including the Soviet Union in any guarantee of Czechoslovakia, and on 16 
November proposed that the Foreign Office `might suggest to the French 
government that they, in their turn, should sound the Soviet government as to 
their attitude. ' 286 When it appeared that Chamberlain was going to acquiesce in 
the exclusion of the Soviet Union in favour of a four power agreement including 
Germany, Italy, France and Britain, Hoare spoke out. 
The proposal was some way removed from the earlier proposal that 
France, Russia and this country should give a joint guarantee to 
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As well as supporting closer Anglo-Soviet relations in official meetings, the 
Home Secretary's private papers also show what appears to be an effort on the 
part of Hoare to improve relations between himself and the Soviet ambassador, 
Maisky. 2$8 
Such support and effort to improve relations between Moscow and London 
reflected the continued struggle of certain ministers to put aside their personal 
prejudices against the Soviet Union. The reason for this was an increasing 
realisation of the potential influence the Soviet Union could have upon 
international affairs in the future. Thus, Halifax told the British ambassador in 
Paris, that the Soviet Union `for good or evil, is part of Europe and we cannot 
ignore her existence. i2" Samuel Hoare urged the Cabinet that it was in Britain's 
`interest to see a strong Russia, and that we must not take any action which 
made it appear that we were anti-Russian, or indifferent to Russia's future. "' 
Moscow's potential importance was being increasingly realised for two reasons. 
The first, as mentioned above, was changing perceptions of Hitler. Those that 
called for improved Anglo-Soviet relations were also those who had begun to 
realise Hitler's aggressive foreign policy ambitions. Not only had the German 
dictator threatened war over Czechoslovakia, but during the winter of 1938 - 
1939, the Foreign Office received rumours that Germany intended to attack 
westwards, and not eastwards as had been thought. 291 Another concern, 
however, were the rumours of a possible German - Soviet rapprochement 
which the Foreign Office began to receive in January. Maxim Litvinov had 
informed the Foreign Office that a German delegation would soon arrive in 
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Moscow. A member of the German embassy said privately that they would be 
buying raw materials and supplying machinery, and, perhaps, arms. `` In 
February, Charles Corbin, the French ambassador in London, emphasised to 
Alexander Cadogan that Hitler's recent speeches had contained no attack on the 
Soviets. X93 Cadogan noted his concern; 
If we may believe that the Germans have found that their project for 
acquiring a dominating position in the Ukraine was not so realisable as 
they had thought, it may well be that they have turned their minds to 
obtaining a form of economic cooperation with, if not domination of, the 
Soviet with a view to benefiting from the almost unlimited sources of raw 
materials which that might put at their disposal. The transformation of 
the anti-Comintern pact into a simple act of mutual assistance against 
unprovoked aggression by any third party might be designed by the 
Germans to convince the Soviet Government that they are no longer their 
chief enemy and that German policy is not directed entirely against the 
Soviet and all its works. It seems to me that we shall have to watch very 
carefully the development of any tendency towards a rapprochement 
between Germany and the Soviet. "' 
It is interesting to note that Cadogan's fear of a German - Soviet rapprochement 
had persuaded him to recognise the value of the Soviet Union. The Foreign 
Secretary's Private Secretary, Oliver Harvey, also recalled in his diary his own 
anxiety at such rumours of a possible German - Soviet rapprochement. " It is 
not purely coincidental that it was at this time that the Foreign Secretary 
decided to initiate plans to negotiate a new trade agreement. 
Though these ministers supported improved Anglo-Soviet relations, the Soviet 
Union had not yet become a primary consideration in the foreign policy 
decision making process. No Cabinet member supported an Anglo-Soviet 
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alliance, because personal attitudes towards the Soviet Union had neither 
changed nor been put aside completely. Several ministers had made an effort to 
overlook their distrust of Moscow, but there was no guarantee that these efforts 
to keep aside such opinions would persist. It remained difficult for ministers to 
embrace a government they had suspected for so long. Hence, it is not 
surprising that ministers and officials made contradictory statements and 
decisions. Halifax, for example, despite his rhetoric and calls for Soviet 
involvement in international politics immediately after the signing of the 
Munich agreement, later agreed to and justified Moscow's exclusion from a 
guarantee of Czechoslovakia. "' He told the Foreign Policy Committee: 
The question arises whether or not the Czech government should ask or 
accept a guarantee from Russia. His Majesty's Government consider that, 
if Russia is brought in as guarantor, it is probable that Germany and Italy 
will refuse to join in the guarantee since the guarantee of Germany is 
essential, we should if matter came to one of clear choice between 
Germany and Russia, prefer the former of the price of the exclusion of 
the latter.... "' 
Nevertheless, Halifax did at least try to improve Anglo-Soviet relations during 
the months following Munich. 
Chamberlain on the other hand had not changed his hope of appeasing Hitler. 
As a result there remained no reason for the Prime Minister to even attempt to 
overlook his own hostility towards and suspicion of the Soviet government, nor 
revise his opposition to closer Anglo-Soviet relations. In a statement in which 
Chamberlain explained to the House of Commons his hopes for the future and 
his foreign policy plans, the Prime Minister failed to even mention the Soviet 
Union. Clement Attlee, leader of the Labour party , exclaimed that the 
`Prime 
Minister cannot even bear to mention them [the Soviet Union]. "" Following the 
events of September, Chamberlain was aware that he had to be careful not to 
CAB 24 / 280 C. P. 258. 
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accentuate the potential for dissent amongst several ministers, so he did not 
openly oppose suggestions to improve relations with the Soviet Union and even 
agreed to Halifax's proposal to initiate negotiations regarding a revision of the 
trade agreement of 1934.299 At the same time, however, Chamberlain continued 
to oppose Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration by putting forward the difficulties 
he perceived to be inherent in closer Anglo-Soviet relations. Furthermore his 
only comments regarding the Soviet Union were negative. When Hoare, for 
example, suggested that the British government should make an effort not to 
appear hostile towards the Soviet Union, Chamberlain added; `at the same time, 
it was desirable to avoid entanglement arising out of a possible dispute between 
Russia and Germany. '3°° During deliberations concerning trade negotiations 
with Moscow, the Prime Minister repeatedly highlighted the problems he 
believed would occur within the negotiations and any possible settlement. '3°' 
Indeed, Chamberlain would continue to emphasise alleged obstacles inherent in 
any collaboration between the Soviet Union and Britain throughout 1939. The 
Prime Minister realised that if an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was to be 
prevented, he would have to work to ensure that the possibility of collaboration 
was not considered by his ministers to any greater extent. 
The events and decisions taken during September 1938 revealed for the first 
time during Chamberlain's premiership that those involved in the foreign policy 
decision making process could, if they chose, put aside personal prejudices 
against the Soviet Union, and that this would determine attitudes towards 
Anglo-Soviet collaboration. Decisions and statements proved that alleged 
impossible obstacles preventing collaboration between Moscow and London 
were not, in fact, so impossible. The catalyst underlying decisions in September 
299 CAB 23 / 97 Cab. 6.8 Feb, 1939. 
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was a realisation of Hitler's aggressive intentions and a fear of war. After 
Munich, further rumours of Hitler's aggressive foreign policy ambitions and the 
first hint that a German - Soviet rapprochement was a possibility forced several 
ministers to realise the potential influence of the Soviet Union upon 
international affairs in the future. This motivated some to continue overlooking 
their suspicion and work towards improving Anglo-French-Soviet relations. Not 
all, however, supported such efforts. Indeed, a number of ministers had never 
been prepared to overlook their aversion to the Soviet Union throughout the 
entire crisis. The most notable example was the Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain. Furthermore, for those that were willing to try and mend fences 
with the Soviet government, it was difficult to keep aside their personal and 
hostile views of the Soviet Union. Their decision to overlook inherent suspicion 
would not be easy nor necessarily permanent, as events and decisions between 
March - May 1939 were to show. 
Chapter Three: 
80 
Attitudes of the British Foreign Office, Moscow Embassy, and British 
diplomats towards the Soviet Union, May 1937 - March 1939. 
Between May 1937 - March 1939, developments within the Soviet Union took a 
dramatic turn. Consequently, Stalin's dictatorship received greater attention 
from the British Foreign Office in London and the embassy in Moscow. 30' This 
chapter discusses the information officials collected, and provides a background 
to the decisions taken in London. It also looks at the opinions of the Soviet 
Union and of Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration amongst those who were the 
first to learn of internal developments. What it reveals, is that, despite the 
weaknesses and horrors of the Soviet Union, attitudes towards collaboration 
were still ultimately determined by distrust, especially ideological distrust, and 
the willingness to overlook it. 
Throughout this period, officials in Moscow worked very hard to accumulate 
information upon, and describe accurately the condition of, the Soviet Union for 
those in London. "' Reports focused upon all areas of life; the nature of 
government and political developments, social issues, the condition of industry 
and agriculture, the strength of the armed forces, and Moscow's foreign policy 
intentions. Though, to a certain extent, the Soviet Union remained an enigma, 
officials were able to provide London with a largely accurate and certainly 
insightful portrayal of developments and views within the country. Officials did 
not know what went on inside the Kremlin3°4 but one should not underestimate 
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the amount they did learn. "' 
The British ambassador in Moscow, Viscount Aretas Akers-Douglas Chilston, in 
particular, gained a great deal of knowledge about the country and its rulers. At 
the root of his portrayal during this period was what he considered to be 
Moscow's `callousness and crude mendacity. "o6 The Soviet Union was not what 
many political idealists thought it to be. Chilston highlighted the rigged 
elections"' and the poor social record of the supposed leaders of Socialism. 3o' 
Though Moscow continued to mislead and claim that developments inside the 
Soviet Union had `shown the whole world that with the Bolsheviks there is 
never any discrepancy between word and deed"", in reality, Chilston explained, 
life for Soviet citizens was hard. He reported at the end of 1937, for example, 
that `such important foodstuffs as flour..., potatoes, white bread of the poorer 
qualities... and Sudak (a staple item in the diet of the Moscow population) are all 
appreciably dearer than they were nine months ago', and that' most kinds of 
winter clothing are scarce. 9310 Those who worked hard rested in `insanitary and 
appallingly overcrowded tenements because the housing plan was allowed to go 
by the board. '311 Chilston told the Foreign Secretary that the reason life was so 
hard for Soviet citizens was clear, namely, because social issues were wholly 
overshadowed by other issues such as defence, but most importantly the 
insurance of political control. 312 
Equally, although it would be true to say that British officials during this period did not realise 
the full extent of the purges, Chilston and others did clearly appreciate the nature of the purges 
and were not completely naive as to its extent. See M. Hughes, Inside the Enigma, p. 253. 
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The gravest result of Moscow's obsessive and dangerous desire for control were 
the purges. Reports upon the purges had first been received in London during 
1937. In addition to show trials of old Bolsheviks3'3, London had also been 
informed of the increasing danger to Soviet civilians. { The Soviet government, 
Chilston wrote, wanted complete political submission and it employed terror as 
the tool to ensure this. 315 `The fact is', Chilston explained, 'a totalitarian 
atmosphere breeds blind fear of the exceptional. '316 He described the meticulous 
planning that went into ensuring such control: 
A compulsory plebiscite must show at least 98 per cent "for". All political 
suspects must nowadays be found to be Trotskyists; all Trotskyists must 
seal their own death warrants by full confession, everything must 
conform exactly to the preconceived plan, and there must be no ragged 
ends, even for the sake of verisimilitude. " 
`This is state planning carried to the pitch of madness', he wrote. 
`... Unquestionably, the note of insanity sounds very loud in the Soviet Union to- 
day. i 318 
At the end of 1937, Chilston informed the British government that the purges 
were by no means over3'9 , and at the 
beginning of 1938, he could confirm that 
they were continuing with unabated fury. 32O At the end of January, Chilston 
hinted that there might be a possible decline in the ferocity of the purges in 
future. "' However, such a belief did not last long. The terror had merely 
changed direction, focusing more upon those in the party and party 
organisations. In February, Chilston reported: 
... 
during the last fortnight the campaign launched by the Plenum of the 
3'3 Chilston to Eden. 26 Jan, 4 Sept, 1937. docs. 20,140. Ibid. 
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Central Committee of the party against false informers and so-called 
reinsurers has been the principle theme of the Soviet press which 
has... described countless instances of completely unfounded 
denunciation against members of the party ... the new 
development 
implies no abandonment of the terror as an instrument of Bolshevik 
policy, but merely the deflection of that instrument to other uses. There 
can be no doubt that the present campaign against informers will in its 
turn claim many innocent victims along with those who have really 
been guilty of malicious dilation. " 
The first example of such party purges following this report was the show trial 
of the old Bolsheviks: Nikolai Bukharin, Aleksei Rykov, Nikolai Krestinsky, and 
G. G. Yagoda, the former head of the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal 
Affairs)' Like the show trials of 1937324 , Chilston commented upon the farce of 
the accusations and of the process of trial: 
In general the present trial resembles the previous state trials, and the 
comment and criticism which have been devoted to them remain 
applicable in the present case. Once again there have been the fantastic 
charges and the inexplicable "confessions " of the accused, to be 
followed, no doubt, by a sentence of death in almost every case. ' 
The ambassador was sure of the `highly unfavourable impression' the trial 
would create in London. 3-6 Nevertheless, the possible repercussion of such 
purges abroad did not appear to concern the authorities" , and at the end of 
March, Chilston reported upon the purge of the Komsomol (Communist League 
of Youth). 328 
Party members, especially, suffered as a result of the continuation of the 
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purges" , 
but they were not the only victims. Chilston's reports during the early 
months of 1938 also included descriptions of the terror directed against the 
National Republics. He informed London, for example, of the trial of M. 
Kulumbotov, previously President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. `The charges 
brought 
... 
', Chilston commented, `... are identical with those brought against ... 
other representatives of National Republics recently tried in Moscow. "" 
Chilston also reported upon the religious persecutions. In early January, he had 
discovered that the `metropolitan serge, Acting Patriarch and Supreme Head of 
the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union' had been arrested: `Large numbers of 
leading dignatories of the church, including twenty bishops, were arrested in 
December and January on charges of espionage, terrorism, and sabotage, and 
were consequently "liquidated "... '33` Chilston noted the long history of religious 
persecution in the Soviet Union. `To say that there had been "signs of a 
recrudescence of religious persecution in this country would scarcely be 
accurate', he wrote. `For many years past the church in this country has been 
subjected to savage and practically incessant persecution. ' During the past year, 
however, Chilston emphasised that `the "purge" in every walk of life has been 
carried to unprecedented limits, and there can be no doubt that the church has 
suffered severely from this intensification of the reign of terror. '2 
As far as Moscow's political aims were concerned, the purges were a success. At 
the beginning of 1937, opposition to Stalin's leadership had existed amongst the 
`old Bolsheviks' , and Chilston 
had reported that it was `abundantly clear that 
discontent and opposition are rife beneath the surface. '33' Throughout 1937, 
329Chilston to Halifax. 2 Apr, 1938. doc. 251. Ibid. 
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however, the British embassy witnessed Stalin gain absolute control over his 
country. In May, Chilston referred to a `desert of conformity. ' In August, he 
wrote that it was `an obvious fact that throughout the Soviet Union all power 
comes from the Kremlin. '3" By 1938, then, Chilston believed Moscow had 
achieved complete internal political control. There still existed some who might 
still oppose the regime' , 
but the government faced no significant opposition. 
The Soviet Union was politically stable. This did not, however, mean that the 
country could continue to survive at the mercy of such terror. Towards the end 
of Spring, the ambassador warned that although the `Russian people, if 
sufficiently ground down, will support almost anything... ', 
... 
it is certain that the lack of suitable leaders in all branches of Soviet life, 
and the fact that such leaders as there are, whether suitable or 
unsuitable, live under the perpetual threat of liquidation and one, in fact, 
liquidated regularly and consecutively, are bound, by annihilating 
efficiency and destroying confidence, to have a highly deleterious effect 
on the life of the state. 33' 
Indeed, the ambassador was already convinced of the devastating effects of 
Stalin's purges upon the economic condition of the Soviet Union and upon the 
condition of the armed forces. "' It was not easy for Chilston and his advisers to 
obtain information about the Soviet economy in 1938. The ambassador noted 
that there was `ample evidence of the reluctance or inability of the Soviet 
authorities to provide statistical information of economic and financial 
developments... '34° Nevertheless, Chilston was certain that the Soviet economy, 
like all other areas of Soviet life, was subordinated to the political aims of the 
government"' , and that this could only undermine 
Soviet economic progress. 
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Influential figures needed for the smooth running of the economy were being 
purged. At the end of March, the ambassador wrote to London informing the 
Foreign Secretary, 
... that the 
following Commissariats and other all-union economic 
organisations have been deprived of the chiefs by dismissal or arrest, 
usually both, since the middle of 1937: Finance State Bank, Foreign 
Trade, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Agriculture, Timber, Railway 
3 Communications..., `}2 
and many others. To these he added `the innumerable arrests of assistant 
commissars and high officials, heads of central boards and trusts, (and) 
directors of factories. '343 
Soviet industry in particular appeared to be undermined by the purges. "' `It is 
evident', Chilston wrote, `that heavy industry suffered during 1937 from the 
relentless hunt for "wreckers" and the consequent excessive changes in 
executive and technical staff. '45 In 1938, the situation had not improved. `There 
is', he noted, 
... every reason to suppose that the 
lack of men capable of holding 
responsible positions, requiring a certain degree of technical and 
administrative knowledge and experience, is making itself felt in every 
branch of Soviet life, and in particular in the field of industry. "' 
Those individuals equipped with that knowledge were frightened to take on 
responsibilities for fear of elimination. The `inquisitions and persecutions' 
Chilston explained, `... have paralysed all sense of initiative in the leaders of 
Soviet industry. "' Poor output resulted 3"8 Chilston noted, for example, that by 
the end of 1937, heavy industry `was unable to perform the task of increasing its 
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output by over 21 per cent. "" The output in 1938 also failed to satisfy 
MOSCOW . 
350 In response, however, the Soviet government did not halt the purge 
of its workers. Rather, it replaced them with `Stakhonovites and junior party 
officials, entirely regardless of their suitability for the post. ' 35' Such action could 
not, Chilston informed London, `be expected to produce satisfactory results. '352 
Chilston's reports upon developments within the Soviet Union did not bode well 
for those in Britain who supported collaboration with Moscow concerning the 
crisis developing over Czechoslovakia. " When addressing the issue of collective 
resistance, especially, he provided further unequivocal support for those 
opposed to a resistance of German plans alongside Moscow and Paris. He 
agreed with the negative conclusions of the attaches with respect to Soviet 
military potential''', and held a similarly negative view concerning Soviet 
economic potential in the event of war. 3 Chilston was later to be proved wrong. 
By 1943, the Soviet people had achieved a massive evacuation and relocation of 
Soviet industry east of the Urals. By 1944, the gross industrial production of the 
Soviet Union far exceeded pre-war levels. 16 Nevertheless, in 1938 Chilston 
thought it `unlikely... that the Soviet economic system, already so disorganised in 
peace time, would be able to stand up to the strain imposed by a war. '357 
In addition to believing the Soviet Union was not militarily or industrially 
capable of fighting, Chilston was, moreover, convinced that the Kremlin would 
not want to go to war in 1938. At the end of 1937, Chilston had told London 
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that, in his opinion, the Soviet government was genuinely dedicated to a policy 
of collective security. Despite their inherent suspicion of the West35' , he wrote, 
the Kremlin still believed this policy was in its best interest. 9 By April 1938, 
however, the ambassador believed that the threat posed to the stability of the 
regime by war would determine Stalin's aversion to any military action over 
Czechoslovakia. Chilston had repeatedly stressed the stability of the Soviet 
regime in his reports, but, he admitted, there would `no longer be the same 
reasons for doubting the possibility of revolution, if this country were to become 
involved in war. '360 Consequently, the ambassador told London `that ... nothing 
short of an immediate threat to the integrity of Soviet territory would be held by 
the rulers of this country to justify entry into a war. '36' He continued, 
I personally consider it highly unlikely that the Soviet government would 
declare war merely in order to fulfil their treaty obligations or even to 
forestall a blow to Soviet prestige or an indirect threat to Soviet security, 
such, for example, as the occupation by Germany of a part of 
Czechoslovakia. 362 
The ambassador, then, confirmed his agreement with the government's decision 
to reject Soviet overtures for collaboration regarding the crisis. He pointed out 
that there was `no reason why, with time and in changed circumstances, it 
should not play an extremely important role in world affairs. ' Nevertheless, in 
1938, Chilston concluded that `the Soviet Union must..., for the time being, be 
counted out of European politics in so far as the exercise of a decisive influence 
one way or the other is concerned. '363 
It is not surprising that Chilston reached such a conclusion regarding 
collaboration with the Soviet Union over the Czechoslovakian crisis. 
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359 Ibid. 





Throughout 1937 - 1938, the ambassador had repeatedly expressed his 
conviction that the Soviet government and its declarations were 
untrustworthy. 3" He referred to the `nonsensical make-believe', `the customary 
synthetic manifestations of enthusiasm', the `trickery' and the `cunning' of the 
Soviet rulers. 365 In fact, there was no evidence to prove Moscow's unwillingness 
to collaborate against aggression in Czechoslovakia. 366 However, during 1938 
the Soviet government had done little to persuade those reluctant to collaborate 
with it. Indeed, at times during the year, the rhetoric and decisions of Moscow 
were decisively anti-British. 36' The British consulate in Leningrad was closed, 
despite a British protest 161, and in March Chilston had pointed to `the important 
and unsavoury role which has been allotted to Great Britain and the British 
intelligence service... i369 in the trial of Bukharin and other old Bolsheviks. The 
ambassador regarded these references to Great Britain as a `deliberate act of 
unfriendliness on the part of those who direct Soviet policy. '37° 
Chilston's reports changed very little after Munich. Though Soviet officials 
suggested that Soviet armed forces would be strengthened" , the purge 
continued. The ambassador informed London, for example, of the purge of 
Soviet forces in the Far East following Soviet - Japanese hostilities at 
Changkufeng in August. 3' Even the head of the purges was not exempt. In 
December, the leadership replaced M. N. I. Yezhov with M. L. P. Beriya as 
People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. 373 In response to London's concerns 
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about Soviet isolationism, Chilston did not believe the Soviet government would 
remove itself entirely from international affairs. " Yet, he did comment upon the 
`markedly aged' and `more careworn' appearance of Stalin during the months 
following Munich. 375 For those in London already concerned about the effects of 
the Kremlin's exclusion from the conference, such an observation may well have 
increased their fears that the Soviet dictator was tired of having his feelers 
towards the West rebuffed, and that he would soon abandon efforts to establish 
cooperation. 
Not all reports sent by the Moscow embassy were compiled by Viscount 
Chilston during this period. Two officials in particular that collated information 
and put forward strong views about the Soviet Union were Fitzroy Maclean, 
third secretary, and G. Vereker, counsellor in the embassy. Maclean, for 
example, provided further insights regarding Soviet economic progress and 
political stability. Travelling throughout the Soviet Union during the year, 
Maclean acknowledged both the economic achievements and failings of the 
Soviet government. " `It cannot be denied', he wrote, `that in the realm of 
industry,... a good deal has been achieved, and is being achieved. '' In general, 
however, his comments were negative. Hence, he concluded, that `everywhere' 
Soviet standards of living and of productivity were `far lower than ordinary 
European standards. "' In addition Maclean thought that little had been 
achieved that could not have been achieved by the previous Tsarist regime. 
Indeed, he questioned `whether as much or more would not have been achieved 
in the same period under almost any other regime. The Empire of the Tsar also 
had numerous not inconsiderable achievements to its credits... '379 The purges 
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were another subject Maclean commented upon, and though, like Chilston, he 
accepted the political stability of the Soviet regime, "" he too made clear his 
abhorrence of the methods employed by Moscow to ensure such control. "' 
Vereker shared such disgust at the purges and wrote several reports regarding 
the persecution of the church during this period. 382 In addition to this, Vereker's 
findings provided further insight into the condition of the Soviet countryside. 
There was little information available to the officials regarding developments 
within the countryside during this period. The Soviet authorities were showing 
an `increasing unwillingness to publish up-to-date statistics' on agriculture, as 
with all subjects. 383 Nevertheless, Vereker did highlight the discontent the 
existed as a result of the collective farm system. "' `There can be no doubt that 
the arbitrary way in which collective farms are administered, and the arbitrary 
treatment of collectivised peasants by local government and party officials, have 
caused grave discontent throughout the country... ' he wrote. 385 Thus, apart `from 
the danger of passive resistance', the Soviet government also `found themselves 
faced with the possibility that, if life was made too unpleasant for the members 
of collective farms, they would dissolve their collectives and set up as individual 
peasants. i386 In April, Moscow responded to the discontent by issuing a decree 
increasing `the proportion of the revenues of the collective farms paid as wages 
to the collective farm workers. "87 But Vereker was clearly not impressed. The 
Soviet rulers, he told London, 
... are no 
doubt anxious to ensure that, with industry in a bad way, the 
army, to say the least of it, not at its best, and the international situation 
most alarming, their troubles should not be added to by a wave of passive 
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resistance amongst the peasantry. 388 
He continued; `The abuses which it is now sought to remedy are to a great 
extent the natural consequences of the collective system. Solicitude for the 
welfare of the individual has never in practice been a feature of the totalitarian 
system of government,... '3" His doubt about the government's apparent 
concern for the welfare of the peasants was confirmed in December when the 
decree was rescinded because of an alleged increase in `bourgeois tendencies. ' 
The reaction of the peasants, Vereker warned London, was unpredictable. "' 
The suffering of Soviet citizens under the Stalinist regime was clearly of great 
concern to members of the British embassy. Yet it is revealing that neither 
Chilston, Maclean, nor Vereker put forward social or moral reasons when 
arguing against collaboration with the Soviet Union over the Sudetenland crisis. 
Vereker, too, opposed collaboration with the Soviets over the Czech crisis in 
1938, but like Chilston, emphasised what he considered to be Moscow's 
insincerity as the main reason 39' Soviet foreign policy aims, he warned, were in 
fact `purely national and selfish. '392 Once more distrust was at the root of 
opposition to Anglo-Soviet collaboration. 
Though both Chilston and Vereker commented upon the role of the Soviet 
Union in the Sudetenland crisis, it was the military attaches in Moscow who 
focused primarily upon the question of Soviet potential and willingness to 
participate in any future conflict. Like most officials within the embassy, the 
military attaches, too, faced difficulties trying to obtain information from the 
3I' Telegram from Vereker. 3 May, 1938. FO 371 / 22298. 
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Soviet authorities. 393 Captain Clanchy, the British naval attache, for example, 
noted at the beginning of 1938 that he had `not been permitted to see any naval 
units or establishments since the 26th June last year. '3` 4 Colonel Firebrace, the 
British military attache, similarly complained in April 1938; `For the last six 
months, I have not been allowed to see any units, and it is clear that it is at 
present the policy to refuse visits to all military attaches. "' Nevertheless, each 
were able to provide information, and draw conclusions, upon Soviet military 
potential. Colonel Firebrace reported upon the condition of the Red Army 
during this period. Like Chilston, the purges and their consequences dominated 
Firebrace's reports. 
The purge of the army had begun in June 1937.396 Experienced and competent 
officers were killed, including Marshal Tuchachevski, a national hero during the 
Russian civil war. 39' Firebrace's disgust at such developments was obvious. `To 
my mind', he wrote, `it is impossible to feel anything but contempt for a man 
who sacrifices his colleagues in this way. i3g8 By 1938, he could see no evidence 
that the purge of the armed forces would end soon. He told Chilston in 
February; `It would not appear that the "purge" of the senior officers in the Red 
Army is over, as there are indications that many of these have recently been 
relieved of their appointments and have passed on to unknown fate. '399 
According to the information collated by the embassy, by 1938 the purge had 
accounted for no less than sixty five per cent of the high ranks. " Firebrace 
31 Colonel Firebrace to Chilston. 18 Apr. 1938. doc. 263. Inclosure in Chilston to Halifax. 19 
Apr, 1938. doc. 262, Captain Clanchy to Chilston. 2 July, 1938. doc. 292. Ibid; Watt, How war 
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confirmed that, like other groups within Soviet society, the valuable members of 
the army had been purged as part of the government's determination to secure 
absolute control. There was, Firebrace believed, 
... no alternative 
between accepting what will eventually be the official 
version, namely, that they are all traitors to their country, or considering 
that Stalin is sufficiently unbalanced to get rid, without remorse or pity, 
of any who may be thought to have the possibility of opposing his 
authority in any degree. " 
The result was inefficiency in the Red Army. " 
Inefficiency also resulted from the politicisation and lack of education of the 
armed forces. At the beginning of the year Firebrace informed London that the 
military press in the Soviet Union were `paying great attention to the question of 
the general education standard of the Commanding personnel of the Red Army. ' 
The military attache `could not help feeling', however, `that the existing 
standard and the standard to be attained are so low that it has been thought 
desirable not to broadcast them to the world. '4" This `low standard of general 
education', he believed, `must reflect on the efficiency of the army. '4" The 
politicisation of the army, which involved ensuring replacement soldiers were 
politically loyal to the leadership, also reduced efficiency. In particular, 
Firebrace attacked the `introduction of the system of military councils and 
military commissars. "°5 As early as September 1937, Firebrace had emphasised 
the difficulties resulting from politicisation in the event of war. He had 
informed Chilston that `... in time of war, if the regulation with regard to all 
orders being jointly signed by the commanding officer and the Commissar is 
persisted in, rapid and really vital decisions will seldom be made. ' This, he said, 
I" Colonel Firebrace to Chilston. 3 Mar, 1938. doc. 233. 
402 Chilston to Halifax. 19 Apr, 1938. doc. 262. 
403 Colonel Firebrace to Chilston. 7 Feb, 1938. doc. 230. Ibid. 
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would `only result in vacillation and inefficiency. "' In 1938, the military 
attache did acknowledge the possibility of improvement within the armed 
forces. He noted, for example, that the low standard of education `should to 
some extent disappear in course of time... "" He also thought that `a great effort 
may... be expected to increase the strength of the artillery arm. '4"" The possibility 
of improvement was an important consideration for those in London, especially 
as the aggressive nature of Germany's future plans became clear. Nevertheless, 
at the time when a decision had to be made regarding the defence of 
Czechoslovakia, Firebrace portrayed the Soviet army as comparatively weak. " 
Consequently, Firebrace concluded that the Soviet Union was not ready for war. 
`It can be stated with confidence', he reported, `that the Red army today is less 
prepared for war than it was in April 1937. ' 4b0 Regarding the Czechoslovakian 
crisis in particular, Firebrace warned: `From a military point of view there must 
be considerable doubt as to whether the Soviet Union is capable of fulfilling its 
obligations under the pact with Czechoslovakia and France by undertaking a 
war of offence. "" Amongst other weaknesses, Firebrace thought that `the 
disorganisation prevailing in every branch of Soviet production distribution and 
transport would be bound to prove highly detrimental in time of war. 412 Not only 
did Firebrace perceive the Soviet Union to be militarily incapable of assisting 
Czechoslovakia, he also believed, like Chilston, that Moscow had no intention of 
involving itself in war. The Soviet government would not want to engage in a 
war `which might have very dangerous consequences for the Soviet regime', he 
wrote. "' Indeed, the attache believed Moscow would only go to war if the Soviet 
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Union, and so the Stalinist regime, was under attack. Firebrace explained that 
the Red Army could not carry a war `into the enemy's territory with any hope of 
ultimate success or without thereby running the risk of endangering the 
regime. '414 As a result, it was `contrary to reason for the rulers of this country to 
involve the Soviet Union in war unless vital national interests were involved. '415 
The Soviet Union could, the attache noted, fight a defensive war effectively. 416 
`In defence of its territory, I still consider that the Red Army would be a 
formidable opponent', Firebrace wrote. 4' Thus, the country could present an 
awesome second front. However, in Firebrace's opinion, Moscow did not believe 
there to be a big enough threat in 1938 to make the risk of war worth taking. 
This did not mean the Soviet Union would never go to war. The attache reported 
that `the Soviet Union consider that war, if not inevitable, is highly likely some 
time not too far distant. ' There was, he noted, `a great effort ... 
being made in 
the army to prepare for the eventuality of war and... the war mentality [was] 
being strenuously cultivated not only in the army but also amongst the civilian 
population. "' He warned, however, that `this does not... necessarily mean that 
the Soviet Union would be prepared to fight this year. ' Thus, Firebrace 
summarised: `I remain.. . of the opinion, that the Soviet Union will do everything 
possible to avoid engaging in war this year, and that it will find any pretext to 
avoid the necessity of having to fulfil its engagements to Czechoslovakia and 
France. '" Notably the attache had stressed that Russia's inability and 
unwillingness to risk war applied only to the year 1938. This was another 
important consideration for those in London, and perhaps partly explains why 
414 Chilston to Halifax. 19 Apr, 1938. doc. 262. Ibid. 
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Halifax and others became concerned about Moscow reverting to a policy of 
isolationism following the Munich conference. During the final months of the 
year, however, London received no evidence that dramatic improvements were 
occurring in the condition of the army. 
The Soviet air force and navy were, similarly, in poor condition. `Although the 
Soviet Air Forces are the largest in the world to-day' it was reported, `in the first 
line strength they suffer from several weaknesses which will considerably 
reduce their effectiveness for the next twelve months or so. ' Of the 
approximately 4, ooo aircraft, for example, 75% were thought to be `obsolescent 
types, including 750 old type heavy bombers... ' It was acknowledged that the 
Soviet bombers that existed could `constitute a powerful striking force' in the 
event of war, but as a result of Moscow's efforts to replace existing aircraft `with 
types generally comparable in all round performance to those of other major air 
powers', `no marked improvement in the first line strength' was anticipated in 
the immediate future. "' The Soviet government did appear, then, to be working 
to improve its airforce. It was reported that the `present rulers of the Soviet 
Union regard the development of aviation in general, and of the airforce in 
particular, as a matter of the greatest national importance. ' The aircraft industry 
in the Soviet Union had a potential plant capacity `may times greater' than its 
output at the end of 1937. Morale amongst air crew was also thought to be high. 
However, British observers did not think that aircraft output would exceed that 
of the 6, ooo airframes and 20,000 engines it was producing in December 1937, 
`even in war'. Furthermore, there was `a serious shortage of reserves of trained 
flying and skilled personnel. ' As with the red army there appeared to be a `poor 
standard of training and maintenance. ' Consequently, although it was thought 
`that in its existing state the Soviet Airforce presents a real threat to any 
neighbour who might desire to risk war', it was also believed to be 
420 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air on the Air Force of the USSR. 23 Dec, 1937. 
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`unlikely... that after the initial blow the U. S. S. R. would be able to maintain her 
effort. '' When in May the British airforce attache in Moscow, Captain 
Hallawell, observed the May Day celebrations, he reported that the display by 
the Soviet airforce was disappointing. "" 
Captain Clanchy, the British royal naval attache, emphasised, like Firebrace, the 
damage inflicted upon the navy's effectiveness by the purges and Moscow's 
policy of politicisation. The purge of the navy had begun in October 1937.423 As 
late as September 1937, Clanchy's reports had been positive. He had thought, 
for example, that `the U. S. S. R' had `already attained a good start over her 
potential enemies, Germany and Japan. ' Furthermore, he believed, there was 
`no lack of trained personnel... 1414 By 1938, however, Clanchy reported that not 
only were workers in shipbuilding factories being purged as alleged wreckers4 , 
but, moreover, experienced officers, needed to command such warships 
effectively, were also being purged. The personnel of the navy were, Clanchy 
reported `cleansing itself of traitors, spies and similar Fascist scum. '426 In July, 
he wrote that it was `possible to form some fairly reasonable estimate of the 
numbers and categories of.. . naval officers who 
have fallen victim to the 
"purge"': 
Every important naval command ashore and afloat, with [one] 
exception..., has been affected ... In actual 
figures the "purge" has 
accounted for twelve flag officers, fourteen engineer flag officers, and 
twenty one post captains, representing a total percentage loss of about 50 
per cent. Amongst high ranking political officers the percentage figure 
is somewhat higher. All naval attaches who had served abroad up to the 
summer of last year are amongst the number who have gone. Personnel 
below the rank of Commander does not appear to have been touched, 
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and at present only about seventeen commanders have been identified as 
having been "purged". " 
The lower ranks of the navy did not appear to have been purged so ruthlessly, 
but these men were incapable of commanding the Soviet navy. `It would 
appear', Clanchy reported, `that one of the greatest disadvantages which the 
fleet is now experiencing is the lack of trained and competent staffs in the 
principal sea commands. "" As a result of the elimination of so many 
experienced naval officers `a striking effect of the "purge"' had become `the 
appointment of extremely young flag and commanding officers', influenced by 
the politicisation process. Clanchy, like Firebrace, assumed that 
... the change 
in naval administration and the jettonising of the principles 
of a combined staff have been brought about by a desire on the part of 
Stalin to run no further risks from opposition to his regime in the ranks 
of the armed forces of the country. 429 
Such politicisation, however, resulted in low morale. Clanchy thought it 
`questionable whether the navy has been able to withstand the disastrous 
reaction on morale caused by the sudden removal of trusted and respected 
officers. "" `Even more important and more widely felt', he stressed, `is the 
reestablishment of a strict and all-pervading political central, exercised alike on 
both officers and men.... masses of political officers, ... openly criticise and spy 
on their own kind as well as on their ship's officers', "' 
However, such developments had not, by 1938, completely undermined the 
worth and potential of the Soviet navy. In January, Clanchy had reported upon 
Moscow's planned expansion of the navy. 43` He added that `further secret 
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submarine construction, especially in the Far East, may be contemplated. '433 In 
a later report, Clanchy noted; `Battleships have been modernised and both 
qualitatively and quantitively the submarine fleet has been developed. '"34 
Notably, Clanchy's reports also revealed that the navy had suffered far less from 
the purges than, for example, the Red Army. He informed the British 
ambassador, Chilston, that `submarine personnel, with the exception of three or 
four senior officers, has not been "purged", and the same is probably true of the 
naval air force. '43' It appeared, then, that the Soviet submarine core of the navy, 
in particular, had remained in good condition. But Clanchy did not believe the 
Soviet Union's future lay only in its submarine strength. Indeed, the attache 
believed the Soviet naval forces could and would probably improve. He warned 
against dismissing Soviet potential in the future and highlighted `another side to 
the picture'. The attache explained: 
The Government have announced their intention of building a large 
navy. The submarine and naval air services are still both efficient and 
sound. In another two or three years time the exceptionally young 
Commanders-in Chief, together with their captains, will have learnt 
much from experience. The numerous naval colleges and technical 
training schools are already beginning to turn out officers and party 
officers of all specialities in large numbers. The discipline of the lower 
deck is still probably sound at heart. Money will be lavished to an even 
greater extent on the navy, and personnel will have new ships and 
weapons to busy themselves with. 436 
It is interesting that, unlike Chilston and other members of the embassy, 
Clanchy did not completely reject Moscow's announcements and promises as 
propaganda. From what Clanchy had learnt throughout the year the Soviet 
leadership did seem committed to acquiring and maintaining naval power. This 
did not, however, mean the Soviet navy could effectively fight a war in 1938. In 
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Clanchy's opinion it would take approximately two to three years for sufficient 
improvement. Such improvement would also be dependent upon the leadership 
abolishing current measures of political control. `The navy cannot really become 
loo per cent efficient until something effective is done to abolish, or at least 
reduce, the status of the political officer"" , 
he reported. Unfortunately for those 
who supported Anglo-Soviet collaboration in Britain, Clanchy could not report 
with any certainty whether and when such political domination would lessen. 
He admitted to being `quite unable to hazard an opinion as to the extent to 
which the navy will be able to free itself from political control. ' For the navy, 
indeed for all of the armed forces and vital services of the country `the problem', 
Clanchy identified, was `linked up with the whole system by which a few men 
are able to hold the country down and administer the Government. "" 
Though some of what Britain's attaches predicted about the Soviet armed forces 
was to be proved correct during the war, it is important to note that they, like 
Chilston, greatly underestimated the capabilities of the Soviet Union. Between 
June 1941 and June 1944, for example, approximately 93% of total German 
army battle casualties were inflicted by Soviet forces. Furthermore, 
technologically, the Soviet Union was able to match the Germans in key 
weaponry, such as T34 tanks and `Katyusha' rocket launchers. 439 In 1938, 
however, the attaches had not witnessed any evidence of such potential. As a 
result of its unwillingness to allow access to important developments and 
information, the Soviet government had undermined its own foreign policy. '° 
Some of the first to read and respond to the reports sent by Moscow were the 
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Foreign office officials in Whitehall, particularly those in the Northern 
Department. Most held similar opinions to those expressed by officials in the 
embassy regarding the nature and consequences of Stalin's purges, and the 
condition of the Soviet armed forces and industry. Soviet foreign policy 
intentions, however, and the issue of collaboration with the Soviets, caused 
division. What deliberations and minutes amongst Foreign Office personnel 
confirmed, was that attitudes towards collaboration were ultimately determined 
by whether they were willing to put aside ideological distrust. 
One aspect of the Soviet Union which evoked agreed response from those in 
London was its internal system. Reports regarding life under Stalin's 
dictatorship stirred horror, suspicion and animosity within officials. It was not, 
for example, thought to be a hospitable country for British citizens and foreign 
diplomats. There was much criticism about the behaviour of the Soviet 
authorities. The decision to expel the British consulate in Leningrad in January 
1938 especially evoked outrage. 44' There existed a great amount of sympathy for 
British officials having to experience Soviet life, so much so that Sir Lancelot 
Oliphant, Deputy Under Secretary in the Foreign Office, noted; `at times one is 
inclined to ask oneself whether in view of their treatment by the Soviet it is fair 
to keep an ambassador in Moscow. '4"2 
Officials knew well, however, that life for their colleagues in Moscow was not as 
desperate as life for the majority of Soviet citizens. They noted in detail their 
horror at the reports of the terror that dominated Soviet society. "' They were 
also in agreement upon the devastating effects the purges were seemingly 
having upon Soviet armed forces and industry, and hence the potential of the 
country. Robert Hadow, a junior official in the Northern Department, believed 
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that `the Soviet army has suffered a set back from which it can only recover 
when its officers again organise the "espirit de corps" and comparative 
independence of politics that was there before the purges. ' Hadow personally 
did not think this would occur under Stalin's leadership. "' Gladwyn Jebb, soon 
to become Private Secretary to the Permanent Under Secretary, pointed out that 
it was not only British observers who realised Soviet weakness. The German 
government, he minuted, had `come to the same conclusion' and Hitler was 
`calculating accordingly. ' Others, such as Laurence Collier, Head of the 
Northern Department, acknowledged the devastation inflicted and dismissed 
Soviet propaganda of alleged military strength as `ludicrous. '446 
Officials also noted the effects of the purges upon Soviet industrial efficiency. 
Ashton Gwatkin, the Foreign Office Economic Adviser, for example, pointed out 
that the lack of skilled or semi-skilled labour in the Soviet Union was `becoming 
a very serious problem in a suddenly and artificially industrialised country. '" 
D. W. Lascelles , First Secretary in the Northern Department minuted; 
In practically every branch of industry conditions are rapidly going from 
bad to worse, and there is no sign that a turning-point is likely to be 
reached in the immediate future. The fundamental causes of 
deterioration are over-ambitious "paper planning" and stark political 
insanity - the first being due in large measure to the fears created by the 
second. "' 
Industrial achievements were noted by some. Gwatkin, thought some 
judgments `unduly pessimistic. "" Aubrey Halford, a junior official in the 
Northern Department, minuted: `There have been improvements in some 
branches of industry - e. g. heavy industry, food industry, mechanic 
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construction, and oil industry. '45° Yet, Gwatkin, Halford and others agreed that 
conditions within Soviet industry, indeed the Soviet economy in general, could 
not be described as'healthy. "" 
The purges were thought to be debilitating efficiency in all areas and as a result, 
officials in Whitehall also believed that the Soviet Union was incapable of aiding 
Czechoslovakia effectively in any forthcoming war. Hadow believed this" , as 
did Jebb. " But military and economic weakness were not thought to be the only 
reasons, or indeed the main reasons, why no effective assistance would be 
afforded to Czechoslovakia in the event of war. More importantly, and like those 
in the Moscow embassy, officials in Whitehall thought that Moscow did not 
actually want to help its ally. `' They, too, distrusted Soviet promises of 
assistance. Alexander Cadogan believed this' , as 
did Hadow and Halford. 4' 
Jebb minuted, `the Soviet government dare not risk a war whose only certain 
result would be destruction of the present government. '457 Hence, it is not 
surprising that such officials were particularly angered by Soviet attacks upon 
British foreign policy during this period. "' Hadow criticised the Soviet `farce of 
attacking British efforts to prevent wars. '' But where did such distrust stem 
from? In contrast to the ambassador and his officials in Moscow, minutes in the 
FO 371 records reveal that officials in London felt no political compulsion to 
suppress, or edit in anyway, their true feelings towards the Soviet Union and 
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Communism. As a result their minutes provide a unique and valuable insight 
into what members of the British political elite genuinely thought. What their 
minutes revealed was that most of those who opposed collaboration with the 
Soviets over the Czech crisis, actually opposed closer Anglo-Soviet relations per 
se, and at the root of this opposition was their ideological prejudice against the 
Soviet Union. Some, namely, Alexander Cadogan, opposed discussion of 
ideological factors and claimed that all decisions made by government were 
entirely practical. 460 However, an examination of the evidence reveals not only 
the existence, but also the influence, of such ideological opinions upon attitudes 
towards Anglo-Soviet relations. The minutes looked at in this chapter were 
mainly written in response to two documents. The first document was a copy of 
a statement by Stalin which was originally published in Pravda on 14 February 
and subsequently reprinted in the Times on 15 February. The statement was in 
reply to questions put to M. Stalin by M. Ivanoff, a young Communist League 
member and propagandist in a district of the Kursk region. The statement read: 
M. Stalin distinguished between two problems: - 
[] The problem of the internal relations of our country, that is the 
problem of overcoming our own bourgeoisie and building complete 
socialism. 
[2] The problem of the external relations of our country, that is the 
problem of fully securing our country from the dangers of armed 
intervention and restoration. 
The first problem said M. Stalin, had been solved, for the bourgeoisie had 
been liquidated and Socialism had been built in the main... 
Turning to the second problem, that of external relations, M. Stalin said: - 
But since we live not on an island but "in a system of states" a 
considerable part of which are hostile to the land of Socialism, creating 
danger, intervention and restoration, we say frankly and honestly that a 
victory of Socialism in our country is not yet final. But from this it follows 
that the second problem has not yet been solved and it will have to be 
solved. It could be solved said M. Stalin, only by joining the serious 
efforts of the international proletariat with the still more serious efforts 
460 Dilks, Cadogan Diaries, pp. 132-3. 
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of the whole Soviet people. "' 
The second document was a memorandum on the comparative threat of 
Fascism and Communism, written by D. W. Lascelles. 4b2 
Robert Hadow and Gladwyn Jebb, especially, held similarly strong opinions 
regarding the Soviet Union and the Communist ideological threat. Though 
Jebb, for example, acknowledged Stalin's letter was perhaps `chiefly intended to 
provide Soviet citizens who have been terrified by the internal purge with fresh 
tasks in the hope of speeding Communism abroad and combating foreign 
aggression"", he nevertheless thought it would lead to an `increase in 
subversive propaganda abroad. '"" Jebb was convinced that Moscow's ultimate 
aim was expansion. He warned that the `trend' towards `imperialism and 
expansion' was now on the increase. " Throughout Europe there was the threat 
of `Marxian socialism' spreading. `Soviet doctrines', he wrote, `are by far the 
greater ultimate danger to this country and to the Empire. ' Jebb explained that 
Moscow was only calling for collaboration with the West because of the weak 
state of its own armed forces. In 1938, the Soviet Union was incapable of 
practically achieving a world revolution. "' Yet, despite such internal weakness, 
Jebb still considered the Soviet Union to be a real threat because of ideological 
differences. Moscow's dedication to `Marxian socialism', he believed, made it 
impossible for the Soviet Union to ever stop being a menace to British interests. 
He did not accept the Soviet government's alleged willingness to collaborate 
with Britain because `the consequences of the ideal world revolution' was a 
461 Letter published in "Times" 15 Feb, 1938. FO 371 122288. (For full document see Appendix 
In. 
462 Vereker to Collier. Transmits draft memorandum. 11 June, 1938. Ibid. (See Appendix lll). 
46' Minute by Jebb. 15 Feb, 1938. Ibid. 
464 Minute by Jebb. 27 Feb, 1938. Ibid; For more on the workings of the Comintern during this 
period see, K. McDermott and J. Agnew, The Comintern: A History of International Communism 
from Lenin to Stalin, (New York, 1997). 
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fundamental hatred of western democracies. "' Indeed, Jebb believed that the 
incompatibility of Moscow's aim for `world revolution' and `domination', and 
Britain's `democratic empire' made Britain the Soviet Union's `principal 
468 enemy'. 
Robert Hadow agreed with Jebb's views. He was also suspicious about 
Moscow's alleged dedication to cooperation with the West. He questioned, for 
example, whether the anti-British tone of the executive committee of the 
Comintern International or the `Geneva Litvinov talkV 'was the true voice of 
Russia'. " Personally, Hadow believed that the former was genuinely 
representative of Soviet thinking. He thought the Soviet Union remained the 
threat it always had been. Hadow responded to Stalin's letter in January by 
noting that; 
... the explanations given 
last Sunday in Hyde Park by the speakers of 
various Communist bodies in Great Britain fully bear out Lord Chilston's 
statement that M. Stalin's letter was, whether by design or accident, open 
to precisely the interpretation which best suited the views of the various 
bodies in and out of Russia. These "explanations" would, I think, have 
interested those who believed that subversive propaganda for the 
achievement of an "universal Socialist state" is no longer, [or to a lesser 
extent], part of the Moscow programme. `0 
Paul Falla, a junior official in the Northern Department, aptly commented in an 
analysis of Anglo-Soviet relations throughout the 192os and 1930s, that 
`political relations,..., continue to be clouded by the persistence of suspicion, in 
spite of the Anglo-Soviet agreement of 1929 for the mutual renunciation of 
subversive activities of Comintern propaganda... "' 
467 I bid. 
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It was because of their own intense mistrust of Soviet intentions that officials 
were indignant about Moscow's apparent success at manipulating the British 
people and government. Hadow expressed his anger at what he believed to be 
Moscow's success at pulling the wool over so many eyes regarding its true 
nature. He despised the `man in the street' and the intellectual `pinkies' and 
`leftists' who were persuaded of the sincerity of the trials and so denied the 
barbarity and failure of the `Socialist' system in the the Soviet Union. " Jebb was 
also anxious and angered by what he perceived to be the leniency shown by 
intellectuals towards the Soviet Union and the complacency felt regarding the 
threat of revolution. `There is', he minuted, `a growing school of intellectual 
thought- in this country quite as much as in France or elsewhere - which feels 
that Marxian Socialism "should be given a chance", ... Of this trend of thought 
Russia is undoubtedly taking advantage... ' Moscow, he warned, was playing 
with the `mouse she hopes to devour. ' 473 The official went on, `Already religion 
is being sapped; patriotism is considered insufficient as an ideal by or for the 
young; and a vague "internationalism" which is closely akin to Popular Front 
doctrines is the cry of intellectual youth. " 
Unsurprisingly, Jebb and Hadow opposed any close relations with the Soviet 
Union. Hadow's opposition was made all the more obvious by his declarations 
of support for closer Anglo-German relations. " Though Jebb did not dismiss 
the possibility that Britain might be `compelled to cooperate with and use 
Russia as a counter-poise to Fascism', he warned that London would have to do 
so `with its eyes open. '476 Jebb's intense suspicion meant that if any alternatives 
remained he would always oppose Anglo-Soviet collaboration. Similar opinions 
were held by Orme Sargent, Cadogan's deputy and Assistant Under Secretary of 
472 Chilston 8 Mar, 1938. FO 371 / 22286. 
43 Minute by Jebb. 11 June, 1938. FO 371 / 22288. 
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State, as well as by a number of British diplomats abroad, including Eric 
Phipps. ' Sargent perceived the Soviet government as champions of Communist 
expansion, and feared that its collaboration with western powers, such as 
Britain, but especially France, would ultimately lead to war from which only the 
Soviet Union would benefit. ' Eric Phipps outlined his prejudices in 
correspondence with Duff Cooper. `Bolshevism', he wrote at the end of 1938, 
... 
is no doubt a bogey in our still, relatively happy island. On the 
continent it seems to be made of more solid substance.. . France, ever 
since the Left elections of May 1936, has suffered from strikes openly 
fermented by the Communists; nor did the imminence of the German 
danger prevent Moscow from pursuing this policy of disabling and even 
disarming its "ally. " In Spain thousands of people have been murdered, 
in Russia millions. In Italy, Fascism would seem to have been directly 
due to Communism. In Germany Nazism was certainly partly to do with 
Communism. 479 
Hence, Phipps could `never see why, if we hate all these horrors that 
Communism has caused or produced, we should imagine that an alliance with it 
is going to benefit us in any way. i48° 
Laurence Collier held a different opinion. In contrast to Jebb and others, his 
minutes indicate that he was not as opposed to, or afraid of, collaboration with 
Moscow. The reason for this was Collier's very different perception of Soviet 
Communism, and so, Soviet foreign policy intentions and capabilities. Collier 
had argued his beliefs regarding the Communist danger before. Between April - 
August 1937, Collier carried out long correspondence on the subject, first with a 
junior member of the British legation to the Holy See (P. I. H Torr) and then 
with a higher ranking official (of the British legation to the Holy See) Francis 
"' For details of Henderson's views see Chapter 6. 
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D'Aray Godolphin Osborne. " In 1938, Collier continued, with very little 
support from his colleagues, to represent the other side of the argument 
regarding cooperation with the Soviet government. Collier agreed with Jebb and 
others that world revolution remained the ultimate aim of Moscow in 1938. He 
also believed that Communism and Fascism were both `intrinsically detestable 
in a high degree' and that both systems constituted `very real dangers to the 
welfare of the British empire. '4" However, and most importantly, Collier did 
not agree that the Soviet Union was the biggest threat facing Britain in the 
immediate future, or indeed, ultimately. As part of this belief, Collier explained 
that the Kremlin's recent enthusiasm for contacting outside governments was 
not due to revolutionary ambitions but because of growing concern about the 
future security of Soviet territory. He dismissed exaggerated, hysterical rumours 
of Soviet expansion. 483 Collier was sure that `the dominant consideration' was 
`the protection of the Union against attack. i484 Moscow's ideological propaganda 
was no longer intended for foreign consumption and was in fact, he argued, 
having little effect upon left wing intellectuals in Britain. "' 
Essential to Collier's arguments concerning the Soviet Union was his belief that 
fascism was Britain's greatest threat. The head of the Northern Department 
had come to such a conclusion not by judging what was thought to be 
theoretically more dangerous, but by what he believed to be the more practical 
creed. Thus, the questions for the foreign office, he noted, 
... are firstly, which of these creeds is 
in itself the more dangerous to 
British interests, and secondly, which is in fact likely to have most chance 
of affecting those interests; for it is clearly not enough to know that a 
481 I shall not discuss Collier's minutes during 1937 at any length in this thesis since it has 
already been analysed in great detail by Lammers in his article, 'Fascism. ' See, Lammers, 
'Fascism', pp. 66-73. 
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doctrine is dangerous in itself - the really important thing is to know 
whether it can be put into practice. 48' 
Collier admitted that `Communism as a pure theory, is unalterably opposed to 
our interests... ' 4" , but, 
he argued, it did not pose the greatest threat because its 
application, in reality, was not practical. 
Fascism, or violent nationalism, Collier maintained, represented both the 
greatest short term, and long term, threat to the security of Britain. He 
disagreed with several points raised by Lascelles regarding the comparative 
threat of Germany and the Soviet Union. In his memorandum, Lascelles had 
argued that the German threat would eventually diminish because the ideal of 
nationalism within Germany would `be modified in practice through force of 
circumstances. ' 8 In contrast, he wrote, Marxism would `inevitably prove the 
more effective propaganda in the long run. i489 Collier responded by pointing out 
that it was, in fact, Communism that was more likely to weaken over time. `All 
our reports', he argued, 
... emphasise the growing 
deterioration of the whole Russian state 
machine under Stalin's present regime and the unlikelihood that it will 
ever become efficient enough to be dangerous unless that regime is 
fundamentally modified. Russia under Stalinite Communism.. . 
is 
becoming less and less of a menace... and it seems probable that she can 
only become a menace again by some fundamental alteration of that 
regime which might well rob it of its Communist character. " 
Furthermore, he minuted, 
... 
if we look at most European countries today, we find that what really 
appeals to the uneducated mass of the people is some form of violent 
nationalism - the "Iron Guard" in Rumania... seem to have an irresistible 
appeal, beside which Socialism and Communism, seems comparatively 
486 Minute by Collier. 5 Apr, 1938. FO 371/ 22288. 





drab and unexciting. 
49' 
What Collier's writings show is that, although he disliked and distrusted the 
Soviet government, and Communism, he was willing to overlook such opinions 
and judge objectively which country represented the biggest threat to Britain. 
This was, after all, what was surely of most importance during this period. 
There were other minor differences of opinion between Collier and other official 
commentators about the Soviet Union. The head of the Northern Department, 
for example, noted the Soviet regime's political stability as a positive attribute. 492 
He also acknowledged the valuable resources within the Soviet Union. Thus, in 
a minute in which Collier criticised those who wished for a German - Soviet war, 
the official warned of the dire consequences of a German seizure of Soviet 
resources; 
Some people here look forward to that almost with equanimity as likely 
to keep Hitler and Stalin both occupied in fighting each other for a long 
time to come; but I fear it is more likely that the Germans... would 
achieve something like a conquest of Russia, or at least a protectorate 
over her, which, however superficial and impermanent it might prove to 
be in the long run, might well enable them to control Russian resources 
at the critical period of their relations with us. 
493 
Yet it was Collier's belief that the Soviet Union and Communism posed less of a 
threat to Britain than fascism which represented the most significant divide 
between him and many others within the Foreign Office, and indeed the 
cabinet. Collier did oppose collaboration with the the Soviet government over 
the Czech crisis in Particular"', but this was not surprising. It was, 
understandably, very difficult for members of the British political elite to trust 
Moscow's reliability completely, despite their efforts to overlook such 
491 Ibid; Collier reiterated his beliefs in a more detailed memorandum required by Lancelot 
Oliphant, deputy Under Secretary in the Northern Department, in August. Lammers, 'Fascism', 
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prejudices. Some contradiction in their remarks was, therefore, likely. Collier, 
however, did not want the Soviet Union diplomatically excluded altogether, and 
indeed made a number of comments suggesting that he was not as opposed to 
improving Anglo-Soviet relations in the future as others were. " 
William Strang, a Foreign Office official who had worked in the Moscow 
embassy in the past and was later to become head of the Central Department, 
also opposed the deliberate exclusion of the Soviet Union in 1938. He told the 
British ambassador in Berlin, Nevile Henderson, that `keeping Russia out of 
Europe altogether' was `not an aspect of German policy which we wish to 
encourage. '`96 Collier's greatest support during this period, however, came from 
the Chief Diplomatic Adviser, Sir Robert Vansittart. 497 Indeed, Vansittart was, 
during this period, the most outspoken and fervent supporter of Anglo-Soviet 
collaboration within the foreign office. 49' It is not surprising then that he 
opposed the exclusion of the Soviet Union throughout the months leading to the 
Munich conference. In September, he wrote to Halifax insisting that there was 
no justification for the decision to include Italy yet exclude the Soviet Union in 
the proposed conference to be held in Munich. `I am strongly opposed to the 
idea of summoning a Four Power Conference in present circumstances', he 
wrote. `It would be the thin end of the wedge for driving Russia out of 
Europe... "99 Furthermore, `It can be supported on no adequate ground', he 
argued. `Indeed there is far more ground for the presence of Russia than of 
Italy seeing that three-quarters of the population of Czechoslovakia are Slav. 'y°" 
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Admittedly, Vansittart had ignored the fact that Italy was a signatory of the 
treaty of Versailles and that the Soviet Union was not. Nevertheless, his point 
regarding Soviet affiliation to the Slavs living in Czechoslovakia was an 
important one. Hitler's demand for the cessation of the Sudetenland was based 
entirely upon Germany's affiliation with the Germans living in the Sudetenland. 
After Munich, Vansittart continued to urge better relations with the Soviets, not 
only from the British but also from the French and Polish governments. '" The 
reason for this, and indeed for Vansittart's continued support of Anglo - French 
- Soviet collaboration throughout Chamberlain's premiership, was twofold. 
First, Vansittart was convinced of Germany's aggressive ambitions. According 
to Anthony Eden, he `clearly saw the growing military power and political 
ambition of Nazi Germany as the principal danger. 'SO2 At the beginning of 1938, 
Vansittart was convinced Hitler's ambition involved taking all of eastern 
Europe. 113 In September, he warned that Germany, `not content with having 
dismembered Czechoslovakia' would `wish to do the same to Poland... ' 504 
Vansittart's opinion of Germany was inextricably linked to his perception of the 
Soviet Union. Thus his recognition of Germany's aggressive ambitions had 
persuaded him that the Soviet Union no longer posed the greatest threat to 
stability in Europe. On 13 September he minuted; 
If the German spirit were fundamentally changed, there would be no 
objection to any form of conference or pact which tended to a solution of 
any specific question. But that spirit has not changed. In fact every hour 
that we live demonstrates more clearly that it is Germany, not Russia, 
that threatens the physical existence of every country and of its 
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Indeed, in Vansittart's opinion, the allegiance of the Soviet government now 
represented a decisive factor in the resistance of future aggression. Its military 
and strategical attributes would provide a crucial counterweight to both the 
Japanese" and the Germans. " `It would be folly', he warned, `to assist 
Germany in driving off the map an associate whose weight we may need. '"' 
If the Soviet government was, on the other hand, to come to an agreement with 
Berlin, the consequences would be disastrous and the balance of power would 
move decisively in Germany's favour. In 1938, Vansittart was one of few who 
believed that a German-Soviet rapprochement was possible. s°9 He believed that 
Moscow would either voluntarily conclude an agreement with Berlin as a result 
of its continued exclusion by the western powers, or, that Germany would take 
advantage of the Soviet Union's isolation and invade, setting up a puppet 
regime. Consequently, the inclusion of the Soviet government, especially in any 
settlement of the Sudetenland crisis, was, he urged, the only way to prevent 
such a potentially devastating occurrence. " 
Vansittart's recognition of Moscow's influence upon the defeat of aggression in 
the future persuaded him to suppress any anti-Soviet feelings he possessed. 
Vansittart was not a supporter of the Soviet regime and like his colleagues 
opposed the ideas of Soviet Communism"' During the mid-1930s, Vansittart 
had expressed fear and his condemnation of what he perceived to be Comintern 
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infiltration in France and Spain. 512 Nonetheless, he was, like Collier, willing to 
put aside such views in 1938 and recognise Britain's need of the Soviet Union. 
His realisation of the possible consequences if the Soviet Union was excluded 
had opened Vansittart's eyes to the reality of the Soviet position and its 
potential importance. This was `realpolitik. ' Unfortunately for Czechoslovakia, it 
was not the outlook adopted by those in the cabinet during most of 1938. 
As a result of his internal policy, Stalin did much to undermine his foreign 
policy and, in particular, his attempts to ensure friendly relations with the West. 
The purges horrified Foreign Office officials in Moscow and London. Soviet 
citizens were suffering and, as far as officials were concerned, Soviet military 
and economic efficiency was also, consequently, deteriorating. Reports about 
the potential of the Soviet armed forces were particularly negative and the 
military weakness emphasised by attaches was cited by cabinet members as a 
reason not to collaborate with the Soviets over the Czech crisis. Two points, 
however, need to be made concerning perceptions of Soviet military potential 
and their influence upon attitudes towards Anglo-Soviet collaboration during 
this period. First, it is noteworthy that although reports about the condition of 
the Soviet armed forces were largely negative, a number of important positive 
points were also made. Through its ability to fight a defensive war, the Soviet 
Union could provide a second front, for example. Furthermore, Captain Clanchy 
had made several comments about the strength of the Soviet navy. Second, what 
reports from Moscow and minutes in Whitehall also show is that, just as 
apparent Soviet military weakness was not the main reason for the Cabinet's 
opposition to Anglo-Soviet collaboration in 1938, nor was it at the root of the 
opposition that existed to Anglo-Soviet collaboration within the Foreign Office. 
Distrust dictated the opposition that existed towards cooperation with the 
512 Vansittart to Clerk. 10 June, 1936. FO 371 /19857; Minute by Vansittart. 11 Nov, 1936. FO 
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Soviets. All looked at in this chapter harboured a distrust of the Soviet 
government. Those in Moscow whose task it was to provide London with 
information about the Soviet Union were more reserved in their reporting. Yet, 
despite insufficient evidence, the ambassador and his officials still supposed 
that Moscow would not act to defend its ally. In Whitehall, officials who 
evidently did not feel compelled to hide their personal opinions of the Soviet 
Union revealed where such distrust actually stemmed from. Thus, their minutes 
confirmed the continuing influence of historical ideological prejudice against 
Soviet Communism. Some supported closer Anglo-Soviet relations during this 
period, namely Laurence Collier and Robert Vansittart. They were equally 
horrified by the purges, and opposed to Communism. Each had had some 
doubts about Soviet intentions or reliability. However, like the anti-appeasers, 
both spoke of putting aside prejudices. Unfortunately, like members of the 
Cabinet, the majority of those in the Foreign Office were not yet willing to do 
this. 
Chapter Four: 
Attitudes of the `Anti-Appeasers' towards the Soviet Union, 
May 1937 - March 1939. 
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Throughout 1938, the British government's policy was one of deliberately 
excluding the Soviet Union from international affairs. This reflected primarily 
an unwillingness of certain ministers to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices. 
Further evidence to support this contention can be found in a detailed 
examination of the attitudes of those collectively referred to elsewhere as the 
9 anti-appeasers. '513 Attitudes towards the Soviet Union amongst these politicians 
did vary. In addition, certain politicians were more willing than others to speak 
out in favour of collaboration with Moscow. Of those that did speak out, there 
were differences in the form of collaboration they supported. Indeed, a close 
analysis of the anti- appeasers highlights the complexity of attitudes that existed 
towards the Soviet Union and Anglo-Soviet relations. It reveals the difficulties 
politicians faced when deciding their position on foreign policy. Despite their 
negative perceptions of the Soviet Union, however, these politicians opposed 
the government's policy towards Moscow. Through such opposition they not 
only stressed the necessity of putting aside anti-Soviet prejudices, but 
illustrated just how possible it was for contemporary politicians and officials to 
do so. 
During the first eight months of Chamberlain's premiership, the Soviet Union, 
Leopold Amery recalled, `hardly came into the picture. "" The Spanish civil war 
no longer dominated discussions. Resentment regarding the repudiation of 
Russian debts from 1918, trade, and Comintern propaganda were raised within 
513 Thompson, Anti-Appeasers. 
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the House of Commons, but there existed little reason to discuss Anglo-French- 
Soviet collaboration in particular. The crisis mounting in the Czech 
Sudetenland, however, enabled the Soviet government to demand its inclusion 
in collective action and diplomacy. In March, Litvinov had proposed a 
conference of the major powers to discuss resistance to further aggression in 
Europe" 
, and soon after this, politicians such as 
Winston Churchill began to 
openly propose a policy of collaboration with the French and Soviets in defence 
of Czechoslovakia. Thus, it is primarily from April 1938 onwards that this 
chapter will look at the attitudes of the anti-appeasers towards the Soviet Union 
and Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration. 
The government's policy of deliberately excluding the Soviet Union from 
international diplomacy, especially concerning the settlement of the 
Sudetenland crisis, was recognised and criticised by the anti-appeasers. One of 
the most openly critical was the Labour M. P. Hugh Dalton. "' He believed that 
Chamberlain's Cabinet were deliberately cold-shouldering the Soviet 
government during 1938. ß" `There are some in this country', he told the House 
of Commons, `who apparently think it worth while and a good bargain to try 
and push the Soviet Union out of Europe... '''$ He told Robert Vansittart, that' it 
was amazing how some people, otherwise intelligent, had made a fixation about 
Russia and seemed almost to prefer that this country should be defeated in war 
without Russian aid rather than win with it. 'S19 The leader of the Liberals, 
Archibald Sinclair, held a similar perception of the government's policy towards 
Moscow. `I believe that it will be disastrous to try to exclude Russia from 
5'S CAB 27/627 58 mtg. 21 Mar, 1938. 
5'6 Dalton had been Under Secretary of State for the Foreign Office during the Labour 
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Europe... ', he told the Prime Minister. '2° Even Leopold Amery, a Conservative 
M. P., hitherto one of the leading isolationist-imperialists, who had urged the 
government to strengthen the bonds of the empire and avoid continental 
entanglementsj2' , 
believed a `fundamental mistake' of the Prime Minister 
during this period was `his refusal to take Russia into his confidence. ''' 
After Munich, politicians reiterated, and indeed increased, their accusations 
and criticisms of the deliberate exclusion of the Soviet Union from 
international affairs. Sinclair repeated his fear; `His Majesty's Government', he 
warned, ` will be making a disastrous mistake if they go on truckling to Herr 
Hitler and Signor Mussolini and leave Russia standing outside, on the mat. "' 
He was joined by a fellow Liberal and former Prime Minister, David Lloyd 
George, who complained that the British government had deliberately `kept 
Russia out of it [the settlement of the Sudetenland crisis], although she was 
more directly interested in this matter than even this country. 'S' He thought the 
government's snubbing of the Soviet Union had been `supreme diplomatic 
imbecility. "' Clement Attleejz6, leader of the Labour party, similarly condemned 
the fact that the Soviet government `were never brought into consultation, 
except on one occasion, and that was when it looked as if things were coming to 
the worst, and their help was wanted. ''' 
Evidently unhappy with Chamberlain's opposition to Soviet involvement in the 
Czech crisis and thereafter in the resistance to future aggression, these 
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individuals called for some form of Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration. What 
form of collaboration they supported and exactly what role they envisaged for 
the Soviet Union, however, differed somewhat. Amongst Conservative M. P. s, 
Winston Churchill was the most fervent and outspoken advocate of Anglo- 
French-Soviet collaboration during 1938.528 Although he had remained 
relatively quiet on the issue of collective security during the Italian invasion of 
Abyssinia in 1935 and the Spanish civil war, from April 1938 onwards, Churchill 
began his public campaign for a grand alliance. " He wanted an alliance to 
include Britain, France and the Soviet Union and which, in the event of armed 
aggression, would militarily act in order to defend the victim. He did not think 
the government should accept all of the terms demanded by Moscow; `we 
should certainly not go cap in hand to Soviet Russia', he told the House of 
Commons. But he did want the Soviet government as an ally against aggression. 
On 15 March, Churchill's `Grand Alliance' speech proposed an offensive- 
defensive alliance including France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, backed 
by staff arrangements and the moral backing of the League. He explained; `If 
that were sustained, as it would be, by the moral sense of the world, and if it 
were done in the year 1938-and, believe me, it may be the last chance there will 
be for doing it - then I say you might even now arrest this approaching war. '53" It 
was, in his opinion, absolute folly, moreover self-defeating, not to cooperate 
with Moscow at such a crucial time. Churchill told an audience in Manchester 
on 9 May; `... how improvidently foolish we should be when dangers are so great, 
to put needles barriers in the way of the general association of the great Russian 
5211 For a detailed analysis of Churchill's views upon appeasement and his alternative proposals 
regarding a 'grand alliance' , see 
Parker, Appeasement. Parker contends that Churchill and a 
grand alliance could have prevented the Second World War. For an opposing view, see 
Charmley, Chamberlain; Ibid, Churchill. 
529My interpretation of various speeches by Churchill during 1938 differs from that of David 
Carlton who argues that Churchill 'stuck to relatively vague demands for preparations for 
collective action under the auspices of the League - with only France openly envisaged as a 
leading potential partner for Great Britain. ' See, David Carlton, Churchill and the Soviet Union, 
(Manchester, 2000), p. 61. 
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mass with resistance to an act of Nazi aggression. '53 Thus, he remained 
convinced until the end of September, that there existed `still one good chance 
of preserving peace', and so urged that a 
... solemn warning should 
be presented to the German government in 
joint or simultaneous notes by Great Britain, France and Russia, that the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia at the present juncture would be taken as an 
act of war against these powers. 5'32 
Robert Boothby, a close friend of Churchill's, also supported such an alliance. 
Frequently writing of his support for Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration in the 
press, as well as in private correspondence, Boothby outlined exactly what he 
wanted with regard to foreign policy in an article for the Daily Telegraph. 
published in March. He proposed `a defensive alliance between those states 
which are determined,..., to resist aggression with all the means in their power. ' 
The basis of the alliance, he explained, `must be France, Britain and Russia. ' 
Boothby stressed that it `would be in no respect an offensive alliance. ' Instead it 
`would come into action only in the event of the armed invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. '3 
Both Boothby and Churchill found sound arguments and support for their 
proposals in the private memoranda circulated by Captain Basil Liddell Hart, 
defence correspondent for the Times' and unofficial adviser to Leslie Hore- 
Belisha Secretary of State for War. Although he was essentially a proponent of 
limited liability and opposed a continental commitment on Britain's part, ` 
between 1938-1939, Liddell Hart maintained contact with several politicians 
11 "The Choice for Europe. " An address given in the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, 9 May, 1938. 
Cited in Randolph Churchill, ed., Into Battle - Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, 
(London, 1941), p. 19. 
51 Winston S. Churchill. Press Statement. 26 September, 1938. (Churchill Papers: 9/132). Cited 
in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill. Companion 1936 - 1939, Vol. 5. Part 3, ( London, 1982), 
p. 1177. 
Letter to the Daily Telegraph. 19 March, 1938. G/3/13/9. Lloyd George Papers. 
534 Brian Bond, Liddell Hart. A study of his military thought, (London, 1977), p. 88; p. 90; p. 111. 
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looked at in this chapter regarding the issue of Soviet involvement in the 
resistance of future aggression. ' Despite the publication of his articles being 
censored by the fervently pro-appeasing editor of the Times , 
Geoffrey Dawson, 
Liddell Hart also published several articles in favour of Soviet involvement in 
the resistance to aggression, not only in the Times but also in the dne 
Morning Herald. Writing such articles and circulating such memoranda whilst 
personally still averse to a continental commitment was one of many paradoxes 
in Liddell Hart's writings. Yet it can be explained. Although inclined towards 
isolationism, Liddell Hart did not support Chamberlain's appeasement policy. 
Rather, like several of the anti-appeasers looked at in this chapter, Liddell Hart 
supported a policy of bluff, `running the risk of war for the sake of peace. '6 
During the 193os, he had supported a policy of collective security with Britain's 
contribution limited to its conditions and resources. Thus, when friction 
mounted surrounding the Czech Sudetenland, particularly after the May crisis, 
Liddell Hart appeared persuaded of the importance of collective resistance, 
including not only British forces' , 
but also Soviet forces. Observing the 
international situation, especially strategic considerations, Liddell Hart wrote 
of the need for collaboration with the Soviets. In June, 1938, for example, in an 
article entitled , 
`The Czechs' Cause - Call for British Stand-Danger of "Buying 
Peace", he explained that a 'settlement that spelt the exclusion of Russia's forces 
from the balance, while establishing Germany's domination of Czechoslovakia, 
would be a very bad bargain, strategically, for the ultimate settlement of 
Europe. ' 538 
535Memoranda circulated by Liddell Hart can be found in numerous collections of private 
papers, such as those of Boothby and Churchill; Ibid., p. 111, nb. 35. 
51 Alex Danchev, Alchemist of War. The Life of Basil Liddell Hart, (London, 1998), p. 203. 
537 Ibid.,, pp. 90 - 112. 
5' Liddell Hart Papers. Kings College Archives. Reference. LH 10/1938/50. The Czechs' cause 
- Call for British Stand - Danger of "Buying Peace. " By Captain B. C. Liddell Hart. In the Sydney 
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One of many politicians who also received memoranda from Liddell Hart, was 
the Conservative M. P. Harold Macmillan. He, too, supported collaboration with 
the Soviets. By the end of 1937, the aggressive acts of Hitler and Mussolini had 
persuaded Macmillan of `the most urgent need of Britain. .. to draw in as her 
allies in the cause of peace the two great nations in the West and the East - the 
United States and Russia. '" In an article written for the Northern Echo on 18 
March, Macmillan called for collaboration with the French and Soviets, if 
Whitehall intended to make the invasion of Czechoslovakia a reason for going 
for war. `° In The Times, he openly supported groups such as `The New 
Commonwealth', who wrote of the increasing threat of German expansion and 
called for a `reversion to the policy of collective security. '" After Munich, he 
expressed his support for an alliance in a private but widely circulated pamphlet 
entitled `The Price of Peace. ' By the winter of 1938 - 1939, Macmillan's 
support for Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration had strengthened. Anglo- 
French-Soviet collaboration, in his opinion, could help preserve peace, and if 
peace could not be preserved, then Soviet assistance would be crucial in the 
event of war. 
Leopold Amery agreed that peace could only be secured through the 
involvement of the Soviet Union in a policy of collective resistance. ' At a 
meeting on 26 September, first at General Sir Edward Spear's office, and then in 
Churchill's flat, Amery discussed with other politicians including the Liberal 
M. P., Lloyd George, the President of the League of Nations Union, Lord Robert 
Cecil and Archibald Sinclair, the importance of `bringing Russia into the 
Macmillan, Winds of Change, p. 529; p. 549 
54° Ibid.., p. 543. 
54' Letter to Macmillan from Lord Davies of 'The New Commonwealth. ' 24 March, 1939. MS 
Macmillan dep. c. 131. Macmillan Papers. Bodleian Library, Oxford University. Macmillan's 
papers have been severely weeded. There are no diaries in the collection for the period 1937 - 
1939. Only correspondence with his constituents survive. 
5'2 Macmillan, Winds of Change, p. 584. 
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picture. ' Amery himself was `all for pressing the government privately on 
this... '" He appreciated that it `was not only the Western powers that were 
concerned about Czechoslovakia. In Russian eyes it was an outpost and bastion 
of Slavdom ... the 
key to the whole strategic situation in Central Europe, not 
lightly to be surrendered into the hand of the declared enemy. '5 Yet, Amery 
found it very difficult to openly oppose the government's policy and campaign 
for closer Anglo-French-Soviet relations. The reason for this was threefold. 
Firstly, the isolationist imperialist stance he had previously held naturally 
opposed continental entanglements, including cooperation with the Soviets 
over the crisis in eastern Europe. Secondly, and more relevant to this thesis, 
Amery had to reconcile Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration with the anti-Soviet 
prejudices he held. ' Thirdly, Amery faced a dilemma many Conservatives faced 
during this period, namely, whether to openly rebel against the leader of the 
party. He noted of his meeting with Churchill and others that `they also wished 
for some public declaration by us, as Conservatives, that we stood for 
cooperation with Russia, to which I strongly objected. " Amery admitted in his 
diary that he could not speak out against Chamberlain because he felt there 
would be little support for such a proposal from fellow Conservative back 
benchers 548 
Anthony Eden's behaviour regarding his support of Anglo-French-Soviet 
collaboration also reflected this dilemma. 49 Thus, he, too, did not speak openly 
about his opinion regarding Soviet involvement in the settling of the 
Sudetenland crisis before the Munich conference. Indeed, despite privately 
agreeing with Churchill and others on the issue of Anglo-French-Soviet 
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collaboration, the former Foreign Secretary refused to sign a telegram to be sent 
to the Prime Minister on 29 September warning him not to betray the Czechs. 
Churchill proposed the telegram and Sinclair and Robert Cecil, amongst others, 
agreed to sign. But Eden refused `on the grounds that it would be interpreted as 
a vendetta against Chamberlain. "" Throughout 1938 Eden had shown 
remarkable loyalty to Chamberlain. He had refused to capitalise on the seizure 
of Austria earlier in the year, evidently a failure of appeasement policy. Instead, 
he chose to stay away from Westminster for two months following the 
Anschluss. ' Eden remained hopeful that he could reenter the cabinet at some 
stage. Despite his political ambitions and loyalty to Neville Chamberlain, 
however, Eden did want the British government to collaborate with Moscow. He 
had favoured closer Anglo-Soviet diplomatic relations since 1935"'52 In the 
Spring of 1935, Eden had been the first British minister to visit the Soviet Union 
following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 , and 
following this he maintained 
contact with the Soviet ambassador Ivan Maisky. ' Indeed both the Soviet 
ambassador and Lord Cranbourne, Eden's Parliamentary Under Secretary 
before his resignation in February 1938, perceived the former Foreign Secretary 
to be in favour of Anglo-Soviet rapprochement. ' Though not in favour of the 
formation of military blocs with Britain and the Soviet Union on one side and 
Germany on the other, during the autumn of 1937, Eden nevertheless had 
worked to prevent the isolation of the Soviet government from international 
diplomacy. ' Moreover, though he was not its most outspoken member, he was 
still a member of the group known as the `Glamour Boys' which met informally 
550 Harold Nicolson. Diary entry. 29 September, 1938. Cited in, Nicolson, Diaries, pp. 371-372. 
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to discuss foreign affairs, including the role of the Soviet Union. 6 He eventually 
expressed his opinion on the issue openly following the Munich conference. 
There was, he argued in the House of Commons in October, `no sufficient cause 
for seeking to organise Europe on such a basis that excludes any great power, 
nor do I believe you can secure the lasting peace of Europe on such a basis. '"' 
Eden did not refer to the Soviet Union by name, but his implication was 
obvious. 
A close associate and a former private secretary of Anthony Eden, Oliver 
Harvey, also supported collaboration with the Soviets during this period. As 
the private secretary of the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, Harvey could 
hardly become involved in the unofficial meetings of politicians regarding 
foreign affairs. Neither, as a civil servant, could he openly air his opinion about 
foreign policy during this period. Yet, Harvey's diary reveals his personal 
interest in the position of the Soviet Union in international affairs throughout 
Chamberlain's premiership. Indeed, his views were not dissimilar to those of 
Churchill's and the other anti-appeasers. Thus, he too, opposed Chamberlain's 
exclusion of the Soviet government and believed that the best settlement for the 
Czechoslovakian crisis involved the Soviet Union. During the winter of 1938- 
1939, Harvey called for closer Anglo-French-Soviet relations in particular. He 
`urged the need', for example, for both the French and British governments to 
9 warm up their relations with Russia... '9 
Members of the Labour party made similar statements of support for the 
involvement of the Soviet Union in the settling of the Sudetenland crisis. During 
556Anthony Eden, The Reckoning, (London, 1965), pp. 31-32; Thompson, Anti-Appeasers, pp. 
167-8; For further discussion of such groups see, Introduction. 
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1938, both Attlee and Arthur Greenwood" said relatively little about foreign 
affairs and the Soviet Union, in particular. Each suffered periods of illness and 
so were absent from the House of Commons. Still, when they did speak on the 
subject, they, too, called for closer Anglo-French- Soviet relations. In April, for 
example, Greenwood voiced his support for Litvinov's recent proposal of a 
conference to discuss collective resistance. "' After Munich, Attlee himself called 
for a conference to establish the future peace of Europe, and emphasised the 
need to invite Soviet representatives. 562 
The most passionate supporter of closer Anglo-Soviet relations in the Labour 
party, however, was Hugh Dalton. Hugh Dalton, although in favour of 
collaboration between London and Moscow in 1938, did not want diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union necessarily at the exclusion of Germany. 
Rather, Dalton wanted `a system of mutual guarantee against aggression in 
Europe. ' Thus, if the Soviet Union attacked Nazi Germany, Dalton was willing to 
defend Germany against aggression. But, at the same time, he wanted the 
British government to assure it would side with the Soviet Union, and others, if 
threatened by German forces. " As the Czechoslovakian crisis heightened and 
Germany's aggressive intentions became increasingly evident, Dalton and the 
Labour party wanted collaboration with the Soviets against German aggression. 
On 8 September, at the Trade Union Congress in Blackpool, the Labour Party 
National Executive issued a statement, agreed by the T. U. C. , which demanded 
that the `British Government must leave no doubt in the mind of the German 
Government that they will unite with the French and Soviet Governments to 
resist any attack on Czechoslovakia... '" Dalton soon after pointed out to the 
5C0 Greenwood's private papers, deposited at the Bodleian library, Oxford University, contain no 
commentary upon the Soviet Union during Chamberlain's premiership. 
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Prime Minister; `Is it not a clear calculation,..., that if it can be shown in 
advance that there would be a combined force annoyed against an aggressor, 
which would include the Soviet Union, we should be much more likely to avoid 
war? ' 
Examining the public speeches and private papers of Hugh Dalton provides 
sufficient evidence to dismiss the contention of A. J. P. Taylor, namely, that 
Labour M. P. s could and did call for an alliance with the Soviet Union because 
they knew that this was something that a Conservative Prime Minister would 
never contemplate. 566 The anti-appeasers were not insincere `troublemakers'. 
The sincerity of Dalton's proposals was clear. The repeated attacks upon 
government policy in the House of Commons and the personal demands made 
to individual ministers, reflected a genuine hope that Chamberlain would 
change his mind. 
Other politicians that joined such efforts to persuade the Prime Minister to 
accept Soviet proposals of collaboration included the National Labour M. P, 
Harold Nicolson, Archibald Sinclair and Lloyd George. Like several M. P. s 
during this period, including Winston Churchill, Nicolson maintained a close 
relationship with the Soviet ambassador, Ivan Maisky, and frequently met him 
to discuss foreign affairs, in particular, Anglo-Soviet relations. "" On 26 August, 
Nicolson noted in his diary that `if Maisky can be induced to promise Russian 
support if we take a strong line over Czechoslovakia, the weak will of the Prime 
Minister may be strengthened. ' 568 Nicholson wanted cooperation between 
London, Paris and Moscow regarding the defence of the Sudetenland. Indeed, 
only days before Chamberlain announced his visit to Munich, he visited the 
" Col. 142.3 Oct, 1938.339 HC Deb 5s. 
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Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, in order to persuade him to collaborate with 
the Soviets. " 
Archibald Sinclair and Lloyd George were both unequivocal in their conviction 
that the Soviet Union ought to be included in the resistance of future 
aggression. 57° In private meetings, each had agreed to pressure the government 
to accept Soviet proposals of collaboration over the defence of Czechoslovakia. J7' 
Both chose to express their attitudes towards the Soviet Union in the House of 
Commons after Munich. Sinclair demanded Soviet inclusion in the guarantee of 
what remained of Czechoslovakia. " Only collaboration with the Soviet 
government, he said, could ensure peace in Europe. 573 Lloyd George, like Hugh 
Dalton, did not believe Anglo-Soviet relations had necessarily to be at the 
expense of Anglo-German relations 57a But, he, too, wanted Moscow included in 
any guarantee of Czechoslovakia. 575 
Notably, Lloyd George, like most of the politicians looked at in this chapter, 
stressed the importance of deterrence in his calls for Anglo-French-Soviet 
collaboration. He told the House of Commons that closer Anglo-French-Soviet 
relations before September would have deterred Hitler and ensured the security 
of Czechoslovakia. `Herr Hitler' he argued, `if he had known there was a 
combination of that kind.. . against 
him if he took any aggressive line against 
Czechoslovakia, would never have taken any step... 'S'6 Churchill, Boothby and 
Dalton had hinted that they were prepared for military collaboration and war if 
I Ibid., p. 366.23 Sept, 1938. 
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necessary, namely if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia. " However, each, firmly 
believed that war would be prevented if Britain, France and the Soviet Union 
allied. Nothing, Robert Boothby believed, 
... 
is more likely to deter Herr Hitler from action which would certainly 
plunge the whole world into the miseries and homes of modern warfare 
than the knowledge that staff talks were now taking place between 
Britain, France and Russia; and that these powers would act together 
during the next few critical weeks while the fate of Europe is in the 
balance. ''$ 
The `veto of France, Britain and Russia', Churchill wrote in September, `would 
certainly prevent the disaster of war. '57° At the time of the Czechoslovakia crisis, 
he argued after Munich, `the German dictator was not deeply and irrevocably 
committed to his new adventure. " Indeed, Churchill believed that the 
likelihood of war resulting from his own proposal to establish a `grand alliance' 
prior to Munich, would have been far less than the potential for war now that 
Chamberlain's actions had compromised Britain's position. "' This was in stark 
contrast to the conviction of many within the Cabinet, at least until May 1939, 
that collaboration with the Soviets would almost certainly increase the 
likelihood of the war. 582 
Churchill in particular, believed a threat of resistance would succeed because it 
would have `given strength to all those forces in Germany which resisted this 
departure, this new design [ an attack on Czechoslovakia ]. 
1583 Lloyd George 
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agreed that Hitler `would not have been backed up by his army' who were, 
according to his sources, `against it' and `frightened of it. ''84 The main reason 
underlying the conviction amongst anti-appeasers that such a threat would have 
succeeded in preventing war, however, was the belief that Hitler's optimism 
about engaging in aggressive actions against countries such as Czechoslovakia 
was largely influenced by the British government's refusal to cooperate with 
Moscow. For example, Nicolson thought that `Ribbentrop always says to Hitler, 
"You need never fear England until you find her mentioning Russia as an ally. 
Then it means she is really going to war. """ Even Henry Channon, M. P., a 
fervent supporter of Chamberlain, agreed that `Hitler is too canny to risk a war, 
so long as there is a chance of French and Russian participation. ' S" Boothby, 
too, thought that Hitler's foreign policy, and his actions concerning the 
Sudetenland especially, had been largely influenced by the state of Anglo-Soviet 
relations. He told Lloyd George; 
There is no doubt whatever that Ribbentrop told Hitler that the British 
government was much more concerned about class interests than 
national interests; and that unless and until direct political and military 
contacts were established between the British and the Russians, he could 
rest assured that the British government did not mean business. ' 
Consequently, those who supported Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration were 
always `desperately keen about pressing the Government to make clear that we 
were in direct touch with Russia in order to impress the Germans, who have 
taken our non-contact with Russia as a clear proof that we do not mean to go 
)588 in... 
These politicians were not, therefore, war mongers. Their reaction to the news 
5B' Col. 2547.19 Dec, 1938.342 HC Deb 5s. 
Nicolson, Diaries and Letters. Cited in Gilbert, Churchill, pp. 1178-1179. 
I'll Robert Rhodes James ed., Chips. The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, (London, 1967), p. 163. 
2 Sept, 1938. 
587 Memorandum from Boothby to Churchill. 1 Oct, 1938. G/3/13/9. Lloyd George Papers. 
5I" Leopold Amery diary entry. 26 Sept, 1938. Cited in Gilbert, Churchill, pp. 1179-80. 
133 
that Hitler had invited Chamberlain to Munich on 28 September confirmed 
this. 589 Clement Attlee and Archibald Sinclair, offered their congratulations and 
encouragement. i9° Attlee admitted, `we all feel relief that war has not come this 
time. 'S" Harold Macmillan noted that he, too, `shared - the general sense of 
relief. My son would stay at school and go to Oxford... "` Even Churchill shook 
Chamberlain's hand and congratulated the Prime Minister on his `good 
fortune. " No one had wanted to go to war in 1938.5 Rather they had believed 
that only collaboration with the Soviets could prevent war. Consequently, when 
the terms of the Munich agreement were revealed and it became apparent that 
the West had merely surrendered to Hitler's threats, calls for Soviet 
involvement in the resistance to future aggression continued and even 
heightened. 
Looking at all of the arguments and proposals put forward in 1.938 by those 
collectively referred to as anti-appeasers it would be reasonable to say that there 
existed some ambiguity surrounding exactly what many of the Conservative and 
opposition members supported as an alternative policy to that of appeasement. 
The fact that several chose not to speak out in favour of collaboration in the 
House of Commons until after Munich, further illustrates the hesitancy that 
existed. '95 Nonetheless, it would not be a fair interpretation of the evidence to 
say that these politicians had no real substitute for Chamberlain's policy. " 
Churchill, Boothby and Hugh Dalton in particular, had spelt out their proposals 
5119 Thompson, Anti-Appeasers, pp. 174-5. 
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in the clearest possible terms. 59' Furthermore, despite such vagueness in exactly 
what M. P. s proposed, it was obvious that each wanted the Soviet government to 
be far more involved in the resistance of aggression than it was, at present, 
being allowed to be. All agreed that Soviet representatives should be informed 
of developments and invited to conferences about Czechoslovakia. After 
Munich, they urged Chamberlain not to exclude the Soviet Union any longer, 
and in particular, to include Moscow in plans to secure the future of what 
remained of Czechoslovakia. 
How can one explain such opposition to the government's policy towards the 
Soviet Union. Why did these individuals, in contrast to Chamberlain, so want 
Moscow to be involved in the resistance to aggression? Firstly, it is important to 
deal with two issues raised earlier in Chapter One, namely, attitudes towards 
Germany and the policy of appeasement, and the structural constraints facing 
the British government during this period. Thus, it can be suggested that the 
politicians looked at in this chapter were motivated in their support of Anglo- 
French-Soviet collaboration by their perceptions of Hitler and their opposition 
to a policy of repeated conciliation, and that they were only able to pursue their 
support because of a deliberate ignorance of the structural constraints facing 
the government. These included Britain's military weakness, the opposition of 
the dominion and east European governments to Soviet involvement in the 
resistance of aggression, and the strategic difficulties their opposition created. 
The politicians and officials looked at in this chapter did oppose Chamberlain's 
policy of conciliation. Amongst those at the forefront of the anti-appeasers, for 
example, was Major General Edward Spears, one of the founder members of the 
"Cols. 93-100; 14 Mar, 1938.333 HC Deb 5s; Diary entry. 13 July, 1938.1/19/23. Dalton 
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December Club. 5q' He had voiced his opposition to appeasement throughout 
the 193os. As early as October 1937, Spears wanted to impress upon the 
Germans that Britain would go to war over the Czech Sudetenland. '" In May 
1938, he wrote to the Times calling for a British commitment on the 
continent. ' Churchill had similarly vehemently opposed and criticised 
Chamberlain's foreign policy during 1938. On 15 September, for example, when 
the British press received news of Chamberlain's visit to Hitler, Winston 
claimed that it was `the stupidest thing that has ever been done. '"' He warned 
that 
... the partition of Czechoslovakia under Anglo-French pressure amounts 
to a complete surrender by the Western democracies to the Nazi threat of 
force. Such a collapse will not bring peace or safety to Great Britain and 
France. On the contrary it will bring both the countries into a position of 
ever increasing weakness and danger. '2 
In his opinion, the Munich agreement and the cessation of the Sudetenland to 
Germany represented the ultimate failure of appeasement policy. 6°3 
Anthony Eden also opposed the government's `policy of concession to 
violence. i ' He supported Chamberlain's determination to avoid war, but 
disagreed on his methods and tactics, especially regarding the timing of the 
conciliation of the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini. " On 20 February, Eden 
had resigned from his post as Foreign Secretary because of his opposition to 
Chamberlain's attempt to secure Italian friendship. As the Czechoslovakian 
crisis heightened, he had become more and more pessimistic about 
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appeasement. 616 During the spring and summer, Eden increasingly opposed any 
further concessions to Hitler. 61, on 9 September, he tried to persuade the 
Foreign Secretary to issue a warning to the German dictator that war over 
Czechoslovakia would not be localised. 6°8 
Oliver Harvey agreed with his former chief. He believed the policy of 
conciliation had undermined Britain's role as the world's champion of 
democracy. " By the end of 1938, Chamberlain's policy, he wrote, was 
'bankrupt. "'° Lord Robert Cecil and Leopold Amery agreed. In a letter to 
Archibald Sinclair, Cecil wrote; `I verily believe that Chamberlain's foreign 
policy is very dangerous. i6' Leopold Amery had urged action to be taken against 
Hitler as early as March and the proclamation of the Anschluss. "' By the end of 
year, he openly criticised the Prime Minister's policy in the House of 
Commons. 613 He reproached the decision makers for yielding `to a stronger will 
and to a clearer judgment of our own nerve. '6" 
Again, concerns about remaining loyal to the Conservative leadership led 
politicians such as Amery to make contradictory statements regarding his 
attitude towards government foreign policy. In the same speech to the House of 
Commons, for example, Amery appealed to fellow politicians not to criticise the 
government; `Least of all I am asking the House to blame the Prime Minister, 
who has had to face a terrible responsibility... '6j5 What possibly persuaded such 
806 Ibid., p. 101; Liddell Hart, B. H. Liddell Hart. Memoirs, Vol. II, (London, 1958), pp. 161-2. 
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politicians to leap to the defence of the government after the Munich conference 
were the attacks being unleashed by members of the opposition. Though 
traditionally an anti-war party, by 1937, the Labour party had also begun to 
criticise Chamberlain's foreign policy. Hugh Dalton was primarily responsible 
for this change. During the last sixteen months of peace, he personally went to 
great lengths to emphasise the dangers of appeasement. Like others, Dalton 
believed that offering Hitler concessions would not prevent war. "' Arthur 
Greenwood supported Dalton, telling the House of Commons that 
Chamberlain's policy was `not the way to peace. "' Nicholson, described 
appeasement as disastrous, "' and was one of few who refused to stand and 
cheer on the announcement of Chamberlain's invitation to the Munich 
conference. b'9 
Amongst the Liberals, Archibald Sinclair vented his opposition to appeasement 
vehemently. He told the House of Commons in July; 
The Prime Minister asks, are we to be plunged into war against our will? 
If those who threaten and trample on the rights of others are to be 
allowed to dominate and absorb the resources first of one country and 
then of another - Austria, Spain, China, Czechoslovakia and the Balkan 
countries, and if brute force proves irresistible, the answer is that we in 
our turn will inevitably have to chose between being plunged into war 
against our will or being reduced to... poverty and servitude. b2° 
Sinclair's speeches, especially, revealed what underlay such opposition to the 
government's foreign policy. Namely, a realisation of Hitler's aggressive 
intentions, and consequently, an immense distrust of any assurances on his 
behalf. In contrast to Chamberlain, Sinclair argued that to rely upon the 
assurances of the dictators would be calamitous: 
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My profound mistrust of the Prime Minister's foreign policy is derived 
from a careful study of his speeches, from which it appears to me that he 
misconceives the world situation and misunderstands both the opinions 
of his opponents at home and the psychology of those two ruthless and 
formidable dictators (not reasonable and honourable, but misguided, 
gentlemen, as he appears to think. ) 621 
In addition to their anti-appeasement stance, these M. Ps also appeared to 
ignore what members of the government and several historians since have 
highlighted as the structural constraints facing London during this period. 
Neither Dalton, Sinclair, Churchill, nor others who criticised the government 
for excluding the Soviet Union appeared to consider the genuine fear of 
Communist infiltration held by the nations of continental Europe. Robert 
Boothby, for example, assumed that the `Great Powers' would be supported by 
`other small European powers. ' " Almost no consideration was given to the 
opinions of the dominions. Furthermore, one could argue that the anti- 
appeasers failed to appreciate the inherent contradiction between their 
proposals and Britain's military weaknesses. At the beginning of 1938, for 
example, Macmillan pointed out that, with the exception of Hugh Dalton, the 
Labour party and Liberals though all in favour `for "standing up to the 
dictators" in principle, were still determined to reject the only practical means 
by which Britain's military power could be rapidly increased. i623 Consequently, 
one could suggest, the proposals of the anti-appeasers were only possible 
because of their deliberate ignorance of the inherent difficulties facing 
Whitehall. 
Yet, what in fact separated the anti-appeasers from the government was their 
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belief that such military, strategical and political constraints were not the 
impossible obstacles that those who opposed closer Anglo-Soviet relations 
portrayed them to be. In contrast to Chamberlain and his supporters, for 
example, those outside the government did not accept that the opinions of 
certain governments were final and, more importantly, decisive. They were 
willing to at least try to persuade such governments of the need for their 
involvement in the resistance to aggression. Churchill, for example, believed 
that the Baltic States, the Scandinavian powers, as well as Poland, could all be 
persuaded to participate in collective resistance. On 9 May, 1938, Churchill 
explained to an audience in Manchester: 
There is Poland; and the countries of the north, the Baltic States, the 
Scandinavian Powers. If we had once gathered together the forces I have 
mentioned, we should then be in a position to offer these countries a very 
great measure of armed security for peace. At the present time they do 
not know which way to turn. But if they saw a strong, armed association, 
such as I have described, whose interest in peace was the same as theirs, 
they might easily be induced to throw in their lot with us and "make 
assurance double sure. "'624 
If such countries could not be enticed into joining a policy of collective security, 
then, Hugh Dalton explained, they would just have to be pressured. He 
emphasised the need to make both Poland and Rumania comply to efforts to 
ensure Soviet aid if necessary. b Liddell Hart pointed out that the British 
government could utilise the fact that Poland was, to some degree, reliant upon 
Britain, situated as it (Poland) was, between two hostile powers. Thus, in an 
article for the New Commonwealth Quarterly, he wrote that countries such as 
Poland needed reassurance from Britain and the West. Their behaviour and 
decisions were effectively in the hands of the British government. "' 
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In 1938 Poland wanted to seize Teschen from Czechoslovakia. That this was 
ignored by the anti-appeasers, as well as the opposition to Anglo-French-Soviet 
collaboration amongst the dominion governments, does show that, to some 
extent, those outside of government could and did overlook inconvenient facts 
about the difficulties inherent in involving the Soviet Union in a policy of 
collective resistance. Nevertheless, Churchill and others had proposed actions 
not considered or implemented by the British government, most notably, 
establishing an alliance as a means of deterrence. What this revealed was that 
whether London collaborated with Moscow or not was actually a matter of will, 
namely, whether politicians were willing to try and overcome such difficulties 
because of a genuine desire for Moscow's involvement. That it was, in fact, a 
matter of will was confirmed by the decision of most of the Cabinet to consider 
Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration at the end of September, despite the 
existence of such alleged obstacles. 
Similarly, those that supported Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration, such as 
Churchill and Boothby, did not perceive Britain's military weakness to be the 
insurmountable barrier Chamberlain and others suggested. Several M. P. s did 
acknowledge it as a serious problem during 1938.627 Churchill, Amery and 
Boothby had continually and openly urged rearmament. 6`8 Although the Labour 
party had previously voted against the defence estimates, it had joined Churchill 
and others in urging rearmament during the later months of 1938.629 However, 
the primary reason these politicians did not accept Britain's military weakness 
as an obstacle to Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration was their sincere belief that 
Hitler's aggressive ambitions could be thwarted through a diplomatic warning, 
by a bluff. What if Hitler called the bluff and war broke out? Admittedly 
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politicians including Churchill did not discuss this possibility in great detail, 
but it would be fair to assume from statements that a number of politicians 
believed that, together with an eastern front provided by the Soviet Union, the 
French and British could defeat Hitler. Churchill believed this, as did 
Macmillan. At the time, Macmillan thought Germany should have been 
militarily resisted over the Sudetenland. Later he reflected that Britain `could 
hardly have been in so perilous a position as that which we had to face in the 
summer of 1940. ' `The armies of France would have been intact', he wrote. 
Furthermore, 
... we should 
have had Germany facing two fronts -a west and an east - 
with Czechoslovakia and perhaps Poland to fight, and beyond them, 
Russia to fear. The Czechoslovak army was considerable and well armed. 
As regards the air, in spite of our weakness, the German bombers would 
have been at the disadvantage of having to attack from home 
stations.. . we might well 
have secured the support of Russia, who 
regarded Munich as a sign of the moral and material weakness of the 
West. The Dominions would doubtless have come along in due course 
once the die was cast. 
630 
It is difficult to say whether Britain would have won a war during 1938. But, 
again, the fact that cabinet ministers themselves were prepared to contact 
Moscow with regard to military collaboration at the end of September suggests 
even they did not believe Britain's military status undermined resistance 
entirely. 
Regarding the more plausible suggestion that perceptions of Germany and 
opposition to appeasement dictated such support for Anglo-French-Soviet 
collaboration, two points need to be made. Firstly, not all who proposed Soviet 
involvement held identical views of the German dictator, or, therefore, were 
necessarily opposed to negotiating with the dictators. Though he held contempt 
for Mussolini and detested Nazism, Lloyd George, for example, remained 
11 Ibid., p. 579. 
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`spellbound' by Hitler following his visit to Berlin in 1936.6`3' After Munich, the 
former Prime Minister remained willing to accept negotiations between Britain 
and Germany, as long as Moscow was no longer excluded. He told the House of 
Commons on 9 November; 
... we are neither Fascists nor 
Communists. We cannot possibly, as a 
democratic and free people, approve of the things that are happening in 
Germany or Italy, but, nevertheless, we are entering into discussions 
with them for a general peace. I am all for it, as long as we treat other 
nations of whose political systems we do not approve in the same way. `' 
Hugh Dalton had also expressed his own acceptance of continued negotiations 
with the Germans at the beginning of 1938.633 Secondly, concerning those, such 
as Winston Churchill, who were adamantly opposed to further conciliation of 
the German dictator, it can be argued that, as with members of the cabinet and 
foreign policy committee, views regarding appeasement were not directly 
influential upon attitudes towards Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration. Thus, 
individuals did not support collaboration with the Soviets because they 
distrusted Hitler and opposed further concessions to him. Rather, their 
realisation of Hitler's aggressive intentions persuaded members of the 
opposition and dissident Conservatives to put aside the anti-Soviet prejudices 
that each held, and that otherwise would have motivated their opposition to 
Anglo- Soviet collaboration. 
That it was, in fact, the decision to put aside prejudices towards the Soviet 
Union that determined the support of Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration, can 
be shown in two ways. Firstly, through the hostile perceptions of the Soviet 
Union held by the anti-appeasers themselves, and secondly, through their 
specific reference to the idea of putting aside such prejudices in speeches and in 
their private papers. Each of the politicians and officials looked at in this 
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chapter harboured anti-Soviet prejudices whilst supporting closer Anglo-Soviet 
relations. Members of the Conservative party in particular had a history of 
intense political and ideological animosity towards the Soviet government. 
Winston Churchill, for example, had supported British intervention in Russia in 
an attempt to bring down the Bolsheviks following their withdrawal from the 
Great War in 1918.634 In fact, he had led calls for an anti-Soviet alliance 
including a reconciliated and rearmed Germany. ' During the 1920s, 
Churchill's hostility towards Bolshevism increased. He opposed all efforts to 
improve relations between the two countries and complained of destructive 
Communist influence not only within Britain but also in India. "' Churchill's 
first gesture indicating a change of approach towards Moscow occurred in 1934, 
but he did not yet support any kind of alliance with the Soviets. Indeed, despite 
maintaining contact with the Soviet ambassador, Ivan Maisky, Churchill, along 
with other Conservatives, including Leopold Amery, sympathised with the anti- 
Communist Franco during the Spanish civil war. 637 During Chamberlain's 
premiership, Churchill continued to express his hostility towards Soviet 
Communism and the Soviet system of government in a number of speeches. 131 
He told an audience in America that Communism and Nazi tyranny were `the 
same things spelt in different ways. '639 In the House of Commons he spoke of the 
threat both the Fascists and Communists ultimately posed to Britain. He 
warned that the Fascists `like the Communists... must seek, from time to time, 
and always at shorter intervals, a new target, a new prize, a new victim. "° 
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Harold Macmillan fully sympathised with these anti-Communist sentiments. `If 
the British government looked at Soviet Russia with suspicion, this was due to 
the history of some twenty years', he wrote. 
Soviet propaganda and Communist subversion were rightly resented, not 
only at home where they were comparatively harmless, but throughout 
India and the Colonial Empire where they were more dangerous. Alliance 
with with Bolshevist Russia may have been necessary, but it was distasteful. 
Anthony Eden, did not appear to share such suspicion and fear of Communism. 
Although, as Foreign Secretary, he had dealt regularly with fears of Communist 
expansion on the continent"', he had, at the same time, continued to try and 
calm the attacks upon the Soviet government and what was perceived to be 
Comintern infiltration by members of his own party. 643 This most likely 
reflected Eden's efforts to prevent Soviet isolationism during the final months of 
his time in government. In no way, however, did his actions suggest he did not 
personally oppose Communist ideology. " 
Clement Attlee and members of his Labour party were, in contrast to most 
members of the Conservative party, self-confessed Russophiles. 5 Hence it is 
true to say that they did not have to overcome such intense and age-old hostility 
towards the Soviet Union. They had, throughout the 1920s, worked to ensure 
improved Anglo-Soviet relations and in 1924, the Labour government led by 
Ramsay MacDonald, granted formal diplomatic recognition to the Soviet state. 
In August of the same year, the government initialled both a commercial 
agreement and a general treaty with the Soviets. In 1929, it was again under a 
minority Labour government that Britain and the Soviet Union exchanged 
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ambassadors for the first time since the Bolshevik revolution. Consequently, 
Labour came to be accused by Conservatives of being `soft' on Communism. Yet, 
the Labour party, too, had always distrusted and opposed Communism. Labour 
leadership denounced the British Communist party, and throughout the 192os 
and 193os, made every effort to distance themselves from Communism. 
`London and Moscow' according to the International Labour Office in 1920, 
were `two antagonistic forces struggling for the supremacy over the working 
masses. i " Antagonism and suspicion therefore remained despite efforts to 
improve relations. As late as April 1938, the Labour leadership revealed its 
continued aversion to Communism through its hostile reaction to Stafford 
Cripps' attempts to rally a popular front, including the Communist party in 
Britain. " 
Both Labour and Conservative members were also appalled by the internal 
system of Stalin's dictatorship. Attlee and Boothby recalled in their memoirs 
their horrors at the realities of the Soviet regime. "' `In 1934', Boothby wrote, `I 
found it oppressive almost beyond the point of endurance. The air was full of 
blood. ' He recalled writing to his mother; `If I lived in this country, I should be 
on Stalin's side - simply in order to survive. 7649 
Furthermore several anti-appeasers who supported collaboration with the 
Soviets during 1938, nevertheless harboured some suspicion about Moscow's 
reliability. Churchill, Liddell Hart, Oliver Harvey, Dalton, and Eden especially, 
found it difficult to trust the Soviet government's intentions with regard to the 
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resistance of aggression. At the beginning of the year, Eden did not believe the 
Soviet Union would intervene in a war in the near future. " Churchill admitted 
in May, that one could not count, in any definite manner, upon Russian 
action. "' Liddell Hart similarly confessed that he was `not inclined to trust 
Soviet representatives. i6' Oliver Harvey believed `we need have no illusions 
ourselves about Russia coming to our help. f6' Hugh Dalton was unsure. The 
Soviet Union, he admitted, was still an `enigma' to the West. `This was the most 
difficult gap in all one's knowledge to get filled in... what would they do? No one 
in this country seemed to know. 'G' To Liddell Hart, Dalton described a 'growing 
doubt' amongst Labour delegates as to `whether Russia would really join in. " 
In contrast to the more obvious anti-Soviet prejudices held by individuals such 
as Churchill, Lloyd George, one could argue, appeared to be pro-Soviet, even 
pro-Communist. During the Spanish civil war, for example, Lloyd George had 
openly supported the Republican government and opposed the decisions taken 
by Chamberlain's government. In his letters to the Soviet ambassador, he 
showed sympathy for the Republican movement, now largely supported by 
Soviet `volunteers'. `Spain looks much more promising than it did a few weeks 
ago', he wrote in February 1938. `The Republican position is decidedly 
improving and that of the Fascists emphatically deteriorating... " One could 
also point to his very good relationship with the Soviet ambassador, Ivan 
Maisky as evidence of his pro-Soviet sentiments. Lloyd George had had a good 
relationship with the ambassador since 1932. By July 1937, Beatrice Webb 
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noted of Maisky; `he has become very intimate with Lloyd George. " It also 
appears that the former Prime Minister `sent a warm message of admiration to 
Stalin, as the greatest living statesman alive' as late as May 1938.658 
Yet Lloyd George's actions and statements can be explained in terms other than 
his being pro-Communist or pro-Soviet. First, as this chapter and chapter eight 
illustrate, several M. P. s at this time had equally close relations with the Soviet 
ambassador. ' Maurice Hankey, for example, wrote that Churchill was 
`apparently a bosom friend of M. Maisky. '66° Hugh Dalton's private papers reveal 
his own close contact with the ambassador. 66i It was through Maisky that 
individuals such as Lloyd George, Dalton, Nicolson and Churchill frequently 
learnt of government decisions and behaviour towards Moscow, and of Soviet 
proposals to the British and French, especially during 1939. This is not to say 
that they believed everything they were told. "' Yet such contact enabled the 
anti-appeasers to challenge the government effectively. Indeed, Lloyd George 
perceived Maisky to be so important as an ally against Chamberlain's 
appeasement policy that he had sent a letter to Stalin in response to rumours 
that Maisky would soon become a victim of the purges and in an effort to save 
him. 663 Regarding his attitude towards the Spanish civil war, it is fair to point 
out that Lloyd George's support of the Republican government was in keeping 
with his hostility towards Italy. Everything the M. P. did, said, or wrote, that 
could be interpreted as indicative of his ideological and political bias in favour 
of the Soviet Union, can therefore, be more convincingly explained as 
illustrations of Lloyd George's desperation to ensure Moscow's involvement in 
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the resistance to future aggression. At no point during 1938 or 1939 did the 
former Prime Minister admit a preference for Communism above Fascism, or 
state any admiration for the Soviet system. Indeed he referred to his horror and 
repudiation of `a good many things which are done in Russia. X66 
Yet the anti-appeasers proposed closer Anglo-French-Soviet relations. That 
these men continued to support collaboration with the Soviets despite their 
distrust of, and hostility towards, the Soviet Union, revealed the decisive 
influence of their willingness to overlook their prejudices. Moreover, the anti- 
appeasers substantiated this through their explicit acknowledgment of such a 
decision. The Liberals, Sinclair and Lloyd George, in particular, spoke of putting 
aside anti-Soviet prejudices in the House of Commons. Archibald Sinclair, for 
example, highlighted the `cold and hostile references which the Prime Minister 
makes to Russia. " At the end of 1938 he remarked; `I hear it said, Russia has a 
different form of government. I hear it repeated, even in this House, that the 
Russians are Bolshevists and revolutionaries, and that they are 
untrustworthy. '66' 'We must stop talking about not being drawn into a war 
between Bolshevism and Fascism', " he warned. Indeed, Sinclair pointed out 
that not only the Soviet Union but Germany, too, had `a different form of 
government. ' Consequently he urged that fellow politicians' ignore the internal 
forms of government in our international relations', including that of the Soviet 
Union. ' 
Lloyd George pointed out the similarities between Germany and the Soviet 
Union. The British political elite, he observed, `do not agree with Fascism or its 
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methods, we repudiate them, we are horrified by some of them, but the same 
remark would apply, as far as the vast majority in this country are concerned, to 
a good many of the things which are done in Russia. ' He urged that those in the 
House `ought not to consider what ideology or system of government a country 
had before entering into a pact with it. "69 Lloyd George revealed the illogical 
nature of the current foreign policy; `Why should we enter into negotiations 
with these Fascist powers in spite of the fact that we disapprove of their 
methods and of the principles of their government, and yet rule out a much 
greater country? ' he asked. `On what grounds do we take that attitude? ' 6'° The 
former Prime Minister posed a good question, the answer to which many of the 
anti-appeasers believed lay the government's prejudices against the Soviet 
Union, and even, Lloyd George suggested, a `sympathy with the Fascist 
dictators. ' He told Chamberlain; 
... you allow Italy and Germany to convert Spain 
into a Fascist State, so 
there will be three Fascist countries against you-and when that is done 
you are going to turn Russia. That is not the way if you are looking for 
peace. If you have any other ulterior purpose let us know what it is. You 
may have a genuine sympathy with the Fascist dictators, believe in their 
ideologies, think it is better for the world that we should have things of 
that sort. 6" 
Lloyd George, in a moment of frustration, had made a similar accusation to that 
of several Soviet representatives, that the British Prime Minister was actually 
pro-Fascist. It was an extreme accusation with nothing in either official or 
private papers to support it. However, it revealed the desperation and anger of 
many of those who were judging the international situation and the Soviet 
Union objectively. Lloyd George went on to show just how past governments in 
Britain had been able to put aside their opposition to the internal system of 
Russia; 
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... we entered 
into a pact with Russia when it was Tsarist, with its 
pogroms, with its shooting down at the workmen in the streets of St 
Petersburg; we entered into a pact with a relentless autocracy. We did 
that in 1914, with the general consent of the nation. b'2 
Lloyd George, however, had overlooked the fact that the Tsarist dictatorship of 
Russia had not been Communist. The minutes of Cabinet and Foreign Policy 
Committee meetings show that it was not horror at the internal system of 
Stalin's government that British ministers and officials primarily objected to. 
Rather, Chamberlain and others feared the ideological threat of Communism. 
Fellow members of the House confirmed this when they responded to Lloyd 
George's tirade by reminding him of the past efforts of the Comintern' to cause 
underground dissatisfaction. "' By 1938, Lloyd George himself had become 
increasingly annoyed at `silly little interruptions like "Are you going to deal with 
the Bolsheviks? ii674 But he had put aside his own negative opinions of the Soviet 
Union. Many within the House of Commons could not. Oliver Harvey realised 
this. He hoped that both the French and British governments would improve 
relations with Moscow `regardless of their ideologies. "' Arthur Greenwood also 
appreciated the fear of Communist expansion within the British political elite. 
He recognised that many looked upon the Soviet Union as the `eternal bogey. ' 
He impressed upon the government that it was simply succumbing to the 
political manipulation of Hitler and Mussolini by allowing discriminatory views 
to dominate foreign policy decisions. The portrayal of the Soviet Union as the 
primary threat to Europe, he said, was `vitally necessary to those two dictators 
to sustain their internal power. ' 
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Others also urged the government to judge the international situation 
dispassionately, in terms of aggressors and victims. Winston Churchill in 
particular adopted this view. Later, Churchill would be referred to as `Russia's 
friend' because of his repeated calls for an alliance with the Soviets. " But he 
had never wanted to be friends with the Soviet government. His son, Randolph, 
later described Churchill's outlook; 
His natural liberalism is as much affronted by tyranny and cruelty in 
Nazi Germany as by similar acts in Communist Russia, but he does not 
allow the interior politics of foreign countries to cloud his judgment upon 
the practical question whether these countries are likely to prove 
themselves serviceable or dangerous to the high interests he set himself 
to guard. 678 
In 1938, Churchill believed that both Fascism and Communism were `equally 
obnoxious to the principles of freedom. ' `But', he told others, `surely we must 
have an opinion between right and wrong? Surely we must have an opinion 
between aggressor and victim? "' If the Soviet Union ever became the aggressor, 
then, of course, Britain would ally with Germany in order to resist aggression. ' 
In 1938, however, Churchill could see that the Soviet Union was the victim, it 
was `a country profoundly menaced by Nazi hostility. ' 68' In an address to the 
Free Trade Hall in Manchester, Churchill told members of the public that the 
Soviet Union was a country `which at any rate seeks no military aggression upon 
its neighbours, a country whose interests are peace.. ' 682 
Such a portrayal of the Soviet government as having no aggressive intentions 
67 Thompson, Anti-Appeasers p. 178. 
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did contradict other statements made by Churchill during this period. 683 
Indeed, an overall analysis of his comments and writings reveal frequent 
contradictions in his portrayal of the Soviet government. Nor was he the only 
one to make such contradictory remarks about the Soviet Union, or even about 
Anglo-Soviet collaboration. The influence of party loyalty upon open remarks 
about government foreign policy has already been mentioned. Contradictory 
remarks regarding Anglo-Soviet relations and the nature of the Soviet 
government especially reflected the difficulty Churchill and others had in 
overlooking completely their personal perceptions of, and feelings towards, the 
Soviet Union. As for Halifax, and several ministers, it was extremely difficult for 
politicians such as Churchill to ignore what many had believed for years to be 
the incompatibility of Communist aims on the one hand, and the security of the 
West on the other. At least they were willing to try. Moreover, they did not 
abandon their support of improved Anglo- Soviet relations. 
Hugh Dalton was another whose comments at times appeared contradictory. 
Despite his admitting doubts about Soviet reliability"' , for example, 
he 
repeatedly defended Soviet intentions in meetings with Neville Chamberlain 
and debates within the House of Commons. In September, Dalton defended 
Moscow's refusal to act alone in the defence of Czechoslovakia as being in 
keeping with existing treaties, rather than being indicative of Moscow's 
insincerity. Thus, at a meeting with Chamberlain on 17 September"' , Dalton 
criticised the Prime Minister for his acceptance of Bonnet's interpretation of a 
conversation held between Litvinov, and the French ambassador in Moscow, 
Jean Payart. Dalton recorded what he had been told, and his response, in his 
diary: 
68 The Defence of Freedom and Peace. ' An address to the people of the United States of 
America. 16 Oct, 1938. Cited in, Ibid.,, p. 56. 
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The PM said that Bonnet, in consequence of this conversation, 
entertained grave doubts as to whether the SU really meant to do 
anything. At this point I said `I must tell you Mr Prime Minister that I do 
not believe that story. It is quite contrary to what I have heard from more 
than one good source on which I place reliance-This conversation, 
moreover is quite inconsistent with the clear, repeated and recent 
statements by the Soviet that if France moved she would move at 
once... 
686 
Even with hindsight and the resentment that existed following Moscow's 
agreement with Berlin in the summer of 1939, Dalton wrote that, in 1938, `they 
would almost certainly have done something. f " He had had doubts about 
Moscow's reliability, then, but he had not allowed such unjustified suspicion to 
cloud the reality of the situation. 
Not all anti-appeasers made contradictory statements. Despite their anti-Soviet 
prejudices in other areas, for example, several had consistently judged Soviet 
foreign policy objectively. Robert Boothby was one. He reflected upon the facts 
of Soviet foreign policy in an article for the Daily Telegraphh: 
Of Russia, in relation to the external world, we know a good deal. The 
Soviet government has on many occasions during the last ten years 
proved that it has no aggressive intentions of any kind. Russia has 
always been an exemplary member of the League of Nations, and there is 
no reason to believe that she would not have fulfilled both her 
obligations. " 
Lord Robert Cecil agreed"' , as 
did Archibald Sinclair. He believed the Soviet 
government would fulfil its obligations to Czechoslovakia not only because it 
was the `historic protector of the Slav race"' , 
but because he, too, believed 
Moscow had proven itself `true to all her international obligations. "" Like 
Diary entry. 17 Sept, 1938.1119/32. Dalton Papers. 
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Boothby, Sinclair also referred to the Soviet Union as a `loyal member of the 
League', which had `actually befriended the victims of aggression"" throughout 
the 1930s. Similarly, Clement Attlee, `at no time' had had `any difficulty in 
knowing where the USSR stood. "" `Throughout the whole of these proceedings', 
he argued, `the USSR has stood by its pledges and its declarations... 'bv4 Harold 
Nicolson agreed. " 
What, then, had persuaded these individuals outside of the government to 
overlook their more negative perceptions of the Soviet Union and support 
Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration during 1938? Crucially, it was the realisation 
that Britain, and indeed Europe, needed the Soviet Union. As mentioned 
earlier, this was primarily due to their distrust of the dictators and their 
appreciation of Hitler's aggressive intentions in particular. Inextricably linked 
to this, however, was an appreciation of the potential influence of the Soviet 
Union. All looked at in this chapter noted what they perceived to be the military 
attributes, strategical advantages and huge resources of the Soviet Union. Such 
strength would either be crucial in deterring aggression and therefore 
maintaining peace, as discussed at the beginning of the chapter. But, if 
necessary, it would also play an essential role in effectively resisting aggression 
in the event of war. Winston Churchill regularly referred to the Soviet Union in 
his speeches as `the enormous power' and `the great Russian mass. f696 Although 
it was in fact a token effort on the part of the Soviet government, Churchill 
highlighted the Soviet assistance given to the Chinese facing Japanese 
aggression. In an address entitled `the Choice for Europe', he told his audience; 
Col. 74.3 Oct, 1938.339 Ibid. 
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Outside this happy island the world is dark with storm. In the Far East a 
brutal onslaught has been made upon what was thought to be an 
enormous, unorganised people. But the Chinese, patient, intelligent, 
brave, though sadly lacking in weapons, have rallied in resistance to the 
cruel invader and aggressor... Here we must recognise the service which 
Russia is rendering in the Far East. Soviet Russia, without firing a shot, is 
holding the best troops of Japan close gripped upon the Siberian front, 
and the rest of the Japanese armies may not in the end be found capable 
of subjugating and exploiting the four hundred million of Chinese' 
Churchill's friend, Boothby, also spoke of the Soviet Union as still one of the 
`Great Powers. '6g8 Oliver Harvey appreciated Soviet air strength especially; as 
`... weak as we might be, Germany must also take Russia into account with her 
airforce,..., Germany was very vulnerable in the East. i699 Harold Nicolson was 
equally convinced that without Soviet assistance, Britain and France were 
`simply not strong enough to resist Germany. "°° 
Hugh Dalton did not want what he perceived to be Soviet military resources to 
remain untapped. In the event of war, Dalton asked the Prime Minister, 
`... would it not be worth something to have the Red Army and the Red Airforce 
on our side rather than neutral? "The Prime Minister claims for himself the title 
of "realist"', he continued, `but does not any realistic foreign policy in this 
country necessarily include an attempt to make sure that, if the worst should 
come, we should have that enormous potential force upon our side rather than 
immobilised? Such enormous potential, he pointed out, was likely to prevent 
war ever occurring; `Is it not a clear calculation,..., that if it can be shown in 
advance that there would be a combined force annoyed against an aggressor, 
which would include the Soviet Union, we should be much more likely to avoid 
697 Ibid, p. 14. 
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war? "' Archibald Sinclair agreed. The West, in his view, needed the Soviet 
Union `now more than ever to restore the balance of power in Europe' and resist 
German domination. " 
Leopold Amery and Liddell Hart did note Soviet military weaknesses and 
strategic problems. About the defence of the Sudetenland, for example, Amery 
noted that `Russia could not, indeed, have sent direct aid to Czechoslovakia, 
even by air, without Rumanian or Hungarian consent. ' In fact, the Rumanian 
government eventually consented to allow Soviet aircraft to cross its airspace. " 
But even if it had refused, Amery added, `she [the Soviet Union] could, at least, 
have threatened action against Poland and Hungary to restrain them from 
falling on Czechoslovakia's rear. "' Liddell Hart, too, pointed out the limitations 
of Soviet strength. `The value of the intervention of the Russian army 
is 
... 
doubtful', he explained to Churchill and others. 
Direct reinforcement of the Czech Army by way of Rumania, if permitted, 
would be slow and limited in effect. The most effective way of help might 
be the indirect form of an attack on East Prussia, assuming that a 
passage through Latvia and Lithuania was conceded. '°5 
Nevertheless, Liddell Hart still stressed that Britain needed Soviet assistance if 
aggression was to ever be effectively resisted. He told several anti-appeasers 
that the `early and adequate intervention of the Russian air force, operating 
from bases in Czechoslovakia, would seem to be an essential factor for the 
latter's chance of offering a prolonged resistance. "o6 Despite the devastating 
consequences of the recent purges, Liddell Hart also emphasised the 
improvements that had been made in the Soviet armed forces since the last war. 
He was not unrealistic in his appraisal, but did admit that the 
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... Russian army 
is probably more powerful than that of 1914, although 
handicapped by the strategic difficulty of access to Germany territory; on 
the other hand, Russia's huge airforce is not only a new means, but could 
be a far more potent menace than was ever developed during the last 
war. 707 
Most importantly, he agreed that it would be disastrous for Britain to have to 
face the Germans without a Soviet ally. 708 
Lloyd George, in contrast, at times exaggerated the strength and capabilities of 
Soviet forces"' , and it is likely this that enabled Chamberlain and others to 
dismiss his arguments. Yet, such desperate statements in an effort to persuade 
others of the value of Soviet involvement should not be allowed to overshadow 
the more poignant points made by Lloyd George about the Soviet Union's 
natural resources and great potential. He was the only one, for example, to 
point out that, whereas `Herr Hitler now boasts that he has 8o, ooo, ooo people 
inside Germany. There are i8o, oo0,00o in Russia. "'° Furthermore, he 
reminded those in the House of Commons: 
The Committee of Imperial Defence, three years before the war, had 
ascertained the strength of every army in the world, and when Sir Henry 
Wilson came to give us the strength of Russia he told us of the 
deficiencies in equipment, in transport, in guns, in the means of supply, 
and in ammunition. There was nothing which we discovered in the war 
which we had not been told beforehand. The amazement to is was that 
for two years Russia held up the attack of what was the finest army in the 
world at that time - without guns, without rifles.. . with 
hardly any 
ammunition they held up the Germans until we were ready. The 
Russians now have a great factory system; their transport has increased. 
They have a system which will enable them to supply all their deficiencies 
707 B. Liddell Hart, 'Armed Balance in Europe - Defence gains in strength - Realism as way to 
peace', Sydney Morning Herald, 17 June, 1938. LH 10/1938/51. Liddell Hart Papers. 
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Lloyd George, as did several of the anti-appeasers, spoke out more about Soviet 
potential after the Munich conference. The circumstances of the conference and 
the terms of the settlement had confirmed suspicions of Hitler's aggressive 
ambitions. Thus, the realisation of Britain's need of Soviet assistance 
heightened. Added to this, however, was now a genuine fear that an aggrieved 
Moscow would revert to a policy of isolationism. Consequently, desperation 
increased amongst the anti-appeasers to impress upon the government 
Moscow's potential and the importance of changing Britain's policy towards the 
Soviet Union before the opportunity to secure such an ally slipped away. The 
fear of Soviet isolationism most likely had something to do with a memorandum 
circulated by Ivan Maisky immediately after Munich which outlined Moscow's 
resentment at events. "2 Liddell Hart pointed out the ramifications in 
November. `It was obvious', he wrote, `that if Russia changed her recent line of 
policy towards a common effort to check Italy, France's position would be much 
weakened. That ominous possibility emphasised the importance of Britain 
giving her more assurance of active support. ' Clement Attlee similarly warned 
the House of Commons that the `Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may well 
hold aloof in future when it considers what little trust can be placed on our 
western democracies, and we shall be left alone with France. "' Linked to such a 
return to isolationism was the increasing possibility that the Soviet government 
might move towards a rapprochement with Berlin. There was no real evidence 
of such a danger at this stage and only Oliver Harvey acknowledged the 
possibility. '5Nevertheless the fear of losing a Soviet ally, whose importance and 
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potential was becoming increasingly obvious, was enough to motivate the anti- 
appeasers to significantly heighten their demands for closer Anglo-French- 
Soviet relations. 
During 1938, then, the anti-appeasers identified and openly opposed 
Chamberlain's deliberate diplomatic exclusion of the Soviet Union. Despite the 
arguments of ministers at the time and several historians since, members of the 
opposition and Conservative party itself highlighted the existence and feasibility 
of an alternative policy. Several were ambiguous about what they wanted 
exactly. But Churchill, Dalton and Boothby clearly outlined their proposals for 
offensive- defensive alliances. Moreover, all agreed and demanded that the 
Soviet government be involved in efforts to resist aggression. The key to their 
proposals, they identified themselves, was a willingness to overlook one's 
personal and more negative views of the Soviet Union. Their recognition of 
Hitler's aggressive foreign policy ambitions and their opposition to a policy of 
repeated conciliation was crucial in its influence upon this decision. But it was 
ultimately the decision to put aside anti-Soviet prejudices that differentiated the 
anti-appeasers from those involved in the foreign policy decision making 
process. The anti-appeasers had identified both the key obstacle, and the 
solution, to the difficulties in Anglo-Soviet relations during this period. 
Government ministers were allowing ideological distrust to dictate foreign 
policy. If stability in Europe was to be secured, such distrust needed to be 
overlooked. Members of the Conservative party, unlike Labour members and 
Liberals, had to overcome decades of hostility and opposition to improved 
Anglo-Soviet relations. But, in 1938, all abhorred Stalin's internal system of 
government and were equally opposed to Communism. Several also admitted to 
doubts about Soviet reliability in the event of war. Opinions of the Soviet 
government amongst the anti-appeasers, therefore, did not differ greatly from 
those held by the decision-makers, including Chamberlain. In contrast to 
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Chamberlain and his supporters, however, Churchill, Dalton and others were 
willing to judge the international situation, and the Soviet Union's role in it, 
objectively. 
It was not easy to overlook the doubts and distrust many had held for years. For 
Conservative members, especially, speaking out in favour of Anglo-French- 
Soviet collaboration meant opposing their own leadership and the majority of 
their party. Consequently, contradictory statements were made. Nevertheless 
each continued to press the government towards collaboration with the Soviets. 
They were willing to do this because they recognised Britain's need of the Soviet 
Union as an ally. Despite the devastation inflicted by Stalin's purges, each 
looked at in this chapter appreciated Soviet military strength and its ability to 
provide a second front. Peace, they realised, could only be preserved if Hitler 
and Mussolini were faced with a united Anglo-French-Soviet front. It was tragic 
that neither Chamberlain nor his government appreciated the influence and 
importance of such an alliance as a deterrence factor. If war could not be 
avoided, the anti-appeasers argued, then only Soviet assistance could help resist 
aggression. When Chamberlain's acquiescence to Soviet exclusion at Munich 
appeared to drive Moscow back into isolationism, therefore, it is not surprising 
that individuals, hitherto relatively quiet on the subject, now spoke out with 
added force. In stark contrast, then, to the contention of Neville Thompson that 
these individuals were not `real converts' but were the very people who would 
have soon regretted any agreement concluded with the Soviet government116, the 
evidence of 1938 illustrated undeniably the genuine and desperate support for 
collaboration with the Soviets amongst the anti-appeasers. 
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Attitudes of the British Cabinet, Foreign Policy Committee and 
Chiefs of Staff towards the Soviet Union, March 1939 - May 1939. 
International developments, political pressure from Westminster and, more 
importantly, rising suspicion surrounding German - Soviet relations, meant that 
the Soviet Union could no longer be ignored by the British government in 1939. 
Several politicians and officials within the foreign policy decision making 
process began to overlook their anti-Soviet prejudices in favour of an 
agreement. Reservations still existed, however, and certain ministers found 
themselves torn between the realities of Soviet potential on the one hand and 
their suspicion of Soviet intentions on the other. Several were not yet even 
willing to consider overlooking their ideological mistrust of the Soviet 
government. One example was Neville Chamberlain who, between March and 
May, revealed openly in the Cabinet and the Foreign Policy Committee, the 
strength of his prejudices and the extent to which he would go in order to 
prevent Anglo-Soviet collaboration. 
On 15 March, German armed forces invaded Bohemia and Moravia. A puppet 
regime was established in Prague and what remained of Czechoslovakian 
independence disappeared. The governments bordering Czechoslovakia were 
alarmed and began to fear for their own security. On 17 March, Veoril Tilea, the 
Rumanian minister in London, informed the government that Berlin had issued 
an ultimatum to Bucharest and that as a result, the Rumanian government 
wanted Britain to assert itself in central and eastern Europe. n' Tilea had, in fact, 
exaggerated the threat posed by Germany. However, by the time this was 
discovered, London had already taken action to begin collective resistance. 
Though the British government had said it would guarantee Czechoslovakia 
"'Halifax to Hoare. 17 Mar, 1939. no. 395; Halifax to Hoare. 18 Mar, 1939. no. 409. D. B. F. P., 3, 
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after Munich, the guarantee had never been ratified. London, therefore, had no 
obligation to defend Czechoslovakia. The occupation of Czechoslovakia did, 
nevertheless, unnerve the government. Poland, in particular, was now thought 
to be at risk. William Strang later recalled the anxiety: `Were Hitler to subdue 
and absorb Poland and Rumania, as he had subdued and absorbed 
Czechoslovakia, he could turn upon Western Europe with added resources from 
eastern Europe at his command. ji8 With support growing for action to be taken 
against the German dictator, and with consideration of the general elections to 
be held in the autumn, Chamberlain decided to act. ' He told the Cabinet that 
`our next course was to ascertain what friends we had who would join us in 
resisting aggression. "" 
The initial decision to cooperate with the Soviet Union in an effort to resist 
aggression in Europe was taken on 18 March. Thereafter, approaches were 
made to Poland, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece, Rumania and the Soviet Union 
with a view to obtaining assurances that they would join in resistance to any 
future act of German aggression. " Litvinov suggested a conference be held in 
Bucharest"' , 
but Chamberlain rejected the proposal because of opposition from 
several governments, including the Spanish, Portuguese and Canadian. ' After 
a proposal for a Four Power declaration" was also dropped because of 
Warsaw's opposition to Moscow's inclusion' , 
it was finally decided that a 
proposal of benevolent neutrality would be put to the Soviet Union, and a 
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British guarantee given to Poland . 
726 The government issued the guarantee on 
the 31 March. Amongst others, France, Rumania and the U. S. were contacted 
about such an agreement with Poland. 7' The only contact with the Soviet 
Union, however, was a meeting between Cadogan and Maisky on 29 March, in 
which Cadogan explained that the idea of a four power conference had been 
dropped and that the British government was contemplating giving assurances 
to the Poles and Rumanians. 728 
After the British guarantee to Poland was announced at the beginning of April, 
Anglo-Soviet relations became tense because of Moscow's resentment at being 
excluded, despite its proposal for a conference and its acceptance of the four 
power declaration proposal. ' On 7 April, the Italian army invaded Albania. 
The British government responded by guaranteeing both Rumania and Greece 
on 13 April, albeit following threats from the French government to offer 
Rumania a guarantee independent of the British. As a result of pressure from 
the Turkish government and the House of Commons regarding Moscow's role in 
such resistance, and following military reports that highlighted the necessity of 
Soviet aid in any guarantee of Poland73° , Chamberlain had little choice but to 
contact the Soviet government. Hence, on 14 April London finally put forward a 
proposal to Moscow which involved a declaration that if aggression took place 
against a European neighbour, Britain, France and the Soviet Union would offer 
assistance if needed. ' On i8 April, the British received the Soviet counter 
proposal. It proposed that England, France and the Soviet Union should 
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conclude an agreement of mutual assistance, including a military convention in 
case of aggression against any of the three powers. " The decision to reject the 
proposal was taken at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee on 19 April. 733 
But it took the British government almost three weeks to reply to the Soviet 
proposal. 
In contrast, the French government now supported a triple alliance. Following 
Munich both Daladier and his military advisers had decided against any further 
capitulation in the face of German aggression. 7' Following the annexation of 
Bohemia and Moravia in March, Paris took action to ensure future resistance of 
Hitler's aggression. 735 Bonnet had supported the guarantee of Poland" and in 
April, Paris pressed London to guarantee Rumania. 737 Notably, Bonnet had also 
supported the rejection of Soviet proposals. French hostility and ideological 
suspicion that had stemmed from earlier accusations of Comintern interference 
in French internal affairs still existed. By the end of March, however, the French 
government had adopted a different attitude towards collaboration with the 
Soviet Union. The French general staff admitted that Soviet military assistance 
was essential if only to aid Poland's survival. " A Soviet alliance was now 
thought to be imperative. 73v As a result, Bonnet sent, on two occasions, separate 
proposals to Moscow. On 14 April, he proposed a mutual assistance pact 
including Britain, France and the Soviet Union. 74° An alliance was not 
concluded. The British had not agreed to such proposals. After its decision to 
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reject the Soviet proposal on 19 April, London had informed Paris that it would 
try to persuade the Soviet government once more that it should make a 
unilateral declaration offering assistance to those who desired it. Despite 
initially accepting the British decision'`' , 
however, Bonnet then went ahead and 
showed the French proposals for a mutual alliance to the Soviet ambassador in 
Paris, lakov Z. Surits. '42 Despite the efforts of the French to ensure the 
conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between Britain, France and the Soviet 
Union" , and whilst the British stalled, Litvinov was removed from office on 4 
May. He was replaced by Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers since 1930. Throughout most of the 193os, Litvinov had represented 
the Soviet government's support for collective action. '*' His removal shocked the 
cabinet and sparked rumours that the Soviet government was now thinking of 
abandoning negotiations with the Western powers and even possibly moving 
towards Berlin. " 
Several ministers at the time, and historians later, explained the rejection of 
Soviet proposals for collaboration during this period in terms of the Polish 
guarantee. The Polish guarantee, it was argued, effectively tied the hands of the 
British government regarding its policy towards the Soviet Union because the 
Poles rejected any involvement of the Soviet Union. 746 Neville Chamberlain, in 
particular, emphasised Polish opposition to Moscow's involvement in any form 
of agreement as a reason to reject Soviet proposals. He denied all responsibility 
for the decision. Acknowledging that `this plan left Soviet Russia out of the 
picture... ' he stated, `we should have to explain to her that the objections to her 
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open inclusion come not from ourselves but from other quarters... "' Later, in 
response to the Chiefs of Staffs report in favour of collaboration with the Soviet 
Union, Chamberlain once again emphasised what he considered to be the 
overriding importance of political factors: 
... the Chiefs of Staff 
had rightly, from their point of view, stressed 
considerations of a military and strategical character, but if these 
considerations pointed in one direction and the political considerations 
pointed in another direction, while due regard must be had for the 
former, care must also be taken not to overlook the importance of the 
latter. ' 
The Foreign Secretary agreed, telling the Foreign Policy Committee at the 
beginning of May that if `we entered into a firm pact with Russia we placed 
Poland and Rumania in a position of great difficulty and embarrassment. " 
Such an agreement would `have a most disturbing influence in Warsaw'? 
especially, and would therefore endanger the collective front. Halifax explained 
that the government `had given certain assurances to Rumania and Poland, and 
we had asked Russia to give similar assurances. If we were to go further we 
should run a serious risk of breaking the common front which we were 
endeavouring to establish. "J' Furthermore Halifax noted the strategical 
importance of both countries. `Without their agreement', he told Eric Phipps, 
Soviet troops would not physically be able to reach central Europe in the event 
of war. " 
The Polish and Rumanian governments were intensely hostile towards Stalin's 
dictatorship. `It was well to remember' Halifax had told the Cabinet, `that the 
feeling of large numbers of people in Europe, which had been nearer to 
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Communism than this country, were strongly hostile to Russia. 75' Warsaw in 
particular also feared provoking Hitler by appearing to be in the Soviet camp. 754 
Colonel Jozef Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, informed Sir Howard William 
Kennard, the British ambassador in Warsaw, that the Polish government could 
not participate in an agreement including the Soviet Union because Soviet 
participation in any plans would place Poland in the `Soviet camp' and therefore 
`provoke Germany. " Samuel Hoare also noted that Beck had left the British 
cabinet `in no doubt as to his country's attitude, declaring that there would be 
an "explosion" if we persisted with the proposal of any joint action that was 
intended to include Poland and Russia in the same bloc . 
'7,56 
The assertion that such Polish opposition to Moscow's involvement dictated 
foreign policy decisions regarding Anglo-Soviet collaboration is, however, not 
true. Rather, evidence reveals that Cabinet ministers, but especially Neville 
Chamberlain, used the Polish guarantee as a convenient excuse to disguise their 
own opposition to an Anglo - French - Soviet alliance. 75' It is notable, for 
example, that from the moment the decision was taken to contact governments 
regarding collective action, Chamberlain favoured an agreement with Poland 
and made his aversion to Moscow's involvement clear. On 22 March, the Prime 
Minister categorically stated his preference for Polish involvement in a policy of 
resistance during a meeting with Lord Halifax and Georges Bonnet. 751 On 23 
March, he told the TUC and National Executive of the Labour Party that Poland 
was now the key and that the Soviet proposal for a conference was 
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impracticable. 759 When the Cabinet met on 29 March, Chamberlain reiterated 
his opinion that `it was of utmost importance to obtain the support of Poland 
and that it was impossible to secure this if Russia was brought into the 
declaration. j" 
Thereafter, Chamberlain presented the guarantee to the Cabinet and Foreign 
Policy Committee as decided policy. '6i Neither the military and strategical value 
of Moscow's inclusion, nor the problems that would result from its isolation, 
were debated. Chamberlain instead looked only for ratification of his policy, 
confident that no Cabinet member, even if they did support Moscow's 
involvement, would question the foreign policy decision making process. 7& 
Furthermore, as Anita Prazmowska has convincingly shown in her book, 
Britain. Poland and the Eastern Front, the guarantee to Poland represented 
only a political warning to Hitler. The British government, when it issued the 
guarantee, had no intention of defending Polish territorial integrity in the event 
of war. The terms of the guarantee did not offer military talks. 'G3 In fact it stated 
that the British would not intervene unless there was a definite act of aggression 
against Poland, unless the Poles resisted and asked for aid, and unless the 
French were fully committed. ' The French had no intention of coming to the 
assistance of Poles in the event of war. Throughout the late 193os, French 
military planners, particularly General Maurice Gamelin, had prioritised Poland 
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as an ally. It was believed to be the cornerstone of an eastern alliance. Yet, 
French military experts knew at the time of guaranteeing Poland that it could 
not militarily contribute to the defence of Polish territory during the early 
months of war. Instead, they were only willing to go to war over Poland because 
it was wrongly believed that Polish forces would occupy the Germans long 
enough to allow the British and French to prepare for war. '65 Thus, no military 
or financial aid, crucial for the preparation of war, was sent to Poland by either 
the French or British following the announcement of the guarantee. 766 
The terms of the guarantee and the intentions of the British government were 
purely political, and it therefore signified no new commitment by the British to 
Poland. "' Relations between the Polish authorities and British representatives 
appeared to have improved following the tensions of the Czech crisis in 
September" , but Polish views had not gained any new or significant influence 
over the British foreign policy decision making process. ' British foreign policy 
was still ultimately decided by London and according to the interests of Britain. 
This was confirmed when ministers later decided to support an Anglo-French- 
Soviet alliance in May. The decision was made on the same day that the Polish 
government was asked for its opinion regarding such an alliance' , and more 
importantly, two days before the Polish reply was received. " Lord Halifax 
proposed to deal with the objections of the Poles and Rumanians by explaining 
`to the States in question that while no doubt the guarantee might be at the 
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moment of some embarrassment to them it would be of great value if war broke 
out. ' 2 Both the Polish and Rumanian objections to Soviet inclusion in an 
alliance system were dismissed by the vast majority of the Cabinet, as fears of a 
German-Soviet rapprochement increased. ' Chamberlain continued for several 
days to highlight the opposition of both the Poles and Rumanians, but he was 
not yet willing to accept the possibility of a German - Soviet rapprochement. 
Moreover, even he seemingly overlooked the protests of the Poles and 
Rumanians and agreed to a mutual alliance with the French and Soviets on 24 
May. 
Not everyone involved in the foreign policy decision making process believed 
the Polish guarantee, and therefore the opinion of the Poles, was more 
important than the inclusion of the Soviet Union in plans to resist German 
aggression. The Chiefs of Staff, for example, though still not in favour of an 
Anglo-French-Soviet military alliance in March 1939, did state their preference 
for an Anglo-Soviet agreement of some kind. In three separate reports 
submitted during March and April, the Chiefs of Staff stated clearly that they 
favoured an Anglo-Soviet agreement above guarantees to either Poland or 
Rumania, and emphasised the potential value of Soviet assistance. In the first 
report issued on 18 March, an explicit comparison was made between the Soviet 
Union and Poland. " Lord Chatfield, the Minister for Coordination of Defence, 
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W. S. Morrison, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Chatfield's deputy in 
the House of Commons, and the three service ministers were told that `if the 
U. S. S. R. was on our side and Poland neutral, the position would alter in our 
favour. 775 Such sentiments were repeated on 28 March, when the Committee of 
Imperial Defence were instructed to consider the `Military Implications of an 
Anglo-French Guarantee of Poland and Rumania, "' and on 25 April, when a 
detailed evaluation of all military and economic factors inherent in such an 
alliance was presented to the Foreign Policy Committee. ' Both reports 
acknowledged the weaknesses within Soviet forces as a result of Stalin's 
purges. " The Soviet Union remained, to some extent, `militarily an uncertain 
quantity. ' 9 Problems also existed with regard to communications and reserves. 
Thus, the Chiefs of Staff considered `it doubtful whether the national economy 
of the Soviet could deliver war stores at a greater rate than would suffice to keep 
in the field on the Western Front 3o Divisions. ' Soviet plans had previously 
calculated that industrial output would provide for ioo divisions in the field 
from from the outset of war. Grave weaknesses in the Soviet railway system 
were also highlighted as a major difficulty in transporting materials and men, 
and, ministers were informed, that after `two or three weeks military 
mobilisation would have to be suspended, or at least held up, to avoid a 
complete breakdown in industry and national life. j" 
The Chiefs of Staff furthermore acknowledged the political problems that were 
attached to Soviet involvement in the resistance to German aggression. They, 
drew `attention to the fact, that the various countries in which we visualise in 
this Report that the Russian forces might be used, may be themselves most 
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unwilling to admit the entry of Russian forces into their territory... ' Such 
ideological hostility was not only directed towards Communism either. The 
report added; 
... that the Russians themselves are 
disinclined to allow their own forces 
to operate from a country where they may become liable to bourgeois 
influence. This deep-seated hostility to Communism and vice versa may 
well nullify the value of many of the military advantages we put forward 
in support of Russian co-operation. "" 
Nevertheless, the Chiefs of Staff believed and argued that the Soviet Union 
remained the key to any eastern resistance to German aggression. The two 
countries highlighted by the Prime Minister as vital to any collective resistance 
would, in fact, crumble under attack: `Rumania could certainly be overrun 
quickly', and `Poland might be overrun in a matter of months', it was reported. " 
In reality Britain and France would be unable to fulfil their guarantees. Thus, 
for Poland and Rumania to resist attack they needed Soviet assistance. The fate 
of Poland, Rumania and the eastern front would depend almost entirely on the 
Soviet Union. The Chiefs of Staff explained: 
When considering the question of any form of guarantee to Poland and 
Rumania it must be borne in mind that Great Britain and France could 
afford them no direct support by sea, on land or in the air to help them 
resist German invasion. Furthermore, in the present state of British and 
French armament production, neither Great Britain nor France could 
supply any armaments to Poland and Rumania who would have to 
depend for assistance in this respect solely on the U. S. S. R. " 
It was also imperative that Germany, in the event of war, be faced with two 
fronts. '' In the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff, only the Soviet Union could 
provide such a second front. Soviet forces were not strong enough to launch an 
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effective offence, but they were capable of fiercely defending Soviet territory. '85 
The Soviet Union had better prospects of resistance and would be able to 
enforce an economic blockade of Germany. " This included interference with 
the supply to Germany of Swedish iron ore, " and the insurance that `Germany 
would be unable to draw upon Russia's immense reserves of food and raw 
materials. "" Furthermore, it was noted that Soviet inclusion might deter 
Japanese forces from entering the war, or at least deter them from attacking 
Singapore and Australia. ' The `intervention of Japan' was considered to be `a 
serious threat to the Allied position in the Far East' and therefore of major 
concern to both the Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet. It was `almost certain that 
Japan would attack Hong Kong', but the biggest fear concerned a Japanese 
attack on Singapore. If Japan captured Singapore, `the British fleet would have 
no base in the Far East from which to operate. "9° The report stressed that the 
inclusion of the Soviet Union could prove valuable with regard to the Far East. 
Not only did the Chiefs of Staff believe `the possibility of Russian intervention 
would deter Japan"' , they also suggested that 
`the necessity for safeguarding 
her [Japanese] lines of sea communications to the Asiatic mainland against 
possible action by the Eastern Naval Forces of the U. S. S. R. would have a 
hampering effect on Japanese strategy. " The Chiefs of Staff, then, were now 
convinced that the Soviet Union could make a significant contribution in the 
event of war. Indeed, they had effectively outlined their belief that Soviet 
cooperation with the West would be 'invaluable. "' 
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In the Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff were supported by the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Lord Stanhope, the Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha, 
the Minister for Health, Walter Elliott , and 
Samuel Hoare. Lord Stanhope 
agreed with the Chief of Staffs emphasis upon the value of the Soviet Union as a 
second front in the event of war. In a meeting of the cabinet on 18 March he 
explained that `if Poland and Russia were allies there would be a big battle front 
in the East as well as in the West and Herr Hitler was greatly averse to being 
faced with this situation. ' 4 Thus, although Stanhope did not state exactly what 
relationship or agreement he favoured with the Soviet Union, he obviously 
perceived Moscow to be a valuable component in any resistance plans. Hore- 
Belisha was more specific about the type of agreement he wished to see 
concluded between the Soviet Union and Britain. He told the cabinet on 18 
March that he was `in favour of reconsidering our policy and contracting frank 
and open alliances with countries such as Poland and Russia. ' 5 Similarly 
Walter Elliot stated his personal belief that `it was most important to get in 
touch with Russia... ' Interestingly, both Stanhope and Hore-Belisha, when 
stating their support of Soviet involvement, assumed Polish compliance. As it 
became increasingly apparent that Warsaw rejected any Soviet involvement 
neither Hore-Belisha nor Stanhope commented further on the subject. The 
most likely reason for this is that both men realised and accepted Chamberlain's 
determination to secure a guarantee of Poland. Indeed, neither minister was 
given much opportunity to discuss the Soviet role until after the Polish 
guarantee was signed, when the Prime Minister could then simply point to 
Warsaw's hostility to Moscow as a reason why Soviet involvement remained 
impossible. 




A more persistent supporter of an Anglo-Soviet agreement within the Cabinet 
and Foreign Policy Committee was Samuel Hoare. Between September 1938 
and March 1939, Hoare had struggled to overcome his suspicion of Soviet 
intentions because of the increasing evidence of Moscow's potential influence 
upon international developments. Throughout 1939, he consistently urged 
Chamberlain to negotiate and conclude an agreement with the Soviet 
government. Despite being a member of the inner cabinet and a loyal supporter 
of Chamberlain's premiership, in March, Hoare openly disagreed with the 
Prime Minister's rejection of Soviet overtures. The Home Secretary argued for 
more equal terms of agreement to be given to Moscow, and stated his desire for 
the Soviet Union to be brought into a'common front. "' 
Hoare agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that the Soviet Union would be a valuable 
ally in the event of war, but he also believed that Soviet involvement in a policy 
of collective action could help preserve peace. The Home Secretary emphasised 
the sheer size of the Soviet Union as a considerable asset to any peace front, and 
stressed that `Russia constituted the greatest deterrent in the East against 
German aggression. ' Without the inclusion of the Soviet Union he feared that 
British foreign policy would be seen `in many quarters' as having suffered `a 
considerable defeat. j9" 
Notably, Hoare did not demand an alliance in March 1939. Instead he called for 
Soviet neutrality to be secured. " The reason for Hoare's support of an 
agreement of neutrality was, however, distinct from Chamberlain's. Thus, 
Hoare believed a proposal of neutrality represented the more realistic 
opportunity for an agreement to be concluded. He was convinced that an 
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alliance between Britain, France and the Soviet Union would be `impossible' 
because of `Stalin's attitude', namely his resentment at London's treatment of 
Moscow. $"° The Home Secretary believed, then, that the main opposition to such 
an alliance would come from the Soviet dictator. This was in contrast to Neville 
Chamberlain who supported Soviet neutrality as a means of avoiding tying 
Britain to an alliance with the Soviet Union. 801 At the same time, Hoare's desire 
for Soviet involvement in no way reflected a significant change in attitude 
towards the Soviet Union. Indeed, during March, the Home Secretary 
confirmed that he held no `predilections' in favour of Moscow. "' His support of 
negotiations and the involvement of the Soviet Union during March was, 
instead, motivated by a fear of Moscow's reaction to being excluded. He urged 
the cabinet to consider Soviet paranoia in its decision making. 803 In particular, 
however, Hoare hinted at the disastrous possibility of a German - Soviet 
rapprochement. Thus he hoped to keep Stalin from `throwing his weight of 
Russian power.. . on the enemy's side. 
'8o4 
Two more Cabinet ministers whose attitudes towards collaboration with 
Moscow were changing due to their suspicion and fear of a German-Soviet 
rapprochement were Oliver Stanley, the President of the Board of Trade, and 
the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald. 8o5 Oliver Stanley, for example, 
suggested at the beginning of negotiations that `there might be a separate 
agreement between Russia and Great Britain to the effect that if either was 
attacked in Europe, each would come to the other's aid. "o6 Later, in May, he 
would reveal the motive behind his support of an agreement as being an 
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increasing fear that `Russia might well gravitate towards Germany. 'a°' 
MacDonald, who had openly opposed any close relations between Britain and 
the Soviet Union during the Spanish civil war, " told the Foreign Policy 
Committee in March 1939 that it was better to have the Soviet Union on the side 
of the allies rather than neutral, or as an enemy. "' He, too, went on to warn the 
cabinet of the danger of an alliance between Hitler and Stalin. "' 
Neither MacDonald nor Stanley spoke out specifically in favour of an alliance 
with the Soviets and French during March and April. They had been repeatedly 
and categorically told by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary that such an 
alliance was impossible owing to Polish and Rumanian opposition. Neither had 
been aware of the military reports compiled by the Chiefs of Staff. In addition, 
neither was by April convinced of the danger of a German - Soviet 
rapprochement. Thus, there was as yet no need for them, or indeed any of the 
ministers or officials, to overlook the personal reasons that motivated one's 
opposition to collaboration with the Soviets. Nevertheless, it is significant that 
MacDonald and Stanley, together with several others within the Cabinet, had 
begun to acknowledge Moscow's potential influence, and so support some form 
of Anglo-Soviet agreement. 
In contrast, Chamberlain continued to oppose collaboration with the Soviet 
government. He still refused to accept any of the strategic or military attributes 
of Soviet involvement when discussing foreign policy with his Cabinet. 
Moreover, he suppressed the two military reports put forward by the Chiefs of 
Staff which insisted that the Soviet Union's involvement in an agreement was 
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crucial to any successful resistance of aggression, "' and sanitised the April 
report by limiting its contents to an assessment of the military strength of the 
Soviet Union only. "' The Chiefs of Staff were told not to question whether the 
British government should accept Soviet proposals for a mutual alliance. "' The 
Prime Minister, therefore, acted deliberately to prevent his Cabinet learning 
about what he recognised to be powerful evidence in support of those who were 
already urging an agreement with the Soviet Union. If the real reason for 
Chamberlain's continual rejection of Soviet proposals was to be effectively 
disguised then the perception of the Soviet Union as militarily useless had to be 
maintained. 
Chamberlain's decision to withhold the Chiefs of Staffs reports from his 
Cabinet and the Foreign Policy Committee was indicative of his autocratic 
control over government and information, particularly concerning foreign 
policy. Indeed, throughout his premiership, Chamberlain had regulated all 
knowledge regarding foreign affairs and foreign policy through his tight control 
of the British press and the BBC. The Prime Minister only exploited a system 
that had been established during the 193os, nevertheless, between 1937 and 
1939, the main sources of information for the British public regarding foreign 
affairs existed `merely [as] a partisan political weapon controlled by 
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politicians. "" Together with Joseph Ball, Director of Conservative Research 
Department, and George Steward, the Press Relations Officer for No. lo 
Downing Street, Chamberlain ensured widespread press support for 
appeasement policy. He personally refused to answer questions of which he did 
not approve. "' Some newspaper proprietors and editors within the British 
press, in particular Geoffrey Dawson, editor of the Times shared Chamberlain's 
views of Nazi Germany and of the Soviet Union. Dawson supported 
Chamberlain's conciliatory policy towards the dictators. 816 Throughout 1938, he 
had opposed all suggestions of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance, and though the 
paper did not oppose negotiations with the Soviets at the beginning of 1939, it 
was only luke warm in its reporting. In private, Dawson did not express such 
ideological hostility towards the Soviet Union as Neville Chamberlain had, and 
some writers have doubted its influence upon his reporting. "" However, the 
editor did speak of `the menace of the Soviet"" and of his own suspicion 
regarding the Soviet government's sincerity. During the later stages of the 
negotiations, the paper provided the government with whatever information it 
collated from abroad in support of the Prime Minister's opposition to an Anglo- 
French-Soviet alliance. "" 
Of course one cannot in anyway compare the British system of government to 
the dictatorships on the continent. But one should not underestimate the Prime 
Minister's potential control over foreign policy during this period. Leopold 
B1 Richard Cockett, Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Manipulation of the 
Press, (London, 1989), p. 1; p. 53; pp. 110-112. Evidence of the debates and criticisms with 
regard to alleged government censorship of the press can be found in the News Department 
papers at the Public Record Office, Kew. See FO 395 series. For example, FO 395/622. 
815 Ibid, p. 8; p. 85. 
e'6 Ibid, p. 12; CAB 27 / 627 82 mtg. 19 Apr, 1939; CAB 53 / 48 C. O. S. 891 mtg. 24 Apr, 1939; 
History of the Times, 1921 - 1948, Vol. II, ( London, 1952), p. 906; Diary entry. 30 Sept, 1938, p. 
144. MS Dawson 42. Dawson Papers. Bodleian Library Archives. 
""History of the Times, pp. 910-911; 919. 
8'B Diary entry. 12 Apr, 1939, p. 59; 22 Aug, 1939, p. 125. MS Dawson 42. Dawson Papers. 
819 Cockett, Twilight, p. 116. 
180 
Amery said of Chamberlain that `he knew his own mind and saw to it that he 
had his own way. An autocrat with all the courage of his convictions right or 
wrong. iB'O Throughout 1939, Chamberlain's actions proved this. Withholding the 
Chiefs of Staffs reports was one example, but his most influential act was to yet 
come, in May. 
What Chamberlain's decision to withhold the Chiefs of Staff's reports did show 
is that neither the contact made with the Soviet government on 19 March nor 
Chamberlain's agreement to secure Soviet benevolent neutrality"', reflected a 
genuine change in his attitude towards the Soviet Union or Anglo-French-Soviet 
collaboration. 822 In fact, the proposal of benevolent neutrality only highlighted 
the arrogance and indifference of many within the Cabinet including the Prime 
Minister. Thus, it was expected that Moscow would accept a proposal that 
involved the Soviet Union being excluded from the diplomatic resistance of 
aggression until such time that the West felt it acceptable for Moscow to 
sacrifice its people and country for the sake of others. The anxieties and 
suspicions of the Soviet government which had been evident during the purges 
were not considered. " 
In addition to its arrogant assumption, the Prime Minister did not actually 
speak in favour of a proposal of neutrality more than three times during the 
negotiations. It was not really what Chamberlain wanted. He preferred to have 
no connection with the Soviet government at all. Chamberlain remained 
opposed to Anglo-Soviet collaboration of any kind because, unlike several 
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ministers, he refused to believe that Moscow would abandon negotiations with 
the West. This reflected his arrogance, his belief that the Soviet Union needed 
Britain, and, more specifically, his rejection of the very possibility of a German- 
Soviet rapprochement. " Chamberlain remained indifferent to the Soviet 
position. "' When Hore-Belisha and MacDonald both raised the possibility that 
Stalin and Hitler might ally during a Cabinet meeting, Chamberlain dismissed 
their points stating that `no decision was called for at the present time. 1826 
Joseph Kennedy, the American ambassador to Britain, wrote that the Prime 
Minister felt he could `make a deal with Russia at any time.. . but 
is delaying... '' 
Nothing, therefore, had persuaded him to put aside his suspicion and 
animosity. The Home Secretary remembered after the war that `Chamberlain 
began by doubting the possibility of any satisfactory pact with a Government 
whose motives he continually suspected. i " Subsequently, he was `constantly 
declaring that the Russians could not be trusted. '" Chamberlain still believed 
that the Soviet Union was `afraid of Germany and Japan, and would be 
delighted to see other people fight them. '83o Later, the Soviet government would 
watch while the allies fought Germany. At the time Chamberlain made such 
comments, however, no evidence existed on which to base such suspicion. 
Despite entering negotiations with the Soviets, Chamberlain also continued to 
vent his ideological distrust to his sisters, writing; `I distrust her motives, which 
seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be 
concerned only with getting everyone else by the ears. '83' In 1939, Moscow's aim, 
in Chamberlain's opinion, remained Communist expansion. Negotiations and 
82' Parker, Appeasement, p. 225. 
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proposals of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance were simply another means to 
achieve this aim. He wrote, `I can't believed that she has the same aims and 
objects as we have, or any sympathy with democracy as such. 'H32 
Such vehement opposition to collaboration with the Soviets, as shown by 
Chamberlain's private papers, proves the inaccuracy of the statement made by 
Simon, in the House of Commons. He had assured all that `... no sort of desire to 
exclude Russia ... ' existed. 
"' In fact, the Prime Minister was supported in the 
Cabinet and Foreign Policy Committee by the William Morrison"' , Thomas 
Inskip83' , Alexander Cadogan, and Lord Chatfield. 
"' These ministers opposed 
an Anglo-Soviet alliance because they , too, had not yet been persuaded to 
overlook their deeply held distrust of Moscow's intentions. Morrison argued 
that Moscow's proposal of a mutual alliance did not imply `any sincere desire to 
help us. i837 Inskip accused the Soviet government of trying to deliberately 
entangle Britain in a war with Germany. "' Cadogan referred to Soviet proposal 
for a mutual alliance as a `paper commitment by Russia to join in a war on our 
side... ' and thought it `extremely inconvenient. "" Though he had acknowledged 
that if the British government rejected an alliance with Moscow `the Soviet 
might make some "non-intervention" agreement with the German government', 
Cadogan dismissed the threat as `a very remote one. i8° Lord Chatfield, like 
1132 Ibid, p. 408. 
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Chamberlain, deliberately misreported the findings of the Chiefs of Staff in 
order to portray the Soviet Union as militarily worthless. "' 
Initially, Chatfield failed to acknowledge that the Chiefs of Staff had compared 
the value of Poland and the Soviet Union, and concluded that Soviet 
involvement was of greater importance than a guarantee to Warsaw. 842 
Following this, the Minister for Coordination of Defence simply lied and, in 
complete contrast to the report presented on 18 March, told the Foreign Policy 
Committee that the Chiefs of Staff believed that `on the whole Poland was, from 
the military point of view, probably the best of potential allies. "' Chatfield may 
have been unaware of the report given by the Chiefs of Staff dated 28 March, 
but the report dated 18 March, which included the explicit comparison of Polish 
and Soviet value, had been presented directly to him. What, therefore, 
motivated the Minister to misinform the Cabinet? One suggestion is that such a 
decision reflected Chatfield's own hostility towards the Soviet Union and 
opposition to an agreement. However, this does not seem likely. Chatfield may 
have personally opposed collaboration with the Soviets, but he would not have 
taken it upon himself to hide the facts, especially from Neville Chamberlain. As 
Minister for Coordination of Defence, Chatfield did not have the authority nor 
the influence to make such a crucial decision alone. Rather, what evidence 
suggests is that the Minister was complying with the instructions of one who 
was determined to avoid an alliance with Moscow and who possessed the 
influence to make such decisions, namely Neville Chamberlain. 
Unlike Chamberlain, however, Chatfield's portrayal of the Soviet Union and his 
attitude towards Anglo-Soviet collaboration did not remain consistent. On the 
one hand he argued that `the assistance which Russia could bring to bear was 




not nearly as great as certain quarters represented it to be"' , and yet on the 
other he asserted the `importance of Russia as a deterrent to Hitler. "" He also 
noted Soviet value in deterring forces in the East. "' Such contradictory 
statements were similarly made by the Foreign Secretary. Though pointing out 
the impossibility of an Anglo-Soviet agreement for a number of reasons, 
including Poland's opposition8" and its alleged propensity to make war 
inevitable"', Halifax at other times appeared willing to compromise with 
Moscow and stated his determination to reach an agreement. 849 Following the 
Soviet proposal for a conference at Bucharest on 19 March, for example, the 
Foreign Secretary told the Cabinet that `if M. Litvinoff attached considerable 
importance to his proposed conference, it might be necessary to see whether we 
could not get somewhat closer to the Soviet point of view in this respect. "' 
Thereafter, he informed the Soviet government that he personally supported 
Anglo-Soviet cooperation. "' He thought it desirable for the allies to `try to get as 
much assistance from Russia as was practicablei8" because the Soviet Union 
could be of the `utmost value in the case of war. i853 Later, Halifax told ministers 
that he was `determined to go to very great lengths to obtain' an agreement. 854 
The Foreign Secretary, then, was concerned that the Soviet government should 
not be made to feel it was being deliberately excluded. Indeed, at times, he 
appeared desperate not to offend the Soviet government. " He told Bonnet, 
that it would be unfortunate to give Moscow `the idea that we were pushing her 
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to one side. '$56 Consequently, `he would take what steps were possible to keep in 
with Russia. "' Such continued emphasis upon the necessity of maintaining 
good relations with the Soviet government was influential. Thus, Halifax 
prevented the complete exclusion of Moscow during March and April, 
something Chamberlain desired. To this extent, Halifax was not in complete 
agreement with Chamberlain's attitude towards the issue of Anglo-Soviet 
collaboration. 8'8 At the same time, however, and despite his efforts to ensure the 
Soviet government did not feel excluded, Halifax accepted the idea of a 
conference similar to that of Munich at the beginning of May. 859 The conference 
was proposed by Pope Pius XII in order to discuss the threat of war. 86o It would 
include both the German and Italian governments but exclude Soviet 
representatives. Both Oliver Harvey and Alexander Cadogan, noted the 
proposal in their diaries. 86' Harvey recorded, `H [alifax] is very interested says 
we cannot possibly refuse. "`2 Though the conference was never held, Halifax's 
response to the suggestion revealed the fragility of his support for closer Anglo- 
Soviet relations at the time. 
How can one explain such contradictory attitudes exemplified by Halifax and 
Chatfield? They reflected the internal struggle ministers were experiencing, 
faced with their negative views of the Soviet Union on the one hand and their 
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increasing realisation of Moscow's growing importance on the other. With 
regard to Halifax in particular, it is likely that his acceptance of the Pope's 
proposal at the beginning of May reflected his own religious conscience. 
Ministers were aware that both the Church of England and the Catholic Church 
harboured hostility towards the Soviet Union during this period. "' At the 
beginning of May, Cardinal Arthur Hinsley, Britain's only Cardinal, privately 
wrote to Halifax to express his anxiety about Communism in Europe. A` The 
Foreign Secretary was himself a member of the High Anglican church and had 
a great, private distaste for Soviet atheism. "' His religious beliefs made it very 
difficult for him to overcome the moral doubts concerning an Anglo-Soviet 
alliance. " Nevertheless, neither Halifax nor Chatfield could ignore Moscow's 
increasing potential influence upon the future of international affairs. In 
particular, they too could not completely overlook the possibility of the Kremlin 
choosing to cooperate with Nazi Germany. Such acknowledgement of the 
possibility of a German - Soviet rapprochement had been fundamental in 
loosening the grip of ideological and political mistrust in the minds of several 
within the Cabinet who had then urged an agreement of some kind with the 
Soviets. In Halifax's opinion, the possibility of a German-Soviet rapprochement 
remained 'bare"' , and consequently 
he continued to oppose an alliance 
between London and Moscow. Nevertheless, he had acknowledged the 
possibility, and it was this underlying anxiety which had began to force a shift in 
the Foreign Secretary's anti-Soviet prejudices and cause him to feel torn. 
By the end of April, 1939, then, Chamberlain still had significant support in his 
opposition to an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. Ideological suspicion dominated 
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the foreign policy decision making process with regard to the Soviet Union. The 
period between March and April, however, was crucial. The dominance of such 
suspicion was shifting, albeit slowly. Ministers and officials, to varying degrees, 
had at least begun to consider an agreement with Moscow. Such decisions had 
been taken without knowing the views of the Chiefs of Staff in their entirety. 
When in May, the Chiefs of Staff were finally allowed to put forward their views 
with regard to an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance in particular, it would take very 




Attitudes of the British Cabinet, Foreign Policy Committee and the 
Chiefs of Staff towards the Soviet Union, May 4- August 24,1939- 
Attitudes towards Anglo-French- Soviet collaboration changed dramatically 
between May and August 1939. For the first time, nearly all the members of the 
Cabinet, the Foreign Policy Committee and the Chiefs of Staff supported an 
Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. Chamberlain was alone in his opposition to such 
an agreement. Yet the negotiations failed and the Soviet Union signed a non- 
aggression pact with Nazi Germany. Neville Chamberlain must bear most 
responsibility for Britain's failure to secure a Soviet ally because he undermined 
the greatest opportunity for a successful conclusion of negotiations in May. 
Ultimately, however, negotiations failed because, with the exception of the 
Chiefs of Staff and Oliver Stanley, all members of the Cabinet and Foreign 
Policy Committee, chose during the final weeks to allow their ideological 
suspicion of the Soviet Union once more to dominate the foreign policy 
decision making process. 
On 6 May, the British replied to the Soviet proposal of 18 April. Moscow 
received the British counter proposal on 8 May. Again it stated that the Soviet 
government should declare its willingness to aid those countries in eastern 
Europe who desired it in the event of war. This time, however, it was proposed 
that Moscow would not have to make such a declaration until after Britain and 
France had gone to war with Germany themselves. On 15 May, Moscow 
rejected the British proposal and again demanded a triple alliance on the 
reasoning that British proposals left the Soviet Union exposed to a direct attack 
by Germany via the Baltic States without any guarantee. 168 Still another attempt 
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was made to secure an independent declaration of assistance from the Soviet 
government. On 17 May, Robert Vansittart repeated the British proposal to 
Maisky , adding the 
incentive of staff conversations. 86" On 1.9 May, Maisky 
reported that the new Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav 
Molotov would accept nothing less than a triple alliance. " The rejection of the 
British proposals created a dilemma for the government. A breakdown of the 
negotiations now had to be faced. "' Finally, on 24 May, Chamberlain agreed to 
an Anglo-French- Soviet alliance, although it was to be in accordance with 
article sixteen of the League Covenant. " On 27 May, Molotov received Britain's 
new proposal. " He rejected these terms. The Soviet Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs objected to the addition of Article sixteen. ' The Foreign Office 
instructed the British ambassador in Moscow to arrange a meeting with 
Molotov as soon as possible and stress the British support for a conclusion to 
the negotiations. On 2 June Molotov put forward Moscow's new proposals. As 
well as demanding a triple alliance he made two new demands. The first was an 
agreement to guarantee all of the states between the Baltic and the Black Seas. 
Aggression against any of the countries would invoke the treaty. In addition, the 
Soviets also now proposed the simultaneous entry into force of the political and 
military agreements, and a clause that the three powers would not make a 
separate peace. $75 Before the terms were received in London, it was announced 
that Germany and the Soviet Union were to sign a commercial agreement. " 
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The slow progress of negotiations during May caused French ministers to panic 
as they, and indeed many members of the British cabinet, became increasingly 
concerned about the possibility of a German - Soviet rapprochement. " No 
more action was taken by Paris however, and throughout June and July, 
London was allowed to dictate the direction of the negotiations with Moscow. '' 
On 14 June, the British government decided to send a Foreign Office official, 
William Strang, to Moscow in order to assist William Seeds, who was suffering 
from influenza. " On 15 June, Seeds, Strang and the French ambassador, Paul 
Emile Naggier, rejected the Soviet proposal and discussed Britain's new 
proposals with Molotov. Thus assistance would be given to the Soviet Union in 
the event of a direct attack by Germany, and London was willing to concede 
that consultations should take place if other states were threatened. The Soviet 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs was told, however, that both the British and 
French governments would act to prevent `aid' going to countries under attack if 
not desired. Thus the British and French governments would not accept the 
Soviet Union violating the independence of surrounding states in the event of 
war. Indeed, they would take action to prevent such violations conducted under 
the guise of giving `aid'. On 16 June, Molotov informed the ambassadors that if 
a guarantee of the Baltic states could not be agreed to then the Kremlin was 
willing to return to a simple mutual alliance whereby assistance would be given 
only in the event of direct attack upon either France, Britain or the Soviet 
Union. 88o London could not accept such an agreement because it did not 
provide for assistance in the event of an attack upon one of the countries 
already guaranteed by Britain, especially Poland. "' After Molotov once again 
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rejected a slightly modified British counter proposal on 22 June , 
Seeds advised 
London that it had either to agree to a guarantee of the Baltic states or return to 
a mutual alliance. 882 
During the following weeks, the issue in contention was the list of countries to 
be guaranteed. The Foreign Policy Committee finally agreed to Moscow's list of 
countries, with the condition that Switzerland, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands be included as countries of concern to the French and British. 883 
The government instructed Seeds that a conclusion to the negotiations should 
be achieved as soon as possible: 
... the 
draft treaty should be as short and simple as possible. It is better 
that agreement should be quickly reached than that time should be spent 
in trying to cover every contingency. It is realised that this may leave 
loopholes in the text and possibly lead to differences of opinion as to the 
interpretation of the treaty at a later date; but those disadvantages are 
preferable to a long delay in the conclusion of a treaty. 884 
On 1 July, the British and French ambassadors discussed proposals with 
Molotov again. The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs objected to the 
inclusion of the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Switzerland in the list of states 
to be guaranteed, stating that the Supreme Soviet had not approved these added 
states. Perhaps Moscow feared being dragged into a war in the West. What is 
more likely is that Molotov was simply being irritating. "' The guaranteed states 
did not have to be named in any published treaty, they would be included in a 
secret annex. However, and most importantly, Molotov now demanded that the 
treaty would be invoked by either direct or indirect aggression. `Indirect 
aggression' would mean `an internal coup d'etat or a reversal of policy in the 
interests of the aggressor. ' The British government received the proposals on 4 
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On 6 July, Seeds was told that the British government would agree not to 
include the Netherlands, Switzerland or Luxembourg if Moscow abandoned 
their definition of indirect aggression. The British government was willing to aid 
a guaranteed state in the event of a direct attack on an obvious abandonment of 
its neutrality or independence. If this could not be accepted by the Soviet 
government then a triple alliance could still be concluded. On 8 and 9 July, 
negotiators discussed the British counter proposal and Molotov offered an 
alternative definition of indirect aggression. The alternative defined `indirect 
aggression' as action accepted; 
... under threat of 
force by another power, or without any such threat, 
involving the use of territory and forces of the state in question for 
purposes of aggression against that state or against one of the 
contracting parties, and consequently involving the loss of, by that state, 
its independence or violation of its neutrality. 88' 
In addition, Molotov now demanded that both political and military agreements 
be signed simultaneously. The French government accepted the new Soviet 
definition of `indirect aggression'. The British took longer. 888 The issue of Article 
six -a simultaneous signing of both political and military agreements - was 
debated throughout July, within the British government, and between London 
and Paris. "' On 18 July, the French government urged London to accept 
Molotov's latest demand with regard to article six 890 London finally agreed and 
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on 23 July, the British and French ambassadors informed Molotov. "' The 
Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs suggested that the issue of indirect 
aggression might cease to be a problem once military talks began. On 25 July, 
Halifax informed Seeds that the British government was ready to agree to 
immediate initiation of military conversations at Moscow. 892 
During the first two weeks of May, those who had been calling for an agreement 
with the Soviet government since March continued to do so. Samuel Hoare, 
Malcolm MacDonald and Oliver Stanley all wanted an agreement to be 
concluded sooner rather than risk the breakdown of negotiations. Although not 
a very influential voice, Hoare and others were joined in their support of an 
agreement by a new member of the Foreign Policy Committee, Leslie Burgin, 
the recently created Minister of Supply. 843 The ambiguity surrounding exactly 
what form of agreement such men supported most likely enabled Chamberlain 
to ignore their protests. 89' Nevertheless, the ministers maintained their support. 
MacDonald, for example, urged Halifax to meet Molotov in Geneva in order to 
ensure the continuation of negotiations. 895 Hoare challenged and dismissed 
what he felt to be unsubstantiated political points being put forward by those 
who simply opposed closer Anglo-Soviet collaboration. In particular, Hoare did 
not accept the excuse that Franco's hostility towards Moscow and the strategic 
importance of Spain ruled out an Anglo-Soviet alliance. He told the Foreign 
Policy Committee that `he did not attach importance to the argument that by 
doing so [accepting Soviet proposals of an alliance] we should alienate Spain 
and throw her into the German-Italian camp. Spain was already in the anti- 
Comintern camp. i896 
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Less than a week after this meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee, Hoare, 
MacDonald, Stanley and indeed most of the Cabinet were willing to openly 
support a full and unambiguous Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. The turning 
point in their attitudes towards collaboration with Moscow was due to a report 
given by the Chiefs of Staff on 16 May. In this report, the threat of a German- 
Soviet rapprochement was, for the first time, portrayed as a very real possibility 
which would have disastrous consequences. An Anglo-French-Soviet alliance, 
and nothing less, therefore, needed to be secured. The Chiefs of Staff wanted a 
`pact', `something more than the bare neutrality of Russia... ' " On lo May, the 
Chiefs of Staff had agreed that an alliance would have negative effects upon a 
strategically important Spain. But, they had also reported clearly that an 
alliance with Moscow could only be rejected if it was absolutely certain that a 
German - Soviet rapprochement was impossible. 
898 On 16 May, they argued that 
such an assurance of continued hostility between Berlin and Moscow was not 
possible: 
If we fail to achieve any agreement with the Soviet, it might be regarded 
as a diplomatic defeat which would have serious military repercussions, 
in that it would have the immediate effect of encouraging Germany to 
further acts of aggression and of ultimately throwing the U. S. S. R. into 
her arms. "' 
The Chiefs of Staff explained that `the greatest danger we had to face would be a 
combination of Russia and the Axis Powers. ' 9°° `From the military point of view 
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such an eventuality would create a most dangerous situation' for Britain. "' 
Consequently, other considerations, such as the strategical importance of Spain, 
were put aside. They reiterated their opinion in a Cabinet meeting on 17 May, 
explaining that, 
.. the 
danger which would result from possible Russo-German 
combination outweighed the disadvantages which might be expected to 
result from the hostile reactions of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Japan and 
possible other countries, to an agreement between this country and 
Russia. "' 
Though the fear of a German - Soviet rapprochement had finally persuaded the 
Chiefs of Staff to overlook their distrust and hostility towards the Soviet Union, 
it did not mean that such historical feelings had disappeared altogether. Thus, 
despite agreeing to an alliance, the Chiefs of Staff did not, in May, agree that 
Britain and France should guarantee the states of central and eastern Europe. 
If, they pointed out, Germany attacked Latvia, Moscow could declare war 
against Germany yet stay behind its frontiers leaving Britain obliged to go to 
war. The Soviet Union, they suspected, was still capable of acting deliberately 
against the interests of the British and French. "' 
Despite this reservation, however, the report dated 16 May had a significant 
effect on ministers and officials. `04 The Foreign Secretary was one example. 
Throughout most of May, Halifax had continued to support Chamberlain's 
decisions to reject Soviet proposals for a mutual alliance. He believed the 
British proposal of a unilateral declaration was fair and `failed to see how there 
was any just ground for maintaining that our proposal denied the principle of 
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reciprocity. ' Indeed, it was, he believed, `quite plain that the obligations we were 
inviting the Soviet government to undertake were identical with those we 
ourselves had assumed. '9°5 In his response to Soviet demands, Halifax was 
condescending, telling ministers that a mere change of style in the presentation 
of London's repeated proposal would `... set out our proposal in a way in which it 
would appeal to Russia... ' and make the document `look more like an 
Alliance. '9°6 The Foreign Secretary's uncompromising position with regard to an 
actual alliance no doubt reflected his continued denial of a German - Soviet 
rapprochement as a real threat. He informed the Cabinet during the first weeks 
of May that; 
he had no information bearing on the likelihood of some secret 
agreement being concluded between Herr Hitler and M. Stalin. He found 
it difficult to attach much credence to ... reports, which might be spread by 
persons who desired to drive us into making a pact with Russia. "' 
On 24 May, however, eight days after the Chiefs of Staff presented their report 
to the Foreign Policy Committee, Halifax changed his mind and told others that 
there was `great force in the view that, having gone so far in the negotiations, a 
breakdown now would have a definitely unfavourable effect. ' He felt that `it was 
therefore necessary that we should be prepared to enter into a direct mutual 
agreement with the Soviet government. ' 908 
Halifax's adviser, Alexander Cadogan, similarly noted in his diary that `we are 
coming up against a choice between a Soviet alliance [or pact for mutual 
assistance] and breakdown - with all consequences. "My opinion', he continued, 
`is hardening in favour of the former. '9°9 Another who changed his mind was 
Samuel Hoare. Hoare who had spoken out in favour of an agreement previously, 
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now announced his unreserved support for an `alliance with Russia. "" Oliver 
Stanley complained at what he saw as the government deliberately dragging out 
the negotiations and also called for a full Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. So, too, 
did Lord Chatfield. "' During the first weeks of May, Chatfield had continued to 
support Chamberlain's rejection of Soviet proposals, despite acknowledging the 
strategic value of a Soviet ally. He had stressed what he believed would be the 
disastrous effect of an alliance upon Franco's Spain, telling ministers that `close 
relations with the Soviet would not justify alienating strategically important 
countries like Spain and Portugal. '912 Yet on 16 May, the Minister for 
Coordination of Defence changed his mind completely and argued for a mutual 
alliance to be signed with Moscow as soon as possible. "' 
Of less influence within the government, but nevertheless significant, was the 
changing attitudes of now Secretary of State for the Dominions, Sir Thomas 
Inskip, the Marquis of Zetland, and Stanhope. All were also now willing to at 
least consider an alliance. "' On 19 May, Inskip, for example, suggested to the 
Foreign Policy Committee that Hitler would not be likely to draw any 
distinction in his reactions between an Anglo-Soviet alliance and a lesser 
agreement. 915 Zetland and Stanhope, like many others, still had reservations 
about allying with Moscow. Nevertheless, both ultimately agreed that the 
British government `might have to go some way in order to prevent a possible 
agreement between Russia and Germany. '916 
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By May, ministers and officials still voiced their hostility towards the Soviet 
government. Cadogan accused Moscow of `blackmail' and found the Soviet 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, to be uncompromising. "' The Foreign 
Secretary believed `the Russian government had been very tiresome during the 
negotiations"" and expressed his `strongest possible distaste for a policy which 
meant our acquiescing in Soviet blackmail and bluf . 
'9" Such critical words 
partly reflected the increasing panic amongst ministers. Several were beginning 
to realise it was no longer in Britain's interest to drag out the negotiations. 
Interestingly, a number of ministers pointed out that an alliance was the only 
possible form of agreement because the British proposal of a unilateral 
declaration did not deal with the issue of reciprocity. 92° But the same ministers 
had conveniently overlooked this point throughout March and April. It was not 
concern for the Soviet position that motivated the change in attitudes towards 
Anglo-Soviet collaboration. It was instead the real belief in the possibility of a 
German-Soviet rapprochement that finally persuaded the majority to overlook 
their personal aversion to the Soviet Union to the extent that they were now 
willing to enter into an alliance of mutual assistance. 
The distinction between changing, and putting aside, one's suspicion and 
hostility is an important one. Ministers and officials acknowledged the 
distinction as well as the influence of their suspicion regarding German - Soviet 
relations. Chatfield, for example, told the Foreign Policy Committee members 
that `his colleagues would realise how distasteful it was to him personally to 
contemplate an alliance with the Soviet', but warned that `if for fears of making 
an alliance with Russia we drove that country into the German camp we should 
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have made a mistake of vital and far reaching importance. "" Alexander 
Cadogan complained that the decision to ally with the Soviet Union was against 
his `will', yet accepted the need for such an alliance to ensure Moscow did not 
`go in with Germany'. '" Cadogan had earlier received information stating that 
`certain members of the German General Staff are in favour of an understanding 
with the Soviet Union' and in May he noted that `they have lately again been 
advocating it. '923 Stanhope admitted that if a rapprochement `were a real 
possibility' it would, in his opinion, be `an overriding consideration'. "' Halifax 
told the Cabinet that he had `never disguised his own views on the subject of 
close association with Russia' but now supported an alliance because `the idea of 
some rapprochement between Germany and Russia was not one which could be 
altogether discarded. ' Hoare explained that he had become `more and more 
impressed by the serious consequences which would ensue from a breakdown of 
the negotiations, "" and in his memoirs spoke of `setting aside' anti-Soviet 
prejudices. " Stanley `thought that the political consequences at home and 
abroad of a further rejection by Russia of our proposals would be most 
damaging and unfortunate. "" He added during the following meeting of the 
Foreign Policy Committee, that he `thought it might also be pointed out.. . that if 
no Three Power Pact was made, Russia might well gravitate towards Germany 
and would not such a development... tend to precipitate a European war? "" 
Even Thomas Inskip, who said little about the Soviet Union during this period, 
noted in his diary his suspicions that Moscow might ally with Berlin. As early as 
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4 May, he wrote; `Vatican minister reports that the usual "reliable source" 
reports that Italy is mediating between Germany and Russia, and that 
agreement has practically been attained. Italy, Germany and Russia are united. 
I wonder! "" 
Hence, by 24 May, nearly the entire Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Policy 
Committee had changed their attitudes towards Anglo-French-Soviet 
collaboration and accepted Soviet proposals for an alliance. What was 
Chamberlain's view during this period? Despite the anxiety that spread about 
Soviet foreign policy intentions following Litvinov's removal from office, 
Chamberlain continued to oppose a mutual alliance with Moscow during the 
first weeks of May. He remained notably `reluctant to embrace the Russian 
bear, "" and reiterated his `most scathing... dislike of the "Bolks" and of 
Russia. '932 For the first time he openly admitted to his Cabinet that he `had some 
distrust of Russia's reliability..., "" and following their presentations on 16 and 
17 May, no longer invited the Chiefs of Staff to air their views in Cabinet or 
Foreign Policy Committee meetings. "' The changing views of his Cabinet 
ministers following the report given by the Chiefs of Staff did, however, effect 
the Prime Minister. 
There were other factors now pushing Chamberlain towards accepting Soviet 
proposals. M15 intelligence, for example, had recently revealed to the Prime 
Minister that the Soviet ambassador, Ivan Maisky, had been orchestrating 
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public pressure in favour of an alliance. 9Chamberlain could not ignore the 
public opinion polls which were showing overwhelming support for an Anglo- 
French-Soviet alliance. "' The British press were also increasing pressure in 
favour of an alliance. 93' Attitudes towards Soviet involvement were not only 
changing within Britain either. By the end of May, the two reasons Chamberlain 
had, to date, continually highlighted to justify his opposition to an alliance, 
namely east European and dominion opposition, were no longer substantiated. 
Both Poland and Rumania gave their consent for the British government to 
negotiate with the Soviets on 22 and 23 May. 93' A number of the dominion 
governments had already put aside their animosity towards the Soviet Union in 
order to secure Moscow's military and political commitment to the allies. 939 On 
24 May, the Cabinet were informed: 
The High Commissioners for South Africa and Canada had both said that 
if we were faced with a choice between a breakdown in negotiations and 
conclusion of an agreement on the terms proposed by the Russian 
Government they had no doubt that their Government would take the 
view that we should conclude an agreement. Broadly speaking, apart 
from New Zealand, all the Dominions appeared to dislike the idea of an 
agreement with Russia but recognised, nevertheless, that having gone so 
far it would be right to make an agreement rather than risk a complete 
breakdown. "' 
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Furthermore, Chamberlain had to consider the change in the international 
situation. On 22 May, Hitler and Mussolini had signed the Pact of Steel. The 
two dictators had committed themselves to waging war in common, thus ending 
the Prime Minister's hope of weaning Mussolini away from Hitler. Potential 
allies such as France and Turkey now had to be considered. "' Ultimately, such 
factors, together with the support for an alliance amongst his own Cabinet, 
finally forced Chamberlain to accept Soviet proposals on 24 May. `It must be 
recognised... ', admitted Chamberlain, `that unless we were prepared to agree 
substantially to proposals on the lines put forward by the Russian Government, 
we should have to face a breakdown in negotiations. "" 
The decision had not been voluntary. Initially, Chamberlain threatened 
resignation. "' Then he felt `disposed to swallow the Soviet desiderata. "" 
Alexander Cadogan told Halifax that the Prime Minister had `come to this point 
very reluctantly and is very disturbed at all that it implies. "' Hence it is not 
surprising that the Prime Minister tried to avoid a full alliance with the Soviet 
Union by basing the agreement upon article sixteen of the League Covenant. 
Oliver Harvey wrote in his diary that Chamberlain wished the alliance `to be 
covered up as much as possible by introducing it into the League machinery, if 
possible as part of article 16. '946 In various accounts of the Anglo-French-Soviet 
negotiations this decision has not, to date, received the attention it deserves. It 
was a premeditated and deliberate act of sabotage by Neville Chamberlain. 
Basing the alliance upon article sixteen meant that before the assistance 
pledged by Britain and France could be given, the League Council would have to 
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meet and discuss, and then recommend to the several governments concerned 
what effective military, naval or air assistance should be given. Thus, the 
inclusion of article sixteen in the alliance ensured a delay in the assistance given 
by Britain and France in the event of war. The idea was thought up by 
Chamberlain and his adviser Horace Wilson in a private meeting. ' The Prime 
Minister's boastful description of its origins and implications to his sister 
revealed that he, in fact, had not overlooked his own distrust of, and hostility 
towards, the Soviet government, and more importantly that he had not 
personally accepted a full alliance with the Soviet Union. It was an `ingenious 
idea' he wrote; 
In substance it gives the Russians what they want but in form and 
presentation it avoids the idea of an alliance and substitutes a declaration 
of intention in certain circumstances in fulfilment of an obligation under 
Art XVI of the Covenant... it is calculated to catch all the misgivings and 
at the same time by tying the thing up to Art XVI we give it temporary 
character. I have no doubt that one of these days Art. XVI will be 
amended or repealed and that should give us the opportunity to revise 
our relations with the Soviet... '' 
Henry Channon, Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Under Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, aptly summarised the insincerity of Chamberlain's 
proposal when he wrote; `Thus really, our new obligation means nothing. A 
military alliance might have been the signal for an immediate war - "blown the 
gaff' but a Geneva alliance is so flimsy, so unrealistic, and so impractical ... 1949 
Chamberlain's devious decision to include article sixteen to any terms of 
agreement destroyed a real opportunity for an alliance between London, Paris 
and Moscow. The historical debates and existing evidence with regard to Soviet 
foreign policy during this period will be discussed later in the chapter. But 
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evidence does show that Moscow was still sincere in its efforts to reach an 
Anglo-French-Soviet alliance when Chamberlain undermined the British 
proposal at the end of May. 9'° Years later, M. A. Vyshinky would tell the UN 
General Assembly of the negative effects Chamberlain's inclusion of article 
sixteen had upon Soviet decisions and opinions: 
That is why M. Molotov, speaking of the Anglo-French proposal, called 
them a step forward even in that form, but he noted that there were such 
reservations, including reservations about certain articles of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, that it could hardly become an 
effective step forward.. 
"" 
Why, in contrast to the vast majority of his Cabinet, the Foreign Policy 
Committee and the Chiefs of Staff, had Chamberlain remained opposed to a full 
triple alliance with Moscow and Paris? He may well have still been hankering 
after an agreement with Germany. Several historians have suggested that 
Chamberlain never completely abandoned his plans to resume negotiations 
with the German government regarding European security, particularly a 
solution to the Danzig and Polish corridor question. " Indeed, in May, the Prime 
Minister complained to his sister that `an association [with the Soviet Union]... 
would make any negotiation or discussion with the totalitarians difficult if not 
impossible. "' He believed that Soviet involvement in a policy of collective 
resistance would act to `consolidate the relations of the parties to the anti- 
comintern pact... ' 9' Rather than help deter Hitler, which Chamberlain planned, 
Soviet involvement was thought to make war even more likely. " The Prime 
Minister, then, still hoped for peace, and this was influential, but only 
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indirectly. 9 Chamberlain's continued hope of an agreement with Hitler was 
influential only in so much as it meant there was no reason for Chamberlain to 
put aside the anti-Soviet prejudices that fuelled his opposition to collaboration. 
If his desire for an Anglo-German agreement had, in fact, been a direct 
influence upon Chamberlain's aversion to collaboration he would not have 
accepted the Soviet proposals at the end of May and expected Soviet agreement 
to his counter proposal. 957 Though he had undermined the prospects for an 
alliance by including article sixteen, in the eyes of Hitler, indeed all of Europe, it 
would have appeared that an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance had been 
concluded. 958 
Distrust and disdain still dominated Neville Chamberlain's opinion of Anglo- 
Soviet collaboration. By the end of May, the only support he could count upon 
within the Cabinet and the Foreign Policy Committee was from William 
Morrison and R. A Butler. ' Morrison, for example, warned members of the 
government that the `lesson of Brest Litovsk must never be forgotten"' , 
thereby revealing that hostility towards the Soviet Union was not only due to 
Stalin's recent purges. Yet neither he nor Butler were influential. Indeed, 
Chamberlain did not even recognise Morrison's support, and when he wrote of 
Butler to his sister, he complained; `the only support I could get for my views 
was from Rab Butler... and he was not a very influential ally. 961 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Simon, was suspected by some 
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ministers to support Chamberlain's opposition to an Anglo-French-Soviet 
alliance. 9 ' He had never spoken out in favour of an alliance and when he did 
contribute to discussions about the Soviet Union his remarks were critical. On 
the other hand, however, Simon had made remarks which suggested some 
support for the Soviet position. Thus, when it was suggested that London 
should respond to the Soviet Union's repeated rejection of its proposals by 
extending the `definition of aggression beyond the scope of physical invasion to 
cover the violation of a country's political neutrality, Simon pointed out that the 
proposal 
... 
did not really do what Russia asked us to do... It appeared to him that 
the Russian Government was still entitled to say that we were only 
undertaking to help Russia if Russia became involved in war as a result 
of aggression having taken place against Poland or Rumania. 9'3 
Following this, he agreed with a number of other ministers that Hitler would see 
very little difference in the proposals being put forward by Vansittart and 
Moscow's proposal of a three power pact. 964 Consequently, Simon's attitude 
towards Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration during this period is very difficult to 
determine. Indeed, fellow members of the Cabinet and the Foreign Policy 
Committee themselves were unsure about his personal opinion. Although 
others listed him with the Prime Minister as one of the `opposers', a question 
mark remained alongside his name. " Analysing his views is made even more 
difficult by the fact that he chose not to write about his opinions towards Anglo- 
French-Soviet collaboration in his private papers. What one can say, however, is 
that his views had little influence precisely because neither those who proposed 
an alliance nor Chamberlain perceived Simon as a supporter. 
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By the end of May, then, Chamberlain had found himself virtually alone in his 
opposition to a mutual alliance, as specified by Moscow. Within the next three 
months, however, Chamberlain would once again secure the support of his 
Cabinet and the Foreign Policy Committee in his opposition to Soviet proposals. 
The reason for this was Moscow's insistence upon a guarantee of the Baltic 
states, and in particular, its demand for a clause of indirect aggression. 
Chamberlain did not agree to Moscow's demand for a guarantee of the Baltic 
states at the beginning of June. He did not believe that Moscow was genuinely 
fearful that the Baltic States might acquiesce in German domination. g66Instead 
the Soviet demand supported his suspicion that Soviet intentions remained to 
expand into eastern Europe. " Chamberlain admitted that he might be `over 
suspicious of Russian intentions"' but he was not willing to change his views. 
At the same time, however, he could not withdraw the British government from 
the negotiations altogether. He was aware of the support that still existed for 
some form of agreement amongst his ministers. `My colleagues are so 
desperately anxious for it [an agreement with the Soviet Union] and so nervous 
of the consequences of failure to achieve it that I have to go warilyi969 he told his 
sister. Consequently, Chamberlain attempted to hinder negotiations. He was 
confidant that the Soviet government had no alternative but to agree to an 
alliance with the British and French. He told the Foreign Policy Committee at 
the beginning of June that he `did not think that Russia could now break off 
negotiations and we could therefore afford to take a fairly stiff line. "' So, in 
meetings, Chamberlain remained either indifferent or antagonistic about the 
Soviets and their demands. " For example, at times of crucial decision making, 
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namely immediately after agreeing to a mutual alliance at the end of May, he 
was away on holiday. 9 ' Such behaviour was in stark contrast to Chamberlain's 
previous efforts to secure an agreement with Germany. He flew to Germany on 
three separate occasions to ensure the conclusion of an agreement with Hitler 
over the Sudetenland crisis. Thereafter, he told ministers that `unless we 
showed that we were prepared to drive a hard bargain, we should necessarily 
get the worst of the bargain. '97; 
When, in June, Chamberlain was presented with an opportunity to prove 
British sincerity to the Soviets by sending a Cabinet minister to assist the 
British ambassador, he undermined the progress of negotiations by sending an 
official of the Foreign Office, namely William Strang. " He told the House of 
Commons that he had chosen Strang to go to Moscow in order to `accelerate the 
negotiations', and hoped `by this method it will be possible.. . to complete the 
discussion that is still necessary to harmonise the views of the three 
Governments and so reach a final agreement. '97' Yet it would have been obvious, 
even to Chamberlain, that sending a non-prominent official would offend and 
increase the suspicions of the Soviet government. Moscow's suspicion of British 
sincerity had been raised on several occasions during Cabinet and Foreign 
Policy Committee meetings during the past weeks. " The Prime Minister could 
and should have sent a Cabinet minister to Moscow, or at least chosen Anthony 
Eden, who volunteered to represent the British government and had met the 
Soviet dictator in 1935.97 Justifications given for Chamberlain's decision by 
historians since are inadequate. 97' If Hitler had invited a British representative 
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to negotiate a settlement, even as late as June, there is little doubt that 
Chamberlain himself would have found the time to fly to Berlin. Strang was a 
capable and intelligent official. But the reason for Chamberlain's choice was 
twofold. Firstly, because he remained insincere with regard to securing the 
Soviet Union as an ally. Secondly, Chamberlain was aware that Strang had been 
unaffected by the romantic Russophilia which he suspected had affected others, 
such as William Seeds. Consequently, he believed Strang would be able to 
withstand the demands and arguments of Molotov and retain London's control 
of the terms of agreement. " 
Sending Strang did offend Moscow98° and by July no agreement had been 
reached between Britain, France and the Soviet Union. The possibility that an 
agreement might yet still be reached was undermined even further when 
Molotov demanded a clause of indirect aggression be included in any guarantee. 
The Prime Minister refused resolutely. For him, the Soviet demand only 
confirmed that he had been right all along to distrust Moscow's intentions. 
What the Soviet government proposed would allow the Soviet Union to take 
offensive action when it deemed necessary. "' Chamberlain warned that 
`manipulation of internal upheaval in these petty states, whether for a White or 
Red revolution, had been made familiar in the last war, and would never be 
difficult to a practised hand. ig82 He warned the Foreign Policy Committee, for 
example, that the under the new Soviet proposal `... the Soviet government 
might insist on occupying strategic positions in Finland on the excuse that 
Finland was acting in the interests of Germany. ""3 
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When justifying his opposition to the Soviet proposals during the final months 
of negotiations, Chamberlain would also often refer to the telegrams of Britain's 
ambassador to Germany, Nevile Henderson. "' This was quite ironic considering 
that during the last days of May, Henderson had actually expressed his support 
of an Anglo-French-Soviet agreement. He was not a consistent supporter of 
closer Anglo-Soviet relations"' , 
but on 28 May, for example, Henderson had 
written to Halifax, stating; `If only we could get our Russian agreement 
through. '9" Days later he wrote; `I heartily wish we could quickly and safely get 
them into the anti-aggression bloc. iy' Henderson's perceptions of the Soviet 
Union were very similar to those of Chamberlain and many others. He 
distrusted the Soviet government"' and his hostility towards Moscow was 
evident in a number of telegrams. " `History contains nothing but examples of 
the unwisdom of putting one's faith into the Slavs"' , 
he told the Foreign 
Secretary. But he had decided, if only for a short time, to put aside such views. 
He was not persuaded by a fear of a German - Soviet rapprochement, as were 
several members of the Cabinet in May. In fact, such a threat featured relatively 
infrequently in his telegrams. Rather, Henderson's decision was influenced by 
his belief that an Anglo-French-Soviet agreement would aid his plans to secure 
an agreement with Hitler. Thus, an agreement, he believed, would `make our 
position one hundred per cent stronger and enable us to play from greater 
strength. '99' 
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Importantly, this support for an agreement with the Soviets was conditional. 
Henderson wanted and needed an agreement immediately. When it did not 
occur, Henderson demanded an end to the negotiations as soon as possible. 
Whether an agreement was signed or not, was irrelevant. The priority was to 
end the negotiations. If London, Paris and Moscow concluded an agreement, 
Henderson's position in any negotiations with Hitler would be strengthened. If 
they failed, this would clear all obstruction to an Anglo-German agreement. 
However, as long as the negotiations dragged on, Britain gained no assurances 
from the Soviets and the opportunity to negotiate with Hitler would disappear. 
`In my opinion', wrote Henderson, `the important thing was to end the 
negotiations one way or another as soon as possible. '992 Thus, as the Soviet 
government continued to reject British proposals during June and July, 
Henderson became increasingly hostile and critical. "' It is likely that 
Chamberlain deliberately chose to highlight these more negative messages from 
the ambassador when arguing his own aversion to an alliance with the Soviet 
Union. 
Throughout July, Soviet insistence upon its latest clause of indirect aggression 
convinced Chamberlain that the negotiations were likely to fail. The Prime 
Minister did not feel remorse, however. Instead he was indignant that he would 
have to take responsibility for the failure of negotiations he had never 
supported. He wrote to his sister Ida to complain: 
We are only spinning out of time before the inevitable break comes and it 
is rather hard that I should have to bear the blame for dilatory action 
when if I wasn't hampered by others I would have closed the discussions 
one way or another long ago. 99' 
For some time Chamberlain had become increasingly angry at what he saw as 
992 Ibid. 11 July, 1939. 
1193 Ibid. 
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the humiliation Britain was suffering. " It was, he said, `most humiliating to 
have our proposals consistently and summarily rejected. "" It is ironic that 
Chamberlain had never expressed such feelings of humiliation when Britain 
pursued Hitler for an agreement in September 1938. The Prime Minister, 
however, had always perceived Germany to be an equal power, deserved of 
political respect. The Soviet Union, in his opinion, had always been a country 
inferior to Britain in every way. 997 Indeed, Maisky later admitted that the Soviet 
government had felt it was treated by Britain `always like poor relations. '998 
Moscow's rejection of British proposals after May therefore injured 
Chamberlain's pride. Furthermore, the British Cabinet, as far as he was 
concerned, `had made concession after concession and ... there was no point of 
substance on which we had refused to accept the Russian standpoint. '999 Several 
ministers and officials made such a point regarding Britain's proposals during 
this period. Halifax and Cadogan both felt that Britain `had gone further than 
many would have thought right in endeavour to find agreement""' , 
indeed that 
London had given `them [Soviets] all they want... "°°' The British government 
had, by 26 June, not only agreed to Moscow's original proposal of a mutual 
alliance, but also compromised on a guarantee of the Baltic states. However, it 
had taken nearly three months for London to finally agree to an alliance and a 
further month to agree to a guarantee. The British government had continually 
rejected Soviet proposals, remaining indifferent to the security concerns of 
Moscow. The assumption of ministers during June and July, that the Soviet 
government would and should be grateful for any compromise on Britain's part 
Ibid; CAB 25 / 625 58 mtg. 19 July, 1939. 
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showed an incredible, though unsurprising arrogance. Nothing had been learnt 
from the negotiations. Soviet suspicion of the West had been noted by some, 
but no thought was given to the possibility that British actions since March had 
increased the Kremlin's suspicion of London's sincerity to the extent that 
further compromise would now be needed to prove Britain's genuine 
willingness to aid the Soviet Union in the event of war. 
Cadogan and Halifax were particularly annoyed by Moscow's uncompromising 
insistence upon its terms of alliance because they had initially worked, in 
contrast to Chamberlain, to continue negotiations in June. Both had continued 
to believe an alliance was still possible and so maintained their support for such 
an agreement. Cadogan, for example, suggested in June that Seeds be recalled 
and briefed to answer Molotov's questions in Moscow. Such action, he hoped, 
would prevent the delays so far caused by Seeds having to wait for replies to his 
questions from the Foreign Office. 1OO2 At the beginning of June, Halifax agreed 
to Anthony Eden's proposal to represent the government in Moscow, l°°3 and 
even suggested sending a legal adviser, William Malkin, to aid the drafting of 
the agreement and smooth the progress of the negotiations: °°4 He remained 
optimistic an alliance would be reached'°°5 and tried to calm the mistrust 
evoked by the latest proposal. The Foreign Secretary emphasised, for example, 
Moscow's real concern that the Baltic States might acquiesce willingly in a 
German takeover. ioo6 The government, he said, needed to appreciate Moscow's 
paranoia. '°°' `The Russians', he explained, 
... were extremely suspicious and feared that our real object was to trip 
them into commitments and then leave them in the lurch. They suffered 
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acutely from inferiority complex and considered that ever since the Great 
War the Western Powers had treated Russia with haughtiness and 
contempt. ioo8 
Even Halifax, however, could not agree to the Soviet definition of indirect 
aggression. He found Molotov's definition of `indirect aggression' to be 
`dangerous and capable of very wide application. ""' Thus, he explained, it 
... would enable Russia 
in certain circumstances to intervene in the 
internal affairs of some other country, where a coup d'etat had occurred. 
For example, the Iron Guard might revolt in Rumania and the Soviet 
Government might then allege that Rumanian territory was being used 
for purposes of aggression against the Soviet government. "" 
Britain could, therefore be dragged into war. A mutual alliance would ensure 
that Britain would only go to war for reasons it had already committed to, 
namely, to protect guaranteed countries against German aggression. A clause of 
indirect aggression meant that the decision to go to war depended upon Stalin. 
Halifax, as well as others within the Cabinet and Foreign Policy Committee, 
could not trust Stalin not to take action against the interests of Britain. The 
Foreign Secretary told the Foreign Policy Committee that 
... 
he had always had in mind the example which M. Molotoff had given of 
Estonia wishing to employ German officers to train her Army.. . the Soviet 
government would be able to claim that such action by Estonia involved 
abandonment of her neutrality and if, as a result, Russia became engaged 
in war with Germany, France and Britain would also become involved in 
war. 1°1' 
William Morrison, similarly protested that if `... some totalitarian or right wing 
regime was established in Latvia, this definition would enable the Soviet 
government to intervene and drag us in with it. "O12 Sir John Simon agreed. It 
was, he told ministers, `important to insure that we should retain a free hand so 
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as to be able to tell Russia that we were not bound to go to war because we did 
not agree with her interpretation of the facts . 
"°ý3 
By July, then, most of the Cabinet were resigned to the fact that an agreement 
could not be found. Since June, individuals had found themselves torn. 
Molotov's shock demand had led several to question their decision to set aside 
suspicion of Soviet intentions at the end of May. Hoare, for example, who had 
consistently spoken out in favour of an agreement and then a mutual alliance 
with Moscow, said little regarding Anglo-Soviet relations after June. The Soviet 
government's uncompromising position regarding the clause of indirect 
aggression in July, made it impossible for ministers and officials to continue 
ignoring their mistrust, and once again, prejudices began to dominate the 
foreign policy decision making process. 
With the exception of Neville Chamberlain who remained convinced until the 
22 August that `it would be quite impossible for Germany and Soviet Russia to 
come together "°'. , ministers and officials were still aware of the threat of a 
German - Soviet rapprochement. For this reason alone, London continued to 
negotiate with Moscow and at the end of July, proposed military talks. '°" 
Halifax told his colleagues; `By securing an agreement with Russia we should 
have safeguarded ourselves for the time being against what might be the most 
serious danger, namely, an agreement between Germany and Russia... ""' An 
Anglo-French-Soviet agreement now seemed impossible but as long as talks 
continued, ministers and officials believed the possibility of Moscow allying 
with Germany would be reduced. But such fear was no longer enough to 
persuade individuals to set aside their distrust of Moscow to the extent that 
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they were willing to agree to Soviet proposals. Throughout July, the frustration 
and hostility that individuals had begun to express in June"" , continued and 
indeed, increased. Halifax had told the Foreign Policy Committee at the 
beginning of July that `those who favoured a continuance of the negotiations 
must realise that this would mean interminable discussions . 
"°'8 He personally 
was finding the `Russian business... quite infuriating"°'9 and wanted an end to 
the `perpetual argument. "O2° He told the British ambassador in Paris that `it [the 
negotiations] blocks everything and frays everybody's nerves... I hope ... we may 
succeed in bringing it to a point one way or the other very soon . 
"O2' Indeed, he 
admitted to the Cabinet that `if the negotiations should, after all, fail, this would 
not cause him very great anxiety... "022 Almost no one spoke out in favour of an 
alliance. '°' 
Moscow's demand for the guarantee of the states surrounding the Soviet Union 
evoked once more the suspicion of the British Cabinet. But were the Cabinet 
right to distrust Soviet intentions throughout 1939? Firstly, one can adequately 
challenge the suggestion that Stalin's foreign policy was driven by ideology and 
an intention to expand Communism. '°' Most recently, Gabriel Gorodetsky has 
convincingly argued that `from its first inception, Soviet foreign policy was 
marked by a gradual but consistent retreat from hostility to the Capitalist 
regimes towards peaceful coexistence based on mutual expediency. "° There 
was a steady and consistent erosion of the ideological dimension of Soviet 
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foreign policy. Instead, Stalin favoured moderate diplomacy in an effort to 
ensure, primarily, the safety and future security of his regime. He was 
opportunistic and his policy remained essentially one of realpolitik. 1O" But was 
the Soviet dictator sincere in the negotiations with the British and French 
during 1939? He was not driven by ideology, but had his opportunist outlook 
led him to move towards an agreement with Berlin, and when exactly was this 
decision made? Some have argued that Soviet foreign policy plans moved away 
from collaboration with the British and French as early as October 1938, 
following the Munich agreement. Pointing to Stalin's speech at the Eighteenth 
Party Congress, in which he criticised the appeasement policy of the West, other 
historians have questioned Soviet sincerity towards the negotiations from 
March 1939. '°" The British guarantee of Poland which soon followed is noted by 
others as a significant event. On the one hand historians have argued that it 
inadvertently ensured the protection of Soviet territory and therefore 
considerably undermined the value of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance for the 
Kremlin. ioz8 An alliance would most likely lead to war, but if the Soviet 
government remained neutral there could soon exist an opportunity to gain 
territory through an agreement with Germany. '°" On the other hand, the Polish 
guarantee has been focused upon as a crucial turning point because of its 
influence on the international balance of power. It is argued that the guarantee 
led, for the first time, to the emergence of Germany as an alternative ally for the 
Soviets because it forced Hitler to neutralise Moscow if he intended to carry out 
his plans with regard to Poland and yet avoid a war on two fronts. At the same 
time, the guarantee forced the British to secure some form of military aid from 
the Soviets in case the guarantee was brought into force. Consequently, the 
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Soviet Union became the key to the European balance of power and could 
choose its ally. When the British failed to satisfy Soviet security needs, Stalin 
sought an alternative with Germany. '°3° Both the removal of Maxim Litvinov, 
and Molotov's increased demands, particularly regarding the guarantee of the 
Baltic States, appeared for ministers at the time and historians later, to confirm 
such suspicion that Moscow was no longer interested in securing an alliance 
with the British and French. 1031 
All of the above interpretations of Soviet insincerity can be challenged. Indeed, 
each decision can be revealed as evidence of Moscow's continued sincerity 
towards securing an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. Thus, regarding first the 
suggestion that Stalin's speech in March indicated a change in Soviet foreign 
policy, it is aptly advised by Geoffrey Roberts that `no credibility whatsoever 
should be attached to this particular interpretation. ' There were a number of 
reasons why this was so, but most importantly it is notable that the speech 
contained `little that was new or unexpected. ""' Litvinov and Molotov had both 
criticised the western policy of non-intervention many times before. Stalin 
maintained the distinction between aggressive fascist states and non-aggressive 
democracies. Hence, the Soviet dictator did not denounce wholesale the British 
and French. Rather his message simply warned that the Soviet government was 
not prepared to resist aggression alone and risk its own security in order to 
ensure the future security of others. "°" 
All assertions of Soviet insincerity, whether argued by highlighting Stalin's 
speech, the strategical benefits of the Polish guarantee or the removal of 
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Litvinov, are undermined by the fact that the Soviet government continued to 
work for an Anglo-French-Soviet mutual alliance until the end of July at the 
earliest. '°3a The Soviet government may have begun to consider the possibility of 
collaboration with the Germans as early as as March. The Polish guarantee, as 
Gorodetsky suggests, may have signified the beginning of Moscow 
contemplating a possible rapprochement with Germany. However, a firm 
decision to reject an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was not taken before July. A 
meeting between the Soviet ambassador in Germany, Alexei Merekalov and 
Ernst Weizsäcker, State Secretary in the German foreign ministry on 17 April, 
regarded by several historians as the beginning of Soviet - German detente, was 
in fact a meeting based upon economic issues, and of no political significance. "' 
Following this, it was the Germans who initiated a policy of rapprochement, 
trying from 5 May onwards to solicit Moscow away from its policy of alliance 
with Britain and France. On 5 May, Julius Schnurre, from the economic 
department of the German foreign ministry, informed Georgi Astakhov, 
Counsellor at the Soviet embassy in Berlin, that Soviet contracts with Skoda, the 
munitions company in Bohemia, would be honoured. Berlin continued to put 
out feelers to Moscow until the end of June. The only indication that Moscow 
might be interested in reaching an agreement with the Germans before the end 
of July, occurred at a meeting on 14 June between Astakhov and Draganov, the 
Bulgarian ambassador in Berlin. Nothing was concluded at the meeting. There 
was a lull in German advances to Moscow between the end of June and the end 
of July, but on 24 July, German approaches resumed. It was on 29 July that the 
Kremlin finally appeared willing to consider a possible political detente with 
Berlin. For the first time Molotov replied to German overtures welcoming `any 
improvement in political relations between the two countries. ' A genuine 
1034 For more discussions on why removal of Litvinov did not signify change in Soviet foreign 
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opportunity for the British government to secure the Soviets as an ally had 
therefore existed throughout the negotiations. It was the behaviour of London 
towards Moscow during this period that played a significant role in pushing the 
Soviet government to move towards Germany. The Soviet Commissar was 
becoming increasingly exasperated with the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations 
and this, together with what appeared to be the imminent outbreak of war due 
to rising tension between Germany and Poland over Danzig, is what probably 
persuaded Moscow to give more attention to German feelers. io36 
Moscow then, continued to propose, and sincerely desire, a mutual alliance at 
the very least until the end of July. The reason for this was that the Polish 
guarantee did not, despite all of the assumptions 1037 , ensure Soviet security 
from 
a German attack. Throughout the negotiations, the Soviet government became 
increasingly concerned about the possibility of a German attack bypassing 
Poland and Rumania and directed at the north of the Soviet Union through the 
Baltic States. io3' Litvinov, had first attempted to include the Baltic States in an 
eastern defensive bloc as early as March 1939, but to no avail. Consequently, on 
28 March Soviet declarations were made to both the Latvia and Estonian 
governments warning them that any agreement with a third power that 
diminished their independence would violate their existing non-aggression 
pacts with Moscow. But the Estonians and Latvians rebuffed the Soviet 
warning, and Estonia soon began to move towards a non-aggression pact with 
the Germans. '°39 This together with Latvia's apparent doubts about British and 
1036 Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, p. 6; For a detailed account of German - Soviet relations 
during this period see Roberts, Soviet Union, pp. 73-82. Such events confirm Gorodetsky's 
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French capabilities and sincerity, and the fact that Lithuania's independence 
now appeared vulnerable following the loss of Memel to Germany, only 
increased Soviet anxiety. On 20 April, at Hitler's birthday parade in Berlin, it 
was observed that both the chiefs of staff of the Estonian and Latvia armies 
were present. '°4° Finally, on 7 June, Soviet security fears were realised when 
both Estonia and Latvia concluded non-aggression pacts with Germany. 
Thus, the Soviet government was not negotiating from a position of strength or 
confidence, and this was confirmed through the demands made for the 
guarantee of the Baltic States. Rather than revealing Soviet insincerity 
regarding a policy of collective resistance with the West, the demands were 
made because Moscow had tirelessly worked, yet ultimately failed, to ensure a 
guarantee of assistance from the British and French in the event of a German 
attack on the Soviet Union, under any circumstances. In 1947, M. A. Vyshinky 
succinctly explained the reasons for the Soviet demand of a mutual assistance 
pact between Britain, France and the Soviet Union, and guarantees to the Baltic 
States. The British proposal for mutual aid at the end of May, he said, was 
`accompanied by such reservations, the effect of which was to nullify these 
proposals. ' He went on: 
The new proposals provided for help to the Soviet Union with regard to 
five countries to which Britain and France had already given guarantees, 
but there was no mention of help by Britain and France to three 
countries bordering on the Soviet Union, namely, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. Clearly, the situation was as follows: that the aggressor, the 
potential aggressor at that time, was of course Hitler. When Great 
Britain, France and the Soviet Union were conducting conversations 
about the future aggressor they then, of course, had Hitler in mind. Well, 
look at this beautiful picture. Britain and France gave guarantees to 
Czechoslovakia and Poland, but they did not wish to give any guarantee 
'°'° Seppo Myllieniemi, Baltian Kriisi, 1938-1941, (Helsinki, 1977), p. 39, citing Finnish Foreign 
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to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Accordingly, if Hitler were to have 
attacked the Soviet Union through Poland or Czechoslovakia, we could 
have counted on aid from Britain and France. On the other hand, if 
Hitler had attacked us through Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and that is 
the way through which Hitler intended to attack us, and did eventually 
attack us, we were not entitled to any help from Britain or France. 1041 
Vyshinsky's speech exemplified the suspicion that several historians have noted 
existed within Moscow towards Western sincerity in the negotiations. 
Indeed, he insinuated that London and Paris had deliberately refused to 
guarantee the Baltic states because of their indifference to a German attack on 
the Soviet Union. The `English and French', Vyshinky said, 
... were very careful to 
leave open the question, which was of interest to 
the Soviet Union, the question whether the U. S. S. R. in turn could count 
on help from Britain and France in case of attack, not on Poland nor 
Roumania with whom Britain had concluded a treaty of alliance, but on 
other states bordering the Soviet Union. " 
Litvinov had suggested a similar desire on the part of Britain and France to see 
Germany attack the Soviet Union in April, 1939, '°44 and Ivan Maisky reiterated 
such suspicions in his memoirs written after the war. '°' Evidence shows that 
there was no conspiracy between the French and British to encourage Hitler to 
attack eastwards. But Moscow's suspicion of British sincerity is entirely 
understandable. Until the end of May, British ministers and officials had 
demanded the Soviet Union involve itself in a war between Germany and the 
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West, yet had rejected any suggestion that Britain involve itself in a war 
between Germany and the Soviet Union. "" Thereafter an alliance was agreed to, 
but with a clause that would ensure delay in the sending of aid and possible 
revision of the alliance in the event of war. The issue of reciprocity, as Vyshinksy 
outlined, was simply never appreciated or addressed by the British Cabinet. 
The issue of reciprocity was not ignored because of a desire to see Germany 
attack the Soviet Union, at least by most members of the Cabinet. In fact, what 
has been proven in this chapter is that the British Cabinet rejected the Soviet 
proposal regarding the guarantee of the Baltics because it appeared to confirm 
suspicions that Moscow was intent on Communist expansion in eastern Europe. 
Cabinet members were right to suspect Soviet intentions. No precedent for such 
a demand existed. Moreover, the Soviet government did, in fact, plan to overrun 
those states on the Soviet border guaranteed by the alliance. Two points need to 
be made, however. Firstly, there was nothing the British government could do 
about defending these states, and they knew it. Whether the British, French 
and Soviet governments concluded an alliance or not, the independence of the 
Baltic states would disappear in the event of war. Either Germany would exploit 
their position to attack the Soviet Union, or, and what was more likely, Berlin 
would include control of the Baltic states in a deal to ensure Soviet neutrality. 
Realpolitik dominated the international situation by the summer of 1939, and 
this leads to the second, and most important, point with respect to Moscow's 
demand. Thus, although the Soviet government intended to exploit the 
guarantee against indirect aggression to establish control of the Baltic states, 
Stalin's motivation was never ideological. "" The demand was not a pretext for 
Communist expansion. Instead, Moscow's desire to bring the Baltic States into 
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the Soviet sphere of influence was inextricably linked to the primary aim of 
securing Soviet territory. In order to adequately protect the Soviet Union from 
an almost certain German attack, the Soviet government needed control of the 
Baltic region as a strategically vulnerable area. Molotov used the demand for a 
guarantee of the Baltic States as a test of British sincerity, to test whether, in the 
event of war, London would allow Moscow to seize control of these States. It 
was a fair demand. Moscow wanted something in return for the sacrifices it 
would make in providing the second front against Germany. The Soviet 
government needed to know that the British and French would allow it to take 
what measures were necessary in war to ensure its survival. The British 
government, however, in its initial rejection of the demands, failed the test. 
Thus, rather than indicate insincerity on Moscow's part, the demand for a 
guarantee of the Baltics in fact revealed the opposite. The Soviet government 
was thinking in terms of war and making demands that it believed would aid the 
effectiveness of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance against German aggression. "' 
Not all Cabinet members had allowed their mistrust of the Soviet Union's latest 
proposal to reverse their support for an alliance. Oliver Stanley, for example, 
continued to speak out in favour of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. Following 
this he condemned the panic and opposition which the definition of indirect 
aggression had provoked within the cabinet. Stanley was no less suspicious than 
his fellow ministers, he simply had no intention of fulfilling the clause of 
indirect aggression. "49 This was an option neither Chamberlain nor other 
members had even considered. The minister reassured the Foreign Policy 
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Committee that interpretation of the terms could be debated in the event of 
action being taken against indirect aggression. He `doubted whether in fact the 
definition was as dangerous to us as had been suggested. It seemed to him to 
give endless opportunities for argument as to the real meaning of almost every 
word in it. "°5" Stanley was the only member of both the Cabinet and Foreign 
Policy Committee who advocated the acceptance of Moscow's latest proposals. 
Outside the Cabinet, however, he was supported by the Chiefs of Staff. Though 
no longer invited to report their views to the Cabinet or Foreign Policy 
Committee after their presentations on i6 and 17 May, the Chiefs of Staff 
nevertheless continued to support an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. They 
reiterated what they believed to be the Soviet Union's strategical and military 
value, especially with regard to Japan. '°" But more importantly, they continued 
to suspect and fear a German-Soviet rapprochement. Thus, while, they, too, 
disliked the Soviet definition of indirect aggression, nothing could persuade 
them that the risk of a German Soviet rapprochement was worth taking, not 
even the mistrust of Soviet intentions. '°' 
Unfortunately neither Stanley nor the Chiefs of Staff were influential upon the 
foreign policy decision making process at the end of July. Neville Chamberlain 
ultimately made the decisions and he now had the support of his Cabinet and 
Foreign Policy Committee. Consequently, only a half-hearted attempt was made 
to secure an agreement with Moscow. '°' Rather than send General Ironside 
who, Moscow was aware, had visited Poland earlier in the year, it was decided 
that the British military staff would be led by Admiral Sir Reginald Plunket- 
Ernle-Erle Drax. Drax had actually been a critic of appeasement policy for some 
1050 Ibid. 
1051 CAB 53 / 50 C. O. S. 928 mtg. 15 June, 1939. 
1052 CAB 54/11 D. C. O. S. 179.16 Aug, 1939. Cited in Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, p. 
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time. He perceived Hitler to be a `self confessed assassin' and a `confirmed liar', 
and had consequently repeated his call for rearmament in preparation for what 
was, he thought, likely to be war. "' His perceptions of the Soviet government 
were not much better. Like many within the British political elite, Drax 
suspected Soviet foreign policy aims remained the expansion of Communism. '°" 
He perceived Moscow's leaders as nothing more than `Bolshevik gangsters. ""' 
He, like Chamberlain, Halifax and Cadogan, also believed that the British 
government had made concession after concession during the negotiations and 
that the Soviets were to blame for the failure to conclude an agreement. 
Nevertheless, Drax wanted an alliance concluded because, he later wrote, 
`Russia was credited with vast armies and the second biggest airforce in the 
world. "°'' 
The British staff together with the French staff, led by General Joseph 
Doumenc, were to travel on a slow passenger cruise liner, the City of Exeter. It 
would take nearly a week to reach the Soviet Union. Justifications have been 
made for the poor choice of staff personnel and transport for the staff mission to 
Moscow. Firstly, before going to Moscow, it had already been accepted that the 
British Expeditionary Force would have to go to France. As such, Generals could 
not risk being caught in the Soviet Union when war broke out. Secondly, 
regarding transport, there existed a real problem of conveying an Anglo-French 
staff mission in possession of war plans over the territory of potential enemies. 
Flying or travelling by train would have involved either landing on German 
territory or facing ambush along the way. To send a mission with a major fleet 
1054 Articles, 'Europe Today', 12 Apr, 1938; 'England's Last Chance', 10 Oct, 1938; 'Future 
German Policy', 12 Dec, 1938. DRAX 2/12; Letter to the Times, 31 Mar, 1939. DRAX 2/3. Drax 
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Moscow'. DRAX 6/5. Ibid. 
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of escorts would, arguably, have been too provocative. '°" Such explanations, 
though logical, were not however the real reasons for the decisions taken during 
the final weeks of negotiations. For a more accurate explanation one has to 
examine the comments made by the decision makers. 
Chamberlain and Halifax were now almost indifferent to the outcome of 
negotiations. They were prepared, if possible, to conclude some form of 
agreement with the Soviet government, but only if the political definition of 
indirect aggression was agreed upon. If this remained impossible, then Halifax 
believed dragging out the negotiations would suffice because it would at least 
prevent an alliance between Berlin and Moscow. "'9 Chamberlain, still in denial 
about the possibility of a German - Soviet rapprochement, only agreed to 
military talks, he told others, because `if we rejected it, we should have endless 
trouble... iio6o Thus, Drax was `directed to go slowly and cautiously until such 
time as the political agreement was reached. ""' Drax acknowledged that `there 
might be some difficulty in this, as it was probable that the Russians would be 
hoping for some tangible results from the military conversations before they 
were prepared to give their final agreement to the political act. w162 But the 
domination of distrust meant that London was not prepared to compromise on 
this point. `It was pointed out' in the Cabinet, `that we should put ourselves in a 
very weak position if we gave confidential information to the Soviet government 
before we had concluded any pact with them. m63 Chamberlain in particular, 
according to Admiral Drax, had never wanted the staff mission sent in the first 
1058 Watt, How War Came, pp. 382-383. 
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place. "" He was `not hurrying on getting in Russia. "o6' As a result, the powers 
given to Britain's military representatives were limited. "" 
This was in stark contrast to the attitude of, and instructions given, by the 
French government. 'o6' On 19 July, Bonnet had sent an appeal to Halifax urging 
acceptance of the Soviet definition of indirect aggression. 116' Before the French 
General, Doumenc, left France to go to Moscow in August, Bonnet and Daladier 
urged him to return with an agreement. '°69 Doumenc, like the head of the British 
military mission, General Drax, did not have plenipotentiary powers. '°'° 
However, Daladier had given the French General the power to "`negotiate with 
the High Command of the Soviet armed forces on all questions regarding 
collaboration needed between the armed forces of the two countries. " "°" As 
General Drax told Lord Chatfield, the ` "British had no written credentials. " "0'2 
Drax wrote later that it was `an astonishing thing that the government and the 
Foreign Office should have let us sail without providing us with credentials or 
any similar document. One naturally felt, ..., a trifle non-plussed when asked to 
produce them. ""' More importantly, the absence of any credentials only served 
to heighten Soviet suspicions about the sincerity of the Western governments 
to conclude an alliance. "' 
Difficulties arose when the British and French representatives were unable to 
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provide the Soviet defence minister, Marshal Kliment E. Voroshilov, with 
adequate `concrete plans' regarding the `organisation of defence. ' `The main 
problem', however, `was whether it was wise to put extreme pressure on Poland 
and Rumania to yield to the Soviet demands. ' Negotiations all but broke down 
when British and French representatives were unable to answer the questions 
put forward by Voroshilov concerning the passage of Soviet troops through 
Poland and Rumania. "" The British government had never been willing to 
permit Soviet access through Polish territory against Warsaw's wishes. On 2 
August, Halifax had told Drax that the Cabinet `did not want to become involved 
in the negotiations between the Russians and Poles or Russians and 
Rumanians. "' The Chiefs of Staff, still convinced that the Soviet government 
would secure an agreement with Berlin if an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was 
not soon concluded on its terms, continued to overlook their suspicion of Soviet 
intentions and urged that pressure be applied to the Poles and Rumanians to 
allow Soviet access across their territory. "" In a memorandum dated 16 August 
the Chiefs of Staff stressed; 
In our opinion it is only logical that the Russians should be given every 
facility for rendering assistance and putting their maximum weight into 
the scale on the side of the anti-aggression powers. We consider it so 
important that if necessary the strongest pressure should be exerted on 
Poland and Rumania to persuade them to adopt a helpful attitude. "" 
The Cabinet did not heed their advice. They should have. Indeed, they should 
have made far more of an effort throughout the negotiations to force Poland 
into allowing access for Soviet troops. It was impossible to claim that the 
decision not to pressurise the Poles had been taken because of concern for 
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Poland's future. The Chiefs of Staff had made it clear that Poland could not 
defend itself if attacked by Germany. In the event that Britain and France 
would go to war against Germany they could do nothing to prevent the 
partitioning of Poland and other eastern European countries by Germany and 
the Soviet Union. '°79 Halifax had acknowledged Poland's likely demise in 
June. "" In addition it cannot be convincingly argued that the British 
government rejected Soviet proposals because of concern about the reaction of 
the British public. "" The opinion of the British public was mentioned only once 
in Cabinet and Foreign Policy Committee meetings. Suspicion of Soviet 
intentions, on the other hand, had been stated on numerous occasions. 
Ultimately, the military technicalities of an alliance, including passage through 
Polish territory, was not dealt with before sending the British military staff to 
Moscow because the intentions of London were purely political, namely to 
ensure the prevention of a German-Soviet rapprochement, not necessarily to 
secure an alliance. When Britain did contact Warsaw with respect to Soviet 
military plans and access through Polish territory, it only did so because of its 
concern about relations between Moscow and Berlin. The efforts to persuade 
Warsaw to allow Soviet troops through its territory were not great. 1082 
The French government, in contrast, applied a good deal of pressure upon the 
Polish government to agree to the passage of Soviet troops through its 
territory. "" But following repeated refusals by Beck to allow access for Soviet 
troops"" , Doumenc was authorised 
by Paris to sign an agreement giving the 
Soviets permission to cross Polish territory. When Moscow insisted on a 
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telegram from the Polish government outlining its permission for Soviet troops 
to cross its territory, "" Bonnet sent a cable to Bucharest falsely stating that the 
Poles had given permission for Soviet troops to cross Polish territory, in an 
attempt to persuade the Rumanians to do the same. io86 These were the actions 
of a government that genuinely wanted to conclude an alliance with Moscow. 
Soviet representatives, including Voroshilov, appeared to believe the French 
were more sincere in their efforts than the British during the military talks. '°8' 
The French government cannot be absolved from responsibility for the loss of a 
crucial ally. Throughout 1939, Paris could have done more to ensure Moscow's 
cooperation and it was a mistake to allow the British to dictate negotiations 
during the final months. However, the French needed to maintain good 
relations with London. They needed a British ally above all else in the event of 
war, and this no doubt partly influenced their behaviour and decisions. '°8$ 
Furthermore, they made much more of an effort to reach an agreement with the 
Soviets than the British, especially during the final days of the negotiations. "" 
London, on the other hand, refused to endorse Bonnet's decision to allow 
Doumenc to sign an agreement allowing Soviet troops access across Polish 
territory. 1090 
Whether, or to what extent, the Soviet government was still intent on entering 
an alliance with Britain and France during August is difficult to determine. "' 
William Strang accurately surmised that it would be a `mistake if we suppose 
that Soviet policy is always exactly calculated, clearly defined and unhesitatingly 
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pursued. ""' Until the end of July, the Soviet government's sincerity towards the 
West was evident in its continuation of negotiations and its rebuff of German 
feelers. During negotiations with the British and French military mission in 
August, however, the demands of Voroshilov appeared deliberately obstructive, 
and relations were maintained with Berlin. "" Could it be that this behaviour in 
fact reflected the insincerity of the Soviet government? "" In addition to their 
failure to agree upon the political demands of the Soviet government , neither 
Drax nor Doumenc had arrived in Moscow able to promise the Soviets 
significant military assistance in the event of war. Indeed, all present at the 
talks, including Voroshilov, were aware of what little effort would be made by 
the West to advance into German territory, especially during the early stages of 
the war. The British and French forces were not strong enough to provide any 
notable help in relieving German pressure on the eastern front. "" One could 
suggest, therefore, that with such little to offer the Soviets, Stalin had already 
instructed Voroshilov to prolong the negotiations whilst a deal with Berlin was 
struck. Indeed, one might argue that the obvious military weakness of the 
British and French had persuaded Stalin against allying with the West months 
earlier. This is one of the more convincing arguments in favour of the portrayal 
of Moscow as insincere. 
However, it seems highly unlikely that Litvinov and then Molotov would have 
continued to try and secure an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance throughout 1938 
and 1939 if Stalin did not think that British and French allies would be 
significantly beneficial to the Soviet Union. If Moscow had no intention of 
securing an alliance because of British and French military weakness, surely 
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Soviet representatives would have made more of an effort to improve relations 
with the Germans. They would not have rejected Berlin's overtures for as long 
as they did. The reason Moscow put feelers out to the West in 1938 and 
continued negotiations with Britain and France during 1939, was because it 
knew Germany intended to attack the Soviet Union. Therefore any assistance 
from the West, as long as Britain and France were committed to the resistance 
of German aggression, was preferable. Assistance would be meagre at first, but 
there could be a second front. The Soviet Union would not be left alone to face 
Hitler. This is why the Soviets continued, sincerely, to seek an alliance with 
Britain and France. On 3 August, Count Schulenberg, the German ambassador 
in Moscow, said that `the Soviet Government is at present determined to sign 
with England and France if they fulfil all Soviet wishes. It will.. . take 
considerable effort on our part to cause the Soviet Government to swing 
about. "oq6 As late as 13 August, Admiral Drax still believed the Soviet 
government was intent on signing an agreement with the British and French, so 
long as all Soviet demands were agreed to. '°97 It was commitment the Soviet 
government sought; an assurance that London and Paris would at least do 
everything they could to work together with the Soviet Union in the resistance 
of German aggression. It was this lack of commitment, shown through the 
repeated rejections of an alliance, then a refusal to accept Molotov's political 
demands, that persuaded Stalin to consider an alliance with Berlin. io9' Moscow 
had not rejected an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance entirely by August. Rather 
than entering negotiations on 12 August intent on an alliance'°99, it seems more 
accurate to surmise, considering Voroshilov's behaviour, that the Soviet 
government had not yet dismissed the possibility of an Anglo-French-Soviet 
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alliance entirely. The negotiations were a test, not of British and French military 
strength, but whether Paris and London were yet willing to cooperate with 
Moscow fully. They failed. Thus, the obvious lack of commitment, especially by 
the British, finally swayed Stalin towards Berlin. On 22 August, the British and 
French staff missions made a last appeal to Molotov, but it was too late. On 19 
August, the Soviet - German economic pact had been announced. On 21 August, 
Molotov agreed to the visit of Ribbentrop, Germany's Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. l'°° The failure of the negotiations was confirmed on 23 August when 
British politicians were told of the Nazi-Soviet non aggression pact. 
When the British politicians were told of the Nazi - Soviet pact on 23 August, 
there were no signs of great panic. "01 Yet, all must have realised what the pact 
meant for the future. Hitler now knew he faced a war only on one front. Poland 
was at the mercy of its two greatest enemies, and there was very little either 
Britain or France could do. It is not surprising, therefore, that Inskip soon 
observed that Chamberlain `seemed under the weather. "1OZ Throughout the 
negotiations during 1939 the Soviet government had remained sincerely 
dedicated to an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. The majority of ministers and 
influential officials struggled to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices to the 
extent that they agreed to a mutual alliance at the end of May. But Chamberlain 
sabotaged the opportunity for a successful conclusion to the negotiations, and 
thereafter, members of the Cabinet and Foreign Policy Committee allowed their 
ideological distrust of the Soviet Union to once more dictate foreign policy 
decisions. The Soviet definition of indirect aggression did appear to confirm 
suspicions of Soviet intentions, but it was a justifiable demand. In addition, 
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London still had to consider the possibility of a German-Soviet rapprochement. 
Suspicions surrounding German - Soviet relations had increased significantly 
throughout 1939, and the remaining possibility of such an alliance was enough 
to persuade the Chiefs of Staff, Oliver Stanley, and indeed the French 
government to continue overlooking their anti-Soviet prejudices. Their 
willingness to accept Soviet proposals proved that it was not impossible for 
individuals to overlook their suspicion. Instead it remained a matter of choice, 
namely, whether one feared a German - Soviet rapprochement, or Communist 
expansion, more. With an underlying assumption that Britain could prevent 
such a rapprochement by simply dragging out the negotiations, minister's 
allowed their historic ideological suspicion to dominate. Ultimately, then, 
through their unwillingness to overcome their anti soviet attitudes, the British 
Cabinet and Foreign Policy Committee, but especially Neville Chamberlain, had 
caused Anglo-Soviet-French negotiations to break down and pushed Moscow 
into Berlin's arms. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Attitudes of the British Foreign Office, Moscow Embassy and British 
Diplomats towards the Soviet Union, March 1939 - August, 1939. 
During 1939, the new British ambassador in Moscow, William Seeds, 
supported an Anglo - French - Soviet agreement, and later an alliance. His fear 
of the Soviet government reverting to a policy of isolationism was enough to 
persuade him to overlook the hostility and distrust he held towards the Soviet 
government. Interestingly, despite the increasing suspicion of a German - Soviet 
rapprochement amongst ministers and officials involved in the foreign policy 
decision making process, the majority of the officials in the Northern 
Department did not believe the rumours received of such a danger. Certain 
officials became anxious about the possibility of such a threat at different times 
during the year, but ultimately, they were not convinced of its likelihood. 
Consequently, with nothing greater to fear than the expansion of Communism, 
which most still suspected to be Moscow's primary aim, they, like Chamberlain, 
did not support an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance until it was too late. 
At the beginning of 1939, the Moscow embassy told London that it could see no 
end in the near future to the terror gripping the Soviet state. "" The devastating 
consequences of the purges upon the armed forces were also still apparent. The 
army was, in the opinion of Firebrace, `still handicapped by the effects of past 
events""' , and the ability of 
Soviet industry to provide supplies in the event of 
war remained doubtful. "°' Pravda's claims that the Soviet navy would soon `be 
the most powerful navy in the world""', could not be substantiated, and 
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Hallawell reported that the `Soviet airforce is capable of developing little 
offensive power..., unless operating in concert with Poland. ' `This power', he 
added, `would even then be limited...... Despite such shortcomings, however, 
Firebrace concluded that the Soviet Union could still prove to be a valuable ally; 
`... it would still prove a serious obstacle to an attacker. ""' The higher ranks of 
the army especially appeared to be entering a new period of stability. Firebrace 
reported in March: 
The publication in the press of the decrees ordering the promotion of 
sixty one senior officers and Commissars gives hope that a condition of 
stability in the higher ranks has at last been reached, as no similar list 
has been made public since the beginning of the army purge in 1937... the 
Red army... is now once more on the upward grade. "" 
Its strategical position still hindered its effectiveness in an offensive war. 
However, Firebrace did not think it was incapable of taking offensive action. "" 
Reports upon Soviet naval potential were also comparatively positive during 
1939" In a dispatch sent at the end of May, Britain's naval attache referred to a 
`number of recent developments' which revealed that the Soviet Union was 
`embarking on a course of rapid naval expansion with the primary purpose of 
meeting a threat from Germany through the Baltic States and to a lesser degree 
with the purpose of strengthening its naval position in the Far East. ""' Indeed, 
in the opinion of both Firebrace and Clanchy, the Soviet government had 
`undoubtedly' begun to prepare its forces for war. "" In addition to the more 
positive reports about the Red army and navy, London was also reassured of the 
Soviet Union's continued political stability. In fact, in contrast to his reports of 
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1938, Maclean no longer believed that war would overturn this stability. `It is 
clear that much would depend on circumstances, and, in particular, on the 
duration of the conflict and the course followed by it', he wrote. But, he 
concluded that `while participation in a war might well have an unsettling effect 
on this country internally, it is not possible to conclude that an internal political 
upheaval would necessarily ensue. 11113 
Thus, during his first months as ambassador in Moscow, William Seeds, who 
had replaced Viscount Chilston in January 1939, was able to inform London of 
at least some apparent progress in the military strength and therefore 
capabilities of the Soviet Union. The terror continued and evidence of its 
destruction on all areas of Soviet life remained. The Soviet Union was a very 
different place to the `real old Russia""' Seeds had lived in before the Bolshevik 
revolution, and though Seeds had harboured a romanticism about the country 
before the turmoil of revolution, in 1939 he was very much aware of the realities 
of Soviet life under Stalin's dictatorship. He, too, for example, appreciated 
Stalin's wish for absolute control. "" It was, perhaps, because of his experience of 
pre-Soviet life before Stalin's regime that Seeds found the Soviet dictator's 
brutality towards Soviet citizens most distressing. He wrote of the `untold 
suffering of widespread famine... ', `... of a standard of living for the "tolling 
masses" lower than that of any non-Asiatic country', and of the `millions of lives' 
sacrificed for the sake of industrial transformation. "" The ambassador was 
appalled by the realities of Soviet life which underpinned the progress being 
made. Nevertheless, Seeds could not deny such progress. In 1939, the British 
ambassador recognised the Soviet Union as a major power. 
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In 1932, the plan, in its broad outlines had been achieved, and the Soviet 
Union had been transformed from a chiefly agricultural to a highly 
industrialised country... During the period of the Second Five Year Plan 
further advances were achieved in the industrialisation of the country, 
and at the stage when the third Five Year Plan is announced the Soviet 
Union can claim to be a country which to all intents and purposes is in 
the position to produce the raw materials it requires to arm itself and to 
provide its population with a bare minimum of the necessities of life. "" 
Seeds noted the existing weaknesses in, for example, Soviet industry. `It cannot 
be said', he wrote, `... that the mastery of the new industrial enterprises and new 
technique, which was to have been the main task of the Second Five Year Plan, 
was achieved. ' He went on to report that complaints by Soviet citizens 
overwhelmed the Soviet press, particularly about the conditions and equipment 
on the collective farms. ""' But, the ambassador admitted, the Soviet Union was 
no longer the economically backward country many in Britain still perceived it 
to be. Indeed, Moscow had achieved much of what it had set out to achieve. 
Seeds admitted that `the Soviet government have achieved their main object of 
incorporating practically the whole of the population of this country in 
socialised activities and creating the framework for a large-scale operation of 
industry and agriculture . 
""9 Whether `the Soviet economic apparatus could be 
greatly expanded to meet the demands which would be made upon it should the 
country be involved in war within the next few months... ' was difficult to 
conclude1" However, it was acknowledged that the Soviet Union possessed 
`essential raw materials. ""' Moreover, Seeds agreed with his officials about 
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shake this stability, but he informed London; `Despite its many glaring defects, 
the system is not likely to break down... "" 
Political stability and economic transformation were not enough to persuade 
Seeds to speak out in favour of Anglo-Soviet collaboration during his first 
months in Moscow. Why? He was not, he explained, as `incurably suspicious"' 
as some. Maclean, for example, believed that Moscow's `ultimate aim in no way 
corresponds to those pursued. .. by the Western 
democracies. 'u' Seeds on the 
other hand did not agree that Moscow was simply waiting for all capitalist 
countries to destroy each other so that it could emerge triumphant and expand 
across Europe. "' Yet, the ambassador did not completely trust Moscow either. 
He was still wary, and revealed his underlying distrust on several occasions. In 
March, for example, the ambassador warned Halifax against believing Moscow's 
rhetoric and promises: 
... while M. Stalin and various other speakers... emphasise 
Soviet 
readiness to defend the frontiers of the Soviet Union, should they be 
attacked, the line taken by all of them is that the chief care of those 
responsible for Soviet foreign policy must be to prevent the Soviet Union 
from being dragged into the struggle now in progress between the Fascist 
states and the so-called democracies... Those innocents at home who 
believe that Soviet Russia is only awaiting an invitation to join the 
Western democracies should be advised to ponder M. Stalin's advice to 
his party; "To be cautious and not allow Soviet Russia to be drawn into 
conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the 
chestnuts out of the fire"1126 
Initially, then, the ambassador did not appear to favour close cooperation with 
the Soviet government. However, by the end of March, Seeds had changed his 
mind. 
"22Seeds to Halifax. 21 Feb, 1939. doc. 25. Ibid. 
1123 Seeds to Halifax. 13 Apr, 1939. no. 52. D. B. F. P., 3, V. 
124 Memoranda A. The Political Stability of the Soviet Union' by Maclean. doc. 31. Inclosure in 
Seeds to Halifax. 6 Mar, 1939. doc. 30. D. F. A., 2, A. 
1125 Seeds to Halifax. 13 Apr, 1939. no. 52. D. B. F. P., 3, V. 
112' Seeds to Halifax. 24 Mar, 1939. doc. 40. D. F. A., 2, A. 
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The ambassador first indicated that he had changed his views regarding Anglo- 
Soviet collaboration in a memorandum he wrote upon the Polish and Rumanian 
opposition to Soviet involvement in a policy of collective security. Seeds wrote 
that he agreed 
... with the Russian ambassador in the hope that some means may be 
found by His Majesty's Government to prevail on Poland and Rumania to 
accept the idea of some form of Soviet military assistance. Such 
acceptance to be notified now and not put off until an outbreak of 
war... 1127 
Seeds urged for pressure to be applied upon the Poles and Rumanians to ensure 
Soviet involvement. He did not think that objections from the Poles and 
Rumanians should dictate the terms of an alliance between Britain and the 
Soviet Union. Hence, he did not agree with those who portrayed their 
opposition to Soviet inclusion as an impossible obstacle. Indeed, the 
ambassador even went so far as to suggest the French threaten its allies with 
desertion; `Could not the French Government... make it clear to Polish and 
Rumanian Governments that if those two countries want French assistance they 
must be prepared also to accept some form of help from France's ally? ""' In 
April, he criticised the decision to repeat the earlier proposal of a unilateral 
declaration. For the Soviet government, he explained, such a proposal only 
confirmed that London had no real intention of cooperating with the Soviet 
Union against aggression. "" 
Seeds still aired his personal grievances against the Soviet Union. His suspicion 
of Moscow's intentions, for example, had not disappeared. He admitted to `not 
being at all sure what these people are actually up to. ' He did not discount that 
the Soviet government might `go on "raising" us higher than we can possibly go 
1127 Seeds to Halifax. 13 Apr, 1939. no. 52. D. B. F. P., 3, V. 
128 Seeds to Halifax. 14 Apr, 1939. no. 161. Ibid. 
1129 Seeds to Halifax . 25 
Apr, 1939. no. 282. Ibid. 
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with a view to an eventual outburst of true Communist indignation at our 
ineffectiveness and hypocrisy, ending in Soviet isolation and safety behind our 
guarantees to Poland. "" Seeds also voiced his ideological hostility, complaining 
that the `Comintern has..., been calling upon the working classes in the 
democratic countries to stand together and to bring about the overthrow of the 
reactionary bourgeois Governments... " Furthermore, he remained the voice of 
caution upon the more positive reports by embassy officials regarding 
developments within the Soviet Union. "However, Seeds continued to support 
an Anglo-Soviet agreement1' , and 
by May, the ambassador stated clearly that 
the British government ought to propose a simple mutual alliance with the 
Soviet Union and France. The government, he advised, `should propose some 
formula which would provide. .. 
for two simultaneous agreements, one being a 
pact of mutual assistance and the second a `concrete agreement as to the form 
and extent of assistance. "" 
Molotov's insistence on the imposition of guarantees on the Baltic States, 
communicated to Seeds at the end of May, disturbed the ambassador. He, like 
many others within the British political elite, was at first opposed to the idea of 
allowing the Soviets to invade a country in time of war under the pretext of aid; 
I said bluntly that neither His Majesty's Government nor British public 
opinion were prepared to consider forcing guarantees of protection on 
independent nations which did not desire them; such unwanted 
guarantees were menaces, not assurances of protection; we had adhered 
to that principle from the outset, and any change in that attitude would 
be repugnant to the fundamental spirit of the British people. "' 
Though Seeds did not question `the military importance to Soviet Russia of 
"3° Seeds to Oliphant. 16 May, 1939. no. 533. Ibid. 
731 Seeds to Halifax. 13 June, 1939. doc. 81. D. F. A., 2, A. 
1132Seeds to Halifax. 30 May, 1939. doc. 65. Ibid. 
"33Seeds to Halifax. 6 Apr, 1939. no. 13. D. B. F. P., 3, V. 
134 Seeds to Halifax. 27 May, 1939. no. 648. Ibid. 
"32 Seeds to Halifax. 30 May, 1939. no. 670. D. B. F. P., 3, V. 
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these [Baltic] states which in war-time might be the object of a race with 
Germany', he did suspect a `less praiseworthy motive on their part. 11136 Yet, this 
recent proposal did not appear to have persuaded the ambassador against 
securing an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. Indeed, Seeds took pains to avoid a 
breakdown of negotiations during June and July, noting the importance of not 
provoking what he perceived to be Molotov's deep suspicion of the West. 1137 
Even Molotov s demand upon the inclusion of a Soviet definition of indirect 
aggression at the beginning of July did not cause Seeds to think twice about the 
desirability of an alliance with Moscow (as it did cause many to do in London). 
By the beginning of July, Seeds, like Halifax and others, expressed frustration at 
the failure to conclude negotiations despite what he believed to be Britain's 
repeated concessions. "' Ultimately, he agreed with London's refusal to accept a 
proposal that sanctioned interference in the internal affairs of another state. "" 
But, it is interesting that, unlike Chamberlain especially, he never once 
considered stopping talks and did not seem to adhere to the cabinet's 
preference to simply ensure the negotiations dragged on. Indeed, until the 
signing of the Nazi Soviet pact, documents reveal that Seeds at least genuinely 
worked to secure some form of Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. "" 
Evidently, Seeds had decided throughout the negotiations to put aside his 
hostility towards the Soviet government, and, to some extent, his suspicion. 
Why? Seeds primary concern was that the Soviet Union would revert to a policy 
of isolationism. Like many of the anti-appeasers, Seeds appreciated the 
Kremlin's suspicions of the West and its increasing resentment at what it 
1136 Seeds to Halifax. 24 June, 1939. no. 139. D. B. F. P., 3, VI. 
137 Seeds to Halifax. 17 June, 1939. no. 73; 20 June, 1939. no. 99; Ibid. no. 103; 27 July, 1939. 
no. 465. Ibid. 
138 Seeds to Halifax. 4 July, 1939. no. 225. Ibid. 
1139 Seeds to Halifax. 18 July, 1939. no. 338; 28 July, 1939. no. 473. Ibid. 
1140 Seeds to Halifax. 13 Aug, 1939. no. 647. Ibid. 
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perceived to be its unfair treatment during the negotiations. "" He repeatedly 
informed London of the suspicion evoked by its proposals1, " and alerted the 
Foreign Secretary to the danger of Moscow pulling out of negotiations. "` In 
May, for example, he warned against assuming Moscow's continued 
participation in the talks emphasising `... the cryptic remark made to me by M. 
Molotov on the 8th May,... to the effect that Soviet policy was liable to 
alteration... "'' During the same month, Seeds did reassure the Foreign 
Secretary that `there is no real evidence yet that the Soviet Government intend 
to retreat from the proposals made to His Majesty's Government and the 
French Government... ""' He wanted to persuade London of Moscow's sincerity 
in order to ensure a continuation of negotiations. At the same time, however, 
Seeds wanted to warn Halifax that the British government could not dictate 
terms and refuse to compromise without the risk of Moscow removing itself 
from negotiations altogether. 
A consequence of Soviet isolationism was the threat of a German - Soviet 
rapprochement. In January, Seeds had informed Whitehall about a possible 
German - Soviet trade agreement. The Soviets were to receive a credit of 
between two to three million marks, and in return, the Germans would procure 
principal war materials. "" In the same month, Vereker informed London of the 
comments of a German embassy official regarding the possible exchange of raw 
materials and arms between Germany and the Soviet Union. "" In February, 
Vereker suggested Stalin was moving closer towards the German dictator. He 
wrote to Collier at the Northern Department outlining an address recently given 
"" CAB 27/625.48 mtg. 19 May, 1939. 
142 Seeds to Halifax. 25 Apr, 11 May, 1939. nos. 282,481. D. B. F. P., 3, V. 
1143 Seeds to Halifax. 13 Apr, 1939. no. 52. Ibid. 
1144 Seeds to Halifax. 12 May, 1939. no. 509. Ibid. 
145 Seeds to Halifax. 9 May, 12 May, 1939. nos. 422,509. Ibid. 
146 Seeds. 27 Jan, 1939. Ibid. 
" Telegram from Vereker. FO 371 / 23686. Cited in Watt, 'An Intelligence Failure', p. 517. 
by the `official People's Commisariat for Foreign Affairs'; 
245 
He explained from Soviet point of view there was nothing to choose 
between the two blocs of powers, the fascist bloc on the one hand and the 
"so called democracies" on the other. Soviet Government, in course of 
their manoeuvres between them would not hesitate to incline towards 
the fascist bloc. ""' 
By April, Seeds felt obliged to inform London that a German - Soviet 
rapprochement was a real danger. `I am bound', he wrote 
... to point to a possible danger arising either now or in case of war at the 
stage where Germany had reached the Soviet frontier through Poland, 
namely an offer by Germany to the Soviet Union of Bessarabia and parts 
of Poland not to mention perhaps Estonia and Latvia. "' 
The Moscow embassy, then, were more than aware of the possible danger of 
improving German - Soviet relations, and they informed London of this. 
Whitehall was not only receiving information from Moscow, however. Indeed, 
rumours received by the Foreign Office in London increased significantly 
during 1939"'0, especially from May onwards. "' Early in May, for example, the 
Northern Department learnt that the German Generals had received a `new and 
unexpected offer' from the Soviet Union which might entirely change the 
situation. "" At the same time, rumours from British representatives in the 
Vatican, and from Coulondre (via Henderson), stating the imminence of an 
agreement between Stalin and Hitler were also received. "' Later in the month 
the Foreign Office was informed for the first time of articles being written by a 
I'll Vereker to Collier. 21 Feb, 1939- FO 371 /23677. 
1149 Seeds to Halifax. 13 Apr, 1939. no. 52. D. B. F. P., 3, V. 
150 Minute by Collier. 24 Jan, 1939. FO 371/23687. 
15' Donald Cameron Watt has identified seventeen known warnings, but has pointed out that 
evidence suggests there may have been more. See, Watt, 'An Intelligence Failure', p. 513. 
1152 Minute by Strang. 6 May. 1939. FO 371/22972; Henderson to Halifax. 5 May, 8 May, 1939. 
nos. 377,413. D. B. F. P., 3, V. Cited in Aster, World War, p. 171. 
1153 Telegram from Osborne. 6 May, 1939; Henderson to FO. 8 May, 1939. FO 371 / 22972. 
Cited in Watt, 'An Intelligence Failure', p. 519. 
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Soviet defector in the U. S called Samuel Ginsberg (alias Walter Krivitsky). 15' A 
memorandum from the Washington Chancery read: 
Reports that a certain General W. G. Krivitsky, described as a former 
general in the Red Army, erstwhile chief of military intelligence for 
Western Europe has lately arrived in the United States of America. He 
has been contributing series of articles to Saturday Evening Post and 
giving interviews to press purporting to give inside story of events in the 
Soviet Union. His reoccurring theme is that M. Stalin has long been 
working towards an understanding with Berlin. "' 
During the month of June, further rumours were received citing German efforts 
in particular to secure an agreement with the Soviets. 1'5' The text of an article 
written by Senor Gimenez Arnau, Rome correspondent of the semi-official 
Spanish News Agency "Efe" , for example, suggested `possible diplomatic 
negotiations between Russia and Germany. ""' Rumours lessened during the 
month of July, but the Washington Chancery did transmit four more articles 
written by Krivitsky and published in the Saturday Evening Post. "" Following 
this, the Foreign Office apparently heard nothing until the Central Department 
received news on 22 August of the Schulenberg - Molotov meeting that had 
occurred on 15 August. "" 
During the spring and summer of 1939, then, the possibility of a German - 
Soviet rapprochement could not be ignored. Despite claims of ignorance by 
Sargent and others after the announcement of the German - Soviet non 
aggression pact16° , minutes 
between January and July show that officials 
1154 See Christopher Andrews for more information about Krivitsky and rumours of the German- 
Soviet rapprochement in general. Andrews, Secret Service, pp. 423-427. 
1155 Washington Chancery to Northern Department. 16 May, 1939. FO 371 /23 6 97. 
1156 Makins minute. 12 June, 1939. no. 36; Mack to FO. 9 June, 1939. no. 11; Ridsdale 
memorandum. 16 June, 1939. Appendix 1, no. iii. D. B. F. P., 3, VI. Cited in Watt, An Intelligence 
Failure', pp. 520 - 521. 
1157 Sir M. Peterson (San Sebastian)23 June, 1939. FO 371/23686. 
1158 Washington Chancery to Northern Department. 14 July, 1939. Ibid. 
1159 Steinhardt to State Department. 16 Aug, 1939. F. A. U. S. , Vol. 1, pp. 334-335; 
Lindsay to 
Foreign Office. no. 41. D. B. F. P., 3, VII. Cited in Watt, `An Intelligence Failure', p. 524. 
1180 Minute by Sargent. 3 Sept, 1939. FO 371 / 23686. Cited in Aster, World War, pp. 317-318. 
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received, considered and judged information from various sources about a 
possible German - Soviet agreement. As a result of this information several 
officials did in fact become unnerved during the year. However, despite these 
reports, few of the officials in Whitehall were ever convinced of the danger of a 
rapprochement. There was simply not enough evidence during the year to 
convince officials who were already deeply skeptical of the likelihood of a 
rapprochement. "b' As early as 1935, Y for example, Orme Sargent had convinced 
himself that such an occurrence would remain impossible because of the 
conflicting ideologies of the two countries. "" In 1939, several officials within the 
Northern Department agreed. Either the sources of these rumours, such as 
Krivitsky, were thought to be unreliable, 1163 or, officials suspected that such 
rumours were deliberately circulated by Berlin or Moscow in order to pressurise 
Britain into coming to an agreement with them. 
Frank Roberts, an official in the Central Department, for example, dismissed 
rumours of a rapprochement as merely efforts on the part of both Berlin and 
Moscow to scare the British government. `It is of course', he minuted, `plainly in 
the German interest to put such confident stories about, just as it is in the 
Russian interest to frighten us with the bogy of an agreement with Germany. "" 
A. S. Halford agreed. "" Similarly, D. W. Lascelles, minuted in January that he 
thought the possibility of Stalin `toying' with the idea of `buying off without a 
fight' was `very improbable. ""' He did not fret about reports of the possible new 
trade agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union either. "" In February, 
1161 Memorandum by Sargent on Russia's probable attitude towards a "General settlement" with 
Germany, and the proposed Air Agreement. 7 Feb, 1935. no. 428. D. B. F. P., 2, XII. Cited in, 
Manne, ' Anglo - Soviet rapprochement', p. 738. 1162 Ibid. 
"'Andrews, Secret Service, p. 423 
"6' Minute by Roberts. 10 June, 1939. FO 371/23067. 
1165 Minute by Halford. 24 Jan, 1939. FO 371 / 23686. 
"66 Minute by Lascelles. 3 Jan, 1939. FO 371/23677. 
1117 Minute by Lascelles. 27 Jan, 1939. FO 371/23687. 
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Lascelles admitted that ' the Soviet "party line" is tending away from the 
democracies and towards the dictatorships. ' He continued; `The absence of the 
usual anti-Soviet tirade from Herr Hitler's last speech seems to indicate that the 
Germans. .. are aware of this new tendency and are playing up to it. ' Yet, he 
dismissed such behaviour as a `Soviet attempt to frighten us [the British 
government]. ""' By May, Lascelles felt reassured that a German-Soviet 
rapprochement would not occur. "' No evidence existed to convince the First 
Secretary that rumours of Berlin and Moscow moving towards one another were 
'well-founded. "" 
Lascelles became unnerved once more between June and July. He accepted, for 
example, that the Germans were `making a special effort to come to an 
understanding with Moscow', and although he pointed out that there was no 
evidence to suggest Moscow would respond to German feelers, Lascelles could 
not deny his fear that Molotov's recent hostility towards London might be 
`symptomatic. ""' By the end of July, however, Lascelles again dismissed what he 
believed to be only unsubstantiated rumours. He criticised Krivitsky in 
particular, noting that the Soviet defector's articles `contain nothing at all 
convincing in support of their author's main thesis, viz. that Stalin has for years 
past been a persistent - though constantly rebuffed - suitor of Germany. ' 
Lascelles continued: 
The thesis may well be true to this extent, that Stalin, who is a dictator 
first and a communist second, has little personal animosity against the 
very similar Nazi dictatorship, is a remarkably cautious schemer who 
never burns his boats if he can avoid it, and would probably welcome an 
understanding with Hitler if he thought it would really work - if he 
thought it would safeguard the Soviet Union from attack for a reasonably 
11'8Minute by Lascelles. 21 Feb, 1939. FO 371/23677. 
1169 Minute by Lascelles. 10 May, 1939. Ibid. 
1170 Minute by Lascelles. 11 May, 1939. FO 371/23686. 
1111 Sir M. Peterson (San Sebastian). 23 June, 1939. Ibid. 
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long period. But there's nothing here to show that he really does think 
that: he is repeatedly described, indeed, as hankering after an agreement 
and as confident of achieving one, but the "evidence" is all indirect and 
second hand. On this subject, M. Krivitski appears to have a genuine 
bee in his bonnet. " 
Lascelles ultimately dismissed the possibility of a rapprochement between 
Berlin and Moscow. But he had revealed some hesitation in doing so. Gladwyn 
Jebbl13 , though also not convinced of a rapprochement, was even more unsure 
about dismissing the possibility altogether. At the beginning of January, for 
example, Jebb, referring to rumours of trade conversations between Moscow 
and Berlin, warned that `the Soviet government would hardly be likely to enter 
into these without some political assurance, which the Germans are presumably 
prepared to give. "" By the end of the month, Jebb's suspicion of political 
relations between Germany and the Soviet Union had lessened, if only because 
the trade negotiations themselves had broken down. "75 However, by March, 
Jebb could not dismiss the possibility of a political agreement between the two 
dictatorships if they saw `the chance of concluding a deal profitable to both. "'76 
Assessing the situation objectively, Jebb realised that it was unlikely either 
Berlin or Moscow would refuse a deal advantageous to their future plans. 
Unfortunately, because there existed no reliable evidence to support the 
official's suspicion, he continued to have doubts about the likelihood of a 
rapprochement. By July, for example, Jebb once more denied the likelihood of a 
German - Soviet rapprochement, this time because of the unreliability of 
Krivitsky's articles. Referring to four articles by Krivitsky transmitted by the 
Washington Chancery at the end of July, Jebb minuted: 
1172 Minute by Lascelles. 14 July, 1939. Ibid. 
11" Jebb was also responsible for liaison with intelligence services. See Aster World War, p. 23. 
1174 Minute by Jebb. 23 Jan, 1939. FO 371 / 23686. 
1175 Minute by Jebb. 26 Jan, 1939. Ibid. 
1176 Minute by Jebb. 19 Mar, 1939. FO 371/23687. 
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These articles obviously contain a few grains of truth, with the result that 
they are very plausible. The writer - as far as I can ascertain - has made 
no mistake of detail, but seems to have drawn all the wrong conclusions. 
For instance, after citing M. Stalin's anti-German moves, he maintains 
that these moves only prove with what ardour the Kremlin is wooing 
the Wilhelmstrasse. Of course one can conduct an expedition to the 
South Pole via the North Pole, but it is not the usual way to go about 
things (even in Russia! )"" 
Laurence Collier held similar opinions about the possibility of a German - 
Soviet rapprochement. Like Jebb, he did not think that sufficient evidence 
existed to prove its likelihood1 ", but on the other hand, could not dismiss the 
possibility completely. At the beginning of January Collier had dismissed 
rumours of German - Soviet military contacts. "' But by February, Collier 
minuted in response to the trade negotiations between Berlin and Moscow that 
`any agreement involving the delivery of German war material to the Soviet 
government must imply a political detente, if not a rapprochement. ""' Collier 
experienced only momentary anxiety however. In response to Hitler's calling off 
the negotiations, he noted that `presumably the political implications of the 
move caused Hitler to change his mind at the last moment (He is not so likely to 
have changed it for purely commercial reasons). fii.. By May, Collier reiterated 
his disbelief in the likelihood of a German-Soviet rapprochement. In a letter to 
the Washington Chancery regarding articles written by Krivitsky he wrote, 
On the whole we do not consider that these would-be hair-raising 
revelations of Stalin's alleged desire for a rapprochement with Germany 
etc, are worth taking seriously; and we shall not ask for more of them 
unless you particularly wish us to do so... ".. 
1177 Minute by Jebb. 14 July, 1939. FO 371123697. 
117e Minute by Collier. 14 Jan, 1939. FO 371 / 23686. 
1179 Collier to Brownjohn. 2 Jan, 1939. FO 371 / 22299. Cited in Watt, 'An Intelligence Failure', 
p. 517. 
h1 Minute by Collier. 27 Jan, 1939. FO 371 / 23687. 
18' Ibid. Collier's brackets. 
1162 Letter to Chancery from Collier. 31 May, 1939. FO 371 / 23697. 
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Yet, at the end of July, Collier, once more, revealed that he was not completely 
dismissive of the possibility of improved relations between Germany and the 
Soviet Union. The `utmost' he thought possible `in the way of a Soviet German 
rapprochement' was `a commercial agreement, plus a understanding to leave 
each other alone for the time being, since no amount of protestation on Hitler's 
part could convince Stalin that the Ukrainian ambitions addressed in Mein 
Kampf were really buried... ' But, Collier concluded, such an agreement 'would 
be serious enough from our point of view. 7i83 
Several members of the Foreign Office, then, though not convinced, had not 
completely dismissed the possibility of a rapprochement as confidently as 
others. Two who could not dismiss the possibility at all, and in fact warned 
others of the likelihood of such a rapprochement were William Strang and 
Robert Vansittart. William Strang, chosen by Chamberlain in June to go to 
Moscow to assist Seeds who was unwell, became increasingly suspicious of a 
German - Soviet rapprochement during the later weeks of the negotiations. In a 
letter to Sargent in July, he wrote; `Our need for an agreement is more 
immediate than theirs.. . The Russians 
have at least two alternative policies, 
namely, the policy of isolation, and the policy of accommodation with 
Germany. ' "" After the war, Strang admitted; `It was always present to our 
minds that the Russians might, as an alternative, come to an understanding 
with the Germans. ""' 
Such a threat had existed in Vansittart's mind since 1934""86 His concerns had 
been heightened during the Sudetenland crisis"" , and 
in 1939 his fears 
183 Minute by Collier. 10 July, 1939. Ibid. 
184 Strang, Home and Abroad, p. 196. 
1185 Ibid. 
1186 Minute by Vansittart. 5 July, 1939. Cited in Manne, `Anglo-Soviet rapprochement', p. 729. 
""See Chapter 3. 
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increased further. In May, for example, he wrote to Halifax; 
I am beginning to get very uneasy about the delay in coming to an 
understanding with Russia. If Russia goes into isolation, this will mean a 
period of the sulks, which may very well be succeeded, and indeed 
probably will be succeeded, by closer relations with Germany. That I 
regard as absolutely fatal. "" 
Vansittart's suspicions were evoked further during 1939 by the information he 
continued to receive from his sources abroad. Throughout the 193os he had 
gained greater experience than anyone outside of the SIS (Secret Service) and 
the GC and CS (Government Code and Cypher School for code breaking). "" A 
number of politicians and officials had private contacts with other countries, 
but Vansittart had almost his own intelligence service. In particular, he received 
much of his information from a former British air attache in Berlin, Group 
Captain Malcolm Christie. "9° Throughout 1939, but especially from May 
onwards, Vansittart received information about German - Soviet relations and 
relayed it to both Halifax and Cadogan. At the end of May, for example, he 
informed Cadogan that the Germans and Soviets were in contact. "9' On 16 
June, Vansittart informed Halifax that the German military `are delighted to 
have got Hitler on the path to an arrangement with Soviet Russia... ' The 
German dictator allegedly planned `to connive with Russia and build up a big 
bloc of friendly or vassal states... around the Reich. "X92 At the same time, 
Vansittart heard from Theo Kordt that there was `reliable information that 
Hitler has already taken steps to open talks with the Soviet Union. "193 
Thereafter, Christie continued, from mid-June onwards, to send Vansittart at 
188 In his minutes Vansittart noted that there was a real danger that the Soviet Union would 
relapse `into isolation' from which it would emerge by establishing 'closer relations with 
Germany. ' See, minute by Vansittart. 4 May, 1939 VNST 2/43. Cited in Colvin, Vansittart, p. 
321. 
189 Ferris, Vansittart', p. 125. 
"90 Ibid, pp. 141-2; Watt, `An Intelligence Failure', p. 516. 
19' Dilks, Cadogan Diaries, p. 182.21 May, 1939; Aster, World War, pp. 183-4. 
192 Minute by Vansittart. 16 June, 1939. FO 371/23009. Cited in Aster, World War, p. 274. 
Colvin, Vansittart, p. 324. 
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least weekly intelligence reports on German preparations for an alliance with 
the Soviet Union. "" 
Admittedly Vansittart's intelligence reports were, at times, inaccurate. "" The 
alleged `Sirovy mission' was one example: on 17 May, Vansittart sent Halifax a 
warning from Christie that Hitler had been negotiating with Stalin through the 
Czech General Sirovy. Though the `Sirovy mission' was also mentioned in a 
letter from Nevile Henderson , Christie's report was at 
least exaggerated, and 
was dismissed by J. M. Troutbeck , 
formerly British representative in Prague, 
as `pure myth .,, 
116 Nevertheless, Vansittart's reports may help to explain why, in 
contrast to the rejection of rumours regarding a possible German - Soviet 
rapprochement by officials in the Northern Department, members of the 
Cabinet and Foreign Policy Committee, including Cadogan and Halifax, 
gradually accepted the danger of an agreement between Berlin and Moscow. 
Certainly evidence has shown that Vansittart used information he received from 
intelligence sources to regain his influence in Whitehall following his removal 
from the post of Permanent Under Secretary in December 1937. He succeeded. 
In particular, John Ferris has revealed that, regarding perceptions of the threat 
posed by Germany, Vansittart's use of intelligence enabled him to influence the 
minds of Halifax and Cadogan. 1X97 One suggestion is that, despite its 
inaccuracies, the repeated warnings from Vansittart to Halifax and Cadogan 
had, at least some influence upon their belief in the danger of a rapprochement 
between Hitler and Stalin. (In addition to Vansittart's intelligence warnings, it 
"9' Rose, Vansittart, pp. 236-7; Aster, World War, p. 275. Cited in Andrews, Secret Service, p. 
424. 
"95 Ferris, `Vansittart', p. 168. 
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War, pp. 181-4; Andrews, Secret Service, p. 424; See also, Donald Cameron Watt, `British 
Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe', in E. R. May, ed., Knowing 
One's Enemies, (Princeton, 1986). 
1197 Ferris, Vansittart', pp. 130 - 131; p. 154; p. 160; pp. 162-5; p. 168. 
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is also worth pointing out that Cadogan, as Permanent Under Secretary, 
received intelligence from other sources, some unidentified, and passed on 
these warnings to Halifax. )"9$ 
What influence did a suspicion in the possibility of a German - Soviet 
rapprochement have upon attitudes towards the Anglo-French-Soviet 
negotiations during 1939? Looking at the minutes available one can identify a 
fairly strong connection between a belief in the possibility of a rapprochement, 
and a willingness to agree to collaboration with the Soviets. "99 But the threat of a 
German - Soviet rapprochement was not a direct nor the only influence upon 
attitudes towards Anglo-Soviet collaboration. It is the contention of this thesis 
that it was such suspicion of a German - Soviet rapprochement, amongst other 
factors, that influenced the extent to which individuals put aside their more 
negative views of the Soviet Union, and accepted Britain's need of Soviet 
assistance. 
Officials continued to harbour their own anti - Soviet prejudices. Ideological 
suspicion and distrust of Soviet intentions continued to be voiced throughout 
1939. Lascelles, for example, spoke of `Soviet hostility towards the greatest of 
the capitalist and imperialist powers7"O° , and the threat of 
`Communist 
propaganda . 
'1`°' He also minuted upon what he believed to be `the completely 
unreliable character of the Soviet government7"O2 , as a government that would 
act entirely in its own interests, and therefore try to avoid war. 1203 Oliphant 
similarly warned against trusting the Soviet government to act. The Soviets, he 
wrote `are, I fear, entirely opportunist and could not be relied upon. They might 
798 Watt, `An intelligence Failure', p. 518. 
199 Aster, World War, p. 181. 
1200 Telegram by Seeds. 28 Mar, 1939. FO 371123677, 
1201 Mr Rokeling to Sir S. Gaselee. 18 July, 1939. FO 371/2367& 
1202 Minute by Lascelles. Cited in Newman, March 1939, p. 142. 
1203 Minute by Lascelles. 25 July, 1939. FO 371 / 23682. 
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even "remember" their being "cold-shouldered" last time and for this reason be 
inclined to let us down. f1204 F. A. L. Warmin, a junior official in the Northern 
Department, adequately summarised the beliefs of many of his colleagues when 
he wrote; `Russia is no friend of ours... "" 
Whether officials allowed such feelings to dictate attitudes towards 
collaboration, however, was greatly influenced by a belief, or not, in the 
possibility of a German - Soviet rapprochement. Thus, for example, Lascelles, 
who was not convinced by rumours of a German - Soviet rapprochement, 
remained opposed to any efforts to improve Anglo-Soviet relations. In response 
to a suggestion at the beginning of the year that a `new ambassador be 
dispatched to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to have a very straight talk 
with Stalin7zo6 , in the 
hope of improving relations between London and Berlin, 
Lascelles minuted; `Much as we need fresh ideas for coping with the German 
menace, I cannot help thinking that this particular scheme is fore-doomed to 
failure. ' He continued; `Essentially, these relations are based on a mutual and 
inevitable antipathy and on the realisation that the other party, in attempting to 
cope with the German menace, will act emphatically and solely with an eye on 
its 
own 
interests. ' 1207 
Oliphant similarly minuted, `To make any advances of a political nature to the 
Soviet would in my opinion be useless... "2°8 Regarding such a political advance 
to Moscow, Ashton- Gwatkin agreed. '`°9 So to did Orme Sargent. Sargent, who 
1204 Minute by Oliphant. 21 Feb, 1939. FO 371 / 23697. 
1205 Minute by Warmin. 3 Jan, 1939. FO 371/23677. 
1206 Minute by Caccia. 3 Jan, 1939. Ibid. 
1207 Minute by Lascelles. 3 Jan, 1939. Ibid. 
1208 Minute by Oliphant. 21 Feb, 1939. FO 371/23697. 
1209 Minute by Gwatkin. 21 Feb, 1939. Ibid. 
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had voiced his own ideological suspicion of the Soviets throughout the 193os12'. , 
but doubted the evidence of a German - Soviet rapprochement, unsurprisingly 
favoured the government's decision to prioritise Poland above the Soviet Union 
in March. "" Thereafter he thought London should seek nothing more than 
economic assistance from the Soviets in the event of war, "' and towards the end 
of negotiations, joined others and voiced his opposition to the Soviet proposal of 
indirect aggression. 113 
A. S. Halford recorded his opposition to military collaboration with the Soviets. 
`To risk arousing a large section of public opinion (not only in this country and 
Europe, generally, but in the Dominions also) by... an... attempt to secure Soviet 
military collaboration-would' he minuted in April, `seem both dangerous and 
illogical now that the Polish guarantee has become a fact. "" Furthermore, he 
held a pessimistic view of the success of any political negotiations. In July, 
Oliphant received an article written by M. Alexandre Kazem Beg (a Russian 
Caucasian and the leader of the Young - Russian Party abroad) which discussed 
the mentality of the Soviet leaders with particular reference to their attitude 
towards Anglo-Soviet negotiations. Halford minuted in response: 
This interesting document rehearses several well known facts (Soviet 
"provincialism" symbolised by the transfer of the seat of government 
from St Petersburg to Moscow, suspicion of contractual agreements, the 
Asiatic tendency towards bargaining etc) but does not indicate how we 
can quickly overcome the obstacles in the way of an Anglo-Soviet 
agreement. The appeal for greater understanding of the Soviet 
psychology looks well on paper, but is ideally not constructive in fact. 
1210 Minute by Sargent. 17 June, 1936. Cited in Douglas Little, `Red Scare, 1936: Anti- 
Bolshevism and the Origins of British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War', Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. XXIII, (1988). p. 297; Minute by Sargent. 8 Jan, 1938. no. 34. 
D. B. F. P, 3, XVIII. 
1211 Minute by Sargent. 20 Mar, 1939. FO 371/23061. 
1212 I bid. 
1213 Corbin to Bonnet. 4 July, 1939. no. 89. D. D. F., 2, XVII. Cited in Watt, How War Came, p. 
378. 
1214 Minute by Halford. 4 Apr, 1939. FO 371/23677. 
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The very "provincialism" of the Kremlin Govt... precludes any possibility 
of our understanding the Russian point of view, since the constructive 
understanding must be mutual and by the same token, the Russians are 
in no circumstances prepared to understand our point of view or even to 
concede that we have one. From the very beginning, the Soviet 
negotiations have not only stood out for the "maximum demand" but 
have increased it - there has been no Asiatic bargaining here. And, given 
the undoubted suspicion which M. Stalin and co. entertain of contractual 
agreements the position seems pretty hopeless. "' 
Accepting the possibility of a German - Soviet rapprochement slightly more 
than others meant that Laurence Collier, in contrast, appreciated the disastrous 
consequences for Britain and the West if Soviet cooperation was lost. How did 
this influence Collier's attitude towards Anglo-Soviet collaboration? "' Though 
Collier did not state specifically his support for the acceptance of Soviet 
proposals during 1939, he did urge the British government to collaborate with 
Moscow. Collier repeatedly stated his belief that the Soviet Union ought not to 
be deliberately excluded by the British government as, he acknowledged, it had 
been during the Czechoslovakian crisis in 1938.1`17 In January, Collier supported 
any attempt to `clarify and improve Anglo-Soviet relations. ' He noted: 
... the policy of 
keeping the Russians at arms length, which we pursued 
during the Czechoslovak crisis (and which, according to some neutral 
diplomats..., we are still pursuing on the Spanish non-intervention 
committee,... ) has been a mistake in so far as it has gratuitously 
advertised to Hitler and Mussolini and the Japanese that they can deal 
with each of us in isolation... 12'a 
Collier went on to suggest `giving Stalin at least a negative assurance that we 
1215 Minute by Halford. 25 July, 1939. FO 371 /23697. 
1216 This was not the only influence upon Collier's attitude towards collaboration with the Soviets. 
He maintained his view that Fascism, not Communism, posed Britain's greatest danger during 
1939, and this was an important influence on his decision to overlook his more negative views 
of the Soviet Union. See, minute by Collier. 25 Jan, 1939. Ibid. 
12" Indeed, Collier noted in a separate minute that Britain's political record with Russia was 
'notoriously unsatisfactory'. See, minute by Collier. 9 Mar, 1939. FO 371/23677. 
1218 Minute by Collier. 3 Jan, 1939. Ibid. 
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will do nothing directly or indirectly to assist Hitler's eastern plans... ' Seeds, 
Collier proposed, could seek an interview with Stalin on the matter and state 
that the British government would 
give ... a solemn assurance that we will 
lend no assistance to German, 
Italian, or Japanese schemes against you - indeed, you may be sure that 
in our own interests we shall do what we can to check them, though as 
you know already, we cannot give you a guarantee of armed assistance in 
hypothetical circumstances any more than you can give one to us. '`'9 
Collier thought this would `be likely to have some small effect at least on the 
Germans', and a declaration, he noted, `might even help to some small extent to 
'1 stiffen their [the Soviet government' s] attitude towards the Japanese,... 220 
In March, Collier repeated his conviction that the Soviet government ought to 
be involved in negotiations over future resistance of aggression. At a time when 
the British government was deliberating the nature of future Anglo-Soviet 
relations, the Head of the Northern Department minuted: 
We may have our doubts as to the possible value of Soviet help in our 
present troubles, but so long as H. M Government hold the view, which I 
understand them to do now, that it is to our advantage to retain at the 
very least the benevolent neutrality of the Soviet government, we ought 
not, I submit, to blow hot and cold on this question of political 
consultation with them... " 
Nor did he believe that the government's changed strategy regarding the 
resistance to future aggression was a justifiable excuse to exclude the Soviet 
Union. `The fact that we are now proceeding on another track than that which 
we originally adopted in the matter of organising resistance to German 
aggression', he wrote, `does not alter the other fact that Soviet goodwill is of 
advantage to us... ""' Indeed, Collier's notes revealed his aggravation at the 
1219 Ibid. 
1220 Ibid 
1221 Minute by Collier. 28 Mar, 1939. FO 371 / 23681. 
1222 Ibid. 
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complaints of the Polish and Rumanian governments regarding Anglo-Soviet 
relations. He noted that `in this particular case it was known to everyone, 
including the Poles, Finns and Rumanians, that consultation had taken 
place... "' 
As well as supporting some form of collaboration between Moscow and London 
regarding the resistance to German aggression, Collier also suggested a mutual 
agreement with the Soviet government regarding resistance of aggression in the 
Far East. the Far East situation is about to become critical (as recent 
telegrams from Tokyo and and Shanghai seem to indicate)', he noted, `I think 
there is something to be said for considering an approach to the Soviet 
Government with a view to coordinating a policy of resistance to Japanese 
aggression. "" R. S. Howe, a junior official in the Northern Department, agreed 
that `the time is coming when we should consider the question of an approach 
to the Soviet Government with a view to coordinating a policy of resistance to 
Japanese aggression. "" He did note, however, `... the obvious danger... that an 
Anglo-Soviet rapprochement would drive Japan more completely into the arms 
of the "Axis" powers. "" Collier also added that such an approach should only be 
considered `on the assumption that we ourselves are prepared to take up a firm 
attitude towards Japan in any case and give evidence of this before we say 
anything at Moscow. ' The Head of the Northern Department acknowledged and 
understood Moscow's doubts about Britain's sincerity. `At present', he admitted, 
`there is nothing to prove to the Soviet government - or, indeed, to the world at 
large - that we will not when it comes to the point, be as complaisant to the 
Japanese as we have been to Hitler and Mussolini... "" 
1223 Ibid. 
1224 Minute by Collier. 21 Feb, 1939. FO 371 / 23697. 
1225 Minute by R. S. Howe. Ibid. 
1226 Ibid. 
1227 Minute by Collier. Ibid. 
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William Strang who increasingly became convinced that an agreement with 
Berlin was a genuine alternative for the Soviets equally appeared to support 
some form of Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration. In 1938, Strang had opposed 
the complete exclusion of the Soviet Union, but he had never spoken out in 
favour of an alliance. At the beginning of 1939, Strang expressed his personal 
hostility towards, and distrust of, the Soviet government: `The Soviet 
government', he wrote, `have attacked H. M. G. in the past for their failure to take 
up a definite attitude towards German aggression. Now that H. M. G. have done 
so, the Soviet government sit back and wash their hands of the whole affair. "" 
Indeed, his views were not dissimilar to those of Chamberlain. On 3 April, for 
example, Strang wrote of Moscow; `It would not be at all contrary to their 
desires to see Great Britain and France at grips with Germany and in process of 
destroying each other. "' When in Moscow during the later months of the 
negotiations, however, Strang reported favourably with regard to an alliance. 
The Soviet government, he thought, was `themselves anxious to reach an 
agreement. ' He elaborated: 
they [the Soviet government] would hardly have entered upon these 
negotiations at all unless they thought that a Three Power Agreement 
was to their advantage... These negotiations are as much an adventure 
for them as they are for us. If we do not trust them, they equally do not 
trust us. They are not, fundamentally, a friendly power; but they, like us, 
are driven to this course by force of necessity. " 
By July, in contrast to Chamberlain's desire to see an end to the negotiations, 
Strang advised on how to secure their successful conclusion. He urged 
appreciation of Soviet suspicions and favoured the sending of senior officials to 
lead the military mission to Moscow. " 
1228 Minutes by Strang 3, Apr, 1939. FO 371 /23016. Cited in Aster, World War, p. 158. 
1229 Ibid. 
1230 Strang, Home and Abroad, p. 182. 
1231 Strang to Sargent. 20 July, 1939. no. 376. D. B. F. P., 3, VI. 
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The most consistent supporter of closer Anglo-Soviet relations, however, was 
also the official who had remained convinced of the threat of a German - Soviet 
rapprochement the longest, namely, Robert Vansittart. At the beginning of the 
year a number of officials had minuted in response to the suggestion of sending 
a'new ambassador' to Moscow to talk to Stalin in the hope of improving Anglo- 
Soviet relations. "' Most had opposed the suggestion. Collier suggested Seeds 
arrange an interview with Stalin. Vansittart, in contrast, called for a Cabinet 
minister to go to Moscow as a gesture of British sincerity. `... What the Russians 
need is a gesture. Let us provide that gesture by sending a Cabinet minister to 
Russia. ""' The Anglo-Soviet trade agreement would provide the perfect `cover' 
for initiating such a meeting with the Soviet dictator, Vansittart noted. l`3" By 
May, Vansittart had become increasingly concerned by the slow progress of the 
negotiations. He wrote numerous minutes to the Foreign Secretary impressing 
upon him that all considerations were irrelevant besides the need for an alliance 
with the Soviet government. "35 His concern had been particularly heightened by 
what appeared to be a proposal by Pope Pius XII to convene another 
conference at the end of April to which several governments were invited to 
discuss the prevention of war. The Soviet government was not invited . 
12,36 
Vansittart believed the British government was capable of concluding another 
Munich, once more excluding Moscow. Oliver Harvey noted in his diary that 
Vansittart was `full of mistrust and wants to insist on Russia being invited. "' 
Vansittart was alarmed at the prospect of further Soviet exclusion. He openly 
criticised what he thought had been Britain's unjustified treatment of Moscow 
1232 See, p. 255. 
1233 Minute by Vansittart. 3 Jan, 1939. FO 371/23677-1 Hugh Dalton also commented that 
Vansittart thought the political implications of Hudson's visit far more important than the issue of 
trade. See, Diary entry. 28 Mar, 1939.1/20/20. Dalton Papers. 
1234 Ibid. 
1235 Minute by Vansittart. 16 May, 1939. FO 371/20366; Minute by Vansittart VNST 3/2; Crozier 
interview with Vansittart. 13 Apr, 1939. Crozier Papers C/5. Cited in Aster, World War, p. 178. 
1236 Cornwell, Hitler's Pope, p. 224; Dilks, Cadogan Diaries, pp. 178-9.5 May, 1939. 
'23' Harvey, Diplomatic Diaries, p. 288.4 May, 1939. 
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throughout 1938'38 , and was, therefore, willing to make every effort to ensure 
Soviet inclusion. On 17 May, for example, Vansittart agreed to Halifax's 
suggestion that he use his close relations with Maisky' 9 to try and secure the 
acceptance of Britain's latest proposal. Unfortunately, though Vansittart was 
able to offer staff conversations as an incentive, the basic proposal remained the 
same, namely a Soviet declaration of aid in the event of war. ''{° Even Vansittart's 
close relations with the Soviet ambassador could not persuade the Kremlin to 
endanger its own country with no offer of support. 
There were other factors that influenced Vansittart and other officials to 
overlook the anti-Soviet prejudices each held. Most of the officials that 
supported closer relations during 1939, had also favoured relations with 
Moscow during 1938, and the reasons remained the same. Laurence Collier, for 
example, maintained his belief that fascism, not communism, posed the 
greatest danger for Britain. "' Vansittart continued to emphasise Soviet military 
potential and Britain's need of such an ally in the event of war. 1 2 Indeed, 
Strang, and Warmin, noted their appreciation of the Soviet Union's military 
value as an ally. 113 Nevertheless, one cannot deny that during 1939 a strong 
connection existed between suspicion of a German - Soviet rapprochement and 
an ability to overlook anti-Soviet prejudices enough to influence attitudes 
towards collaborating with Moscow. For this reason it is unfortunate that more 
officials could not be persuaded of its likelihood. 
After the announcement of the German - Soviet non aggression pact at the end 
of August, Foreign Office officials blamed the intelligence services for not 
1238 Minute by Vansittart. 3 Jan, 1939. FO 371/23677. 
1239 Colvin, Vansittart, p. 33; Dilks, Cadogan Diaries, pp. 181-2.19 May, 1939. 
1240 Aster, World War, pp. 178-9. 
1241 Minute by Collier. 25 Jan, 1939. FO 371/23697. 
1242 Minute by Vansittart. 9 Mar, 1939. FO 371/23677. 
1243 Minute by F. A. L. Warmin. 3 Jan, 1939. Ibid. 
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providing sufficient information warning of a rapprochement. `The fact 
remains', wrote Orme Sargent, `that we were never told that the Germans and 
Russians had started negotiations with one another - which was the only thing 
that mattered. '1 Although information had at times been `notoriously difficult' 
to obtain and had been `contradictory or had `come from persons of 
questionable reliability""' , the sheer amount of rumours received hinting at 
some form of German - Soviet rapprochement would have suggested to any 
objective observer that something was occurring. ''' But too many made the 
erroneous assumption, like Chamberlain, that Hitler would allow his own 
ideological hostility towards the Soviet Union to dictate his foreign policy. 
Not everyone dismissed the rumours and possibility of a German - Soviet 
rapprochement altogether, and some were convinced of its likelihood. This had 
a prominent influence on their attitudes towards Anglo-French-Soviet 
collaboration. It was not the only influence. Soviet military and strategic 
potential, for example, continued to be raised by officials such as Vansittart. The 
ambassador, William Seeds, spoke more of the threat of Soviet isolationism 
than a rapprochement. What he, Vansittart, Strang and others did share, 
however, was an appreciation of Britain's need to secure a Soviet ally as soon as 
possible, and a willingness to allow this to overshadow any negative, 
prejudicial, views of the Soviet Union. 
1244 Andrews, Secret Service, p. 426; Minute by Sargent. 3 Sept, 1939. FO 371/23686. Cited in 
Aster, World War, pp. 317-18. 
1245 Ibid, pp. 425-6; Memorandum by Collier. 26 Aug, 1939. FO 371/23686. Cited in Ibid. 
1246 The Military Intelligence Division, for example, referred to an 'unusually large number of 




Attitudes of the `Anti-Appeasers' towards the Soviet Union, March 
1939 - August 1939- 
Throughout March - August 1939, the anti-appeasers remained supportive of 
Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration. Indeed, their support strengthened, as those 
who were previously ambiguous about what type of agreement they supported 
specifically demanded an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance by May. The guarantee 
of Poland was accepted, but not accepted as an excuse to reject Soviet proposals. 
As Hitler's aggressive intentions became increasingly obvious, the need to 
overlook personal prejudices towards the Soviet Union and accept Moscow's 
proposals became, in the minds of the anti-appeasers, even more urgent. This 
was exemplified in their own willingness to continue supporting an alliance, 
despite Molotov's insistence upon a clause of indirect aggression. 
Following Hitler's takeover of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the anti-appeasers 
learnt of the government's intention to guarantee Poland. Before one can 
examine their attitudes towards Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration during this 
year, it is important to analyse their response to what historians, and politicians 
at the time, deemed to be such a crucial development. When the guarantee to 
Poland was announced in the House of Commons on 3 April, 1939, nearly all of 
the politicians looked at in this chapter supported the guarantee and 
congratulated the Prime Minister on his decision. "' Archibald Sinclair 
welcomed the guarantee as a deterrent to Hitler. ' Arthur Greenwood and 
Hugh Dalton agreed. '' Anthony Eden stated his confidence in the Prime 
Minister's decision. He claimed the guarantee to Poland would `have the most 
1247 Liddell Hart, Memoirs, p. 218. 
1248 Ibid. 
1249 Attlee, leader of the Labour party, was not present at the debate on 3 April due to illness. 
Cols. 2478; 2480; 2569-2570.3 Apr, 1939.345 HC Deb 5s. 
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excellent effect' and would be of great `deterrent value. "° Despite fearing that 
the guarantee had caused resentment in Moscow, Eden's former Secretary, 
Oliver Harvey agreed. ''' Winston Churchill expressed `the most complete 
agreement with the Prime Minister' on the matter1252 , and Lloyd George 
congratulated Chamberlain `upon the initiation of this new policy and upon the 
reversal of the old policy which we have so often deplored in this House. "` 
Yet, with the exception of Oliver Harvey who was wrongly convinced of 
Poland's superior military strength, all who supported the guarantee also 
maintained their demand for collaboration with the Soviets. Their initial 
congratulatory attitude towards the guarantee in no way indicated that it 
replaced the importance of securing the Soviet Union as an ally. On the night 
before the guarantee was concluded, for example, Greenwood accompanied 
Hugh Dalton to see Chamberlain in the cabinet room. Referring to the Prime 
Minister's decision to guarantee Poland the next day (31 March), Dalton warned 
that `he would never get away with it... unless he brought in the Russians. ' 1" 
During the debate in the House of Commons on 3 April, Greenwood stressed 
that the House could not `ignore the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. "" It 
was, Dalton agreed, 
... vitally 
important the Soviet Union should be brought into this 
combination... We hope that soon we shall pass from general declarations 
of friendliness to some evidence of positive and continuous cooperation 
between London and Moscow with a view to bringing the Soviet Union, 
with all its tremendous forces, effectively into this combination against 
aggression? "" 
Winston Churchill warned that to `stop here with a guarantee to Poland, would 
°u Liddell Hart, Memoirs, pp. 218 - 219. 
1251 Harvey, Diplomatic Diaries, p. 272.3 Apr, 1939. 
1252 Ibid, p. 218. 
1253 Col. 2505 3 Apr, 1939.345 HC Deb 5s. 
1254 Dalton, Memoirs, p. 238. 
1255 Cols. 2478; 2480 3 Apr, 1939.345 HC Deb 5s. 
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be to halt in no man's land under the fire of both trench lines and without the 
shelter of either. 72'' Thus, the British government could not risk losing a Soviet 
ally; 
No one can say that there is not a solid identity of interest between the 
western democracies and Soviet Russia, and we must do nothing to 
obstruct the natural play of that identity of interest.. . The worst 
folly, 
which no one proposes we should commit, would be to chill and drive 
away any natural cooperation which Soviet Russia in her own deep 
interests feels it necessary to afford. "' 
His friend and fellow M. P., Robert Boothby, reiterated the plea. 
"59 
The anti-appeasers did not ignore the issue of Polish opposition to Soviet 
involvement in a collective bloc. Some, including Churchill and Attlee, believed 
the government had exaggerated the opposition to Soviet involvement. `It is 
suggested' Attlee said in the House of Commons, `that the real trouble is that 
certain states will not line up if the USSR are on the alliance. I believe that is 
vastly exaggerated. 7zb° Churchill told the Soviet ambassador, Ivan Maisky, that 
he believed it was still possible that the Polish and Rumanian governments 
`might be prepared at a pinch to let you in. ' The condition, he added, was that 
they `would certainly want some assurances that you would eventually get 
out. i26' Both Churchill and Attlee underestimated the strength of opposition 
within Poland and Rumania. Others, such as Dalton, Sinclair and Lloyd George, 
did not. They were fully aware of the animosity towards the Soviet Union 
amongst these governments. But, they argued, such views should not determine 
foreign policy decisions, especially regarding the Soviet Union. The opinions of 
the Poles and Rumanians, they believed, were of secondary importance. Of 
greater importance was securing the Soviet Union in any collective bloc 
1257 Liddell Hart, Memoirs, p. 218. 
1258 Col. 2502 3 Apr, 1939.345 HC Deb 5s. 
1259 Col. 10.8 May, 1939.347 Ibid. 
`° Cols. 1819-1825 19 May, 1939. Ibid. 
1261 Harold Nicolson. 3 Apr, 1939. Cited in Gilbert, Churchill, pp. 1429-30. 
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established. The reason for this, each were clear, was Soviet military potential 
and the strategic necessity of its inclusion. During the debate on the Polish 
guarantee, Archibald Sinclair told fellow M. P. s: 
I know the difficulties with regard to Russia. I know the distrust of 
Russia that is felt in Poland -a legacy of Russian misgovernment in the 
days of partition, and, of course, the Piludski tradition, which still 
dominates Polish politics, is not friendly to Russia. Nevertheless, the task 
of bringing Russia into co-operation with us in resistance to aggression is 
one of supreme importance. j'62 
Hugh Dalton referred more specifically to the strategic necessity of Soviet 
involvement if an effective bloc of aggression was to be achieved. "" The Labour 
M. P. had met several Polish representatives and appreciated the difficulty of 
getting Moscow and Warsaw to `pull together, even now. ""' Though Dalton, like 
Churchill, did not rule out the possibility of Poland and Rumanian acquiescing 
in Soviet involvementi265 
, this was not, for him, the crux of the matter. Not only 
was the Soviet Union's involvement crucial for the West, but it was also crucial 
for Poland's own survival. Support in the air and supplies could only be 
provided for the Poles by the Soviet Union. '266 
Lloyd George spoke of the strategic necessity of Soviet involvement with the 
Soviet ambassador Ivan Maisky. `You know', he told the ambassador, 
... I have never had a high opinion of Chamberlain, but what he is doing 
now is breaking records for stupidity.. . we are giving guarantees to Poland 
and Rumania, but what can we do for them if they are attacked by Hitler? 
Practically nothing. Geographically these two countries are situated that 
we cannot reach them. Even arms and munitions can only be supplied to 
them through Soviet territory. The key to their salvation lies in your 
-Col. 2493 3 Apr, 1939.345 HC Deb 5s. 
1263 Dalton, Memoirs, p. 238. 
1264 Ibid, pp. 240-241; Diary entry. 28 Mar, 1939.1/20/20. Dalton Papers. 
1265 Diary entry. 12 Apr, 1939.1/20/36. Dalton Papers. 
1266 Ibid. 2 Apr, 1939.1/20/29. Dalton Papers; Dalton, Memoirs, pp. 240-241. 
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hands. Without Russia nothing can be done .... So... there should have 
been an agreement with Moscow. But what does Chamberlain do? 
Without coming to any agreement with the Soviet Union, and in fact 
behind its back, he distributes `guarantees' right and left to countries in 
Eastern Europe. What crying folly! What a disgrace for British 
diplomacy! '`67 
Consequently, when Chamberlain informed the House of Commons that he 
believed Poland would represent the second, eastern front of resistance in the 
event of war, `Lloyd George burst into laughter and began to gibe Chamberlain. ' 
The former Prime Minister explained; 
Poland had no airforce to speak of, an inadequately mechanised army, 
worse than mediocre armaments, and that Poland was weak internally - 
economically and politically. Without active help from the USSR, 
therefore, no "Eastern Front" was possible. 
`If we are going in without the help of Russia we are walking into a trap', he 
continued. `It is the only country whose army can get there... ' 68 Soon after, The 
Times caustically described Lloyd George's sober warning as `an outburst of 
inconsolable pessimism', remarking that `he seems to inhabit an odd and 
remote world of his own. ' But Liddell Hart, who had earlier told Lloyd George 
that `there was', in his opinion, `little chance of checking Hitler except by 
securing the support of Russia' because it was `the only power that could give 
Poland direct support and thus provide a deterrent to Hitler', aptly pointed out 
that `Lloyd George was at this crucial moment for once in accord with the view 
of the military authorities - and indeed, of anyone who had the slightest grasp of 
the practical conditions. )" 
Not only did Lloyd George point out the strategic necessity of the Soviet Union's 
involvement, he also made clear his belief that Warsaw's political opposition to 
the inclusion of Moscow, could, and should, be dismissed: 
1287 Maisky, Who Helped Hitler, p. 111. 
1266 Liddell Hart, Memoirs, p. 219. 
1269 Ibid, p. 222; p. 219. 
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If Russia has not been brought into this matter because of certain 
feelings the Poles have that they do not want the Russians there, it is for 
us to declare the conditions, and unless the Poles are prepared to accept 
the only conditions with which we can successfully help them, the 
responsibility must be theirs. '''° 
The former Prime Minister had raised a crucial point conveniently overlooked 
by those who used the opposition of the Poles to excuse their own aversion to 
collaborating with the Soviets, namely, that Poland really had little choice, and 
that London could dictate conditions of resistance. 
Following Hitler's take over of Czechoslovakia and the guarantees to both 
Poland and Rumania, then, the anti-appeasers continued to call for the 
collaboration many had now been urging for over a year. Those that had called 
specifically for an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance during 1938 continued to do so. 
But between March and May, they were joined by those previously vague and 
uncommitted about exactly what form of Anglo-Soviet collaboration they 
wanted. In March, for example, the National Council of Labour issued a 
statement which called upon the government to establish a `peace pact' with 
France, the Soviet Union, and any other nations willing to join a collective bloc 
to resist German aggression. "" Clement Attlee still referred to `unity' between 
the three countries. "" By May, however, with still no agreement concluded, 
Attlee spoke out specifically in favour of an alliance. `The best hope of 
preventing war', he told the government, `is to get a firm union between Britain, 
France and the USSR as the nucleus of a world alliance against aggression, an 
alliance so strong that it is not a question of winning a war, but of preventing a 
war. ' 1273 Dalton, now really the prominent spokesman for the Labour party on 
1270 Cols. 2509-2510.3 Apr, 1939.345 HC Deb 5s. 
'27 Daily Herald 29 March, 1939, p. 10. Cited in William Rayburn Tucker, Attitude of the British 
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the issue of collaboration with Soviets1X7' , repeated his support for an alliance. 
Dalton would accept nothing less. He was not prepared, for example, to accept 
an agreement of Soviet neutrality despite the fact that it still might ensure 
Soviet supplies. "" Instead, he recalled in his diary; `I... urged an Anglo-Franco- 
Soviet military alliance against any aggression in Europe, Asia or North 
Africa. ""' He believed the Soviet proposal of an alliance on i8 April represented 
`surely a most dazzling prize to be seized instantly, with both hands, and 
triumphantly displayed to the world. 7' 
Winston Churchill similarly continued to demand an alliance. He called for the 
Soviet Union's `full inclusion in our defensive bloc. "z'$ He, too, later believed 
`... that Britain and France should have accepted the Russian offer, proclaimed 
the Triple Alliance, and left the method by which it would be made effective in 
case of war to be adjusted between the allies engaged against a common foe. "" 
Churchill was supported in parliament and in the press by Robert Boothby. On 
14 March he had urged the government that it was time to initiate talks. 128° 
Boothby perceived the future for Britain would be `dark' unless the government 
concluded a `defensive alliance. ' The key to this alliance, he emphasised, was 
`unquestionably Russia . 
"z8' In 1939, Boothby and Churchill were joined in their 
demands for an alliance by Edward Spears. 1282 
Lord Robert Cecil, who, during 1938, had attended private meetings along with 
Churchill and others in order to discuss pressing the government to accept 
1274 Diary entry. 30 Mar, 1939.1/20/27. Dalton Papers. 
1275 Ibid. 1/20/40 12.4.39. Dalton Papers. 
1276 Dalton, Memoirs, pp. 248-9. 
1277 Ibid, p. 249. 
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1280 Letter to Daily Telegraph 14 Mar, 1939. G 3/13/9. Lloyd George Papers. 
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Soviet proposals, continued during 1939 to offer his support to several 
individuals and organisations prominent in the campaign to secure Anglo- 
French-Soviet collaboration. 1113 Soon after Hitler's invasion of Prague, for 
example, Cecil gave his support for a plan to hold a large meeting at the Queen's 
Hall which aimed to `call most urgently for immediate and active co-operation 
between all peace-loving nations, with special reference to France and the 
Soviet Union. iz84 Lloyd George also received many letters throughout 1939 
asking for his opinion, and his support, on the issue of the Soviet Union and an 
alliance. The International Peace Campaign was one such organisation. 1285 In 
addition, Lloyd George corresponded with Victor Gollancz, editor of The Left 
News which aimed to highlight the necessity of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. 
A leaflet they distributed in April, for example, protested; `If we were involved 
in a war against Germany and Italy with Russia outside we should be in the 
greatest peril. But... if the Dictators knew they had to face such a combination, it 
would never come to war. ' Lloyd George thought the leaflet was `most 
valuableiz8' , and 
in the same month agreed to talk at a rally, organised by 
Gollancz, in favour of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. 1 " 
One who did not speak out in favour of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance during 
the early weeks of negotiations was the former Foreign Secretary, Anthony 
Eden. Still influenced primarily by party loyalty and ambition1 ", Eden was not 
prepared to press the issue, let alone oppose Chamberlain. Eden recalled later, 
1283 Letter to Cecil from General Secretary of The Council of Action for Peace and 
Reconstruction. 17 Mar, 1939. p. 66. Add 51183. Cecil Papers. 
1284 Letter to Cecil from Victor Gollancz. 17 Mar, 1939, p. 24. Ibid; Letter to Victor Gollancz from 
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for example, his suggestion, 
... to Chamberlain and Halifax, that 
in order to make a beginning with the 
Soviets, we should make use of the fact that France, Russia, Turkey and 
ourselves were all parties to the Straits convention. The four countries, 
might, I thought, issue some form of joint declaration, perhaps about 
preserving the status quo in the eastern Mediterranean. Lord Halifax 
replied that the difficulties were too great and I did not press the idea. "" 
By May, however, Anthony Eden joined others in dismissing the political 
excuses put forward by the government'Z'° and openly called for an acceptance 
of Soviet proposals. At the beginning of May, Oliver Harvey noted of Eden; 
`.... A. E. is very disturbed about our Soviet negotiations which he thinks lack 
boldness and imagination: we ought to agree to a tripartite alliance with France 
and Soviet Russia. "" On i9 May, Eden himself told the House of Commons 
that what he wanted to see was 
... a triple alliance between this country, France and Russia 
based on 
complete reciprocity; that is to say, that if Russia were attacked and we 
and France would go to her help, and if we or France were attacked 
Russia would come to our aid. Then, if any other nations of Europe were 
victims of aggression and called for help, we should make it clear that we 
would be prepared, all three of us, to give that help at once and to the 
fullest extent of our resources. "' 
Eden appreciated that what he had suggested probably went much further than 
the government wanted to go, but he was convinced that if the British 
government was to succeed in the negotiations, action would have to be taken 
as soon as possible. "" 
In fact, members of the Cabinet and Foreign Policy Committee had, by this 
stage, also begun to seriously consider accepting Soviet proposals for an Anglo 
1289 Eden, The Reckoning, P. 54. 
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French-Soviet alliance. A key motivation in persuading ministers to put aside 
their ideological distrust of the Soviets was an increasing suspicion and fear of a 
German - Soviet rapprochement. Anthony Eden was similarly motivated by 
such suspicion. In his memoirs, Eden wrote; 
In any attempt to rally the peace-loving nations of Europe, Russia's 
position was capital... Stalin was the arbiter of Russian policy and he 
might,..., come to terms with Hitler at any moment. The repeated public 
expression of hatred for each others systems and intentions could be 
swiftly expunged in dictatorships. "' 
Oliver Harvey, too, mentioned the possibility of a German - Soviet 
rapprochement, especially following the news of Litvinov's removal on 4 May. 
`News of Litvinoff s resignation came as a complete surprise... ', he wrote in his 
diary, `... Does it mean Russia will turn from the West towards isolation? And if 
so, won't she inevitably wobble into Germany's arms? "X95 Days later, his 
suspicion grew. On 7 May he wrote; 
Still great obscurity about Russia though Maisky assures - as he must - 
that there is to be no change - Potemkin says the same to the Turks. But I 
do not like it and there are hints here and there that it may mean a 
Russo-German rapprochement. "' 
Interestingly, however, neither Churchill, Sinclair, nor any other supporter of 
an alliance outside of government referred to the possibility of a German - 
Soviet rapprochement. It was never openly debated in the House of Commons 
and it was hardly mentioned in private papers. Instead, for these individuals, 
the motivation continued to be an increasing realisation of Hitler's aggressive 
foreign policy ambitions and, inextricably linked to this, an appreciation of the 
fact that Britain needed the Soviet Union either to prevent war1297 , or to 
effectively resist aggression in the event of war. For many, especially Labour 
1294 Ibid, p. 53; pp. 55-56. 
1295 Harvey, Diplomatic Diaries, p. 287.4 May, 1939. 
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and Liberal members, Moscow's value remained its ability to deter Hitler and so 
preserve peace. Arthur Greenwood told the government; `however you may 
assess the military value of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there can be 
no question that she might well prove to be the final, decisive and smashing 
factor on the side of keeping peace in the world. ""' Archibald Sinclair did not 
want to see a repeat of Munich, "' and was convinced that Britain and its allies 
could not `preserve peace without Russia. '1300 
Amongst the Conservatives, Robert Boothby expressed his appreciation of the 
Soviet Union's huge resources. He, like many others who urged an alliance 
with Moscow during 1939, did not ignore the military weaknesses still existing 
within the Soviet Union. However, he was convinced of the potential that 
remained. `You hear stories in certain quarters about the inefficiency of the 
Soviet army', he told an Edinburgh audience, `but, whether they are true or not 
the indisputable fact remains that Russia is one of the greatest powers of the 
world, and her resources, both in men and material are practically unlimited. ' 1301 
Consequently, he believed; `No single step could be taken better calculated to 
avert the threatening world war... ' than to agree to an alliance. "°' Even Anthony 
Eden, acknowledged Soviet strategic and military importance once he decided 
to confess his support of an alliance. '3°3 He warned the government `if you are 
going to build a deterrent it is folly not to build the most powerful deterrent in 
your power. "3°i 
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Lloyd GeorgeX3°5 , Churchill and Hugh Dalton also continued to emphasise the 
importance of a Soviet ally as a deterrent against aggression. " However, by 
1939, they increasingly perceived the value of an alliance as being primarily in 
terms of securing a wartime ally. Dalton added that the Soviet Union was the 
only country which could assist the allies in the Pacific where both France and 
Britain had interests. 130' Later he would insist on the importance of a Soviet ally 
in the battle against Japan. '3°8 The importance of securing Soviet cooperation in 
Churchill's mind was evident in his pleas to Chamberlain: 
I beg His Majesty's Government to get some of these brutal truths into 
their heads. Without any effective Eastern Front, there can be no 
satisfactory defence of our interests in the West, and without Russia 
there can be no effective Eastern Front. ''9 
Added to this realisation was an increasing recognition of Soviet suspicions of 
the West. Anxiety rose largely as a result of the information Maisky continued 
to supply regarding Moscow's mistrust of British sincerity. "" The Soviet 
government had already threatened isolationism once before. As early as 
March, Maisky had told Oliver Harvey that Moscow very much mistrusted 
London. ' Harvey consequently thought there would be `a strong movement 
towards isolation now. '13" Soviet proposals in 1939, Maisky told Dalton, were 
designed to test Chamberlain's sincerity. "' Through its rejections of Soviet 
proposals the government was failing the test, and this must have weighed on 
the minds of those who realised the extent of Soviet potential in the deterrence 
and effective resistance of aggression. Sinclair, in particular, tried to impress 
1305 Cols. 1818-24. Ibid. 
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upon others the existence and importance of Soviet suspicion of the West: 3'3 So, 
too, did Churchill. In most of his speeches, he pointed out the benefits of 
securing an agreement with regard to reducing the mutual suspicion that 
existed between the powers. "" When Molotov replaced Maxim Litvinov as 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs at the beginning of May, the resentment and 
suspicion of the Soviet government appeared to be confirmed. Maisky warned 
Dalton that although Molotov's appointment did not, in fact, signify a change in 
Soviet foreign policy, this could not be ruled out if there was no progress. "'S 
Thereafter, M. P. s continued to stress the importance of removing the 
`conditions of distrust and mutual suspicion... 11316 It was, Harvey appreciated, 
`essential if we are to get our agreement to take the most extraordinary 
precautions that our procedure or approach does not arouse mistrust. ""' 
Unfortunately, and as Harvey acknowledged, Neville Chamberlain could not see 
this. 
The result of such anxiety coupled with a strong conviction of Britain's need of a 
Soviet ally continued to motivate the anti-appeasers to overlook their own 
attitudes towards the Soviet system and government. Churchill, especially, 
continued to publicly condemn the Soviet system and ideology throughout the 
negotiations. `There is Nazi Fascist ideology, and the Communist ideology. 
Britain and France are equally opposed to both', he told an audience in May. '3'8 
Churchill told Maisky in private; `Now I don't care for your system and I never 
have. "-"9 Yet still, he urged others to bring in the Soviet Union to a collective bloc 
against aggression. 
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The papers of Robert Cecil in 1939 provide another example of just how difficult 
it was for all members of the political elite to overlook their aversion to the 
Soviet Union, and yet, the determination of the anti-appeasers to do so. Cecil, 
like Halifax and many other politicians, was a devout Christian. The papers of 
Archbishop Lang illustrate the close relationship Cecil had with the church 
leaders. 1320 In contrast, the Soviet government was anti-religious. A letter to 
Cecil in April 1939 by Robert MacGregor (President of the Royal Empire 
Society) exemplified the hostility that many Christians held towards the Soviet 
Union during this period. `There is no religious liberty', MacGregor wrote. `The 
Russian Government is openly anti-God. How can we expect God's blessing on 
us if we seek Russia as an ally. It is really ridiculous to ask Russia to defend the 
liberty of other nations. " ' Yet, like Churchill, Cecil was convinced of the need to 
put aside such feelings. He explained this in a lengthy reply to MacGregor: 
As far as I can see, the Russian peace policy at this moment is identical to 
ours, and therefore, prima facie, it would appear to be reasonable that 
we should work together for a common end, however much we may 
disagree with and disapprove of all other parts of Russian policy. If 
anything that we were doing could be treated as approval of these parts 
of Russian policy, then of course I should be strongly against it. But, if 
not, where are we to draw the line? We are going to collaborate with 
Turkey; yet the present government of Turkey has committed great 
crimes and some of their predecessors with whom they are more or less 
identified have been guilty of some of the most atrocious proceedings in 
history. Yet I do not imagine that you would say we should refuse 
Turkish collaboration for peace because of these circumstances. "" 
MacGregor did not accept Cecil's argument immediately. The series of letters 
between the two men makes interesting reading, but more importantly, shows 
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the emotional provocation caused by the subject of an Anglo-French-Soviet 
alliance. In another letter, MacGregor wrote; 
I... would concentrate on the question, `Can we expect God's blessing, if 
we seek an alliance with a Government which is openly `anti-God', who 
openly seek to train its people as atheists; who seek to dethrone god - 
who take away hope of heaven to its people... Whose policy is not 
confined to its own people but seeks to influence the world thus.. . all 
Christians want the blessing of God. I know you sir, are a very sincere 
and devout Christian.. .1 cannot understand, 
[why]... hardly anything is 
said against the terrible Russian Government, seeking at home and 
abroad to dethrone out loving God & Saviour! "" 
His difficulty in accepting an alliance with a country so `anti-God' emphasised 
the strength and conviction Cecil, as an equally devout Christian, must have had 
to put aside such feelings in his decision to support an alliance. But this was 
what he chose to do and he explained his pragmatism aptly: 
I still do not see why cooperation with Russia in defence of peace 
involves any approval of the Russian form of Government. Suppose a 
ship were sinking and a Russian warship was near, would you suggest 
that the crew of the sinking ship should not take advantage of the 
assistance of Russian officers and sailors? I cannot think that you would. 
But if you did, I am afraid I should have to say that I disagreed with 
you. 
1324 
Whilst an Anglo-French-Soviet military alliance remained unconcluded, 
therefore, the anti-appeasers continued to criticise and so apply pressure upon 
the government. Clement Attlee, for example, accused the government of 
making no `constructive effort' to secure an agreement. "325 He and the British 
public, he said, were `disturbed by the contrast between the rapidity of the 
acceptance of onerous obligations by this country and the dilatory methods in 
seeking collateral security. "326 Dalton rightly accused the government of 
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deliberately spinning out the negotiations. He complained that 
... time was spun out, principally by long periods, during which no doubt 
there were consultations with Paris - one cannot complain of that - but 
during which the negotiations were kept hanging, sometimes for a 
fortnight and sometimes longer, between the receipt of the Russian 
proposal and the sending of the next reply. 1327 
Anthony Eden, too, was concerned that the negotiations were not `being driven 
forward with sufficient zest... 11328 
The reason for the government's failure to secure the collaboration of the 
Soviets, many believed, remained that which had determined Moscow's 
exclusion in 1938. Thus the anti-appeasers continued to accuse government 
ministers of an unwillingness to put aside prejudices against the Soviet Union. 
Clement Attlee raised the issue of political and ideological prejudices in the 
House of Commons soon after the announcement of the Polish guarantee. `I 
realise', he told the government, `... the difficulties there are in Europe owing to 
past history and conflicting ideologies, but these things have had to be 
overcome in the past and in the face of grave dangers. "329 In May, he reiterated 
his conviction that `a good deal of opposition comes from distrust of the 
ideology. "'° Dalton was equally accusatory in his statements; `We have had 
seething assurances from the Prime Minister that ideological differences will 
not be allowed to interfere with negotiations, yet, there are no indications that 
there have been any approaches made between London and Moscow. 71331 
Archibald Sinclair stated his belief that it was the prejudices against the Soviet 
Union within the government that had `enormously increased the difficulties of 
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reaching agreement with Russia. ' He pointed out that the Prime Minister 
failed to even mention the Soviet Union when talking about the European 
situation. Furthermore, for `a year', he said, `he [Chamberlain] has referred to 
them [the Soviet Union] as a country "half European and half Asiatic". "' 
Sinclair emphasised the damaging effect such references and behaviour by the 
Prime Minister were having in Moscow. Nor, he warned, was this `the only 
reference which the Prime Minister has made which has had a bad effect upon 
opinion in Russia... " ` Consequently, he urged the government to make more of 
an effort to `dissipate' the `atmosphere, which has been developed in the 
relations between Russia and this country... "' A fellow Liberal, Lloyd George, 
highlighted specifically the government's `distrust' of Moscow. '6 Furthermore, 
he suggested that members of the Cabinet were deliberately ignoring the 
strengths of the Soviet Union because of their distrust and their personal 
aversion to collaboration with the Soviets. `There is a reluctance' he said, `which 
I think is a mistake, on the part of people who do not want to know the facts 
because somehow or other they contravene their theories, to acknowledge the 
tremendous change that has occurred in Russia, industrially and militarily. " M7 It 
was, Lloyd George pointed out, quite ironic that London should distrust the 
Soviets when `every pact we have entered into since 1931 to deal with a situation 
like this, we have broken... "8 Of greatest importance, however, was that 
London now `put these distrusts on one side. ' The issues, Lloyd George pleaded, 
`were too tremendous... "9 
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Winston Churchill agreed. He implored the government once again to overlook 
its suspicion of Soviet intentions and instead approach the negotiations with 
pragmatism. `When you come to examine.. . the 
interest and loyalty of the 
Russian Government in this matter', he said, `you must not be guided by 
sentiment. You must be guided by a study of the interests involved. » Wo He 
reiterated the need to overlook personal prejudices at an address at the 
Cambridge Corn Exchange: 
We must not at this juncture do anything which encourages these 
Dictators to suppose that we are not ready with other like-minded 
countries to go to all lengths in doing our share of common duty. I have 
heard that a very high functionary in Berlin said Herr Hitler: "You will 
know that Britain is in earnest on the day when the British working 
classes accept conscription, and the Conservative party agree to an 
alliance with Russia. " If we wish for peace, of failing peace, victory, surely 
we ought to have both? This is a time when prejudices must abandoned 
on either side, and a true comradeship established. "' 
Following his decision to speak openly about his support of an alliance, Eden, 
too, stressed the need to overlook prejudices. In particular he spoke about the 
hostility towards the Soviet system of government and the distrust of Soviet 
intentions. `I have no desire to enter into arguments as to the merits or 
otherwise of the methods of the government employed in Russia... ', he stated in 
the House of Commons, `... nor is it indeed necessary or relevant to the decision 
we have to take. ""' `Lots of people in this country have the idea that 
dictatorships should not be touched with a barge pole', Eden explained, but, he 
continued, 
... we have to remember that all the countries that we 
have guaranteed are 
dictatorships. We have departed from the old idea of a front of 
democratic powers against dictators... We are now building up 
something like a common peace front of all people without regard to 
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their form of Government. "' 
Regarding suspicions of Soviet intentions, Eden told the Commons at the end of 
July that he understood the `long legacy of suspicion' which was `by no means 
easily removed. ""' Nevertheless, it could be overlooked, and this is what Eden 
and others continued to impress upon the government until the breakdown of 
negotiations in August. 
The frustration and anxiety of those who realised the need for an Anglo-French- 
Soviet alliance had resulted in constant attacks upon the British government 
throughout March-May. However, this did not necessarily mean that those 
outside of the government believed every Cabinet member was equally guilty for 
the failure of negotiations. Hugh Dalton was certain, for example, that the 
Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were primarily to blame. "" 
Halifax and Hoare, he believed, had actually been in favour of an alliance for 
some time. Dalton noted of his meeting with Maisky: `I tell him I learn that 
Hoare is and has been for a long time, very sound on Russia. It is a mistake to 
put him in the same group with P. M. and Simon. Halifax, likewise, understands 
the position well. 'X346 Admittedly, there appears little evidence in the official 
papers to support such a negative portrayal of the Chancellor of Exchequer. But, 
apart from this, it would be fair to say that the anti-appeasers had a surprisingly 
accurate appreciation of the attitudes that existed within the cabinet, 
particularly with regard to Neville Chamberlain. 
One reason individuals such as Chamberlain rejected Soviet proposals of an 
alliance during 1939 was their unwillingness to put aside their suspicion of 
Soviet foreign policy intentions. Indeed, following Molotov's proposal of a 
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1344 Cols. 2035-6.31 July, 1939.350 Ibid. 
1345 Diary entry. 3 May, 1939.1/20/50; 7 May, 1939.1/20/53 ; 28 May, 1939.1/20/43. Dalton 
Papers. 
1346 Diary entry. 3 May, 1939.1/20/50. Ibid. 
283 
guarantee concerning the Baltic States and his insistence upon a Soviet 
definition of indirect aggression, all of those involved in the foreign policy 
decision making process, including Halifax, began increasingly to allow their 
distrust to once again dominate their attitudes towards collaboration with the 
Soviets. In contrast, the anti-appeasers continued in their support of an 
alliance. Only Churchill, Lloyd George, and Hugh Dalton spoke specifically of 
the proposal in the House of Commons, and even defended Moscow's clause of 
indirect aggression. However, others, aware of the terms proposed, did continue 
to call upon the government to secure Soviet collaboration. "" Hugh Dalton 
told the House of Commons, for example, that the Soviet government was 
entitled to take such steps to ensure its security. Moscow was, he said, 
... perfectly right to 
keep their weather eye on Estonia and Latvia and 
perfectly right, if a watertight treaty is to be constructed between us and 
them, to get some safeguard for immediate and swift action to prevent 
the flowering of any nasty little bud of indirect aggression. 13`'8 
Dalton pointed out that Moscow's concern about the Baltic States was no less 
important than, for example, Britain's concern about the Low Countries. "" 
Lloyd George, similarly, explained what he perceived to be Moscow's justified 
request for equality in the terms of an alliance: `Russia is only asking for exactly 
the same terms... She will come in whole heartedly, with the whole of her 
tremendous force provided we say that France, ourselves and Russia shall be in 
on exactly the same terms. "" Winston Churchill, who also continued to support 
`a full and solid alliance... with Russia' 1351 , pointed out that Molotov's most 
recent demand made little difference to Britain's position, and in the event of 
war, the security of Britain was of foremost importance. In a speech given on 28 
June at the Carlton Club, Churchill explained: 
1347 Thompson, Anti Appeasers, p. 214. 
1348 Col. 2011.31 July, 1939.350 HC Deb 5s. 
1349 Diary entry. 28 June, 1939.1/20/43 ; Ibid. 1/20/74. Dalton Papers. 
1350 Col. 2084.31 July, 1939.350 HC Deb 5s. 
1351 Lord Camrose to Winston S. Churchill (Churchill Papers: 8/628) 30 June, 1939. Cited in 
Gilbert, Churchill, p. 1540 (nb. 1). 
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We all hope that a full and solid alliance will be made with Russia 
without further delay. It would seem that the Russian claim that we 
should all stand together in resisting an act of aggression upon the Baltic 
States was just and reasonable, and I trust we shall meet in the fullest 
manner. Frankly I don't understand what we have been boggling at all 
these weeks. At the point to which we have come, these additional 
guarantees do not add much to our danger compared to what will be 
gained in collective security by an alliance between England, France and 
Russia. "" 
Anthony Eden was so eager to see a successful conclusion of the negotiations, 
even after the Soviet government's new demand, that he volunteered to go to 
Moscow himself to continue negotiations when William Seeds fell ill with flu. "' 
He informed Halifax that Stalin would expect at least the same consideration 
afforded Mussolini when Halifax and Chamberlain had visited Rome, in 
January. "" As a result of his earlier visit to Moscow in 1935, Eden believed his 
representation of the government would prove more effective. He told an 
audience in Warwick `an hour's talk between principals may be worth a month 
of writing. fX355 Later, he said he `felt the issue to be so critical and weight in the 
scales of peace and war that the risks had to be taken... "356 Concerning the Soviet 
proposal of a guarantee against indirect aggression towards the Baltic States, 
Eden believed London `could have got better terms... had we not been so 
hesitant in the early stages. ' He was not completely comfortable with the new 
terms, yet accepted them. 1357 
Lord Cecil also remained supportive, expressing his belief at the end of June 
1352 `Three months of Tension. ' An Address to the City Carlton Club, London, 28 June, 1939. 
Cited in Churchill, Into Battle, pp. 112-119. 
1353 Harvey, Diplomatic Diaries, p. 295.5 June, 1939. 
1354 Eden, The Reckoning, p. 55; Churchill, World War, p. 155. 
1355 Yorkshire Post. 12 June, 1939. Reporting Eden's speech at Grove Park, Warwick. Cited in 
Dutton, Eden, p. 136. 
1356 Eden, The Reckoning. p. 55. 
1357 Eden to Cranbourne 27 June, 1939. AP 14/2127A. Eden Papers. Cited in Dutton, p. 136. 
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that `immediate completion of agreement with the Soviet Union is essential for 
peace. ""' Archibald Sinclair told the House of Commons at the end of July; `For 
my own part I have always been and am still hopeful that an agreement will be 
reached with Russia. ""' He pressed the government to send a `man of the 
highest standing in the country' to the `political and staff talks' to be held in 
Moscow in August. "' 
The anti-appeasers were neither blindly pro-Soviet nor entirely anti- 
government during the negotiations. Their primary interest remained simply to 
see the conclusion of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. Consequently, where 
necessary, they were also prepared to criticise the Soviet government. Earlier in 
the year, for example, Dalton had told Maisky that he felt both the Soviet and 
British governments were to blame for the failure to secure an agreement 
regarding the guarantee of Rumania. "' Once again, in July, Dalton was not 
willing to overlook Moscow's faults and responsibility in the hindrance of 
negotiations. He chastised Maisky for what he believed to be Moscow's 
unjustifiable objection to British demands for a guarantee of the Low Countries: 
I say that the argument of his General Staff is sheer tripe... Either, I say, 
there will be a war in which the SU is not engaged, or not... I warn him 
that there will be a good deal of criticism of the Russians for delaying the 
conclusion of the Pact, even though they may seem to themselves to have 
good arguments. But so will British ministers if they stress the similarity 
between Russia's interest in the Baltic States, which we are now prepared 
to recognise and British and French interest in the Low Countries and 
Switzerland. '3" 
By July , 1939, Moscow's difficult behaviour 
did pose a genuine dilemma for the 
1358Telegram from Cecil. 29 June, 1939, p. 169. Add 51183. Cecil Papers. 
1359 Col. 1995 31 July, 1939.350 HC Deb 5s. 
1350 Ibid; Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador, had made it clear that the Soviet government 
desired a senior individual such as General Gort (Chief of the British General Staff) to lead the 
British staff mission. Cited in Maisky, Who Helped Hitler, p. 164. 
136' Diary entry. 12 Apr, 1939.1/20/37. Dalton Papers. 
36z Diary entry. 4 July, 1939.1/21/1. Ibid. 
Labour party. `Either we press the Government or not', Dalton wrote. 
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In the first case, we may encourage the Russians to be more difficult and 
be represented by ministers here as impeding negotiations.. . In other 
cases, we are taken to be acquiescing in HMG's conduct of the 
negotiations and make our supporters in the country impatient. "" 
A large number of Labour members were beginning to see the Soviet 
government as being `pernickety. "" Oliver Harvey, similarly, did not appreciate 
what he perceived to be Moscow `getting more and more difficult and elusive. ""' 
Yet, the `proper mess' that was the negotiations, he noted, was `chiefly owing to 
the slowness and reluctance with which we first tackled Soviet Russia. "" The 
British government remained thought of as the main culprit in the failure to 
conclude an agreement. 
Consequently, the British government continued to be criticised for what the 
anti-appeasers perceived to be detrimental decisions or inaction. Dalton, Lloyd 
George and Winston Churchill, for example, criticised the decision to send the 
Foreign Office official William Strang to assist William Seeds in the negotiations 
in June. Strang was `able and devoted', Dalton acknowledged, but he was `not 
exactly the opposite number of M. Molotov. 7"' `Russians are not less proud than 
the people of other countries', he pointed out. In his mind, the decision had 
been a deliberate show of disrespect by the Prime Minister. It was `a little infra 
dig for M. Molotov to have been left to talk for weeks with Mr Strang. ""' Either 
Halifax or Anthony Eden should have been sent. '3' Hence, Dalton urged the 
Prime Minister in the House of Commons to dispatch a senior minister. "" Only 
1363 Ibid. 
1364 Diary entry. 10 July, 1939. Ibid. 
1315 Harvey, Diplomatic Diaries, pp. 302-303.9 July, 1939. 
1366 Ibid. 
+ p. 301.1 July, 1939. 1I' Dalton, Memoirs, p. 255. 
1368 Col. 2112.31 July, 1939.350 HC Deb 5s. 
1369 Dalton, Memoirs. p. 255. 
1370 Ibid; Col. 5.26 June, 1939.349 HC Deb 5s. 
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this, he believed, could help remove the atmosphere of distrust and 
misunderstanding and so `ease the next stages' and ensure the conclusion of an 
alliance. '37 Lloyd George, too, termed the decision an `insult' to the Soviet 
government. '3" Churchill told the government that the sending of what he 
perceived to be `so subordinate a figure-gave actual offence' to the Soviet 
government. "' `The difficulties of negotiation between London and Moscow' 
were, according to Oliver Harvey, `obvious - no plenipotentiaries. ' 1374 
During the year, several politicians had highlighted such a belief that the British 
government was not treating the Soviet government with the diplomatic respect 
deserved of an equal power in the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations. In April, 
for example, Dalton told the government that he and others `find almost 
inexplicable the continual reluctance of the Government, not merely to conduct 
negotiations with Russia, but even to pay such conventional tributes or make 
such friendly observations as are commonplace in international relations. ""' In 
May, Sinclair warned the government against treating `her as a convenience, as 
a country we can call into help us when we and the countries whose welfare and 
independence we are most concerned are in danger. ""' Instead he urged the 
need to `treat her as an equal partner in resistance to aggression... ' This involved 
including the Soviet government in diplomatic as well as military affairs: `... if we 
welcome her soldiers to the battlefield we must not, as we did at Munich, 
exclude her statesmen from the council chamber. "' Lloyd George accused the 
government of `political snobbery' and asked; `What is the good of this political 
snobbery that wants only to help a proletariat government provided you do not 
137' Diary entry. 11 July, 1939.1/21/8. Dalton Papers. 
1372 Col. 2084.31 July, 1939.350 HC Deb 5s. 
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rub shoulders with it? ""' Such accusations, but particularly Lloyd George's 
identification of `political snobbery', accurately evaluated the attitude of 
Chamberlain and several others towards the Soviet Union during the 1939 
negotiations. Throughout, official records and private papers show that the 
Prime Minister especially believed Moscow ought to be grateful for any 
recognition given by London. The government's behaviour, delaying its replies, 
for example, reflected this. One could argue that such sentiments were not 
important to the development of the negotiations, that the Soviet leader was not 
interested in what the British thought of his government, but instead was 
concerned only with what, militarily, the British and French could offer. But to 
take such a view would ignore the fact that Stalin was not only paranoid, but 
also very proud. It is difficult to believe that such obvious contempt would not 
have had an effect upon the dictator's attitude towards the West. The anti- 
appeasers certainly believed this. They, on the other hand, appreciated the 
reality of the Soviet Union's military and political potential. 
In addition, and importantly, the anti-appeasers continued to trust Soviet 
intentions during 1939- Whatever their personal views of the Soviet system and 
its ideology, individuals such as Churchill, Cecil, Boothby and Eden stressed the 
mutual interests of both Britain and the Soviet Union during this period. Unlike 
most within the Cabinet and the Foreign Policy Committee, for whom distrust 
of Moscow was ultimately impossible to overcome, the anti-appeasers sincerely 
believed the Soviet government, as far as the resistance of aggression was 
concerned, could be relied upon. Robert Boothby, who had believed Moscow's 
declared foreign policy intentions during the Czechoslovakian crisis, continued 
to defend Moscow in the Daily Telegraph during 1939. On 14 March, for 
example, Boothby wrote an article which explained, in detail, what he believed 
1378 Cols. 1818-24. Ibid 
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to be the peaceful nature of Soviet foreign policy as announced by Stalin in a 
speech to the Soviet congress on lo March. This speech had evoked much 
criticism and suspicion within the Foreign Office and Cabinet because of its 
attacks upon British foreign policy. Later, historians pointed to the speech as 
being indicative of Soviet insincerity in the forthcoming negotiations. "" Yet, 
Boothby defended Stalin's speech and intentions, writing: 
Mr Stalin's recent speech to the Congress of Soviets has not received the 
publicity in this country which it deserves. It contained, perhaps 
inevitably, some unflattering references to the Western Democracies. But 
he laid down a concrete foreign policy which is of considerable intrinsic 
importance at the present time. It was based on the following four 
points: 
[i] Peace and the strengthening of business like relations with all 
countries. 
[2] Close and neighbourly relations with all countries which have a 
common frontier with the USSR. 
[3] Support for nations which are the victims of aggression. 
14] Retaliation against any instigator of war who might attempt to 
infringe the integrity of the Soviet borders. 1380 
Interestingly, in his memoirs, Anthony Eden appeared to doubt Soviet sincerity 
during the negotiations and claimed, as several historians have done, that the 
Polish guarantee effectively protected the Soviet Union and therefore 
undermined the value of an alliance for Moscow: 
... the British and French 
bargaining position had been weakened. In 
every sense we scarcely carried the guns. Hitler could offer Russia at least 
temporary peace, while if Stalin came to terms with us, he must expect 
that the Führer might at any moment direct his vengeful fury 
eastwards. "" 
Of course, Eden's memoirs were written after the war and during a period of 
hostility between the West and the Soviet Union. During the negotiations in 
1379 Roberts, Soviet Union, p. 66. 
1380 Letter to Daily Telegraph 14 Mar, 1939. G/3/13/9. Lloyd George Papers. 
1381 Eden, The Reckoning, pp. 55-56. 
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1939, he repeatedly expressed not only his support of an alliance after the 
announcement of the Polish guarantee, but also his belief that Moscow ought to 
be trusted. He told the House of Commons in May that he had `never been able 
to see any reason why,..., the relations of this country... and the Soviet 
Government should come into conflict. ' He explained; 
If there is one country that has surely got plenty to do at home, that 
country is Russia. One glance at the map is sufficient to show how 
immense are her territories, and to travel any part of Russia's great 
distances reinforces that conviction, that no country in the world has a 
greater need for peace. '382 
Thus, whilst Chamberlain believed Stalin's aim was to provoke war and then 
abandon Britain to fight Germany and Japan, Eden could imagine `no country 
which has less to gain from war. ""' Even by the end of July, Eden still believed 
that there was `no-where on the earth's surface any reason why these interests 
[the interests of Britain and the Soviet Union] should conflict. ""' Oliver Harvey 
similarly noted the possible security the Soviets had gained from the British 
guarantees to Poland and Rumanian. In addition, by the end of June, he 
believed `the forthcomingness of the Germans (who are working in Moscow very 
hard) are having their effect, and they are losing interest. ' Yet, he stressed, that 
there still remained `little doubt that the Soviets want agreement. "38' 
Churchill and Dalton, amongst others, stressed the mutual fear both Britain and 
the Soviet Union had of Germany. In a speech given in the House of Commons 
as early as April Churchill argued that the Soviet government were terrified of 
Nazi Germany going eastwards, and it was upon `that deep, natural, legitimate 
""Col. 1855-6.19 May, 1939.347 HC Deb 5s. 
1383 Ibid. 
138° Cols. 2035-6.31 July, 1939.350 Ibid. 
1385 Harvey, Diplomatic Diaries, p. 299.24 June, 1939. 
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interest... ' which the British government could rely on to secure an alliance. ""' 
Dalton pointed out the threat facing the Soviet Union from the East also. j387 
Thus, despite the Polish guarantee, the cessation of anti-Soviet propaganda in 
Germany and all the numerous factors pointed out by politicians, and later 
historians, as evidence of Moscow's insincerity in 1939, the anti-appeasers could 
still appreciate that, in fact, the Soviet Union remained a potential victim. That 
Chamberlain and his ministers could, and ultimately would, not realise this, led 
to the breakdown of negotiations. 
Winston Churchill articulated the thoughts of all the anti-appeasers when he 
wrote that the Soviet - German non-aggression pact marked `the culminating 
failure of British... foreign policy and diplomacy. ""' Throughout 1939, the anti- 
appeasers proved that any chance of securing a Soviet ally was lost due to the 
unwillingness of certain ministers to put aside their anti Soviet prejudices 
during the foreign policy decision making process. They did this in two ways. 
Firstly, through their own continued support for an Anglo-French-Soviet 
alliance. Secondly, through the nature of their criticism levied at the British 
government. Thus, despite continuing to hold, and even voice, their own 
negative views of the Soviet Union, the anti-appeasers maintained their support 
for Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration and by May had unified in an explicit 
demand for an alliance. Even after Molotov's demand for a clause of indirect 
aggression, the anti-appeasers continued to openly support the conclusion of an 
alliance. Some, most notably Churchill, Dalton and Lloyd George, even 
defended Moscow's justification in making such demands. The Soviet 
government's faults were acknowledged, but Soviet potential either to preserve 
1386 Brabazon to Winston Churchill 13 Apr, 1939. Cited in, Gilbert, Churchill, p. 1448; The 
Invasion of Albania. 13 Apr, 1939. ' A Speech delivered in the House of Commons. 13 Apr, 
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1311 Churchill, World War,, p. 157. 
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peace or resist aggression in the event of war, had not changed, and this 
overshadowed all other considerations. Indeed, as a result of Chamberlain's 
guarantees at the beginning of the year, securing Soviet aid had become even 
more necessary. With Hitler's aggressive ambitions now obvious and mounting 
concern about Moscow's suspicion of western sincerity, war without a Soviet 
ally appeared increasingly likely. Consequently, political excuses put forward by 
the government, especially regarding Polish opposition, were revealed to be just 
that. Despite acknowledging the differences of opinion within the Cabinet and 
what appeared to be an acceptance of Soviet proposals at the end of May, the 
politicians looked at in this chapter openly blamed the failure to secure a Soviet 
ally upon the unwillingness of the decision makers to put aside ideological 
distrust and political hostility, and they were right to do so. 
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Conclusion. 
Throughout Chamberlain's premiership the Foreign Office provided the British 
political elite with detailed and insightful information about different aspects of 
the Soviet Union. They were told that political directives dominated everything. 
In his determination to ensure absolute control, Stalin had ordered the murder 
of an untold number of his own citizens in the purges. In addition to the 
immense suffering of the Soviet people, politically oppressed and living in 
substandard conditions, the apparently indiscriminate purges undermined any 
industrial or agricultural progress. Moreover, each of the armed forces had 
been significantly weakened. The higher ranks of the military were continuing 
to be purged. Their replacements were politically loyal yet inexperienced. 
Furthermore, the equipment needed for fighting in all three services was in 
poor condition. The Red Army was capable of fighting an effective defensive 
war, and all three attaches agreed that the Soviet Union would still appear to 
others to be a formidable opponent. Added to this, from 1938 onwards, the 
attaches acknowledged that the Soviet Union was preparing for war, and would, 
sometime in the future, become an influential power. Hence, the wholly 
negative portrayals of the Soviet Union by certain individuals were not entirely 
substantiated by the facts. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that politicians 
and officials in London had received enough information to support their 
aversion to the Soviet government. 
Interestingly, therefore, it was not this information that provoked opposition 
towards Anglo-Soviet collaboration amongst ministers. All members of the 
British political elite spoke of their disgust at the internal policies of the Soviet 
government. But those who opposed Anglo-Soviet collaboration never 
explained their opposition in terms of their horror at the suffering of the Soviet 
citizens. Ministers did, on several occasions, highlight Soviet military weakness 
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when explaining their rejection of Soviet proposals. But it was not the poor 
condition of the Soviet armed forces that ultimately decided attitudes towards 
Anglo-Soviet collaboration. Two points support this assertion. Firstly, ministers 
did consider and later agree to, military collaboration with the Soviets, despite 
the fact that such apparent weaknesses still existed. Indeed, the consideration 
given to military collaboration in September 1938 and the acceptance of an 
alliance in May 1939 proves that none of the alleged structural constraints 
highlighted by those who opposed Anglo-Soviet collaboration were in fact the 
insurmountable obstacles they were portrayed to be. Secondly, ministers, 
indeed Chamberlain himself, admitted that Soviet military weakness was only 
of secondary importance. Of primary importance was anti-Soviet prejudice, 
namely ideological hostility and distrust. 
Ministers had a choice during this period. They could choose whether to ally 
with the Soviet Union or not. What influenced their decision, indeed what 
determined the attitudes towards Anglo-Soviet collaboration amongst all 
members of the British political elite, was whether they were willing to put aside 
the anti-Soviet prejudice that each held. Politicians and ministers themselves 
identified the distinction between changing and putting aside their distrust, 
and several acknowledged the influence of such a decision on their views of 
Anglo-Soviet collaboration. Moreover, the crucial influence of putting aside 
one's anti-Soviet prejudice upon attitudes towards collaboration was shown by 
the fact that perceptions of the Soviet Union amongst individuals from all 
parties remained relatively similar, whilst their opinions of collaboration 
differed, and for some, altered over time. 
There were differences in the degree of the hostility and suspicion held by 
various politicians. Clement Attlee's attitudes towards the Soviet Union were 
not, for example, as extreme as those of Winston Churchill. Nevertheless, 
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between 1937 - 1939, similar views of the Soviet Union were held by all of the 
government ministers, military experts, Foreign Office officials, and anti- 
appeasers looked at in this thesis. All opposed Stalin's totalitarian system of 
government and were horrified by its consequences for the Soviet economy, 
armed forces, and the Soviet people. More importantly, however, they shared a 
deep distrust of the Soviet government. They mistrusted Soviet foreign policy 
intentions and were suspicious of its reliability as a potential ally. Ideological 
prejudice was at the root of such distrust. All politicians and officials were 
ideologically opposed to Soviet Communism and many perceived it to be a 
formidable threat to the stability of Britain and Europe. Moscow's primary aim 
was still perceived to be Communist expansionism. The efforts of the Comintern 
to undermine the democracies during the 1920S still evoked resentment during 
Chamberlain's premiership. Indeed, much of the resentment and mistrust 
between 1937 - 1939 arose as a result of the decisions and actions of the Soviet 
government throughout the previous two decades. When the Soviets proposed 
collaboration to resist future German aggression in 1938, the response of 
ministers and politicians was decided by whether they were willing to overlook 
this ideological distrust. 
The anti - appeasers, including a number of officials within the Foreign Office, 
namely Laurence Collier and Robert Vansittart, argued against the diplomatic 
exclusion of the Soviet Union. It is unclear what form of Anglo -Soviet 
collaboration these individuals supported before Munich, but they all wanted 
the Soviet government involved in efforts to preserve peace. Winston Churchill 
and Robert Boothby called specifically for an alliance with the French and 
Soviets. Support for their position increased during the winter of 1938 - 1939, 
and, with the exception of Laurence Collier who remained vague about what 
form of collaboration he supported, by May 1939, nearly all of the anti- 
appeasers were unified in their calls for an Anglo-French-Soviet mutual 
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alliance. The support for a mutual alliance amongst the majority of these 
politicians and officials, however, remained, even after Molotov's demand for a 
clause of indirect aggression. Only Churchill, Hugh Dalton and Lloyd George, 
spoke out in defence of the demand. Others, such as Eden, clearly regretted the 
demand. However, neither Churchill, Dalton, Lloyd George, Eden, nor any 
other `anti-appeaser' now rejected the need for an alliance. 
The key to the support for an alliance amongst the anti-appeasers and several 
Foreign Office personnel was that each had a greater fear than Communist 
expansionism, and this fear persuaded them to overlook the anti - Soviet 
prejudice each held. What the anti-appeasers feared more than Communism 
was Britain being left to face an aggressive Germany without a Soviet ally. All of 
the anti-appeasers examined in this thesis, together with Vansittart and Collier, 
foresaw quite how serious Hitler's aggressive ambitions were, and implacably 
opposed the repeated concessions being made by London to appease Hitler and 
Mussolini. Inextricably linked to their realisation of the threat posed by 
Germany was the belief that Britain needed the Soviet Union as an ally. 
Dissident Conservatives, members of the Labour party, Liberals and certain 
foreign office personnel acknowledged Soviet military potential and its strategic 
significance. They knew that Britain needed the Soviet Union and the threat of 
its potential, either to preserve peace or to resist German aggression in the 
event of war. In this context, their perceptions of Germany, appeasement 
policy and Soviet potential were important influences upon their attitudes 
towards Anglo-Soviet collaboration. But these perceptions were not direct 
influences. The key determining factor as to whether politicians and officials 
supported collaboration with the Soviets, was whether they were willing to 
overlook their anti-Soviet prejudice. Perceptions of Soviet potential and of 
Germany were indirectly influential in that they effected whether one decided 
to overlook such prejudice or not. 
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Thus, for members of the Cabinet, Foreign Policy Committee and the Chiefs of 
Staff, who supported appeasement policy and whose views of Hitler also 
differed from those of the anti-appeasers, there was, during the months before 
Munich, no reason for them to overlook the ideological distrust many admitted 
dictated their opposition to Anglo-Soviet collaboration. Soviet proposals of 
cooperation to resist future German aggression were rejected. Hitler's 
aggressive and uncompromising behaviour over the Czech crisis, together with a 
genuine belief in the inevitability of war at the end of September, however, 
forced most in the Cabinet to overlook their prejudice at the end of September 
to the extent that they were, if only momentarily, willing to collaborate with the 
Soviets to resist aggression. The distrust and hostility amongst ministers and 
officials had not yet been overlooked completely. Thus, no political agreement 
was signed with the Soviets following Munich. Yet, the events of September, and 
following this, the takeover of Bohemia and Moravia in March, induced a shift 
in attitudes towards Germany. This, consequently, began to influence the extent 
to which ministers allowed their anti-Soviet prejudice to dictate foreign policy 
towards the Soviet Union. Thus, Halifax began to work to improve Anglo-Soviet 
relations, and, by the end of March 1939, several ministers and the Chiefs of 
Staff actually spoke out in favour of Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration. 
These individuals, and in particular the Chiefs of Staff, now began, like the anti- 
appeasers, Vansittart, and Collier, to appreciate the key position that the Soviet 
Union held. But changing views of Nazi Germany and an appreciation of 
Moscow's influence were not the most persuasive considerations for the military 
experts and those in government during 1939" More important was the fear of a 
German - Soviet rapprochement. Notably, amongst the anti-appeasers only 
. 
Anthony Eden and Oliver Harvey appeared concerned by rumours of a 
rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow. Concern was much more 
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widespread amongst those involved in the foreign policy decision making 
process. Indeed, when ministers were finally convinced of the possibility of a 
rapprochement in May, the majority were prepared to overlook their anti-Soviet 
prejudice completely, enough, in fact, to accept a mutual alliance. 
The exception in the Cabinet throughout was Neville Chamberlain. His views of 
Germany and hope of coming to an agreement with Hitler did not change 
significantly. Moreover, he refused to accept the possibility of a German - 
Soviet rapprochement. Consequently, and as his private writings show, he was 
never willing to suppress his personal hostility towards and distrust of the 
Soviet government, even when he appeared to agree to an alliance. Those that 
shared Chamberlain's aversion to collaboration, namely W. S. Morrison and 
Butler in the Foreign Policy Committee, and officials such as Hadow, Halford, 
Sargent and Lascelles in the Foreign Office, also rejected rumours of a German - 
Soviet rapprochement, and continued to allow their historical and ideological 
suspicion of Moscow to dictate their opinions of an alliance. 
But Chamberlain needed the support of his Cabinet. As a result, when Molotov 
demanded, and then refused to compromise on a guarantee against indirect 
aggression, the Prime Minister seized the opportunity to evoke once more the 
suspicion and resentment ministers had only managed to suppress completely 
only a few weeks earlier. With the exception of Oliver Stanley and the Chiefs of 
Staff, Chamberlain succeeded in evoking such suspicion of the Soviet 
government from his ministers because those in the Cabinet and Foreign Policy 
Committee who had supported an alliance had only done so because it appeared 
the lesser of two evils, the other being some form of collaboration between 
Berlin and Moscow. The Soviet government's demands from June onwards, 
however, seemed to confirm the prejudice that had never disappeared from the 
conscience of individuals, and an alliance no longer seemed the lesser evil. 
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Communist expansionism again appeared to be Europe's greatest threat. 
Gradually, suspicion reappeared and once more dictated the foreign policy 
decision making process regarding the Soviet Union. 
An examination of the evidence during this period shows clearly that the subject 
of Anglo-Soviet collaboration was a difficult one for anti-appeasers, civil 
servants and those in the government. It was a real struggle to suppress an 
almost inherent prejudice against the Soviet Union, and there appeared many 
reasons not to speak out in favour of closer Anglo-Soviet relations. The 
decisions and behaviour of the Kremlin itself continually undermined any 
support for collaboration. Reports from Moscow throughout Chamberlain's 
premiership, for example, highlighted the devastation inflicted by the purges 
upon the Soviet Union's economy, and, more importantly, its armed forces. 
Furthermore, during the latter weeks of the 1939 negotiations, Soviet 
representatives were perceived to be difficult and increasingly uncompromising. 
There were also issues such as political loyalty which individuals found difficult 
to overcome. It is not surprising, therefore, that of the individuals studied in 
this thesis, many made contradictory and sometimes confusing statements 
about their attitude towards Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration. 
Nevertheless, ministers, officials, and anti appeasers did have a choice and it is 
significant that on two occasions, the majority of Cabinet and Foreign Policy 
Committee considered and later agreed to an alliance with the Soviets. Indeed, 
it is precisely because these ministers and officials twice chose to overlook 
prejudice and accept the need to collaborate with the Soviets that it is 
inaccurate to wholly condemn the entire British government for the failure to 
secure a Soviet ally. Despite its critical approach, the aim of this thesis is not to 
condemn the British government. Rather, it is the contention of this thesis that 
if foreign policy decisions had been made by others in the Cabinet including 
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Hoare, Stanley, or even Chatfield and Halifax, an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance 
would have been concluded at the end of May. 
This alliance was not concluded because Neville Chamberlain deliberately 
sabotaged the opportunity by underpinning the British proposal for a mutual 
alliance at the end of May upon article 16 of the League Covenant, thereby 
confirming Moscow's suspicion of Western sincerity. Though crucial to the 
failure of the negotiations, this decision by Chamberlain was just one example 
of his determination to prevent a British commitment to the Soviet Union. 
Throughout 1938-1939, Neville Chamberlain deliberately exploited his position 
and power as Prime Minister to stop others overlooking their anti-Soviet 
prejudice, and to prevent the acceptance of Soviet proposals. Thus, he concealed 
important military evidence, deliberately misinformed his Cabinet and the 
Foreign Policy Committee, and took decisions detrimental to Anglo-Soviet 
relations without consulting others. 
Was Chamberlain therefore ultimately responsible for Britain's failure to secure 
a Soviet ally? Although this thesis is not an examination of Anglo-French-Soviet 
relations, it is necessary at this point to reflect briefly on the responsibilities of 
the French and the Soviets in the failure of the negotiations. The French 
government, for example, was also guilty of allowing its own anti-Soviet 
prejudice to dictate its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. During 1939, 
Paris was unwise to allow the British to represent and, for most of the time, 
dictate, the position of the allies in the negotiations. But the French government 
needed a British ally. Moreover, and unlike London, Paris agreed to an Anglo- 
French-Soviet alliance in April, and thereafter continued to press for the 
acceptance of Soviet proposals. Throughout the final weeks of the negotiations, 
and especially during the military negotiations in Moscow, the French decisions 
reflected a government that had put aside its ideological hostility completely, 
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and genuinely desired an Anglo-French-Soviet mutual alliance. Paris, therefore, 
cannot be held equally responsible for the failure of negotiations. 
Neither can the Soviets be held equally responsible for the failure to secure an 
alliance. As mentioned above, the Kremlin took decisions with regard to its 
internal policies during the period of Chamberlain's premiership that 
undermined its foreign policy aims of securing collaboration with the West . Its 
demands and behaviour, especially during 1939, understandably evoked 
resentment and distrust in the West. Soviet representatives were difficult and 
politicians suspected Moscow wanted to invade independent countries in the 
Baltic. Indeed, Moscow did want to take over the Baltic States in the event of 
war. But the Soviet government had throughout Chamberlain's premiership 
genuinely desired an alliance with the French and British. Its hostility and 
demands increased because of evidence of British insincerity. The Soviet Union 
needed to ensure its security in the event of war, especially if, as seemed 
possible, the West encouraged German forces eastwards. The most important 
point, as far as Britain and France should have been concerned, was that 
Moscow , until August, sincerely worked to conclude an Anglo-French-Soviet 
alliance in the hope of resisting German aggression. 
Britain was responsible for the failure to secure a Soviet ally. Ministers and 
officials were at fault because of their unwillingness, for so long, to overlook 
their distrust of the Soviet Union to the extent that they could accept Soviet 
proposals. They finally agreed to a mutual alliance in May 1939, but with the 
exception of Stanley and the Chiefs of Staff, all then chose to allow their 
prejudice to dictate once more the foreign policy decision making process 
regarding the Soviet Union during the last weeks of the negotiations. 
Nevertheless, it was Neville Chamberlain, alone, who consistently refused to 
suppress his own intense ideological suspicion and resentment. Only he 
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repeatedly rejected Soviet proposals. Consequently, it was ultimately Neville 
Chamberlain who drove away the one ally who could have made a significant 
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Appendix 
Appendix I; List of British politicians and officials. (May 1937 -August 1939). 
Cabinet 
Ernst Brown Minister of Labour 
Leslie Burgin Minister of Transport 
Minister of Supply (From Apr, 1939) 
Neville Chamberlain Prime Minister 
Duff Cooper First Lord of the Admiralty ( May, 1937- Oct, 
1938) 
Walter Elliot Secretary for Scotland 
Minister for Health (From May, 1938) 
Lord Hailsham Lord Chancellor 
Lord President of the Council (Feb - Oct, 
1938) 
Lord Edward Frederick Halifax Lord President of the Council 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (From 
Feb, 1938) 
Maurice Hankey Secretary to the Cabinet 
Sir Samuel Hoare Secretary of State for Home Affairs 
Leslie Hore Belisha Secretary of State for War 
Sir Thomas Inskip Minister for Coordination of Defence 
Secretary of State for Dominions (From Jan, 
1939) 
Malcolm MacDonald Secretary of State for Dominions 
Secretary of State for Colonies (From Jan, 
1939) 
William S. Morrison President of Board for Agriculture 
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Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (From 
Jan, 1939) 
W. Ormsby-Gore Secretary of State for Colonies 
Sir John Simon Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Lord James R. Stanhope President of Board of Education 
First Lord of the Admiralty (From Oct, 1938) 
Oliver Stanley President of the Board of Trade 
Lord Swinton Secretary of State for Air 
Lord Herbrand de la Warr Lord Privy Seal 
President of Board of Education (From Oct, 
1938) 
Kingsley Wood Minister for Health 
Marquis of Zetland 
Secretary of State for Air (From May, 1938) 
(Lawrence J. L. Dundas) Secretary of State for India 
( Lord Alfred Ernle Chatfield joined the Cabinet as Minister for Coordination of 
Defence from January, 1939). 
Foreign Office 
Richard Austin Butler 
Sir Alexander Cadogan 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs (1938 - 40) 
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs ( 1936-38) 
Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office 
(1938 - 1946) 
Henry Channon Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
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Viscount A. A. Chilston British Ambassador to Soviet Union (1933 - 
1938) 
Captain Clanchy British Royal Naval attache in Moscow 
Laurence Collier Head of the Northern Department, Foreign 
Office 
Paul Falla Junior Official in the Northern Department, 
Foreign Office 
Captain Firebrace British military attache in Moscow 
Ashton Gwatkin Economic Adviser to the Foreign Office 
Robert Hadow Junior Official in the Northern Department, 
Foreign Office 
Aubrey Halford Junior Official in the Northern Department, 
Foreign Office 
Captain Hallawell British airforce attache in Moscow 
Oliver Harvey Foreign Secretary's Private Secretary 
Sir Nevile Henderson British Ambassador to Germany 
R. Howe Junior Official in the Northern Department, 
Foreign Office 
Gladwyn Jebb Private Secretary to the Permanent Under 
Secretary, Foreign Office 
Sir William Kennard British Ambassador to Poland 
Daniel William Lascelles First Secretary in the Northern Department, 
Foreign Office 
Reginald Leeper Head of the News Department, Foreign Office 
Mason MacFarlane Britain's military attache in Berlin 
Fitzroy Maclean Third Secretary in the British Embassy 
(Moscow) 
Sir Lancelot Oliphant Deputy Under Secretary in the Foreign Office 
Sir Eric Phipps British Ambassador to France 
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Sir Orme Sargent Assistant Under Secretary of State, Foreign 
Office 
Sir William Seeds British Ambassador to Soviet Union ( From 
Jan, 1939 ) 
William Strang Head of Central Department, Foreign Office 
Sir Robert Vansittart Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office 
(1930-38) 
Chief Diplomatic Adviser to Foreign Office, 
(1938-41) 
Gregory Vereker Counsellor in the British Embassy (Moscow) 
A. Walker Junior Official in the Northern Department, 
Foreign Office 
F. A. L. Warmin Junior Official in the Northern Department, 
Foreign Office 
`Anti - Appeasers' 
Leopold Amery Conservative M. P. for Sparbrook 
Clement Attlee Leader of the Labour Party and M. P. for 
Stepney 
Robert Boothby Conservative M. P. for East Aberdeenshire 
Lord Robert Cecil President of the British League of Nations 
Union and M. P. for South Dorset 
Winston Churchill Conservative M. P. for Epsom 
Hugh Dalton Labour M. P. for Bishop Auckland 
Anthony Eden Foreign Secretary, 1935 - 38. Conservative 
M. P. for Warwick and Leamington 
David Lloyd George Liberal M. P. for Caernarfon Boroughs 
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Arthur Greenwood Deputy Leader of the Labour Party and M. P. 
for Wakefield 
Harold Macmillan Conservative M. P. for Stockport 
Harold Nicolson National Labour M. P. for West Leicester 
Archibald Sinclair Leader of the Liberals and M. P. for Caithness 
General Edward Spears National Liberal M. P. for Loughborough 
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Appendix II; Article in The Times. Dated, 15 February, 1938. FO 371 / 22288 
` PREPAREDNESS IN RUSSIA - STALIN ON DANGERS FROM ABROAD - 
VICTORY NOT YET FINAL - Moscow, Feb 14, - An important statement by M. 
Stalin on the present position of the Soviet Union was published in the Pravda 
to-day. The statement was in reply to questions put to M. Stalin by M. Ivanoff, a 
young Communist League member and propagandist in a district of the Kursk 
region. 
M. Stalin distinguished between two problems: - 
(1. ) The problem of the internal relations of out country, that is the 
problem of over-coming our own bourgeoisie and building a complete 
socialism. 
(2) The problem of the external relations of our country, that is the 
problem of fully securing our country from the dangers of armed intervention 
and restoration. 
The first problem, said M. Stalin, had been solved, for the bourgeoisie had been 
liquidated and Socialism had been built in the main. We call this (he continued) 
the victory of Socialism, or, more accurately, the victory of Socialist 
construction in a single country. Trotsky, Zinovieff, Kameneff, and other such 
gentlemen, who subsequently became the spies and agents of Fascism, denied 
the possibility of building Socialism in our country without the previous victory 
of the Socialist revolution in other countries, in the capitalist countries. These 
gentlemen in fact wanted to turn our country back to the road of bourgeois 
development while covering their apostasy with false references to "the victory 
of the revolution" in other countries. Precisely this was the subject of dispute 
between our party and these gentlemen. The further course of the development 
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of our country showed that the party was right and Trotsky and company were 
wrong. 
PROLETARIAN AID - Turning to the second problem, that of external relations, 
M. Stalin said: - But since we live not on an island but " in a system of States, " a 
considerable part of which are hostile to the land of Socialism, creating danger, 
intervention, and restoration, we say frankly and honestly that a victory of 
Socialism in our country is not yet final. But from this it follows that the second 
problem has not yet been solved and it will still have to be solved. 
It could be solved, said M. Stalin, only by joining the serious efforts of the 
international proletariat with the still more serious efforts of the whole Soviet 
people. International proletarian connexions of the working class in the 
U. S. S. R. with the working class in bourgeois countries should be strengthened 
and reinforced. Political assistance on the part of the working class of the 
bourgeois countries to the working class of our country, in the event of an 
armed attack, should be organized, just as there should be organized every 
assistance on the part of he working class of our country to the working class of 
the bourgeois countries. Our Red Army and Red Air Force should be 
strengthened and consolidated in every way. Our whole people should be kept 
in a state of mobilization and preparedness in the face of danger of an armed 
attack, so that no "accident" and no tricks of our external enemies could catch 
us unawares. ' 
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Appendix III; Memorandum by Lascelles. Enclosed in Vereker to Collier. 
14 June, 1938. FO 371 / 22288 
` The superficial similarities between the fascist system of government, on the 
one hand, and the pseudo-communist Soviet system on the other, are so 
evident, so numerous and so well - known that it would serve no useful purpose 
to enumerate them in detail. Indeed it may fairly be said that the difficulty is to 
discover important points of practical dissimilarity. Despite wide constitutional 
divergencies, both systems involve in practice the rule of a dictator invested 
with almost unlimited powers; a Government subservient not only to the 
dictator himself, but also to the political party of which he is the head; the 
elimination of all other political parties, and a concomitant ruthless suppression 
of individual liberty in every field by such means as an all-pervading censorship 
and a secret police operating largely without law; the constant use of a vast and 
strident propaganda machine; indulgence in occasional crude travesties of 
popular suffrage in the form of rigged plebiscites, or "elections" in which there 
is no choice of candidates; the piling up of colossal armaments; encouragement 
of the militarist outlook and a more or less privileged social position for the 
armed forces; the more or less complete prostitution of literature and the arts 
to the political theories of the regime, and so on. 
Contrasted with this manifold similarity of practical methods, there is of course 
a wide divergence of ostensible aims, and this divergence is regarded in some 
quarters as rendering the Soviet system at once less intrinsically detestable and 
less immediately dangerous to third parties. While, however, there can be little 
doubt that the Soviet system does constitute a less immediate danger, it is 
questionable whether this is really attributable to the existing differences of 
theory and dogma; and it is also questionable whether the intrinsic merits of the 
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Soviet system can fairly be assessed on the basis of its theoretical aims. 
It may be possible to form an estimate of the present tendencies and dangers of 
fascism by a straightforward interpretation of the public utterances of Hitler 
and Mussolini and the writings of Treitschke and others, for fascism of all 
brands appears to be comparatively outspoken in its aims and consistent in its 
development. It is, however, of little use, and indeed positively dangerous, to 
take the holy writings of Bolshevism or the public utterances of M. Stalin as 
indicative of the real aims of the Kremlin. One might as well attempt to predict 
the Vatican's policy towards fascist Italy from the Sermon on the Mount. There 
is a yawning gulf between Soviet professions of faith (both past and present) 
and Soviet practice; and, what is more important, the gulf seems to be growing 
steadily wider. In 1938 Soviet practice was in almost all respects further from 
Soviet professed ideals than at any time since the October Revolution. 
The greater honesty and frankness of fascism is indeed easily explained: its 
aggressive doctrine is not primarily intended to appeal to the outside and still 
independent world, whereas Soviet Communism is. Berlin, Rome and Tokyo 
aspire openly to expansion by force of arms: Moscow also aspires to expansion - 
the expansion of its system, and (less avowedly) of its own control over the 
system - but by a more subtle method, which necessitates the preliminary 
hoodwinking of large sections of foreign opinion. It cannot, therefore, afford the 
same degree of frankness, and in point of fact it carries hypocrisy to almost 
unbelievable lengths. 
In these circumstances a comparison of fascist and communist theory would be 
purely academic, and in practice most misleading. To say, for instance, that 
Soviet Communism, unlike Fascism, "regards politics as the art of human 
happiness", may be perfectly sound as an interpretation of official Bolshevik 
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dogma, but is of no value whatsoever as a guide to Soviet methods and policy, 
external or internal, at the present time or in the immediate and foreseeable 
future. If fascism avowedly aims at "maximising the material power or the 
nation", it must be allowed that the Soviet Government themselves have 
achieved a very considerable measure of success along these lines, and that this 
success has been achieved at a stupendous cost in terms of human happiness. 
The argument that the three principal fascist countries have, unlike the Soviet 
Union, already "maximised their material power" by means of foreign conquest, 
is only superficially true: from a relatively insignificant Russian nucleus the 
Soviet political system expanded more by force of arms than by genuine 
conversion, engulfing peoples, who had little or no wish for it and whose 
misfortune it was to lack even the protection of the Peace Treaties, since they 
had previously - and equally unwillingly - been incorporated in the old Russian 
Empire. The system has since then expanded, for all practical purposes, far 
beyond the southern confines of that Empire, Soviet influence being paramount 
in Outer Mongolia and steadily increasing in Sinkiang - two areas which 
comprise between them roughly a third of China. For that matter, the Soviet 
Government for many years did their utmost to secure control over China 
proper, and only ceased to supply their proteges with arms, money and advisers 
when it became obvious that a stale - mate had been reached. It is not any 
distaste for foreign expansion, but mere political expediency, which has so far 
prevented these and other territories from final absorption in the Soviet Union. 
Meanwhile, in the internal sphere "the art of human happiness" is cultivated by 
the Soviet Government after a fashion which differs only from fascist practice by 
an even greater ruthlessness. 
In the name of an intensely bigoted political creed a merciless war is waged on 
all forms of religion, though there can be no doubt that after twenty years of 
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persecution the bulk of the Soviet population is still deeply religious at heart. It 
may be that in this matter the Soviet authorities genuinely believe themselves to 
be acting for the best. So did Torquemada, who is not generally regarded as a 
pioneer of human progress. 
A similar ruthless cruelty is the hall-mark of the Soviet system in other spheres. 
The methods employed to enforce collectivisation on the land resulted in death 
by starvation for several million Soviet citizens. Innumerable public works, such 
as the White Sea Canal, have been and are being carried out in the Soviet Union 
with political convict labour working under conditions which only the most 
prejudiced apologist of Bolshevism could call tolerably humane. Possibly these 
works may be ultimately designed to increase human happiness, but their 
immediate object is all too evidently to "maximise the material power of the 
State. " To argue that this process is merely a defensive reaction to the fascist 
menace from without, is to ignore the chronological sequence, and also, of 
course, to beg the major question (touched upon elsewhere in this 
memorandum) of the Soviet Government's own ultimate aims. The argument 
could not, in any case, serve to excuse the senseless brutality of the methods 
employed. If Nazi Germany still believes in "the classic German doctrine of the 
State as power", it can scarcely be denied that the Kremlin has hitherto shown 
in practice a whole-hearted devotion to the same creed. Already the power of 
the State over the individual is unquestionably more absolute in the Soviet 
Union than in any of the fascist countries, and it is steadily growing. 
Parliamentary criticism of the sort still permitted in Japan would be quite 
unthinkable in the Soviet Union: the independence of thought and action 
displayed by the German clergy would be equally unthinkable in any section of 
the Soviet population (and not merely among the priesthood, towards whom the 
Soviet authorities are of course hostile in principle). Little as the ordinary 
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German or Italian citizen may have to boast of in the way of personal liberty, the 
Soviet citizen has infinitely less, and the measures taken to keep him in a state 
of blind subjection are of a thoroughness unrivalled elsewhere. In Germany and 
Italy to-day, for example, anyone can still buy foreign newspapers, though not 
all of them all the time: in the Soviet Union it is many years since any foreign 
newspaper was on sale to the public - the Soviet Government cannot afford to 
allow the Soviet citizen even this inadequate means of comparing his lot with 
that of ordinary people in other countries. Again, the discontented but not 
openly rebellious inhabitant of a fascist country can usually contrive without 
much difficulty to leave it, though he may not be allowed to take with him 
anything much besides the coat on his back. The ordinary Soviet citizen, on the 
other hand, has not the least possibility of leaving the Soviet paradise, whether 
he go naked or clothed, and those few who are sent abroad on Government 
service, or as exponents of Soviet cultural propaganda, are invariably obliged to 
leave their children or other near relatives behind them in pawn. 
By some of those who admit that the freedom of the individual is greater in 
Germany than in the Soviet Union it is nevertheless urged in extenuation of the 
latter than one should take the recent history of the two countries into account. 
The German citizen, they say, is infinitely less free not than he was thirty years 
ago, the Soviet citizen freer though far from free. The first of these two 
statements is obviously true; the second is false, and would be obviously false 
were it not for the success of the Soviet Government during the last twenty 
years in distorting the history of Tsarist Russia for their own ends. The Russia 
of thirty years ago compared of course very unfavourably with the Germany of 
that date in point of political liberality, but the Russian subject nevertheless 
enjoyed a far greater freedom than his Soviet descendant of the present day. 
Russian socialists (whose political opinions, incidentally, were expressed 
whenever possible with bombs) were, it is true, persecuted relentlessly by the 
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Tsarist police, but many political parties, including groups of more or less 
advanced liberals, were permitted to pursue their diverse aims in public and 
without molestation. Moreover the Okhrana, besides being a great deal more 
tolerant than the Ogpu, was also far less efficient and all-pervading. The same 
degree of interference in the private life of the ordinary citizen would indeed 
have been quite impossible to achieve under the old economic dispensation 
even if it had been desired by the authorities, and is equally impossible to 
achieve in the economic conditions obtaining now in fascist countries: without 
collectivisation and housing arrangements once inadequate and communal, the 
Ogpu would be shorn of half its "antennae". The greater liberality of the old 
Russian regime in the political sphere was matched by greater tolerance in 
matters of culture notwithstanding the rigours of the Tsarist censorship: if 
innovators were frowned upon and sometimes persecuted, at least they 
managed to exist to a large extent without the compulsory hospitality of the 
State and to maintain themselves in the public eye. Anyone who doubts this 
should read the works of poets like Nekrasov, as published and widely read in 
Russia long before the October Revolution, and should then try to imagine the 
fate of a Soviet poet who showed one tenth of their independence of thought. All 
this is obvious enough, and would be scarcely worth mentioning were it not for 
the fact that many apologists of the Soviet regime, in their desire to find excuse 
for its barbarities, have accepted without question the Soviet picture of pre-war 
Russia. Nothing could be more unjust. Even the ugliest side of the Tsarist 
regime - the Siberian penal system - was merciful compared to its modern 
Soviet equivalent. Political convicts, male and female, were not then obliged, as 
they now are, to work on the construction of railway lines through the bitter 
months of the Siberian winter, handling steel rails at a temperature of - 45 
centigrade; indeed the lot of the political convict under the old dispensation was 
in most parts of Siberia by no means intolerable, whereas now it is even worse 
than that of the common criminal. 
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But to return to the comparison between fascist and bolshevik tyranny: it is 
impossible to state positively whether the political subjugation of the individual, 
beside being more absolute in the Soviet Union than in fascist countries, is also 
more keenly resented; but at least it is relevant to remark that there has been 
nothing in the fascist countries that can in any way compare with the political 
purge of the Soviet Union during the last two years. That purge, which cost the 
lives of many tens of thousands of Soviet citizens and brought misery upon 
many millions, was either a manifestation of sheer sadism on a colossal scale, or 
an indication of very widespread discontent amongst all sections of the Soviet 
population. 
It is surely these positive facts, rather than the theoretical views of the Soviet 
leaders on the subject of the millennium, which should serve as a basis for the 
comparison of the intrinsic objection-ableness of the two systems. After all, the 
Soviet Union has had twenty long years (fifteen from the end of foreign 
intervention) to achieve its ostensible aims; and if material prosperity (which is 
of course a fascist ambition also) is on the increase in the Soviet Union, that 
corner stone of all true democracy, the liberty of the individual, has not only not 
increased, but is most markedly on the wane -a fact which the recent Soviet 
"elections", so called, only served to emphasise. This total suppression of the 
liberty of the individual may possibly be compatible with a genuine desire to 
achieve the goal of human happiness, but if so the point of view revealed is so 
perverse as to render the method, if not the desire itself, entirely unworthy of 
respect. 
The Soviet Government's claim that their country is "the only true democracy in 
the world", or indeed that it is a democracy at all, is thus a piece of most arrant 
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and arrogant nonsense. Somewhat less nonsensical is the argument often 
advanced by foreign sympathisers, that the Soviet Union, however 
undemocratic politically, is at least a champion of economic equalitarianism. 
Yet here again Soviet practice is steadily drifting away from Soviet theory. The 
Soviet Union's proudest boast is that it has abolished the private exploitation of 
labour. That is a true boast; but it is probable that the average Russian 
workman, if he could be made aware of the position of the workers in the 
capitalist world of Western Europe and the U. S. A., would envy them most 
heartily. He is grossly exploited, not by individual employers between whom he 
can choose and against whom he can strike, but by the State itself, against 
whom he can strike, but by the State itself, against which he is absolutely 
powerless. And the State consists in practice of a horde of Government and 
Party officials who, without being able to rival in actual wealth the old moneyed 
class, exist in conditions of luxury which are in glaring contrast to his terrible 
poverty. For in the Soviet Union political "pull" ensures almost all those things 
which money buys elsewhere. If the Soviet Party boss, enjoying a comfortable 
country house, a car, several servants and special facilities for obtaining food 
supplies, is still rather less well off than the big industrial magnates in the 
fascist countries, the ordinary Soviet worker is far less well off, in respect of 
food, housing and most other essentials, than the ordinary workers in those 
same fascist countries. The privileged existence of the one, and the sordid 
indigence of the other, are plain for all to see who live in Moscow. Moreover 
these economic class distinctions, so far from being in process of disappearance, 
are fast crystallising - inevitably so, since even quite minor representatives of 
the bureaucracy now draw salaries upwards of twenty times as large as the 
average wage of the manual worker (or over forty times the lowest wage), since 
wealth can be inherited (free of all death duties, at that! ), since the official rate 
of interest on the State loans is four per cent, and since "influence" is of 
paramount importance in almost all walks of life. It will be time to talk of Soviet 
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economic equalitarianism when the sons and daughters of prominent Party and 
Government officials are found working in the factories at the average wage for 
unskilled labour, or as peasants on the collective farms; when the percentage of 
Party and Government officials in the luxurious Black Sea sanatoria falls below 
fifty; and when the children of the "big men" in the Kremlin are educated in the 
ordinary schools. And let it not be urged that "these things take time", that the 
Soviet system has had too short a while to justify itself; for in all these things the 
retrograde tendency is unmistakable, and Russia under Stalin is markedly less 
liberal than was Russia under Lenin. Meanwhile many foreign observers of the 
Nazi and Italian fascist systems, including some of the bitterest critics, admit 
that these systems are making a genuine effort, if not to break down the existing 
occupational barriers (which indeed they encourage), at least to reduce the 
purely snobbish barriers, based on wealth and birth, that formerly separated 
one class from another. 
In only one essential respect can Soviet economic equalitarianism be said to be 
a reality: there is nothing in theory to prevent a Soviet citizen from living in 
lifelong idleness on inherited wealth, but to do so would still, in all probability, 
involve unpleasant consequences. Every citizen must at least go through the 
motions of pulling his weight, though the pretence is in some cases very 
transparent. In this respect the Soviet system undoubtedly compares favourably 
with the fascist order - and equally, of course, with our own. 
On the Social side also there a few credit items to set against the formidable list 
of debits, but the theoretical advantage is always whittled down in practice. To 
one extolling the famous Soviet "right to work" the late Lord Snowden observed 
that to the best of his knowledge there was no unemployment on Dartmoor. The 
retort contains a core of solid truth. The Soviet citizen who enjoys this right 
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(and in point of fact not all Soviet citizens enjoy it all the time) does so subject 
to the proviso that he shall work when, where and for whatever wage the 
Government may decide, otherwise he is liable to find himself without 
employment and with nothing between himself and actual starvation. Soviet 
racial policy, again, is by no means as liberal and disinterested as it professes to 
be: a short extract from a recent Chancery letter is annexed hereto by way 
amplification of this statement. The Soviet attitude in regard to the equality of 
the sexes contrasts very favourably with that of the fascist Powers, but the 
recent legislation for the encouragement of large families is a distinctly 
retrograde step towards the fascist conception of woman as a factory for the 
production of the State's requirements in human material. The foregoing are 
not the only "credit items" on the social side, but they are probably the most 
important, and it will be seen that in practice they are all subject to a very 
considerable discount. 
Comparison of the dangers which the two systems constitute to third parties, 
and in particular to the British commonwealth, is of course a separate question; 
but here also it is well to confront Soviet theory with Soviet practice.. . and to be 
guided chiefly by the latter: all the more so since even the Soviet theoreticians 
do not speak with one voice. Official Soviet spokesmen, particularly in recent 
times, have repeatedly asserted that "the Soviet Union does not covet a single 
inch of foreign soil. " Yet the vows of these same spokesmen to the cause of 
World Revolution are periodically renewed , and there can be no doubt 
whatsoever that in their view World Revolution means the ultimate rule of 
Moscow, exercised with as much ruthless thoroughness as it is even now 
exercised over the Allied Republics constituting the Soviet Union. For all 
practical purposes, therefore, the ideal of World Revolution on the Soviet model 
is an aggressive and nationalist ideal. There can be no question that the Soviet 
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authorities, no less than the fascist Powers, would in actual fact welcome the 
collapse of the British Empire at a moment of their own choosing. As suggested 
above, it is not that there are at heart any less imperialist or "expansionist" than 
the fascists: the Soviet Union is already a vast empire comprised of many 
peoples having for the most part no common ties of blood or faith, in which the 
hollow pretence of voluntary confederation fails altogether to conceal the 
despotic centralised rule of the Kremlin; and it is caution, not any disinclination 
of principle, that prevents the Soviet authorities from attempting to extent their 
dominion still further southward, from its present limit on the Pamirs, to Cape 
Comorin. The attempt would indeed probably take the outward form of 
"assistance to the toiling Indian masses in their struggle for national liberation", 
but in its essence it would be none the less an imperialist adventure for all that, 
and would be very similar in its practical results to a more straightforward act 
of aggression on fascist lines. Once incorporated in the "free brotherhood of 
Soviet people", the Allied Soviet Socialist Republics of Northern India and the 
Decan would have it no more chance of seceding than Abyssinia has of 
detaching herself from the Italian Empire, and would enjoy no greater degree of 
real autonomy in regard to fundamental economic and social questions, despite 
all superficial and constitutional appearances to the contrary. The facade would 
of course be markedly different, but the framework behind it would not. 
Meanwhile, however, caution and the avoidance of war are essential to the very 
existence of the Soviet Union. Whatever the fascist States may think of their 
ability to step at once into our imperial shoes - and it is at least questionable 
whether the Germans for their part have any illusions on that score - the 
Russians certainly do not feel able, at the present juncture, to turn a British 
collapse to their account. The Soviet Government, whatever their ideals may be, 
have as yet achieved so small a sum of real human happiness for their own 
people that they are unable to count on internal solidarity in any foreign 
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venture. Moreover they lack what is at once the principal incentive and the 
excuse of the fascist Powers - an urgent population problem. They have plenty 
of room and abundant store of raw materials. Obviously, therefore, they can 
well afford to wait; and until they are ready, any change in the existing order of 
the capitalist world is unwelcome to them, for such a change could scarcely fail 
to benefit the fascist States whom alone they really fear. The Soviet danger to 
third parties, and especially to the British Commonwealth, is in consequence 
remote compared with the fascist danger; and it may be desirable and possible 
to cooperate with the Soviet Union against the Fascists for a while. Such 
temporary cooperation, however would not result in lessening the danger 
ultimately to be feared from the Soviet Union, and might well have the effect of 
increasing it by strengthening the external position of the Soviet Government. 
The conversion of Bolshevism to methods of permanent cooperation with the 
Western democracies is not for a moment to be hoped for. It cannot be too 
strongly emphasised that if at the moment the Soviet Government fear the 
fascist Powers alone, it is the Western democracies whom they really hate. 
Though fascism so closely resembles their own system in practice, they 
nevertheless regard it as a disease which, while it may in the immediate future 
have the most serious consequences for the world in general, cannot indefinitely 
stem the tide of human progress. The Western democracies, on the other hand, 
with their slow but steady advance towards a socialist order by means of 
evolution rather than revolution, are rightly regarded by the Kremlin as rivals 
far from formidable than the fascist Powers in the long run. Herr Hitler may be 
the immediate enemy, but Sir Walter Citrine and the moderate, constitutionally 
- minded socialists are recognised as the ultimate menace to the ideal of a 
Bolshevik world-order. As a necessary consequence of M. Litvinovs avowedly 
opportunist policy of cooperation "at the present juncture", the ultimate 
aspirations of the Soviet Government towards World Revolution have been soft- 
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pedalled of late, but there is absolutely no reason to believe that these 
aspirations have been, or are likely to be, abandoned. Even if we assume - and it 
would be most rash to do so - that the present rulers of Russia have lost all 
traces of revolutionary idealism, it is quite certain that many of those whom 
they rule have not. Meanwhile the "capitalist-encirclement" is an ever - present 
nightmare to those same rulers, whatever their private ideals may be. The two 
political systems are fundamentally hostile to one another, and the Soviet 
Government undoubtedly believe that there can be no permanent security 
either for Bolshevism or for themselves so long as the capitalist world exists. 
Moreover if there has been any cooling - off of revolutionary ardour amongst 
the Soviet leaders, there has been no indication of a corresponding increase in 
devotion to purely pacifist ideals. On the contrary, there have been many signs 
of a revival of the old militarist and imperialist mentality which made of pre- 
war Russia a standing menace to the British Empire in Asia. It is sometimes 
assumed that if we are to be faced once more with a Russia dominated by 
militarist and Pan-Russian sentiment, we shall at least be rid of the Comintern 
danger by way of compensation. But this is to misunderstand altogether the 
aims of the Third International and to ignore its subservience to the Soviet 
Union as a nationalist State. There is nothing incompatible between the 
militarist and Pan-Russian mentality and the ideal of World Revolution as 
understood by the Kremlin. 
It remains to consider which of the two systems is likely to prove more 
dangerous in the long run. As already pointed out, time is on the side of 
Bolshevism, and this fact, which lessens the immediate danger of Bolshevism as 
compared with Fascism, surely makes the ultimate menace of the former by far 
the greater. Given the barest minimum of political and economic good sense - 
and so far, admittedly, there has been little of the one and not too much of the 
other - the Soviet Union, with its almost limitless resources in men, materials 
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and space, has every possibility of increasing its already formidable power 
tenfold in the course of the next few years without indulging in any foreign 
venture. But as its strength increases, so without doubt will its truculence in the 
sphere of foreign affairs. For, as already stated, it is impelled towards expansion 
both by its political creed and by its realisation of the fundamental hostility of 
the capitalist encirclement. If there is no physical reason (such as the pressure 
of a growing population) why it should not remain indefinitely within its 
present ample boundaries, there are unfortunately several cogent psychological 
reasons why it should not be content to do so. 
The fascist States, on the other hand, have time against them - hence of course 
the greater imminence of the fascist menace. If, however, they can be restrained 
by a show of firmness from launching a general attack on their neighbours 
during the next few years, there seems no fundamental reason why the danger 
which they at present constitute should not evaporate altogether. For their 
relationship to their neighbours is essentially different from the relationship of 
the Soviet Union to the rest of the world. True, they have shown every 
disposition to take what they can get wherever they can get it; but in this they 
are not so very different from their neighbours. The difference, such as it is, lies 
in the greater effrontery of their methods, their greater determination to do at 
all costs what almost all countries have as some time done and what most of 
them would do again if sufficiently tempted. If, in fact, their general 
psychological attitude does little credit to the present-day capitalist world, it is 
not fundamentally an abnormal one. Unlike the Soviet Union, they have no 
proselytizing mission behind their urge to expand nor is there any irreconcilable 
cleavage between their social system and that of the rest of the capitalist world. 
Faced with a combination of main force (which is the essence of their own 
creed) and reasonableness as regards their legitimate demands, e. g. in the 
matter of raw materials, they may yet be induced to adopt an attitude of 
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comparative good - neighbourliness and cooperation. The hope may at the 
moment seem slender enough in all conscience, but there is nothing impossible 
about it. 
With the Soviet Union it is quite otherwise. That country is sundered from all 
others by an unbridgeable gulf of dogma. If the fascist States may be likened to 
intolerably bumptious but essentially ordinary schoolboys, in whose ultimate 
conversion to respectability it is difficult for the already respectable to believe, 
the Soviet Union resembles rather a young giant of some alien, hostile and 
hated race. He does not throw his weight about much at present, for he is a 
rather sickly creature, but he is growing fast, and knows in his heart that he can 
never shake down with the rest. 
The foregoing paragraphs deal with the ultimate dangers of the two systems to 
third parties, i. e. the dangers of actual aggression, whether straightforward or 
masked. It remains to consider which of the two systems is in the meantime the 
more dangerous in the matter of propaganda. 
The fascist creed, as has been said above, is not primarily intended to appeal to 
the outside world. It is undisguisedly nationalist, and those who profess it make 
no secret of their ambition to rule such other nations as they can subdue by 
force of arms; it is founded largely on a collection of ethnological errors so crude 
as almost to rival the tenets of British Israel; and it is bitterly hostile to a race 
which is scattered throughout all countries and exceedingly influential in most. 
It is, therefore, fundamentally repellent to both the patriotism and the common 
sense of the vast bulk of the population in other countries. Such success as it has 
achieved abroad is due to a purely negative factor - to its clever exploitation of 
the general fear of Bolshevism amongst the more conservative, who regard 
Fascism as the lesser evil, and would, however little they admire it, prefer it to 
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Bolshevism in their own country and (more especially) in countries other than 
their own. 
Specifically Soviet communist propaganda has also made but little progress so 
far, at any rate in the British Empire. This is not only due to the deplorable 
object-lesson provided by the conditions actually obtaining in the Soviet Union, 
but also to the fact that Soviet propaganda, though conducted on a colossal scale 
and with no lack of material resources, is on the whole remarkably clumsy. 
Nevertheless its appeal is necessarily far wider and more insidious than that of 
the fascist doctrines, and of Nazism in particular. Its nationalist tendencies are 
carefully masked beneath the pretence of internationalism, of free federation as 
opposed to Muscovite hegemony, and consequently it is not, if taken at its face 
value, obviously incompatible with a kind of national patriotism - witness the 
attitude of the French communists. Moreover, however discouraging the picture 
presented by Soviet Russia itself, Marxian communism, which is still the official 
creed of the Soviet Union, shines forth in contrast to the Nazi doctrines as a 
sober and intellectually respectable philosophic system, and is associated in the 
minds of countless people abroad with the idea of democracy and social 
progress - for which, indeed, the Soviet Union stands in theory, though not in 
practice. The suggestion has often been made, not altogether without 
plausibility, that Marxism cannot be condemned merely because a people as 
notoriously inept as the Russians have made a mess of it; and from this it is but 
a small (though very dangerous) step to the belief that the Marxian experiment 
could be tried in other countries without involving the tutelage of Moscow. 
For all these reasons there is, as it were, a permanent clientele for more or less 
specifically Bolshevik doctrines in all foreign countries, both amongst 
intellectuals and amongst those who, without the ability to think things out for 
341 
themselves, have little cause to be satisfied with the capitalist system. This 
clientele varies in inverse proportion to the index of economic prosperity. Not 
all the "clients" condone the actions of the Soviet Government, but their ideals 
are of a kind which that Government knows only too well how to exploit. 
To sum up, then, it may be said: 
(a) that in practice, though not in theory, Bolshevism is at least as 
intrinsically worthy of detestation as fascism; 
(b) that for a number of practical reasons unconnected with its theoretical 
aims, Bolshevism constitutes the less immediate menace of the two; 
(c) that Bolshevism, which is in practice, though not avowedly, as 
aggressively nationalist as fascism, is the more dangerous and 
irreconcilable enemy in the long run; and that 
(d) Bolshevik propaganda is, and must always remain, a far more serious 
problem than its fascist counterpart. ' 
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